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ABSTRACT 
Drawing on postmodern approaches to the practice of history, this thesis 
examines the historiography of British policy towards European integration 
since 1945. Its core argument is that historians are subject to a host of 
pressures. This argument is developed through analysis of seven factors which 
have influenced the writing of British European policy. Prime amongst them is 
the influence on historical interpretation of writers' sociological background. 
The thesis examines the change in the dominant group of writers in the field 
from politicians to professional historians. It is only in that context, it explains, 
that the competing interpretations placed on British European policy can be 
understood. From here, the six other factors at work on writers are examined: 
the level of analysis writers use to explain British foreign policy, the approach 
to intentions and outcomes in the international arena, the use of hindsight and 
empathy in the writing of history, myth-making in contemporary history, the 
use of sources and the type of study written. 
The secondary argument advanced in this thesis is that the changing 
sociological context of the historiography of Britain and Europe can best be 
elucidated by mapping the writers into schools. Using the typology of 
historiographical progression set down in American Cold War historiography, 
the thesis identifies three schools of writing in the historiography of Britain and 
Europe, `orthodox', `revisionist', and `post-revisionist'. It goes on to draw 
conclusions about the nature of schools of writing in Britain, drawing 
6 
particular attention to the comparison with American foreign policy 
scholarship. 
The thesis ends by analysing two broader conclusions to emerge from the 
historiography of Britain and Europe: British historians' obsession with 
primary sources and implications for the study of the making and 
implementation of foreign policy. The conclusion also reflects on three broader 
points of interest: the relationship between questions and answers in history, 
the lack of attention in methods training courses to the process of narrative 
construction of historical texts and Britain's continuing inability to define for 
itself a place in the wider world. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This chapter introduces the philosophical framework within which this thesis 
was conceived and written. It is argued that there is too much distance, and not 
enough dialogue, between philosophers of history and the practitioners with 
whom they purport to converse. This study aims to bridge that gap by bringing 
philosophical reflection on the nature and practice of history to bear upon a 
fertile area of historical study. Historians need not fear postmodern 
reflectivism. It does not imply the end of history as a field of intellectual 
inquiry. Nor should they ignore the implications it has for the practice of 
history in Britain. Historians are, after all, in the most privileged position of all 
scholars to reflect upon their craft. Opening up channels of communication 
between philosophers and practitioners will be of massive benefit to both 
communities. Cross-fertilisation of ideas, methods and approaches will 
invigorate both fields, stimulate academic debate and advance our 
understanding of the past. 
The first section of this chapter examines postmodernism in the context of the 
methodological revolution currently sweeping through the study of history, 
politics and international relations. It argues that the study of history-writing is, 
by its very nature, postmodern, in the sense that it takes a reflective, 
interpretative approach to historical texts. How far one can go in determining 
all the influences on historical interpretation- notably publishing pressures- is, 
however, still open to debate. The second section demonstrates the scope that 
exists for dialogue among philosophers and practitioners by arguing that one 
can find plenty of postmodern theorists who offer a position which is 
constructive enough to admit that historical `facts' exist. At the same time, and 
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this is the crucial point, the historian needs to be methodologically and 
epistemologically aware enough not to treat those `facts' unreflectively. The 
foundations will thus be laid for the next chapter, which considers the method 
of research employed in the thesis and the argument it advances. 
1. Postmodern History and the Methodological Revolution 
`A major issue of debate among contemporary historiographical theorists is the 
difficulty of maintaining a position that is "constructivist" enough to recognise 
the unavoidable intrusion of point of view, implicit theory, and interpretive 
tropes in the production of "history", but "realist" enough to ascribe actual 
truth value to some historical accounts. [Hayden] White has not accomplished 
this feat, though he has committed himself to it'. 1 
Ian Lustick's disdainful verdict on White's philosophy bears witness to the 
scepticism with which critical theory has traditionally been greeted by 
historians. They either leap like Richard Evans to the `defence of history', 2 or 
dismiss reflectivist approaches as passing distractions from the scholarly 
process of narrating what happened in the past using the evidence left to us in 
1 Ian Lustick, `History, Historiography and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and 
the Problem of Selection Bias', American Political Science Review, 90,3 (1996), pp. 605-18 
(p. 613). E. H. Can likewise worried that one is put in a difficult situation when one analyses the 
relationship between the historian and his or her facts, `navigating delicately between the Scylla 
of an untenable theory of history as an objective compilation of facts... and the Charybdis of an 
equally untenable theory of history as the subjective product of the mind'. See What is History?, 
2°d edn. (London: Penguin, 1990), p. 29- 
2 Richard J. Evans, In Defence of History (London: Granta, 1997). Postmodern ideas, warned 
Arthur Marwick in 1988, are a `menace to serious historical study'. See Arthur Marwick, `Two 
Approaches to Historical Study: The Metaphysical (Including "Postmodernism") and the 
Historical', Journal of Contemporary History, 30,1 (1995), pp. 5-35 (p. 5). 
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the present. As Geoffrey Elton put it: `a philosophic concern with such 
problems as the reality of historical knowledge or the nature of historical 
thought only hinders the practice of history'. 3 
The epistemological tenets of postmodernism have unfortunately been sullied 
by far-right groups who have pressed the analytical insights of reflectivism to 
its limits by questioning that the Holocaust ever occurred. 4 This use of 
postmodernism, John Gaddis argues, 5 as `an instrument of politics', is a 
`Whorfian kind of relativism' which undermines the practical advantages 
which can accrue from the methodological revolution the human sciences are 
currently witnessing. 6 To argue that the Holocaust revisionists reflect `the 
postmodern intellectual climate' is to confuse propaganda with critical 
3 Geoffrey Elton, The Practice of History (London: Methuen, 1967), preface p. 7. On p. 57 he 
was less kind, calling the concern with interpretation `pernicious nonsense'. The `practice of 
history' to which he refers is the positivist approach which assumes `there is... a truth to be 
discovered if only we can find it'. See p. 54. See also Geoffrey Elton, Return to Essentials 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The acknowledged architect of positivism was 
Leopold von Ranke whose recommendation was that we should endeavour `to show things how 
they actually were'. Quoted in John Tosh, The Pursuit of History, 3rd edn. (London: Longman, 
2000), p. 5. There is a succinct summary of the positivist conception of history in Georg G. 
Iggers, Historiography: From Scientific Objectivity to the Postmodern Challenge (Hanover. 
Weslyan University Press, 1997), pp. 3-5, and in Beverley Southgate, History: What and Why?: 
Ancient. Modern and PostmodernPerspectives (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 13-22. Evans 
notes that it is an oversimplification to ignore the reflectivism in Ranke's work, in Defence of 
History, op. cit., p. 17. But it is fair to judge the continuing allure of Ranke's method of 
historical research to British historians in the context of his assiduous use of primary sources. 
See Max Beloff, An Historian in the Twentieth Century: Chapters in Intellectual Autobiography 
(London: Yale University Press, 1992). 
4 Their approach is summarised in Evans, In Defence of History, op. cit., pp. 238-40. David 
Howarth is also alert to the `relativistic nihilism' which, he argues, makes the very label 
`something of a misnomer'. See ` Discourse Theory', in David Marsh and Gerry Stoker (eds. ), 
Theory and Meth ds in Political Science (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), pp. 115-33 (p. 116). 
Alex Callinicos also discusses the Holocaust-related dimension of postmodernism in Theori 
and Narratives: Reflections on the Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), pp. 66-75. 
See also Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p. 13; Charlotte Watkins Smith, Carl Becker: On 
History and the Climate of Opinion (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1956), pp. 109-10. 
S John Lewis Gaddis, `The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold 
War', Diplomatic History, 7,3 (1983), pp. 171-90 (p. 189). 
6 Hayden White, The Content of the Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation 
(London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1992), p. 187. 
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scholarship. 7 Attempting to reconstruct the past is a difficult, complicated 
process involving narrative reconstruction and imaginative leaps of faith to 
recreate causal chains of events. 8 It has long been recognised that history- 
writing is not neutral or innocent, that is always written by someone for 
someone, but the misleading connotation that postmodernism naturally results 
in an `anything goes' interpretation of history fatally overlooks the constructive 
impact reflectivism can have on the practice of history. 9 
It is an impact that historians have too often overlooked, but something 
historiography can remedy, as Robert Holub points out: `Why a given work or 
author becomes famous, how that fame is perpetuated over periods of time, 
what factors increase or diminish a reputation- all of these questions involve 
the historian as much as the sociologist or psychologist'. 10 The gap between 
practice and theory can be bridged by promoting dialogue between the 
practitioners of history, and postmodern philosophers of history. `This', 
Michael Bentley notes, `is the environment in which historiography has moved 
7 Evans, In Defence of History, op. cit., p. 241. An example of the misunderstanding from which 
White regularly suffers is to be found in Colin Wight, `Meta Campbell: The Epistemological 
Problematics of Perspectivism', Review of International Studies 25,2 (1999), pp. 311-6. 
Selectively quoting throughout he erroneously assumes that White sees no value at all in using 
historical facts as the basis of narrative reconstruction. David Campbell responds in the next 
article `Wight is greatly confused about White on the status of the historical record'. See David 
Campbell, `Contra Wight: The Errors of Premature Writing', Review of International Studies, 
25,2 (1999), pp. 317-21 (p. 319). 
8 This study employs Lawrence Stone's definition of `narrative': `the organisation of material in 
a chronologically sequential order and the focusing of the content into a single coherent story, 
albeit with sub-plots'. Quoted in Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 45. 
9 This term is taken from Southgate, History op. cit., p. 133. It is also used, erroneously, to 
describe the postmodern position in Raymond A. Morrow and David D. Brown, Critical Theory 
and Methodology (London: Sage, 1994), preface, p. 13. 
10 Robert C. Holub, Reception Theory: A Critical Introduction (London: Methuen, 1984), p. 47. 
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to centre-stage'. 1 Contrary to the argument of Jeremy Black who asserts that 
`Postmodernist perspectives... are of scant value to those for whom 
[historiographical] studies are intended', 12 this thesis argues that 
postmodernism, historical philosophy and historiography are locked in a 
symbiotic relationship based on both reflectivism and interpretivism. 
The label `postmodernism' is commonly attached to methods of approaching 
academic study which call into question `the [scientific] claims that originally 
inspired the Enlightenment project'. 13 `Postmodernist de-differentiation', 
remarks Scott Lash, ` puts chaos, flimsiness, and instability in our experience of 
reality itself'. 14 Feminist theories are paving the way for assessments of the 
workings of the international system that depart from overbearing patriarchal 
norms (a focus on `men' as the most influential or only players). 15 Post- 
colonial and neo-Marxist approaches are shifting the focus in international 
relations from core to periphery states. 16 Consideration of the kinds of 
11 Michael Bentley, Modem Historiography: An Introduction London: Routledge, 1999), 
preface p. 9. 
12 Jeremy Black, review, `A Little Local Difficulty: The Pursuit of History. By John Tosh; The 
Routledge Companion to Historical Studies. By Alan Munslow; The Past and its Presenters: An Introduction to Issues in Historiography. By John Warren', Times Higher Education 
Supplement: Textbook Guide, 25 February 2000, p. 3. 13 Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, op. cit., p. 3. 14 Scott Lash, The Sociology of Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 1990), p. 15. 15 Nancy Fraser and Linda Nicholson, `Social Criticism without Philosophy: An Encounter 
between Feminism and Postmodernism', in Thomas Docherty (ed. ), Postmodernism: A Reader (London: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1993), pp. 415-32'; Jan Jindy Pettman, `Gender Issues', in 
John Baylis and Steve Smith (eds. ), The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to 
International relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 483-93; J. Ann Tickner, 
Gender in International Relations: Feminist Perspectives on Achieving Global Security (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1992); Joni Lovenduski, Women and European Politics: 
Contemporary Feminism and Public Policy (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 
1986). 
16 Eric Hobsbawm and Terry Ranger (eds. ), The Invention of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983); Ashis Nandy, Traditions. Tyrannies and Utopias (New Delhi: Oxford 
University Press, 1987). 
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knowledge one can discover about history are not immune from this challenge 
to our conception of the international system. In the context of foreign policy 
analysis there is a growing awareness that to study foreign policy is not just to 
study `what the Foreign Office does', it is to establish multiple chains of 
causation and webs of interaction in Whitehall, Downing Street, British culture 
and society and the world at large. This suggests that to conceive of 
`diplomatic history' as the study of `the preoccupations of political leaders'" is 
being eroded as the field of `international relations' expands to include 
`international studies' and thus the study of previously neglected actors on the 
political stage. Feminist and post-colonial methods are `natural allies' of 
postmodernism in the process of epistemological reflection, '8 because they 
increase awareness that history needs also to account not only for `the 
perspectives... of decision-makers but of those who are outside positions of 
power yet can present an equally plausible representation of reality'. '9 
`History, the individual self, the relation of language to its referents and of 
texts to other texts- these are some of the notions which', Linda Hutcheon 
observes, `at various moments, have appeared as "natural" or 
unproblematically common-sensical. And these are what get interrogated by 
" Brian White, `Diplomacy', in Baylis and Smith (eds. ), The Globalisation of World Politics, 
op. cit., pp. 249-62 (p. 253). 
I Lyon, Post modernity op. cit., p. 80. 19 Tickner, Gender in International Relations, op. cit., p. 132. 
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postmodernism'. 20 The complementary approaches to the study of international 
relations identified above, Beverley Southgate observes, `can be seen to 
confirm and contribute to the crisis of postmodernity'. 21 Postmodern 
reflections on history highlight the intrinsic individuality of all narrative 
reconstructions and alert us to the key role of the historian in shaping the 
events he or she describes. As Carl Lorenz put it: `it is the historian, not the 
past, which does the dictating in history'. 22 There is concurrently a move to 
uncover the array of governmental and publishing constraints on the 
historiography in addition to the relatively ostensible sociological, political and 
methodological inputs. Such is the individuality of each historical narrative, 
the postmodernist might argue, surely there is more to reveal about the history- 
writing process than social connections, political orientation, method of 
research and sources? For example, Black is convinced that there is more to 
learn in this context. No historiographic study to date, he argues, `offers a 
serious discussion of the role of publishers and the nature of the pressures 
affecting publication'. 23 This study finds that there have been moments when 
historians' language and interpretation have been affected by publishers. John 
Young, for one, has revealed that he was asked by his publishers to 
20 Linda Hutcheon, A Poetics of Postmodernism: History Theory Fiction (London: Routledge, 
1998), preface p. 13. See also Terri Apter, `Expert Witness: Who Controls the Psychologist's 
Narrative? ', in Ruthellen Josselson (ed. ), Ethics and Process in the Narrative Study of Lives 
(London: Sage, 1996), pp. 22-44 (p. 42). All the contributors to this volume focus on the 
distinction that needs to made between the observer and the observed. Of special interest to this 
thesis is Scott W. Webster, ` A Historian's Perspective on Interviewing', pp. 187-206. 21 Southgate, History, op. cit., p. 98. See also Regina U. Gramer, `On Poststructuralisms, 
Revisionisms and Cold Wars', Diplomatic History, 19,3 (1995), pp. 515-24 (p. 517). 22 Quoted in Keith Jenkins, `Introduction: On Being Open About Our Closures', in Keith 
Jenkins (ed. ), The Postmodern History Reader (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 1-30 (p. 18). 
23 Black, review, `A Little Local Difficulty', op. cit., p. 3. 
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`tone... down' his `sabotage' thesis on key individuals in 1955-6.24 It can 
therefore be argued that `in the practical world the demands of editors and 
tenure committees also need to be kept in mind'. 25 
Adding to the growing awareness of the impact of publishing pressures on 
historical interpretation is Ludmilla Jordanova who argues that patronage 
remains a crucial determinant of academic career-building and publishing. 
Moreover, `Publishers develop market niches and their choices have a 
considerable impact on the content of what is published, especially on how 
books are used within the educational system'. 26 The historiographer can 
legitimately ask the questions: are certain publishing houses constrained only 
to publish the conventional wisdom? Is historiographic progression extant on 
the major publishing houses, to the detriment of smaller, innovative houses? 
Do authors with `radical' backgrounds or interpretations find it hard to gain 
publishing contracts? The final question brings to mind Donald Maclean's 
book on post-Suez British foreign policy which has some innovative comment 
on British European policy at a time when the conventional wisdom was 
historiographically dominant. 27 Is it because of his `discredited' background 
that he has generally been ignored? The Economist's verdict on Maclean is 
enlightening: `Donald Maclean is about as unlikely an author for a serious 
24 Email correspondence with John Young. Permission received to quote this message of 10 
February 1999. See also Phil Baty, who discusses the pressures on academics from publishers, 
particularly in government-sponsored projects, in `Labour Policy Poses Threat to Freedom', 
Times Higher Education Supplement, 31 March 2000, p_ 1. 
25 Alan C. Elms, Uncovering Lives: The Uneasy Alliance of Biography and PsXchology (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 22. 
26 Ludmilla Jordanova, History in Practice (London: Arnold, 2000), pp. 16-8. 
27 Donald Maclean, British Foreign Policy Since Suez 1956-1968 (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1970). 
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study of British foreign policy as Mr Ronald Biggs would be for a survey of the 
criminal investigation department'. Amusing indeed, but it overshadows the 
reviewer's surprise at Maclean's `oddly impersonal style', and the seriousness 
with which his work should in fact be taken. 28 
Such points about `outsiders' and `insiders' are inextricably linked to the 
process of historiographical evolution, who gets published, when and how the 
process of publishing can inhibit certain interpretations from emerging at a 
particular time. But before one approaches the complex relationship between 
publisher and author, there is much to discover about the writing of 
contemporary history. As Holub argues: `The editorial policies of publishing 
houses or the selections of libraries may very well have some impact on the 
development of theory, but they are never enough to determine impact' 
. 
21 It is 
the texts that have been of a priori importance to historiographic development. 
For this reason this thesis concentrates on the sociological, political and 
theoretical links among the writers it scrutinises, from the start-point of 
White's epistemological problematic which investigates the problem of 
historical knowledge and how it is constructed. 30 
28 `Through a Spyglass Darkly', Economist, 7 May 1970, p. 47. 
29 Holub, Reception Theory, op. cit., pp. 34-5. See also Zara Steiner, `The Historian and the 
Foreign Office', in Christopher Hill and Pamela Beshoff (eds. ), Two Worlds of International 
Relations- Academics Practitioners and the Trade in Ideas (London: Routledge, 1994), pp. 40- 
53 (p. 40). 
30 This work is less concerned with White's narrative theory, for which he is better known in the 
fields of philosophy and literary studies. Anyway, all of this stems from his overarching concern 
with epistemology, and can be considered an adjunct to the concerns of this thesis. 
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2. Postmodernism and the `Facts' of History 
There are certainly plenty of postmodern theorists who give us the mechanics 
for a finely balanced postmodern approach to history which is reflective 
enough to promote methodological rigour, innovation and experimentation but 
`realist' enough to admit that there are historical events to be reconstructed. 3' 
Southgate makes this point well: `if some belief is maintained in an external 
reality- a social, political, economic, cultural reality, which may owe much to 
its linguistic portrayals but is ultimately independent of them- then some goal 
remains for historical investigation; and it remains possible in principle to 
aspire to some understanding of that actual independent existing past. '32 Iggers 
concurs that, on a `weaker' reading, postmodernism can remain constructive 
enough to appeal to historians because it `still assumes that real people had real 
thoughts and feelings that led to real actions that, within limits, can be known 
and reconstructed'. 33 The postmodern approach to history is `not an academic 
witch-hunt'34 designed to invalidate the study of the past from various 
31 Keith Jenkins puts postmodern theorists into five categories according to their distinct 
outlooks. For the purposes of simplicity I have not distinguished in the thesis between 
categories of postmodern historian, choosing to reflect on their broad agreement that `history' 
as we conventionally study it needs to be reassessed in the light of postmodern reflection. See 
Keith Jenkins, ` Introduction', op. cit., pp. 21-5. Key works include Joyce Appleby, Lynne Hunt 
and Margaret Jacob, Telling the Truth About History (London: W. W. Norton, 1994); Iggers, 
Historiography, op. cit.; Keith Jenkins, On `What is History? ': Carr and Elton to Rorty and 
White (London: Routledge, 1995); Southgate, History op. cit. Earlier manifestations of this 
approach include Carl L. Becker, `What is Historiography? ', in Phil L. Snyder (ed. ), 
Detachment and the Writing of History: Essays and Letters of Carl L. Becker (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1958), pp. 65-78; John Cannon, The Historian at Work (London: George Allen 
and Unwin, 1980); Michael Stanford, The Nature of Historical Knowledge (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1986). 
32 Southgate, History, op 
. 
cit., p. 124. 33 Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p. 119. 34 Southgate, History, op 
. 
cit., p. 7. 
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viewpoints, but an attempt to expose the limits to existing methods and a guide 
to how one can analyse events in a sharper, more sophisticated fashion. 
White, it must be remembered, did not deny the existence of historical `facts' 
but warned against complacency in using those facts unreflectively. 35 Keith 
Jenkins restates White's case most aptly: `Nobody is denying... that the actual 
past occurred. However, the facts that now constitute that now absent past and 
which get into representations have clearly been extracted from the now extant 
"traces of the past" and combined through inference by historians into 
synthetic accounts that mere reference back to the facts as such could never 
entail'. 36 Postmodern historians are sceptical about the ability of historians to 
uncover exactly what happened in the past but do not deny the importance of 
trying. `It is hardly surprising', argues Callinicos, `that contemporary 
scepticism about historical knowledge should focus on the fact that historians 
work on texts to produce other texts'. 37 
History-writing in this context is displaced from the lonely Eltonian world of 
dry `facts' and 'truths', 38 into a world in which historians constantly interact 
with each other and with the individuals whose motives they now attempt to 
3s As Martin Jay observes, White takes care to distinguish between `the facts or events of history' and `their narrative representation'. Quoted in Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. 
cit., p. 73. 
36 Jenkins, ` Introduction', op. cit., p. 19. See also Alan Munslow who observes that `historians 
do not invent events, people or processes', in Deconstructing History (London: Routledge, 
1997), p. 11; Jenkins, On 'What is History? ', op. cit., p. 29. 37 Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 65. 38 See also G. M. Trevelyan who argued that `the chief value of history is educative, its effect 
on the mind of the historical student, and on the mind of the public', a quote which sheds light 
on the individuality with which historical research is often undertaken, as if it is good for one's 
intellectual development, but little else. See G. M. Trevelyan, An Autobiography and Other 
E_ ssavs (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1949), p. 57. 
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reconstruct. Southgate's comparison of the historian with the farmer ploughing 
`a solitary furrow' in the field of evidence reflects how British historians 
approach their subject. Postmodernism opens up the field for dialogue which is 
crucial to the advancement of historical understanding, particularly if one 
accepts that history is a social as much as theoretical and factual construction. 
If one embraces postmodernism, and to continue Southgate's metaphor, `at 
least now fertilisation can result in a more luxuriant crop, and enjoyment can 
be attained from harvesting'. 39 Alan Munslow also suggests that pluralism is to 
be enjoyed: `Historiography well illustrates this eruption in our knowledge of 
the past, as well as our irruption into it. Not only is there more history, but 
historians agree on it less'. 40 Lucien Febvre took the same line in 1933: 
`Given? No, created by the historian, so many times. Invented and fabricated, 
with the aid of hypotheses and conjectures, by a delicate and fascinating 
labour'. 4' The postmodern study of history reveals a moving, challenging, 
changing and emotive intellectual environment, one which is deconstructive 
yet maintains belief in an external historical reality. 
Georg Iggers elucidates this tenet of White's philosophy. `There is', he writes, 
`a difference between a theory that denies any claim to reality in historical 
accounts and a historiography that is fully conscious of the complexity of 
historical knowledge but still assumes that real people had real thoughts and 
feelings that led to real actions that, within limits, can be known and 
39 Southgate, His tory, op. cit., p. 131. 
40 Munslow, Deconstructing History, op. cit., p. 16. 
41 Quoted in Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 75. See also Jenkins, On `What is 
History? ', op. cit., p. 29. 
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reconstructed'. 42 This study associates historiography explicitly with White's 
epistemological problematic, arguing that the study of the art of history-writing 
is centrally concerned with the kinds of knowledge one can know about the 
past, and how to represent it. Historiography, notes Holub, substitutes `for the 
objective depiction of events and individuals the history of their becoming 
events and individuals for us'. 43 
It subjects what Neil Winn refers to as an `emerging historical literature744 on 
Britain's relationship with Europe since 1945 to the historiographical test, 
analysing what lays behind the interpretations placed upon events by the 
various authors and what, therefore, explains historiographical evolution in 
Britain. Its core argument is that there are multiple forces at work on the 
construction of historical narratives and that each writer asserts his or her own 
explanation for British European policy. Paradoxically, however, it is the acute 
diversity of historical narratives which makes this such a revealing corpus of 
literature. For, despite the apparent eclecticism in the-literature, writers can be 
placed into schools- labelled for simplicity `orthodox', `revisionist' and `post- 
revisionist'- according to the interpretation they place upon the main events in 
British European policy. 45 The schools are divided on social, political and 
methodological grounds, all of which are intricately bound up with the date of 
writing and type of study produced. Before investigating the dynamics of the 
42 Iggers, Hlistorigravhv, op. cit., p. 1 19. 43 Holub, Reception Theory, op. cit., p-49- 
44 Neil Winn, review, `Dealing with Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to the EEC. 
By N. Piers Ludlow', Journal of Common Market Studie_s 36,2 (1998), pp. 283-4 (p. 284). 
4s These labels are not, it is shown, intended to denote intense ideological conflict as in 
American Cold War scholarship, but merely chronological progression in the historiography. 
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schools, it is necessary to analyse the intellectual underpinnings of the thesis. 
The next chapter explores the method of research used, and introduces the 
principal and secondary arguments advanced in the thesis. 
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Chapter 1 
METHOD AND ARGUMENT 
This thesis is not an historical account of Britain's relationship with the 
continent. By contrast, it explains how the morass of historical evidence has 
been manipulated by politicians and historians into competing accounts of 
British European policy, 1945-73. It was stimulated by the observation that 
every year the number of publications on Britain's relationship with Europe 
rapidly expanded and with it the variety of interpretations placed upon the key 
events. Why do writers disagree with some in a given field but not others. Is it 
their method, their sources, the genre of study they write, their political 
affiliation, or their sociological links? What makes these questions even more 
striking is that, in an academic era when the form of studies (method and 
research designs) have become as salient as substance (content and strength of 
argument), there exists little if any commentary at the beginning of the books 
or articles to inform the reader how the author had conducted his or her 
research. 
This chapter will build on the philosophical framework of the thesis, discussed 
in the previous chapter. It will do this by analysing in greater detail the method 
of research employed in the thesis, and then introduce the primary and 
secondary arguments developed in the remainder of the study. To achieve these 
aims, the chapter is split into five sections. The first considers the nature of 
historiography, drawing out its postmodern dimensions by defining it as the 
study of the art of history-writing as well as the process of history-writing per 
se, and goes on to compare the approach employed in this study with that taken 
by Cold War historiographers in the United States. It points out the rationale 
behind the labels used to describe each school of writing, `orthodox', 
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`revisionist' and `post-revisionist'. They are used, it shows, to denote the 
chronology in the scholarship, a time-line, rather than to convey the political 
content often associated with them. The opening section then reflects upon the 
empirical and theoretical value of approaching historical texts from a 
historiographical viewpoint. It argues that historiography is an acutely 
revealing exercise because it offers the chance not just of thinking more 
critically about the practice of history but of uncovering fresh historical 
evidence. The second section continues to explain the method employed in the 
thesis by analysing why it is that the focus is on the literature on Britain's 
relations with Europe, 1945-73. It shows that on both the theoretical and 
practical levels this is an ideal corpus of literature to analyse, not least because 
it can inform current political and academic thinking about Britain's place in 
the world and approach to European integration. 
The third section examines two alternative approaches to the identification of 
schools of writing, other than the thematic approach adopted in the thesis: the 
levels of analysis and institutional approaches. It argues that, while they have 
some strengths, and a strong intellectual coherence in many respects, they do 
not provide a better method of schoolification than the grouping of writers 
according to their position within the key debates about Britain and Europe. 
This is because to raise the a priori significance of theoretical approach or 
institutional affiliation is to overstate the importance of these variables at the 
expense of other inputs to interpretation. Hence, it is shown, the more 
conventional historiographic method of inferring influences on writers from 
their published interpretation allows one to explore the potential variables 
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more efficiently. The fourth section introduces the argument advanced in the 
thesis, introducing the reader to the six main influences on historical 
interpretation identified in the chapters that follow. In order of importance they 
are analysed as follows: the social construction of the schools, competing 
views about the foreign policy process, perceptions of intentions and outcomes 
in British foreign policy, the use of hindsight, myth-making in contemporary 
history, the use of sources. The concluding remarks in this chapter highlight 
the salience of the seventh variable, the type of study written in determining 
writers' positions within the debate, tying up all the observations previously 
made about how historians approach their material. 
1. The Historiographic Method of `Schoolification' 
`Every history', remarks Munslow, `contains ideas or theories about the nature 
of change and continuity as held by historians- some are overt, others deeply 
buried, and some just poorly formulated'. ' John Tosh is another who observes 
that historians `are not given much to reflecting at length on the nature of their 
discipline'. 2 Rod Rhodes recently confirmed this sense of methodological 
malaise which the social sciences are only belatedly addressing: `Our forebears 
in political science were not preoccupied with methodology. Not for them the 
lengthy digression on how to do it'. 3 This thesis directly addresses this issue, 
' Munslow, Deconstructing History, op. cit., p. 5. 2 Tosh, The Pursuit of History, op. cit., p. 215. 3 R. A. W. Rhodes, `The Institutional Approach', in Marsh and Stoker (eds. ), Theory and 
Methods, op. cit., pp. 42-57 (p. 42). Callinicos also remarks on the vagueness of historians' use 
of theory in their research. See Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 91. 
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offering a `lengthy digression' into the philosophical and methodological 
tenets of the thesis. It begins with the choice of method. 
Historiography is crucially concerned with the nature of historical narrativity, 
how histories are constructed, interpretations developed and positions 
challenged by successive waves of writers. It is defined by Peter Burke as the 
`history of historical writing... This awakening of interest in history's own past 
goes with an increased self-consciousness on the part of historians, and a 
rejection of the idea that they can produce an "objective" description, 
uncontaminated by their own attitudes and values, of what actually happened'. 4 
Written well over twenty years ago this definition is especially pertinent given 
the current appeal of postmodernism. 
The reflectivist nature of historiography suggests that there is a great deal to 
recommend Frank Ankersmit's claim that `historiography, remarkably enough, 
has always had something postmodernist about it'. 5 The aim of history is to 
recreate what happened in the past using fragmentary evidence left to us about 
those events, what Elton calls the `present traces of the past'. 6 The aim of 
historiography, the study of the art of history-writing, is to scrutinise the 
purveyors of historical knowledge, to tease out the processes by which writers 
draw conclusions about historical phenomena. As White argues, `It is because 
4 Peter Burke, definition in Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass (eds. ), The Fontana Dictionary 
of Modem Thought (London: Collins, 1977), p. 286. 
S F. R. Ankersmit, `Historiography and Postmodernism', History and Theory, 28,2 (1989), 
pp. 137-53 (p. 141). He took up this point in F. R. Ankersnt, `Reply to Professor Zagorin', 
History and Theory, 29,3 (1990), pp275-96. 
6 Elton, The Practice of History, op, cit., p. 9. 
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real events do not offer themselves as stories that their narrativisation is so 
difficult... Historiography is an especially good ground on which to consider 
the nature of narration and narrativity because it is here that our desire for the 
imaginary, the possible must contest with imperatives of the real, the actual'. 7 
He has been joined by writers such as Joyce Appleby, Lynne Hunt and 
Margaret Jacob, who observe that a reflective approach to history-writing alerts 
us `to how the different perspectives of historians enter into their books'. ' 
Iggers likewise notes that `every historical account is a construct, but a 
construct arising from a dialogue between the historian and the past, one that 
does not occur in a vacuum but within a community of inquiring minds who 
share criteria of plausibility'. 9 The historiographer begins with the assumption 
that there is no `transparently true and theoretically neutral historical record'. io 
One can reasonably argue, therefore, that the historiographic method arms us 
with the sharpest intellectual tools for analysing the changes in historical 
interpretation over time. 
The wish to `schoolify' writers stemmed from the discovery in the United 
States that the historiography of the Cold War had been driven by successive 
schools of writing which were extant on the political climate of opinion, 
different communities of writers and on the examination of `newly 
White, The Content of the Form, op. cit., p. 4. 
B Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, Telling the Truth About History, op. cit., p. 246. 
9 Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p. 145. 1° Lustick, `History, Historiography, and Political Science', op. cit., p. 613. 
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declassified' sources. " The Vietnam war shocked a whole generation which 
looked back to reinterpret the origins and development of the Cold War in the 
context of its disillusionment with American `imperialism'. 12 Not surprisingly 
the New Left `school of thought' harboured a different interpretation from the 
received wisdom of the political right which essentially blamed Russia for the 
onset of superpower tensions. Gaddis himself proposed a post-revisionist 
synthesis of the two explanations, all of which have since been challenged by 
corporatist and neo-orthodox accounts. ' 3 
This study employs the chronology but not the specific political implications of 
the labels `orthodox', `revisionist' and `post-revisionist'. These have been 
coined for convenience, to denote the chronological progression in the 
historiography, not because the British schools reflect the intensely politicised 
schools in American Cold War scholarship. The term `revisionism' has 
connotations in other fields of inquiry, as the association of David Irving with 
" The use of the word `school' is important because it predates this study's use of the term to 
describe a community of writers who adhere, with variation on specifics, to a broad 
interpretation of a given event or period of events in history. Despite the occasional dissenting 
voice, the school is a generally accepted term in American Cold War historiography to denote 
the successive waves of writing in the field. See Gaddis, `The Emerging Post-Revisionist 
Synthesis', op. cit., p. 171; J. Samuel Walker, `Historians and Cold War Origins: The New 
Consensus', in Gerald K. Haines and J. Samuel Walker (eds. ), American Foreign Relations: A 
Historiographical Review (London: Francis Pinter, 1981), pp. 207-36; Gramer, `On 
Poststructuralisms', op. cit.; Richard A. Melanson, Writing History and Making Policy: The 
Cold War. Vietnam and Revisionism Volume 6 (London: Lanham, 1986). The major dissenter 
is Warren Kimball, who disagrees that historical writing can be categorised in schools. He 
argues that the term artificially suppresses disagreement amongst writers in the same camp. See 
Lloyd C. Gardner, Lawrence S. Kaplan, Warren F. Kimball and Bruce, R. Kuniholm, 
`Responses to John Lewis Gaddis, "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of 
7,3 (1983), pp. 191-204 (p. 198). the Cold War"', Diplomatic History 
12 Gaddis, ` The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis', op. cit., p. 172. 
13 John Lewis Gaddis, `Corporatism: A Skeptical View', Diplomatic History. 10,4 (1986), 
pp. 356-62; Michael J. Hogan, `Corporatism: A Positive Appraisal', Diplomatic History, 10,4 
(1986), pp. 363-72. See also Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron- Harry S. Truman and the 
Origins of the National Securi1y State. 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998). 
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`Holocaust revisionists' shows. Again, such implications are eschewed in this 
thesis. The term `revisionism' is used to denote the body of writing that 
followed, a response to the `orthodoxy', and which has now been followed by 
`post-revisionism'. 
Until more appropriate labels can be found, one must not shy away from using 
these names to identify the schools. This is a particularly persuasive argument 
when one considers that the terms are often accepted to show not political, but 
chronological progression in historical debate. Alan Bullock defines 
`revisionism' as a `tendency in American historiography in the 1960s and early 
1970s to rewrite the history of the Cold War and shift blame for it onto the 
USA. This trend was strongly reinforced by the faults and failure of US policy 
in Vietnam... The revisionists' attack on the orthodox version of US post-war 
policy represents the second stage in the historiography of the Cold War. This 
in turn has been succeeded by a third stage [post-revisionism] which offers a 
more balanced appreciation of the complexities of the situation in the 1940s 
and represents a synthesis of the first two'. 14 Chris Cook also captures the 
chronological progression in schools of writing in the Dictionary of Historical 
Terms. He defines revisionist historians as those `who overturn a generally 
accepted view of historical events in the light of new evidence and modified 
interpretation'. 15 In the context of British historiography the term `revisionism' 
needs to be understood in the framework implied by Bullock and now 
14 Bullock, definition, in Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass (eds. ), The Fontana Dictionary of 
Modern Thought (London: Collins, 1977), p. 542. 
'S Chris Cook, A Dictionary of Historical Terms, 3'a edn. (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), 
p. 310. 
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articulated by Cook. 
Figure 1: Directions in Western Historiography 
Ultra-Reflectivism 
Advances in historical interpretation crucially dependent 
on politics, method, sociology, publishers' pressure, 
editorial input. Sources: secondary plus more interviews 
with academics, publishers and editors. 
DEPTH OF 
INQUIRY 
British Model of Historiographical Progression 
Advances in historical interpretation crucially dependent 
on social and generational changes. Bound up with this 
are political and source-based inputs. Sources: secondary 
text analysis 
American Model of Historiographical Progression 
Advances in historical interpretation most crucially 
dependent on politics, but also on sociological and 
source-based inputs. Sources: secondary text analysis 
The research design for this study develops Gaddis' method of 
historiographical reconstruction, labelled above the `American Model of 
Historiographical Progression'. While the method of research was similar, the 
conclusions drawn are quite different, as Figure 1 shows. What can be labelled 
the `British Model of Historiographical Progression' has, it can be seen, to take 
more account of the sociological, rather than political, inputs to the writing of 
history. 16 The figure also sets out the potential for this approach to 
16 One can speculate on the reasons for this. The crucial point appears to be that there has been 
greater post-war consensus in the foreign policy arena in Britain. Though this is a controversial 
statement if one looks at points of detail, in general terms, and especially in the European arena, 
it is a judgment not without merit. Thus, this study argues, new historical interpretations have 
tended to coincide with changes in the communities of writers dominant in the field at particular 
times. 
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historiographic analysis to uncover even more personal, low-level inputs to 
writers' interpretations. It is an area that has yet to receive detailed attention, 
yet one which might highlight a whole new set of influences on the writing of 
history. 
Before that, however, the rationale behind Gaddis' method of grouping writers 
in schools according to their interpretation needs to be explored, because it 
provides the benchmark by which this method has to be judged. The case 
against identifying schools in Cold War scholarship has been made by Warren 
Kimball. He took issue with Gaddis on the grounds that to `lump' writers 
together in schools `suggests that he sees a high degree of unity' among them, 
which is not borne out by the evidence of substantial disagreements among 
writers, particularly of the New Left. " Is it not artificial to locate writers who 
sometimes disagree heatedly with each other in the same school? 
The case against was also made in an anonymous referee's report on an article, 
by this author, which schoolified the literature on Britain's Free Trade Area 
proposal in 1956. It divided the literature into the three categories pursued in 
this thesis: orthodox, revisionist and post-revisionist. The referee put the case 
as follows: `Miriam Camps alone proves the article's own methodology wrong: 
proper historical research on British European policy cannot be classified into 
schools, at least not in the categories the author suggests'. 18 In both the United 
States and Britain, therefore, there is a groundswell of opinion that writers are 
17 
.. 
- 
'-. 
_.. 
. 
... _. ... .- __.. varuner, &apian, xunuall anci xumhoun, -xesponses', op. cit., p. ivn. 
'a Referee's report on draft article, 'The Myth of Sabotage: Plan G in British European Policy, 
1955-7'. Received 11 October 1999. 
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all too different, their interpretations so individual, that to group them together 
brings unwarranted simplicity to a diverse field of historical inquiry that one 
should rejoice in, not gloss over. 
Yet the schoolification of writers is no artificial exercise. Writers were not 
placed into schools for the sake of it, or to suit a preordained conviction that 
British historiography was evolutionarily similar to that across the Atlantic. It 
would have been convenient had there not been schools. One could have drawn 
conclusions about the deep differences between the academic communities in 
Britain and America. It could have trumpeted the genuine interpretative 
eclecticism of British historians, their methodological experimentalism, their 
ability to recreate the past in a bewildering number of ways. This contrast 
between the two communities of scholars could have been explained first by 
the absence of an equivalent trauma to the Vietnam war in Britain which so 
influenced the political and historical outlook of an entire generation. The 
relationship between Britain and Europe might be turbulent. It is, however, 
relatively less conflictual compared to the heated debate over Vietnam. Hence, 
it is unlikely that debates over Britain's relationship with the continent would 
impel `normally placid professors to behave like gladiators at scholarly 
meetings' as occurred in the United States on more than one occasion. 19 The 
study might, secondly, have uncovered few links among writers on Britain and 
Europe for the very reason that the European question tends to spark as deep 
19 Gaddis, ` The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis', op. cit., p. 171. 
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intra- as inter-party debate, 20 suggesting broad consensus on broad questions of 
foreign policy and on the European question in particular. 21 As Michael Clarke 
suggests, `Ideology is always difficult to translate into action, and foreign 
policy is an area which time and again blunts ideological fervour in favour of a 
more cautious pragmatism'. 22 The parties of government, Labour and 
Conservative, have historically been equally split over Europe and, historians 
find, it is hard to label one more sympathetic to European unity than the other. 
One must to wait to see whether the current Conservative stance on Europe 
represents a decisive and long-lasting division on Europe between the two 
main parties in Britain. The litmus test of William Hague's rhetoric will come 
if and when the Conservatives are returned to power. 
Contrary to the argument that it is impossible to schoolify British historians, 
20 That the `Britain in Europe' campaign is currently spearheaded by a cross-party selection of 
dignitaries is evidence to this end. Earlier examples include the applications to join the EEC in 
the 1961 and 1967 which were made by the Conservatives then Labour respectively, suggesting 
`a degree of continuity across changes in office'. Stephen George, Politics and Policy, op cit., 
p. 112. See also George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit., pp. 5-41; Christopher Lord, `Sovereign 
or Confused: The "Great Debate" About British Entry to the European Community 20 Years 
On', Journal of Common Market Studies, 30,4 (1992), pp. 419-36; A. J. Nicholls, `Britain and 
the EC: The Historical Background', in Simon Bulmer, Stephen George and Andrew Scott 
(eds. ), The UK and EC Membership Evaluated (London: Pinter, 1992), pp. 3-9. 
21 `Consensus', Kavanagh and Morris note, `does not mean absence of conflict' between parties. 
`It is more appropriate to think of it as a set of parameters which bounded the set of policy 
options regarded by senior politicians and civil servants'. In Dennis Kavanagh and Peter 
Morris, Consensus Politics From Attlee to Major, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), p. 13. 
Emphasis in original. See also Pimlott, Frustrate Their Knavish Tricks: Writings on Biography, 
History and Politics (London: HarperCollins, 1994), p. 232; Richard H. Ullman, `America, 
Britain, and the Soviet Threat in Historical and Present Perspective', in Wm. Roger Louis and 
Hedley Bull (eds. ), The Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 103-14 (pp. 104-5). 
22 Michael Clarke, `The Policy-Making Process', in Smith, Smith and White (eds), British 
Foreign Policy Tradition. Change and Transformation (London: Hyman, 1988), pp. 71-95 
(p. 84). Consensus has also been observed in the arena of defence policy since 1945, highlighting 
the broader argument that the post-war era has been characterised by bipartisan agreement in 
many key areas of government activity. See Tony McGrew, `Security and Order: The Military 
Dimension', in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, op- 
cit., pp. 99-123 (p. 114). See also Richard Little, `The Study of British Foreign Policy', in Smith, 
Smith and White (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 245-59 (p. 245). 
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this study finds that one can identify a certain degree of debate within schools 
and interpretative overlap across them. But schools nevertheless exist. It rejects 
Kimball's claim that the term `school' implies rigid adherence to a monolithic 
interpretation of events. To do this the thesis uses the term in the sense in 
which Gaddis and other Cold War historiographers use the term, 23 uses which 
have been replicated in other contexts. For example, Martin Hollis and Steve 
Smith use the term to define competing theories of international relations. 
They observe that `International Relations at the start of the 1990s is... a subject 
in dispute. There is no dominant theory. Instead, there are several schools, each 
with its own set of assumptions and theories'. 24 Derek Urwin uses the term to 
describe the competing theoretical approaches to European integration. 25 
Elsewhere, Moses Finley separates the division of interpretations over 
Thucydides' method into 'schools. 26 One would not expect individuals in such 
schools to adhere to exactly the same interpretations. The term is flexible 
enough to incorporate specific instances of disagreement among its members 
while suggesting a shared assumption that the interpretation, and by 
23 Gaddis, `The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis', op. cit., p. 172; Hogan, `Corporatism', 
op. cit., p. 372; Lawrence S. Kaplan, `Review Essay: The Cold War and European Revisionism', 
Diplomatic History, 11,2 (1987), pp. 143-56(p. 155); Brian McKercher, `Reaching for the Brass 
Ring: The Recent Historiography of American Interwar Relations', Diplomatic History, 15,4 
(1991), pp. 565-98 (p. 567); Walker, Historians and Cold War Origins', op. cit., p. 224. For 
`school', the terms `approach' and `understanding' are sometimes used, but the implication is 
the same, that writers agree on broad interpretation if not specifics. See Grainer, 'On 
Poststructuralisms', op, cit., pp. 517-9; Melanson, Writing History and Making Policy, op. cit., 
p. 7; Jerald A. Combs, `Review Essay: Norman Graebner and the Realist View of American 
Diplomatic History', Diplomatic History. 11,3 (1987), pp. 251-64 (p. 253). 
24 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International relations (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 38. Emphasis added. 
2$ Derek Urwin, review, `The Origins and Development of the European Union 1945-95: A 
History of European integration. By M. J. Dedman', Journal of Common Market Studies. 35,1 
(1997), p. 170. 
26 See his introductory remarks in Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, 2" edn. 
(London: Guild, 1993), p. 12. 
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implication the methods, epistemological and ontological underpinnings, of the 
opposing school is flawed. 
But the question remains: why study the published interpretation of writers as 
opposed to their oral testimony? This is a question Gaddis did not take time to 
answer but it is profitable to consider because it addresses the legitimate 
concern that there can be a divergence between published interpretation and 
private belief To answer this one must refer to the interpretationist philosophy 
of William Child. 27 He argues that it is built on the presupposition that 
`reflection on the nature of interpretation can yield conclusions about the 
nature of thought'. 28 Interpretationism, he explains, is the `ascription of beliefs 
and desires to a subject' not `the ascription of meanings to a subject's words'. 29 
Herein lies the philosophical justification of the historiographic method 
employed in the thesis. It is crucially concerned with interpretation and what 
this reveals about the nature of historical practice and thinking in Britain. The 
reason published interpretation is the historiographer's data, is that it is written 
interpretation that drives the historiographic process. It is monographs, edited 
volumes, articles and reviews which are the public exposure of a particular 
writer's stance on events, whatever his or her stance privately. It is the textual 
27 William Child, Interpretation. Causality and the Mind (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 
28 Ibid., p. 13. 
29 Ibid., p. 4. The process of interpretation, he goes on, happens `on the basis of publicly 
available facts about a subject's behaviour... When we interpret someone, we aim to make sense 
of her by attributing beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions and other propositional attitudes- 
attitudes in the light of which her behaviour is intelligible as, more or less, rational action. 
Interpretationists think that we can gain an understanding of the nature of the mental by 
reflecting on the nature of interpretation. '. See p. 7. 
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debate, the arguments in books and journals that drive historians into the 
archives looking for new evidence, that prompt them into using new methods 
of exploring historical occurrences. The thesis assumes, therefore, that one can 
ascribe interpretation to inner belief, even if this link is occasionally not there 
in practice. 
When published interpretation departs from private belief one moves into the 
difficult territory of which account- private or published- to believe? 30 It can be 
argued against Child, though his project is psychological not historiographic, 
that one does not need to know `everything that someone could find relevant in 
interpreting a subject' to understand historiographical progression. 31 His 
interpretationist prescriptions have therefore been adapted to suit the particular 
demands of understanding historiographical progression. As Child admits, `the 
information that provides the basis for interpretation can only include what is, 
or in ordinary circumstances could be, available to the ordinary observer; it 
cannot, for example, include information about goings on in a subject's brain 
or nervous system'. 32 The historiographic method employed in the thesis thus 
concentrates on the published interpretation of writers and assumes that one 
can draw inferences based on the weight of evidence- even if causal links are 
more problematic- about what impelled writers to interpret the history of 
Britain and Europe as they did. 
30 The interpretation placed on events in Lord Beloff's Britain and the European Union: 
Dialogue of the Deaf (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996) seemed to contradict what he privately 
thought about Britain's European partners in interview, 15 April, 1998. 31 Child, Interpretation. Causality and the Mind, op. cit., p. 26. 
32 Ibid., p. 25. 
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By speaking both to theorists and to historians this thesis is a first wave attempt 
to cross the divide between postmodern theories of history and the practical 
pursuit of history. By taking a full reading of White, " the discipline of 
historiography can be constructive enough to admit the existence of historical 
`truths', but reflective enough to maintain that the `truth' for one writer is not 
necessarily the `truth' for another. This is similar to the position of Jose y 
Gasset Ortega who argues that `the world can only be interpreted by alternative 
systems of concepts, each unique and equally true'. 34 This approach is 
philosophically justified in interpretationist terms and practically justified in 
the context of the importance to historiography of the written over the spoken 
words of historians. Such is the theoretical value of this study. 
There are two further empirical reasons why a historiographical thesis is so 
useful. They may not be as pressing as the theoretical reasons given above, but 
are nonetheless important offshoots of all historiographical studies. The first is 
that historiographies are a significant source of bibliographic data for 
historians and political scientists. This is largely self-explanatory in that by 
analysing the state of the historical debate at a particular juncture 
historiographical studies reveal all the major works in the field. By establishing 
links among writers, historiographies contextualise the key debates and open 
up the subject-matter for analysis by researchers in other fields. 
33 As opposed to the nihilist, `anything-goes' approach of writers such as Wight and Evans. 
34 Quoted in Wight, `Meta Campbell', op. cit., p. 314. 
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This is particularly important in the context of political science. There is a 
debate, principally in the United States, about the relationship between 
`history' and `political science', the conventional wisdom being that the two 
are divided down an ideographic-nomothetic faultline, or what Jack Snyder 
calls `richness and rigour'. 35 Anthony Forster summed up the distinction in a 
recent review article in which he stated `This is more than a matter of 
semantics with the major controversy over how political science and history 
study international relations. The key differences concern the aspiration to 
prediction, policy relevance, complexity versus simplicity, and whether 
scholars should seek to understand single events rather than generalise about 
classes of events'. 36 Historians, the received wisdom goes, describe, political 
scientists explain. To use another analogy, historians are the plankton, political 
35 That is, a division in aims between understanding the particular and explaining the general. 
See Elms, Uncovering Lives, op. cit., pp. 15-6; Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman, 
`Diplomatic History and International Relations Theory: Respecting Differences and Crossing 
Boundaries', International Security, 22,1 (1997), pp. 5-21 (p. 11); Jack S. Levy, `Too Important 
to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the Study of International Relations', 
International Security, 22,1 (1997), pp. 22-33 (p. 24). 
36 Anthony Forster, `No Entry: Britain and the EEC in the 1960s', Contemporary British 
History, 12,2 (1998), pp. 139-46 (pp. 139-40). See also Anne Deighton, `The Cold War in 
Europe, 1945-1947: Three Approaches', in Ngaire Woods (ed. ), Explaining International 
Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 81-97 (p. 89); Richard H. 
Immerman, `In Search of History- and Relevancy: Breaking Through the Encrustations of 
"Interpretation"', Diplomatic History, 12,2 (1988), pp. 341-56 (p. 342). This debate is not 
without its precedent in Britain. In 1975 Alan Bullock and Ritchie Ovendale were vigorously 
engaged in 1975 about the alleged separation of the two disciplines, following a remark made by 
Ovendale about Frankel's `social science' text which, he found, was `of more limited value to 
the historical scholar'. See R. Ovendale, review, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973. By Joseph 
Frankel', International Affairs. 51,4 (1975), pp. 574-5 (p. 575). `Correspondence' ensued 
between the two in International Affairs 52,2 (1976), p. 329. See also Colin Seymour-Ure's 
observation that political scientists have a `preoccupation with the contemporary' which 
obscures their relevance to historical literature in his review, `Cabinet Decisions on Foreign 
Policy: The British Experience October 1938 June 1941. By Christopher Hill', International 
Affars. 68,1 (1992), p. 170. Another diplomatic historian, John Kent, is similarly disparaging 
about the `crude theorising' of historical events. See John Kent, review, `The End of 
Superpower: British Foreign Office Conceptions of a Changing World. By Stuart Croft', 
Contemporary Record, 9,2 (1995), pp. 477-9 (p. 478). 
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scientists the whale, devouring historical research in a bid to generalist about 
the workings of domestic and international political systems. In addition, 
political scientists, like social scientists, are as interested in developing method 
as answering the substantive question. They are as keen, maybe more keen, to 
build an elaborate theoretical apparatus, as to process material through it. Such 
are said to be the distinctions between the historian and the political scientist. 
The distinction between the disciplines can be exaggerated, as the contributors 
to a 1997 International Security symposium demonstrated, 37 and it is necessary 
to dwell on the methodological similarities across history and political science. 
Particularly significant is the implicit use of theory made by historians, theories 
that inform and are informed by shared ways of thinking with political 
scientists about how to study international relations. 38 That theories remain 
implicit should not blind us to their use by historians. The scope for dialogue 
and cross-fertilisation across the disciplines is therefore immense. 
The crux is, however, that political scientists often rely heavily on historical 
accounts as data for their theory-building. With this in mind, Lustick observes 
that `On most periods and themes of interest available accounts differ, not only 
substantively but also with respect to the implicit theories and conceptual 
37 International Security, 2,1 (1997). Especially useful are Paul W. Schroeder, 'History and 
International Relations Theory: Not Use or Abuse, bit Fit or Misfit', International Security, 22, 
1 (1997), pp. 64-74 (pp. 65-6). For earlier queries of the separation see Carr, What is History?, 
op. cit., pp. 63-5; Elton, The Practice of History, op. cit., pp. 10-11; Dennis Kavanagh, `Why 
Political Science Needs History', Political Studies, 39 (1991), pp. 479-95. 
38 Particularly revealing about such theories are the sources used by each, for they tell us much 
about how contentious terms such as `decline', `foreign policy', `diplomacy' and `statecraft' are 
defined and measured. See also Smith and Smith, `The Analytical Background', op. cit., pp. 22- 
3. 
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frameworks used to establish salience or produce commonsensical 
explanations. Un-selfconscious use of historical monographs thus easily results 
in selection bias... [Rjesponsible techniques for using historical sources are 
available, but they require understanding of the extent to which patterns within 
historiography, rather than "History", must be the direct focus of investigation 
and explanation'. 39 Historiographies guide research in the areas on which they 
focus, by highlighting lacunae and pointing out potentially fruitful alternative 
methods and theories that could by utilised to advance historical 
understanding. Exploring the variety of interpretations placed upon history 
helps refine theories built on historical narratives. For example, there have 
been several explicit attempts to explain the workings of the Whitehall 
machinery and it is an implicit goal of studies of British foreign policy- 
making. 40 Historical evidence about relationships within Whitehall between 
individuals, bureaucracies, Committees, Cabinet members and all external 
contacts is crucial to our understanding of the foreign policy process. 
Theories, it may be argued, are most representative when they include the 
biggest sample of data. Building comprehensive theories about the workings of 
the Whitehall machine are inextricably linked to the progression in historical 
understanding, as new sources reveal previously hidden influences at work on 
39 Lustick, `History, Historiography, and Political Science', op. cit., p. 605. 
ao The most thorough is William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain 2"d edn. 
(London: RIIA, 1977). See also James Barber, Who Makes British Foreign Policy? (Milton 
Keynes: The Open University Press, 1976); Sir James Cable, ` Foreign Policy Making: Planning 
or Reflex? ', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 3,3 (1992), pp. 357-81; Joseph Frankel, British Foreign 
Policy 1945-1973 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); Roy E. Jones, The Changing 
Structure of British Foreign Policy (London: Longman, 1974); David Sanders, Losing an 
Empire. Finding a Role: British Foreign Policy Since 1945 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); 
David Vital, The Making of British Foreign Policy (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1971). 
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the making of British foreign policy. Being alert to the historiographical origins 
of interpretations of the decision-making process is of great help to the 
political scientist who wants to avoid `selection bias', defined by David Collier 
as `occurring when the nonrandom selection of cases results in inferences, 
based on the resulting sample, that are not statistically representative'. 41 
Historiographies are valuable in this respect because they elucidate the relevant 
books in the area and analyse the relationship between competing 
interpretations. It is sometimes said that the political scientist needs to be a 
better historian than the historian, in the sense that theory lives and dies by its 
factual base. Historiography can help strengthen the empirical grounding of 
political science theories because of the mass of information they contain 
about alternative approaches and histories to consult. Armed with a 
comprehensive historiography the political scientist need not carry out 
historical research him or herself, that is, be a better historian than the 
historian. He or she will have a good guide to all the available literature in a 
single work on which to draw as necessary. In such a way alternative sources 
or methods can be discussed to ease the way for dialogue with others in the 
field and cross-fertilisation of knowledge across disciplines. 
There is an additional dimension to consider when discussing the theoretical 
and empirical benefits of historiography. 
41 Quoted in Lustick, `History, Historiography, and Political Science', op. cit., p. 606. 
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Figure 2: The Relationship Between Historians, Political Scientists and 
Policy-Makers 
Historians 
Political Policy-Makers 
Scientists 
It might be argued on one hand, that policy-makers do not or would be unwise 
to use `history' to inform policy. Harold Macmillan was convinced that 
`history does not repeat itself . 42 Lord Beloff concurred that `the "lessons of 
history" cannot be applied in any simple or mechanical fashion... All one can 
hope to have are suggestions and intimations that set the imagination 
working'. 43 Evans likewise argued that `Time and again history has proved a 
very bad predictor of future events. This is because history never repeats itself; 
nothing in human society, the main concern of the historian, ever happens 
twice under exactly the same conditions or in exactly the same way'. 44 These 
are prescient illustrations of the ideographic-nomothetic distinction that 
characterises the conventional separation of history from political science and, 
by extension, theory. 45 
42 Quoted in Richard Lamb, The Macmillan Years 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth (London: 
John Murray, 1995), p. 65. 
43 Beloff, An Historian in the Twentieth Century, op. cit., p. 129. 
44 Evans, In Defence of History, op. cit., p. 59. 
as In a recent article scrutinising the pervasiveness of social theory in academic discourse, Frank 
Webster draws no attention at all to the relationship between history and theory: `social theory 
draws upon an enormous body of material, pulling together philosophers, sociologists, literary 
critics, anthropologists, even the occasional economist'. It is as if history has nothing to say to 
theorists at all. See Frank Webster, review, `Harnessing the Rampant Theory: Theorising 
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On the other hand, it has been found that policy-makers, like political 
scientists, use history for a variety of reasons and in a number of ways. The 
above diagram shows that the links between the two groups of academics are 
stronger than their respective relationship to policy-makers, 46 but the use of 
history by policy-makers, however inept or simplified, should not be 
overlooked. 47 This is best illustrated by referring to the work of Dan Reiter and 
Richard Neustadt and Ernest May. 48 Reiter found using quantitative data on the 
alliance politics of `minor powers' in the twentieth century that `states make 
alliance policy in accordance with lessons drawn from formative historical 
experiences 49 
Neustadt and May found that policy-makers can be `taught' to use history as an 
analytical framework in which to develop more appropriate responses to 
foreign and domestic problems. Their argument stemmed from the observation 
that a host of American Presidents have used history systematically, if 
Classical Sociology. By Larry J. Rey; Social Theory in the Twentieth Century. By Patrick 
Baert; Social Theory and Modernity. By Nigel Dodd; Social Theory: A Historical Introduction. 
By Alex Callinicos; The Blackwell Reader in Contemporary Social Theory. By Andrew Elliott 
(ed. ); Contemporary Social and Political Theory: An Introduction. By Fidelma Ashe et al', 
Times Higher Education Supplement: Textbook Guide, 25 February 2000, p. 23. 46 Melanson concluded that `Those who write history and those who make policy will probably 
remain locked in their reciprocal, but frustrating relationship'. Melanson, Writing History and 
Making Policy, op. cit., p. 226. 47Turning it round, Foucault argues, one cannot discount intellectuals from `political 
responsibilities which he is obliged willy-nilly to accept'. Paul Rainbow (ed. ), The Foucault 
Reader: An Introduction to Foucault's Thought (London: Penguin, 1991), p. 72. 
4$ Dan Reiter, `Learning, Realism and Alliances: The Weight of the Shadow of the Past', World 
Politics, 46,4 (1994), pp. 490-526; Richard C. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in Time: 
The Uses of Histo. ry for Decision-Makers (New York: The Free Press, 1986). Bruce Kuklick 
also drew conclusions about learning from history in American Policy and the Division of 
Germany: The Clash with Russia over Reparations (London: Cornell University Press, 1972). 
See also Melanson, Writing History, op. cit., pp. 4-6. 
49 Reiter, `Learning, Realism and Alliances', op. cit., p. 490. 
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inappropriately to draw `fuzzy analogies' about current problems. 50 There have 
been no comparable studies in Britain- 51 But the history of European relations 
in the 1950s suggests that policy-makers were hesitant about joining 
supranational integration not just for dogmatic or ideological reasons. They 
were concerned about the recent past of potential partners, their political, 
military and social stability. Confirming Neustadt and May's findings, 
Christopher Lord argues that `Decision-makers will tend to appraise new 
situations in the light of lessons drawn from previous experiences'. 52 In short, 
the weight of history loomed large in their thinking: why throw in Britain's lot 
with countries which had so recently been overrun in the Second World War? 53 
5o Neustadt and May, Thinking in Time, op. cit., pp. 32-3. See also John J. Mearsheimer, ` Back 
to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War', International Security, 15,1 (1990), 
pp. 5-56 (p. 9). He argues that `views on the future of Europe are shaped by [policy-makers') 
implicit preference for one theory of international relations over another'. 51 The nearest in terms of weight of evidence (and conclusions) are Christopher Hill, `The 
Historical Background: Past and Present in British Foreign Policy', in Smith, Smith and White 
(eds. ), British Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 24-49. See also Christopher Lord, British Entry to the 
European Community Under the Heath Government of 1970-4 (Aldershot: Gower, 1985), pp-3- 
8; Little, `The Study of British Foreign Policy', op. cit.; Steiner, ` The Historian and the Foreign 
Office', op. cit., pp. 45-9. 
52 Lord, British Entry to the European Community, op. cit., p. 7. Examination of the official 
record has reinforced the view that simplifying historical analogies permeated Whitehall thinking 
and led to Britain's ultimate withdrawal (or exclusion) from the founding of the EEC. See 
Simon Burgess and Geoffrey Edwards, `The Six Plus One: British Policy-Making and the 
Question of European Economic Integration, 1955', International Affairs, 64,3 (1988), pp. 393- 
413 (pp. 396-7); Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe. Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European 
Integration 1945-63 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), p. 42; Richard Lamb, The Failure of the 
Eden Government (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1987), p. 68; N. Piers Ludlow, Dealing with 
Britain: The Six and the First UK Application to Join the EEC (Cambridge University Press, 
1997), p. 19; John Turner, Macmillan (London: Longman, 1994), p. 97; John W. Young, "'The 
Parting of Ways"?: Britain, the Messina Conference and the Spaak Committee, June-December 
1955', in Michael Dockrill and John W. Young (eds. ), British Foreign Policy. 1945-56 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 197-224 (p. 199). 53 An equally prominent doubt in Whitehall, about whether there was sufficient political will on 
the continent to succeed, turned on whether the Six could unite on economic grounds given the 
historical protectionism of the French. `Britain and Europe's "Third Chance"', Economist, 19 
November 1955, pp. 633-4 (p. 633); Elisabeth Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe 1945-1970 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 151; Michael Charlton, The Price of Victory (London: BBC, 1983), p. 165; Roy Denman, Missed Chances: Britain and Europe in the 
Twentieth Century (London: Cassell, 1996), p. 194; George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit., 
p. 26; Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories: The Conservative 
Party Since 1945 (London: Fourth Estate, 1997), p. 99; Northedge, British ForeigLi Policy, op. 
cit., p. 166; Sked and Cook, Post-War Britain, op. cit., p. 148. 
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Nicholas Ridley made the unfortunate comment in July 1990 that `I'm not 
against giving up sovereignty in principle, but not to this lot. You might as well 
give it up to Adolf Hitler'. 54 Further examples include Ernest Bevin's 
comparison of the Soviet Foreign Minister to Hitler in 1946,55 and Harold 
Wilson's resistance to devaluation in the late 1960s. 56 Observations about 
policy-makers learning from history are summed up by David Sanders' 
observation that many British foreign policy-makers since the 1930s have used 
a `simplified' structural-realist model to inform foreign policy decision- 
making. 57 Hence, there is strong evidence to suggest that policy-makers do use 
history as a readily accessible model, a font of experience from which to draw 
analogies about current predicaments. 
In this context, historiography has a fundamental role to play because it 
sharpens the intellectual tools available to policy-makers in their quest for a 
reliable historical model. When they consider the range of historical 
interpretations placed on the past they would be well advised to consult a 
historiographical study offering the entire range of interpretations. That would 
add nuance and subtlety to their thinking and the model they decide to use. 
That in the above diagram the relationship between academics and policy- 
54 Quoted in Colin Pilkington, Britain in the European Union Today (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1995), p. 99. 55 Alan Bullock, Ernest Bevin (London Heinemann, 1983), pp. 132-4. 
56 It was, one biographer observed, an `article of faith' traceable back to his days as President of 
the Board of Trade during the devaluation crisis of 1947. Austen Morgan, Harold Wilson (London: Pluto, 1992), p. 266. 57 Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., p. 265. He also remarks on Eden's `long-standing 
determination to avoid repeating the errors of "appeasement" after 1945. See p. 276, and 
Steiner, `The Historian and the Foreign Office', op. cit., pp. 48-9. See also D. R Thorpe's 
reference to the impact of Suez on London's reaction to the Cuban missile crisis, in Alec 
Douglas-Home (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996), p. 239. 
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makers is denoted by a relatively thin line shows the problems of promoting 
such historical awareness in practitioners. While possible in theory it is 
unlikely that policy-makers will develop the habit of using academic studies to 
frame policy choices. The situation is changing, a trend identified by Hill when 
he wrote that `The relationship between academics and policy practitioners has 
become steadily more significant over the course of this century '. 58 There are, 
moreover, examples of academics explicitly influencing policy direction. 59 
Politicians are, however, constrained by time and resources, often preferring 
official histories written hastily in response to particular problems, rather than 
dense academic tracts which would develop their thinking along the lines 
suggested by Neustadt and May, 60 thus their scepticism that academic 
perspective will ever feature highly in political thinking. 61 Until further study 
of learning from history is carried out in Britain, and unless academics wish to 
compromise the intellectual content of their studies to appeal to policy-makers 
(which is unlikely), there are only limited possibilities for developing closer 
links between the academic and political communities in Britain. 
This should not detract from the overall argument advanced in this section. On 
58 Christopher Hill, `Academic International Relations: The Siren Song of Policy Relevance', in 
Hill and Beshoff(eds. ), Two Worlds of International Relations, op. cit., pp. 3-25 (p. 3). The new 
ESRC guidelines and the growing importance of policy-relevant research in government circles 
is also evidence of the increasing interconnection between the academic and political worlds. 
59 Hill cites the impact of Peter Ludlow's Centre for European Policy Studies on the 1989 
Delors report on Economic and Monetary Union and reform of the Common Agricultural 
Policy. Ibid., p. 21, footnote 2. 60 The fragile nature of the relationship (voiced by individuals on both sides of the divide) is 
summed up in Steiner, `The Historian and the Foreign Office', op. cit., and in Hill `Academic 
International Relations', op. cit., pp. 3-25. This volume contains consistent allusion to the 
caution, if not suspicion, with which the relationship is conducted. 
61 It is also the view of Steiner, in `The Historian and the Foreign Office', op. cit., pp. 45-8. 
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the theoretical level, bringing the historiographic method to bear on historical 
narratives is philosophically rewarding, theoretically rigorous and empirically 
significant. It is based on a constructive reading of White and assumes `truths' 
about history exist, but they exist in the minds of the individual historian, each 
using his or her own methods and resources to study history. That scholars of 
Britain and Europe rarely recognise their interpretative similarities to others in 
the field allows us, by analysing the theoretical landscape, to draw fascinating 
conclusions about the state of the historical art in Britain. On an empirical 
level, historiographic studies show academics potential avenues down which 
historical understanding might in the future be advanced and provide both 
academics and policy-makers with a set of bibliographic and interpretative data 
on which to draw broader conclusions about the nature of history and politics. 
Having discussed the merits of the historiographic method, it is now necessary 
to consider the reasons for studying the writing of British European policy 
between 1945 and 1973. 
2. Why the Literature on Britain and Europe, 1945-73? 
On the theoretical level, there are three prime reasons for analysing this corpus 
of writing. The first is that, with the Thirty Year Rule now cutting off access to 
the official material in the Public Record Office (PRO) after 1969, scrutinising 
historical interpretations to 1973 permits comparisons to be drawn between 
works penned pre- and post-archival release. The aim of the thesis is to 
uncover why historians interpret events as they do. Studying histories which 
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have out of necessity been written without access to unofficial sources allows 
us to test the proposition that sources are crucial stimuli behind advances in 
historical understanding. It is argued that, on the most general level, the 
interpretative content and texture of historical narratives changes dramatically 
when the Thirty Year Rule closes off access to primary source material. 
The second reason is that, in light of its importance to our understanding of 
British, European and world politics since 1945, there has been nothing 
substantial written on the methods of historical research in this particular field. 
Studies rarely contain methodological sections explaining how research was 
operationalised, which theories guided historians' thinking and the potential 
for refinements and advances in understanding flowing from that particular 
study. Several authors offer surveys of the state of the art as a way of 
grounding their particular interpretation, 62 but no thorough study has yet been 
made of the entire range of sociological, political and methodological forces at 
work on historical interpretation. Students have been poorly served by existing 
accounts. This thesis provides a corrective and aspires to make a more 
sophisticated contribution. 
The third reason for taking this particular subject matter is that it has been a 
burgeoning area of research for the last fifteen years. Many established 
historians who led the way now research alongside a younger generation of 
62 There are measured accounts of this period in John W. Young, Britain and European Unity. 
1945-1992 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993); Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Co- 
operation Since 1945 (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992). A similar account of a shorter period is to be 
found in Jan Melissen and Bert Zeeman, ` Britain and Western Europe, 1945-51: Opportunities 
Lost? ', International Affairs, 63,1 (1987), pp. 81-95. 
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students who are refining their methods and subjecting their interpretations to 
minute historical attention. It is a vibrant field which is constantly evolving, 
mutating and casting its net wider and wider in search of new sources and 
evidence through which to interpret British European policy. The subject 
matter is crucially important to contemporary debates about the British attitude 
towards Europe. If any study can highlight ways to advance historical 
understanding and the quality of interpretative insights, it is the 
historiographic. 
On the empirical level, Britain was a significant actor on the international stage 
in the period 1945-73. London took the lead in organising West Europe's 
response to the offer of Marshall Aid from America in 1947, culminating in the 
establishment of the European Recovery Programme and, in 1948, the 
Organisation for European Economic Co-operation which oversaw the 
recovery of post-war Europe. Meanwhile, Britain was a prime mover in 
forming the Dunkirk Treaty with France in 1947, extending this a year later to 
form the Brussels Pact with Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. In 
1949 Britain was a signatory of the Washington Treaty and a founder member 
of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Five years later, in 1954, ft 
was Prime Minister Anthony Eden who provided the security dimension for 
Western Europe through an expanded Brussels Pact which established Western 
European Union (WEU), following the collapse of the European Defence 
Community (EDC) in the French National Assembly. Outside the European 
Community Britain still acted in the world arena, and in 1959 was a founder 
member of the European Free Trade Area (EFTA). London's subsequent 
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efforts to join the EEC raise all sorts of pertinent questions about the problems 
of Community enlargement which are still being faced today. 
There is good reason to argue, indeed, that interest in British European policy 
has flowed directly from growing historiographical awareness that more than 
just two powers were engaged in the Cold War. Many specialists on Britain 
and European integration originally started out examining the role of Britain in 
the division of Germany and the origins of the Cold War which was, after all, 
`the touchstone of beginning and of the end of the Cold War'. 63 (Examine the 
writing of Avi Shlaim, 64 Deighton, 65 John Young, and Geoffrey Warner). 67 
63 Deighton, `The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 83. 64 Avi Shlaim, `Britain, the Berlin Blockade and the Cold War', International Affairs, 60,1 
(1984), pp. 1-15; Avi Shlaim, `The Partition of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War', 
Review of International Studies, 11 (1985), pp. 123-37; Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (eds. ), 
British Foreign Secretaries, op. cit.; Shlaim, `The Foreign Secretary and the Making of Policy', 
op. cit.; Shlaim, Britain and the Origins of European Unite, op. cit. 6 Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany. and the Ori iu ns. o_f 
the Cold War (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993); Anne Deighton (ed. ), Britain and the First Cold 
War (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Anne Deighton, `Cold War Diplomacy: British Policy 
Towards Germany's Role in Europe, 1945-9', in Ian D. Turner (ed. ), Reconstruction in Post- 
War Germany: British Occupation Policy and the Western Zones 1945-55 (Oxford: Berg, 
1989), pp. 15-34; Anne Deighton, `The "Frozen Front": The Labour Government, the Division 
of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War', International Affairs, 63,3 (1987), pp. 449-65. 
She has gone on to publish a number of studies on Europe, including Anne Deighton (ed. ), 
Building Post-War Europe: National Decision-Makers and European Institutions. 1948-63 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995); Anne Deighton, `Harold Macmillan, Whitehall, and the 
Defence of Europe', in Elisabeth du Reau (ed. ), Europe des Elites? Europe des Peuples?: La 
Construction de L'espace Eur peen 1945-1960 (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1999), 
pcp. 235-47. 
John W. Young, Britain. France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951 (Leicester: Leicester 
University Press, 1984); John W. Young, Cold War Europe 1945-1989_A Political History 
(London: Edward Arnold, 1989); John W. Young, `Cold War and Detente with Moscow', in 
Young (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, op. cit., pp. 55-80; 
John W. Young, `The Foreign Office, the French and the Post-War Division of Germany, 1945- 
46, Review of International Studies, 12 (1986), pp. 223-34. He was supervised by another Cold 
War specialist, Robert Frazier who penned `Did Britain Start the Cold War?: Bevin and the 
Truman Doctrine', Historical Journal 
, 
27,3 (1984), pp. 715-27. 
67 Geoffrey Warner, `The Division of Germany 1946-1948', International Affairs, 51,1 (1975), 
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Governments 1945-1951 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), pp. 82-116. 
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Their career paths provide evidence of the role fads and fashions play in 
determining which areas of history receive attention, which ignored. 68 Kaplan 
remarks that much European ` revisionism' came at a time in the-middle of the 
1980s when there was `heightened awareness of the growth of a European 
entity capable of defending itself, either alongside or independent of the United 
States'. 69 Richard Little also suggests that `developments in world 
politics... had an impact on the discipline's research agenda '. 70 As interest in 
European integration soared in the wake of the Single European Act, and 
perhaps recognising the long tradition of Anglo-American scholarship on 
68 A point drawn out in Beatrice Heuser, review article, `Keystone in the Division of Europe', 
Contemporary European History, 1,3 (1992), pp. 323-33 (p. 325). 69 Kaplan, `The Cold War and European Revisionism', op. cit., p. 150. The commitment of the 
EEC in the SEA to implement `a European foreign policy', and the parallel upgrading of the 
importance of the Western European Union is presumably the event to which Kaplan refers. See 
Neill Nugent, The Government and Politics of the European Union, 3`d edn. (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1994), p. 73. 
70 Richard Little, `Historiography and IR', Review of International Studies, 25,2 (1999), 
pp. 291-9 (p. 295). 
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Britain's role in the division of Germany, 7 many of these writers moved from 
Britain and Germany into its natural successor, Britain and European 
integration. The political climate of opinion, the impact of the Thirty Year 
Rule and pragmatic career choices thus all seem to have played big roles in the 
development of a distinct area of study on Britain and Europe. Here is a good 
example of the interconnectedness of accident and background in determining 
the areas to which historians turn their attention, echoing Beloff's comment 
that `Most the choices I made [about what to study] can be put down to the 
71 John H. Backer, The Decision to Divide Germany American Foreign Policy in Transition 
(Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press 1978); Trevor Burridge, `Great Britain and the 
Dismemberment of Germany at the End of the Second World War', International History 
Review, 3,4 (1981), pp. 565-79; Alec Caimcross, The Price of War British Policy on German 
Reparations 1941-1949 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986); Robert W. Carden, ` Before Bizonia: 
Britain's Economic Dilemma in Germany, 1945-46', Journal of Contemporary History, 14,3 (1979), pp. 535-55; David Dilks, `The British View of Security: Europe and a Wider World, 
1945-1948', in Riste (ed. ), Western Security, op. cit., pp. 25-59; Joseph Foschepoth, `British 
Interest in the Division of Germany after the Second World War', Journal of Contemporary 
Histoiv, 21,3 (1986), pp. 391-411; John Lewis Gaddis, ` The United States and the Question of 
a Sphere of Influence in Europe, 1945-1949', in Riste (ed. ), Western Europe, op. cit., pp. 60-91; 
John Gimbel, The Origins of the Marshall Plan (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976); 
Harold Ingrams, `Building Democracy in Germany', Quarterly Review (1947), pp. 208-22; Bill 
Jones, The Russia Complex: The British Labour Party and the Soviet Union (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1977); Lothar Kettenacker, `The Anglo-Soviet Alliance and the 
Problem of Germany, 1941-45', Journal of Contemporary History, 17,3 (1982), pp. 435-58; 
Julian Lewis, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-War Strategic Defence. 
1942-1947 (London: The Sherwood Press, 1988); Charles S. Maier, `Who Divided Germany? ', 
Diplomatic History, 22,3 (1988), pp. 481-88; R. B. Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship: 
Anglo-American Relations and Western European Unity. 1947-56 (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1972); Ray Merrick, `The Russia Committee of the British Foreign Office and the 
Cold War, 1946-47', Journal of Contemporary Histo y, 20,3 (1985), pp. 453-68, Philip Mosely, 
`Dismemberment of Germany: The Allied Negotiations from Yalta to Potsdam', Foreign Affairs, 
25,3 (1950), pp. 487-98; Harold Nicolson, `Peacemaking at Paris: Success, Failure or Farce? ', 
Foreign Affairs, 25,2 (1947), pp. 190-203; Ritchie Ovendale, `Britain, the USA and the 
European Cold War, 1945-8', Histo 
, 
67 (1982), pp. 217-35; Ritchie Ovendale, The English- 
Speaking Alliance: Britain. the United States the Dominions and the Cold War 1945-51 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1985); David Reynolds, ` The Origins of the Cold War: The 
European Dimension, 1944-1951', Historical Journal, 28,2 (1985), pp. 497-515; Victor 
Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982); Keith 
Sainsbury, `British Policy and German Unity at the End of the Second World War', English 
Historical Review, 94 (1979), pp. 786-804; Tony Sharp, The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal 
Division of Germany (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975); Raymond Smith, `A Climate of Opinion: 
British Officials and the Development of British Soviet Policy, 1945-7', International Affairs, 
64,4 (1988), pp. 631-47; Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings of the Cold War. 1945- 
46 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986); R. Harrison Wagner, `The Decision to Divide Germany 
and the Origins of the Cold War', International Studies Quarterly, 24,2 (1980), pp. 155-90; Sir 
John Wheeler-Bennett and Anthony Nicholls, The Semblance of Peace: The Political Settlement 
After the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1972); John Zametica (ed. ), British Officials 
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vagaries of chance. Some were perhaps due to my upbringing and education, 
preparing me for or predisposing me to some choices rather than others'. 72 
On a negative note, Britain since 1945 has consistently acted as an impediment 
to supranationalism in Western Europe, playing a role Pierre-Henri Laurent 
describes as an `internal inhibitor'. 73 London's watering down of the powers of 
the Council of Europe, its rejection of the Schuman Plan, a supranational 
European Army and withdrawal from the Messina process which led to the 
founding of the European Economic Community stand out as defining events 
in post-war European integration history. Britain is still seen as the `awkward 
partner' in the European Union (EU), 74 the focus of a coalition of states 
`content to shelter behind British objections rather than take up the argument 
themselves'. 75 
Britain's turbulent relationship with the EC, now EU, is one of the defining 
political conflicts of our age. Historical awareness of how Britain has got 
where it has vis-a-vis European integration is of absolutely crucial importance. 
It sheds light on a multitude of issues relevant to the study of contemporary 
history, politics and international relations. In the context of European studies, 
the case of Britain sheds light on the problems applicant states and the 
and British Foreign Policy 1945-50 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1990). 
72 Beloff, An Histori an, op. cit., p. 1. 73 Pierre-Henri Laurent, `Reappraising the Origins of European Integration', in Hans J. 
Michelmann and Panayotis Soldatos (eds. ), European Integration: Theories and Approaches (Maryland: University Press of America, 1994), pp. 99-112 (p. 104). 74 George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit. 75 Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, 2nd edn. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1991), p. 204. 
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Community and Union have had coming to terms with enlargement, `Euro- 
scepticism', and concepts of `sovereignty' and the national interest. For 
analysts of British politics, Britain's policy towards European integration sheds 
light on the pluralism of the foreign policy process, the role of opposition 
parties in constraining foreign policy, and the importance of policy projection 
in a complex international environment in which rhetoric can be as potent as 
reality in determining foreign policy outcomes. This thesis is therefore aimed 
at several audiences. It primarily addresses philosophers of history but the 
practical findings on methods of historical research will also appeal to 
historians and political scientists. Having discussed the merits of 
historiographically analysing the writing of British European policy, it is now 
useful to consider alternative methods of schoolification that could have been 
employed. It will be shown that grouping writers according to the 
interpretation they place on historical events is the most apt approach to 
schoolification not only because of its intellectual coherence and tradition, but 
because of the flaws inherent in the two most promising alternatives. 
3. Deeper Reflections on the ` Schoolification' Process 
A school of writing is defined as a group of writers who subscribe explicitly or 
implicitly to the same or similar interpretation of an event or events in a given 
area of history. The major points of conflict among writers of British European 
policy can be identified as follows: Bevin's concept of the `Third Force'; 
Britain and the Schuman Plan; Britain and the European Army; Britain and the 
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founding of the EEC; Macmillan's application to join the EEC; De Gaulle's 
first veto; Wilson's entry bid; de Gaulle's second veto; Heath's `Europeanism' 
and entry in 1973. Once writers' positions in each debate had been identified, 
conclusions were drawn about how they related to other writers taking up the 
same or similar position in the debate. Had there been no, or few, sociological, 
political or methodological links among the writers taking similar 
interpretations the thesis would have argued that no schools existed and drawn 
conclusions about why that happened to be the case. However, there is a 
correlation between the interpretation writers place upon events and the 
politics, aims and methods of writing. It is the distinction between writers on 
these grounds that forms the boundaries between schools of writing. 
There are two alternative methods that could have been used. The first- 
mapping writers according to the level of analysis on which they account for 
British foreign policy- requires schools to be based on the theoretical 
underpinnings of writers' work. The second- institutional affiliation- assumes 
that schools of writing emerge from particular universities or other institutions. 
Analysing the strengths and weaknesses of each in turn, it will be shown that 
locating writers in schools according to their interpretation incorporates certain 
theoretically appealing aspects of both these alternatives without succumbing 
to their considerable failings. 
" 
The Levels of Analysis Approach: Theory Before Interpretation 
As Barry Buzan explains, the `level of analysis' problem `is about how to 
identify and treat different types of location in. which sources of explanation 
for observed phenomenon can be found'. 76 Born during the behavioural 
movement in the United States, levels of analysis attempted to bring scientific 
certainty and methodological rigour to the social sciences. 77 One of its 
architects, J. David Singer, argued that the levels model compelled writers to 
choose `whether to account for the behaviour of the international system in 
terms of the behaviour of the nation-states comprising it or vice-versa'. Moving 
`down' a level, `Are we to account for the behaviour of the state in terms of the 
behaviour of its constituent bureaucracies (and other agencies), or vice-versa? '. 
Lower still, `Are we to account for the behaviour of a bureaucracy in terms of 
the behaviour of the human individuals comprising it, or vice-versa? '. 78 One 
can see from this exposition that the structure-agency dichotomy is at the heart 
of the levels of analysis approach to foreign policy analysis, a theoretical 
instrument developed, Singer continued, `to explain [foreign policy outcomes], 
and when descriptive and explanatory requirements are in conflict, the latter 
79 ought to be given priority'. 
This model possesses two principal strengths. First, it is an accessible view of 
how states behave in the international system, splitting what are perceived to 
be the dominant forces at work in the international system into neat `levels' or 
76 Barry Buzan, `The Levels of Analysis Problem Reconsidered', in Ken Booth and Steve Smith (eds. ), International relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), pp. 198-216 (p. 199). 77 Ibid. 
78 J. David Singer, `The Levels-of-Analysis Problem in International relations', in James 
Rosenau (ed. ), International Politics and Foreign Policy (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1969), 
pp. 20-9. For a reformulation of this model see Smith and Smith, `The Analytical Background', 
op. cit., pp. 8-11. 
79 Ibid., p. 22. 
`categories' of analysis. Second, it was dominant at a time when the study of 
international relations was undertaken in the shadow of the Cold War, a 
bipolar international system, and conception of `power', defined in terms of 
nuclear weapons, ideology and bipolar conflict on the world stage. 80 As Buzan 
suggests, `Levels of analysis made a strong impact on international relations 
not least because the ideal of levels seemed to fit easily and neatly into the 
organisation of the discipline's subject matter in terms of individuals, states 
and systems'. "' 
The literature analysed in the thesis is foreign policy-oriented. Would it not 
therefore be appropriate to schoolify writers according to their use of foreign 
policy theory rather than the interpretation they offer? 82 This would involve 
locating writers in three schools pertaining to the level on which each situates 
his or her analysis of British European policy, `world system', `nation-state' or 
`individual' level. Is it not to misunderstand the nature of scholarship to 
examine interpretative content instead of theoretical underpinning? Given what 
has already been discussed about the relative lack of methodological reflection 
by historians in Britain, it appears not. By considering the theoretical and 
empirical weaknesses of the levels of analysis model it will be argued that it 
cannot supplant the thesis' interpretationist approach to the literature on 
Britain and Europe. 
90 In the Realist world-view, remarks Sanders, ` the nation-state... can best protect itself by 
pursuing a strategy of either maximising its own power capabilities or seeking to avoid the 
development of any power preponderance elsewhere'. Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., 
p. 258. 
81 Buzan, ` The Levels of Analysis Problem Reconsidered', op. cit., p. 200. 8' See, for example, the categorisation of Kenneth Waltz as an international system level writer, 
contrasting with Lawrence Kaplan's nation-state level in ibid., p. 201. 
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The theoretical concern with the levels model is that while conceptually neat, 
are there just three levels of analysis? Martin Hollis and Steve Smith's recent 
concerns about the model echo Buzan's worry that there is an `unwarranted 
impression of simplicity about the whole idea'. 83 That each of the three levels 
can be sub-divided into four or more extra levels raises the issue of what is 
being explained here? This question is particularly pressing in an era of 
interdependence and globalisation. If one yearns for a parsimonious model that 
explains state behaviour, how deep into the black box of the state does one 
need to delve to make predictions? How, for instance, does the behaviour of 
individuals explain state behaviour across time or are each particular to their 
own states? What, then, of comparative generalisations? Or should one ignore 
individual influences and abstract to the upper levels? What, then, of the 
impact of individuals, bureaucracies and nation-state interaction in an 
`anarchic' world? The model raises more questions about how to explain 
foreign policies of states than it can possibly answer. 
It is such concerns which highlight the second weakness of the levels model. 
Even at the height of the Cold War most writers did not rigidly adhere to its 
structure, so what is its raison d'etre? Singer conceded that scholars do not 
necessarily need to choose a single explanatory level of analysis: `the problem 
is really not one of deciding which level is most valuable to the discipline as a 
83 Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding, op. cit., pp. 1-91; Buzan, `The 
Levels of Analysis Problem Reconsidered', op. cit., p. 202. 
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whole and then demanding that it be adhered to from now unto eternity '. 84 
Steve and Michael Smith have likewise pointed out that `A comprehensive 
account or analysis of foreign policy in any country will take account of all of 
these levels, not only individually, but also in terms of the linkages and 
interaction between them'. 85 The question then becomes ` if two or more units 
and sources of explanation are operating together, how are their different 
analyses to be assembled into a whole understanding? '. 86 For these two main 
reasons, it can be argued that the levels model contains a number of internal 
inconsistencies and contradictions with which even its proponents struggled to 
come to terms. There are additional points to consider, which can be identified 
in the following figure. 
84 Singer, `The Levels of Analysis Problem', op. cit., p. 28. 
"Steve Smith and Michael Smith, `The Analytical Background: Approaches to the Study of 
British Foreign Policy', in Smith, Smith and White (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, pp. 3-23 (p. s). 86 Buzan, `The Levels of Analysis Problem Reconsidered', op. cit., p. 213. 
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Figure 3: Contemporary History and Foreign Policy Analysis in the Study 
of International Relations 
World 
System 
Level 
Explaining 
Foreign 
Policy 
Analysis 
Nation- 
State 
Level 
Individual 
Level 
Understanding 
On the empirical level, the main weakness of the levels of analysis model is 
that its concern with theory has not been replicated by many historians of 
British European policy. Lawrence Freedman has found that `most 
contemporary narrative analysts of British foreign policy actually use a 
mixture' of the rational actor and bureaucratic politics models. `Despite being 
conceptually distinct', Sanders surmises, `the two models are in fact mutually 
compatible and can be jointly applied to the same empirical materials without 
serious difficulty or contradiction'. 87 They do not generally elect a level on 
which to analyse foreign policy-making, but, as a function of the documentary 
87 Freedman is quoted in Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., pp. 273-4. 
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method, have been content to present their narratives in the framework of 
individual and bureaucratic rivalry in the foreign policy process. As such, 
scholars in the field of Britain and Europe, defined in the figure above as 
`contemporary history', 88 weight their analysis more towards the lower than 
higher levels of analysis. One is compelled to infer back on the basis of 
interpretation to say that X is a nation-state level writer, Y an individual level 
writer. This undermines the levels of analysis model still further, because it is a 
prerequisite that one chooses a level on which to explain foreign policy 
outcomes. That writers are located on different levels with great difficulty, and 
that they do not locate themselves on levels, 89 presents a fundamental 
argument against using the levels model to schoolify writers. It has had little 
impact on the evolution of British historiography. 
Second, and even more damaging, White suggests that `The field of historical 
studies may be taken as exemplary of those disciplines in the human and social 
sciences that rest content with the understanding of matters with which they 
deal in place of aspiring to explain them'. 90 `Contemporary history' is located 
88 ` The contemporary' in Britain is usually held to denote `post-1945 history'. See Anthony 
Seldon, `The Theatre of Contemporary History', in Anthony Seldon (ed. ), Contemporary 
History: Practice and Method (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), pp. 117-28 (p. 117). See also 
John Barnes, ` Books and Journals', in the same volume, pp. 30-54 where, on p. 30, he gives the 
widely accepted view that `contemporary history is best concerned with that period in which 
there can be profitable interaction between oral history and at least some documentation'. See 
also R. Palme Dutt, Problems of Contemporary History (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1963), pp. 15-16. Fewer writers locate its origins at the start of the century. See Beloff, An 
Histori an, op. cit., p. 32. In different countries the date tends to differ also. See Francois 
Bedarida, `France', in Seldon (ed. ), Contemporary History, op. cit., pp. 129-32. 89 A rare exception is Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit. His concluding chapter is devoted to 
the `relevance of foreign policy theory' Sanders argues that his study has been based on the 
bureaucratic and international system levels of analysis, an attempt to reflect the `world-views of 
the policy-makers themselves'. See pp. 257-87. This quote is from P. M. 9° White, The Content of the Form, op. cit., p. 60. Callinicos likewise argues that the `typical aim 
of historical writing [is] to give an explanation of some event or episode or phenomenon in the 
past'. Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 55. 
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in the half of the graph where `understanding' is the goal. British historians 
working in this area do not attempt to `explain', preferring, in Hollis and 
Smith's terminology, to `understand' British attitudes to the continent, usually 
over narrow periods of time. 91 The levels model is, by contrast, an attempt to 
explain and predict state behaviour. The concerns of historians do not sit well 
in the explanatory framework it provides. 
The levels model, in sum, is an explanatory tool not a descriptive device. As 
Singer reminds us: `when descriptive and explanatory requirements are in 
conflict, the latter ought to be given priority'. 92 Historians of British European 
policy allude to geographic and geostrategic explanations for Britain's 
aloofness from the continent after 1945. But they cite too the salience of 
individual conceptions of British foreign policy and the role of bureaucratic 
rivalry fought out within the Whitehall machine and in Cabinet. This is 
represented above by a shape to contemporary history which tapers at the top, 
highlighting the observation that historians regularly transgress boundaries 
between levels of analysis. To schoolify scholars on one or other level would 
be to falsely assume the a priori importance of theory to British historians, to 
artificially simplify the multilayered accounts produced, to ignore 
interpretative eclecticism and render an injustice to the literature. 
Contrary to Sanders' claim that foreign policy research `is rarely conducted in 
91 Hollis and Smith, Explaining and Understanding, op. cit. 92 Singer, ` The Levels-of-Analysis Problem', op. cit., p. 22. 
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a theoretical vacuum', 93 historians' attention to the detail of particular events 
obviates their ability to theorise. British historians have been extremely reticent 
about generalising about the foreign policy process in Britain. Accounts of the 
period 1945-73, or some smaller portion, are usually closed and left to stand 
alone as descriptions of a past history which have little explicit relevance to 
present issues. Events, it seems, cannot be taken out of context. There are texts 
which draw explicit conclusions about the pluralism of the British foreign 
policy process, reinforcing the accounts of Wallace, Barber and Cable cited 
above. 94 There has also been a tendency in some recent literature to draw 
conclusions about European Union enlargement from the case of Britain's 
entry attempts. 95 However, the problems of drawing general conclusions from 
particular historical epochs is highlighted in Forster's review of Ludlow's 
monograph: `While [his] conclusions may apply in their totality to the period 
of the 1960s- and indeed may explain the failure of the second British 
application- a far more nuanced set of conclusions needs to be drawn 
concerning the more recent process of enlargement'. 96 
The EU is an evolving entity, its future state the subject of intense debate. In 
93 Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., p. 285. 94 Roger Jowell and Gerald Hoinville (eds. ), Britain into Europe' Public Opinion and the EEC 
1961-75 (London: Croon Helm, 1975); Robert J. Lieber, British Politics and European Unity: 
Parties. Elites. and Pressure Groups (Berkeley: University of California, 1970); Jeremy Moon, 
European Integration into British Politics 1950-1963: A Study of Issue Change (Aldershot: 
Gower, 1985). The latter used `a methodological innovation in content analysis technique to 
examine the European integration issue in British politics', that innovation being `quantitative 
analysis of political discourse'. It has not been repeated since. See F. E. C. Gregory, review, 
`European Integration into British Politics 1950-1963: A Study of Issue Change. By Jeremy 
Moon', Journal of Common Market Studies, 24,3 (1986), pp. 255-6. 95 Uwe Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the Common Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1975); Lord, British Entry, op. cit.; Ludlow, Dealing with 
Bri tain, op. cit. 96 Forster, `No Entry', op: cit., p. 144. 
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this light, and given the intrinsic problems of generalising across historical eras 
it is no surprise that historians have shrunk from generalising, preferring the 
descriptive over predictive approach to Britain and Europe. One suspects that 
as historians investigate the archives on Britain's EEC entry under Heath, 
conclusions about contemporary British attitudes and policies, especially 
public, media and. business opinion, the links from the past to the present will 
be better defined. This is because Heath, `sceptics' argue, guided Britain into 
Europe without due regard for the constitutional, legal and financial 
implications and without recourse to public opinion. 97 This is naturally fertile 
ground on which to consider subsequent British attitudes to the process of 
European unity. It may be that historians of the Heath period will be more at 
ease with making links between the past and present than they have hitherto 
been. 
Even so, any drift in the literature away from `understanding' towards 
`explaining' has been limited. These empirical weaknesses of the levels 
approach serve to exaggerate the theoretical concerns about it as a method of 
schoolification. It is not that writers do not choose a level on which to write, 
but it is not an explicit choice. Accounts are increasingly weighted to the lower 
levels, debates among writers revolving around individual motivation and 
nuance of language in the official documentation. 98 British historians' 
reluctance to generalise is against the spirit of the levels approach which 
97 Jay, Change and Fortune op. cit., pp. 431-4; Thatcher, The Path to Power, op. cit., pp. 209- 
10. 
98 The analysis of post-revisionism in Chapter 3 shows how the subtle changes in -ministerial and 
official motivations are developing into the main historiographical battle ground. 
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demands just such theoretical underpinnings and conclusions. To prioritise the 
impact of levels of analysis would be to falsely raise the a priori importance of 
just one possible input to historical narrativisation over the host of others that 
are apparent in the historiography. The historical truths sought by historians are 
not akin to the sorts of `truths' about the working of the international system 
sought by foreign policy analysts. 
" The Institutional Approach to Schoolification 
Schools of writing, it has been observed, are often associated with particular 
institutions. The `Frankfurt School' originated in a research institute 
established in the Weimar. Republic in 1923,99 while the Annales school of 
French historians `had a firm institutional basis. 100 In Britain examples include 
the connection between the `English school' of international relations and the 
LSE, 101 and the "third-way" thought current at the London School of 
Economics'. 102 Such tight communities of individuals are fertile environments 
in which to develop shared understandings, approaches, theories and models of 
academic study. Is it not the case, therefore, that schools of writing on Britain 
and Europe can be modelled according to institutional affiliation? 
As an alternative method of schoolification to the interpretative method 
99 Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, op. cit., pp. 6-7 and pp. 14-6; 
Webster, `Harnessing the Rampant Theory', op. cit. See also Harriet Swain, 'Blair's Capital 
Hearing Aides', Times Higher Education Supplement, 17 March 2000, p. 20. 00 Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., pp. 51-2. 101 Tim Dunne, Inventing International Society: A History of the English School (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1998), pp. 5-10. See also Roger Epp, `The English School on the Frontiers of 
International relations', Review of International Studies, 24 (1998), pp. 47-63. 102 Webster, ` Harnessing the Rampant Theory', op. cit. 
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employed in this study, the institutional approach has two merits. First, the 
association of schools with institutions, noted above, gives it a strong 
intellectual legitimacy which derives from the established tradition of linking 
the one to the other. There is a precedent in Britain of analysing schools in 
terms of academic affiliation, offering a ready-made set of methodological 
tools for writing the historiography of British European policy: map the 
writers, analyse their backgrounds and draw conclusions about the role of 
institutions as necessary. The second merit of this approach is that it would 
surely provide neat boundaries between schools which would be characterised 
by a `high degree of unity' among their members. 103 For some scholars the 
term `school' implies just such monolithic adherence to a singular 
interpretation of events. It could be, for example, that competing 
interpretations were associated with competing intellectual traditions, 
academic methods and approaches in different institutions. One could go on 
from here to draw conclusions about the influence of politics and methods in 
different institutions on historical interpretation. 
There is evidence that Oxford and the LSE have been at the forefront of the 
revisionist school of writing. Deighton developed in the early 1990s a new 
approach to Britain's role in the early Cold War period, which stressed the role 
in the foreign policy process played by advice from officials and civil 
servants. 104 Young and Kent at LSE developed the revisionist critique of the 
103 Gardner, Kaplan, Kimball and Kuniholm, `Responses', op, cit., p. 198. 104 Deighton, The Impossible Peace, op. cit.; Deighton, `Cold War Diplomacy', op. cit.; 
Deighton, `The "Frozen Front"', op. cit. 
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`consensus' interpretation of the Third Force. 105 These have since supervised, 
or in a looser context, inspired many British historians working in this field, 
giving revisionist historiography a distinctive institutionally-oriented 
appearance. This is particularly poignant in that Cambridge arguably has less 
of a tradition in international history and international relations research than 
either LSE or Oxford. The former is naturally near the centre of power by 
virtue of geographic location, the latter's `politics, philosophy and economics 
degree provided many of the key politicians and political thinkers of the 1960s 
and 1970s'. 106 Cambridge has a stronger link to the natural sciences, a tradition 
which has continued recently with the University `putting its efforts into a 
different kind of power base, joining the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
in a £68 million science enterprise project and developing a computer lab with 
£12 million of funding from Bill Gates'. 107 In short, one can reflect on the 
applicability of Patrick Dunleavy's comment about Oxford, that it has a 
curriculum `largely of historical interest' to the LSE also. 108 One could thus 
reflect on the irony that these establishment institutions have been home to 
interpretations which challenge the received wisdom of the policy-making 
establishment which, Milward complains, was `based on access to expensive 
105 John Kent, 'Bevin's Imperialism and the Idea of Euro-Africa, 1945-49', in Dockrill and 
Young (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, pp. 47-76; John Kent and John W. Young, `British Policy 
Overseas: The "Third Force" and the Origins of NATO- In Search of a New Perspective', in 
Beatrice Heuser and Robert O'Neill (eds. )Securing Peace in Europe 1945-62: Thoughts for the 
Post- Cold War Era (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 41-61; John Kent and John W. Young, 
`The "Western Union" Concept and British Defence Policy, 1947-8', in Richard J. Aldrich (ed. ), 
British Intelligence. Strategy and the Cold War 1945-51 (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 166- 
92; John W. Young, `The Foreign Office, the French and the Post-War Division of Germany, 
1945-46, Review of International Studies, 12 (1986), pp. 223-34. See also Michael Dockrill, 
'British Attitudes Towards France as A Military Ally', Diplomacy and Statecraft. 1,1 (1990), 
pp. 49-70 (p. 59). 
106 Swain, 'Blair's Capital Hearing Aides', op. cit. 
107 Ibid. 
108 Quoted in ibid. 
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private education and privileged entry into two universities notable for the 
irrelevance of the knowledge they imparted to the task at hand'. 109 There are, 
however, two drawbacks of using the institutional approach to schoolification. 
First, a searching examination of the literature suggests that institutional 
affiliation is not the only influence on historiography in Britain. While it 
reveals some of the influences on interpretation, to base schools mainly on 
institutions is to posit a link between the two that holds for some writers, but 
clearly not for many others. The best one can say is that institutional links are 
one of a number of reasons why the historiography has developed as it has. 
Political dogma, methodological eclecticism, historians' training in Britain, the 
type of study written, awareness of theoretical underpinnings and alertness to 
one's relationship to others in the field are all equally compelling explanations 
for advances in historical understanding. For different writers each operates 
with different force at different times and in different parts of their narratives. 
The interpretative method is the best way of capturing this array of influences 
and blending them into a sufficiently nuanced account which admits the 
intrinsic individuality of historical narratives but also the existence of schools. 
The second weakness of building schools on institutions is that, if revisionist 
historiography has been characterised by relatively tight social structures, what 
109 He continues in the same vein, noting the `frequently amateurish and socially prejudiced' 
nature of the Foreign Office and, to a lesser degree, the Treasury. Alan S. Milward, The 
European Rescue of the Nation-State (London: Routledge, 1992), p. 431. Clive Ponting also 
curses the `small governing elite drawn from an extremely narrow educational background of 
the public schools and Oxbridge'. See Clive Ponting, review, `Secrets and Lies: The Culture of 
Secrecy: Britain 1832-1998. By David Vincent', Times Higher Education Supplement, 3 March 
2000, p. 25. 
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of its orthodox predecessor? There is less of an institutional grounding for this 
school, which combines transnational critics of British European policy. 
Ideology, rather than institutions is at the heart of the orthodox school. In 
Britain individuals associated with the Federal Trust have been prominent in 
expounding the orthodoxy, ' 10 but a range of other ideologies have joined them 
in inventing the record. " Identifying institutional affiliation works in the 
orthodox context but only to a certain degree. The communities of writers who 
have driven the historiography are too diverse to be captured in a narrow 
institutional context. What this method misses are, crucially, the competing 
ideologies behind the schools and the exceptions to the schools, that is 
individuals who share the methods but not the backgrounds of the leading 
members of the schools. Sociological contrasts between the schools are clear, 
but they do not always run down institutional lines. This is a necessary but not 
sufficient determinant of historiographical evolution. Just because someone 
researches at an establishment university, does this structural factor determine 
his or her interpretation any more than method, the climate of opinion, the time 
of writing and the nature of the study undertaken? The social construction of 
the field is intimately linked to the shared methods and assumptions about 
Ito For details on the history and membership of the Federal Union and associated organisations 
see Richard Mayne and John Pinder, Federal Union: The Pioneers (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1990). See the next section for further detail on this and other sociological linkages in the 
orthodox school. 
III There are two examples of the disparity to orthodox historiography. The first is the Marxist 
critique of British foreign policy which stress London's allegiance to Washington in the 
immediate post-war era, apparently reinforcing the continental opinion that Attlee's Labour 
administrations had colluded with the Conservatives at the expense of European integration. See 
D. N. Pritt, The Labour Government. 1945-51 (London: Laurence and Wishart, 1963); Konni 
Zilliacus, I Choose Peace (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1949). The second is de Gaulle's critique 
of British European policy in the 1960s. Hardly a `European' in the Monnet sense, the General 
nonetheless supported continental criticisms of Britain's aloofness from the continent and, again, 
subservience to the United States, both of which figure prominently in orthodox historiography. 
See Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal 1958-62. Endeavour 1962-, trans. Terence 
Kilmartin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971). 
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Britain's post-war European policy among different communities of writers. 
However, to prioritise them over the other potential explanations would be to 
overplay the structural determinants of historiography. 
The same overemphasis on structures occurs if one were to schoolify according 
to date of publication. This would be persuasive in the sense that it would 
capture shifting academic conceptions of IR in Britain and the changes in 
interpretation brought about by the release of archival documentation under the 
Thirty Year Rule, but illusory from an interpretive point of view. Politicians 
publishing in the 1990s have no more wish to debunk the conventional wisdom 
than those writing in the 1970s. There is a better case when applied to the 
academic literature, yet the implication would be that one could group new 
writers without even reading their work. While it might hold to some extent, 
the type of work, the sources used and the range of sociological pressures on 
writers all play their parts as well. The interpretations offered are multi- 
layered. It is crucial to know where writers stand on debates within schools as 
well as across them, so that one can discern who are the leading lights within 
schools, and who are their disciples. 
As with the levels model, the interpretative method employed incorporates the 
input from institutional and other social backgrounds, developing schools 
which are not monolithic, not as tight as some scholars might like, but 
nonetheless the nearest one can get to capturing the individual yet 
interpretatively linked histories of Britain's relationship with Europe. The 
levels approach has been rejected because it necessitates drawing links 
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between theory and interpretation that rarely exist in a field of research which 
is dominated by diplomatic historians trying to uncover the foreign policy- 
making process in the context of individual and bureaucratic attitudes towards 
the continent. They focus on the particular not the general, undermining the 
core tenet of the levels of analysis approach. The institutional approach suffers 
from an over-reliance on structures as opposed to inputs from the individual 
historian's method, ideology and the deeper influences of the type of study 
written and publishing pressures. In conclusion, neither the levels of analysis 
nor institutional methods of schoolification offer the subtlety of the 
interpretationist method which incorporates the strongest elements of each in a 
more sophisticated account. 
4. The Argument of the Thesis 
Having explored the method behind this study, one can now introduce the 
argument developed below. The primary argument of the thesis is that history- 
writing in Britain is subject to a host of influences which affect the 
interpretation offered by writers. In terms of identifying the variables, one can 
identify seven and rank them according to their apparent impact on the writing 
of history. The weightiest influence stems from writers' social background, 
connections, organisational and professional affiliations. What this means, in 
sum, is that the historiography of Britain's relations with Europe has been 
driven by the changing dominance over time of different communities of 
writers in the field. From an agenda which was largely politically-dominated in 
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the 1960s and 1970s, one discovers that, as professional historians began to 
take an interest in the material, so conventional wisdoms have been 
challenged, the evidence reassessed in the light of fresh evidence. As new 
generations of historians now begin to survey the competing views of both 
these communities of writers, interpretations are changing still further. Thus, 
generational and social change have been inextricably linked in the process of 
historiographical progression. 
It is crucial to understand the social dimension of the field before one explores 
the other six variables at work on the historiography. It is difficult to rank them 
in that they apply to different writers in different ways and with differing 
forces at different times. Nonetheless, they are analysed in the following order: 
competing views about the policy process, perceptions of intentions and 
outcomes in British foreign policy, hindsight in history, myth-making in 
contemporary history and the use of sources. The final variable to be analysed, 
the type of work produced, is intimately connected to the social background of 
the individual because the goal of one's study is intensely revealing about the 
questions one is putting to the history and therefore about the implicit 
intellectual framework within which history is written. One can see from this 
the extreme interconnection between the variables. For analytical purposes, 
however, it is necessary to identify first order and second order variables. It is 
hoped these categories of analysis will prove useful. 
The secondary argument developed in this thesis is that the writers of British 
European policy can be grouped into `schools of writing'. It is for this reason 
7, 
that the chapters are divided into analysis of each school in turn, progressing in 
chronological order from the orthodox school, to the revisionist and now a 
post-revisionist school has emerged. Organising the thesis thematically around 
schools seems to be the most appropriate way of showing the multiple 
influences at work on writers. It is especially revealing about the social 
construction of the historiography. The reasons why certain interpretations are 
glossed over by some writers and not others are what binds those writers 
together in schools. They are driven by competing historical and political 
agendas which dictate what evidence is used and what is ignored, how `foreign 
policy' is analysed, which personalities are criticised and who habilitated. One 
can by all means reflect on the factual similarities in the accounts produced on 
Britain and Europe. But recognising this overlap should not blind us to the very 
real interpretative differences that divide writers into schools. Before analysis 
of the dynamics of each school in detail, it is useful to reflect further on the 
primary argument advanced in this study. This section will conclude, therefore, 
by introducing how each influence on the historiography is analysed below. It 
begins with the social construction of the schools. 
" 
The Social Construction of the Schools 
The observation has been made in the natural sciences that `There is still much 
to discuss, notably the role of communities of researchers, not just individuals, 
in building epistemic standards into scientific practice'. 112 The social 
construction of schools has to be the starting point for historiographical 
112 Tumey, `Values in Scientific Ventures', op. cit. 
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analysis which attempts to untangle the structural forces at work on writers' 13 
from their own intellectual, theoretical and source-oriented inputs to the 
narration of history. It is no coincidence that one of the most recent 
publications on the historian's craft, Jordanova's History in Practice, is the 
first to deal in depth with the infrastructure of the discipline, the financial and 
practical, as well as the ontological, epistemological and methodological 
aspects of the practice of historical research and writing. Her argument about 
the utility of understanding the sociology, and anthropology, of history is well- 
taken: `fields', she argues, `share intellectual preoccupations, and in this sense 
they are communities built around ideas of one kind or another, whose 
members are constantly conversing, in their writings as much as in their direct 
contacts'. 114 She develops this line of argument two pages later: `Just as 
modern societies need to be understood in terms of the structures, such as 
transport, banking and health services, which enable them to function, so 
academic disciplines need to be placed in the context of their support systems 
and institutional bases'. 15 This thesis elucidates the prime importance of the 
sociological underpinnings of the historiography of Britain and Europe. 
The major difference between the schools, it asserts, is first of all that between 
the communities of writers who have driven the historiography. Referring to 
Jenkins' distinction between ` upper' and `lower case' history helps explain this 
divide. ' 16 Upper case `History' means `grand' or `metanarratives' of a Marxist 
113 Notably the political climate of opinion, without which one cannot understand the stimulus 
to writing and the ultimate goal of historical studies. 14 Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., p. 1. 
us Ibid., pp. 1-3. 116 Jenkins, ` Introduction', op. cit. 
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nature, implying, as David Howarth points out, `recourse to some underlying 
and "totalising" device of legitimation, as with the Marxist story of how history 
necessarily progresses in successive stages, to ensure objectivity or truth of our 
knowledge and to justify socialist or Communist political objectives'. "? 
Marxist and other such metanarrative histories, the argument goes, are 
explicitly about attempting to change the present and future by re-writing the 
past. 
The first school of writing to emerge on Britain and Europe- the orthodox 
school- was of the metanarrative nature, unable to hide its criticisms of British 
European policy, supporting David Edgerton's claim that the `historiography of 
modem Britain, especially Britain in the wider world, is dominated by one 
issue- "decline"'. i1ß The integration process set in motion by the `founding 
fathers', ' 19 had orthodox writers suggested, a final destination. 120 As the title of 
a 1991 study of Monnet suggests, there is apparently a `path to European 
117 Howarth, `Discourse Theory', op. cit., p. 117. 
118 David Edgerton, review, `Declinism: The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities, 
1945-50. By Correlli Barnett', London Review of Books, 18,5 (1996), pp. 14-5 (p. 14). Another 
who makes this link is Peter Ghosh, review; `How We Got Where We Are: Hope and Glory: 
Britain 1900-1990. By Peter Clarke', London Review of Books, 18,23 (November 1996), 
pp. 18-19 (p. 18). 
9 This is the term used to describe the individuals credited with inspiring and developing in the 
1950s the plans for the European Coal and Steel Community, the (failed) European Defence 
Community and most commonly the Treaty of Rome. The group includes Jean Monnet, Robert 
Schuman, Pierre Uri and Paul-Henri Spaak. See Derek Urwin, review, `The European Rescue 
of the Nation-State. By Alan S_ Milward', Journal of Common Market Studies, 32,1 (1994), 
pp. 112-3 (p. 113). 
120 Jean Monnet, Memoirs, trans. Richard Mayne (London: Collins, 1978). 
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unity', some final `state' which Britain was wrong to reject. 121 These writers 
are Marxist in style if not substance, 122 for their sweeping discourse can be 
compared to a `metanarrative'. Foucaultian thinking has it that "'discursive 
formations" refer to regular bodies of ideas and concepts which claim to 
produce knowledge about the world'. In his work he `sketches out... underlying 
discursive regularities and connects their production and transformation to the 
broader social and political processes of which they are a part'. 123 
Judging by the language and metaphors the orthodox school use to chastise 
British policy-makers, one can reasonably compare the `Monnetist' 124 
approach to British European policy with metanarratives which contain their 
own discourse, hegemonising important signifiers and marginalising 
alternatives which challenge the ideological predilection of the `author'. To 
12' Douglas Brinkley and Clifford Hackett (eds. ), Jean Monnet: The Path to European Unity 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1991). See also Francois Duchene, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman 
of Interdependence (London: W. W. Norton and Co., 1994); Mary and Serge Bromberger, Jean 
Monnet and the United States of Europe, trans. Elaine P. Halperin (New York: Coward- 
McCann, 1968). 
122 Though Marxist historiography has added considerable weight to the Monnetist charge that 
Britain eschewed European integration for the `special relationship'. A key writer to take this 
line is Wolfram Kaiser who has developed a `dual appeasement' approach to British European 
policy. He argues that Harold Macmillan's application to join the EEC in 1961 rested largely on 
the wish to `appease the United States government into continuing the special treatment of 
Britain'. Kaiser's emphasis on Washington's hold over British foreign policy is a dramatic 
restatement of the `Keep Left' approach to British foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s. 
Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., p. 108; Wolfram Kaiser, `To Join or Not to Join?: The 
"Appeasement" Policy of Britain's First EEC Application', in Brian and Harriet Jones (eds. ), 
From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and European Integration Since 1945 (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1993), pp. 144-56. 
123 Howarth, `Discourse Analysis', op. cit., p. 116. Hayden White's `Performance Model of 
Discourse' resembles the historiographical approach to interpretation in the sense that it regards 
discourse `as an apparatus for the production of meaning rather than as only a vehicle for the 
transmission of information about an external referent'. White, The Content of the Form. op. 
cit., p. 42. See also Little, `Historiography and IR', op. cit., p. 294. 
'24 This term is used in the thesis interchangeably with the term `orthodox school'. The use of 
`Monnetist' implies the socially constructed nature of the first school around Monnet's vision of 
European integration. 
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echo Gabriel Spiegel, it seems that histories are grounded strongly in social 
contexts: `it is by focusing on the social logic of the text, its location within a 
broader network of social and intertextual relations, that we best become 
attuned to the specific historical conditions whose presence and/or absence in 
the work alerts us to its own social character and formation, its own 
combination of material and discursive realities that endow it with its own 
sense of historical purposiveness'. 125 
In the same way that Howarth shows Thatcher to have hegemonised key words 
and phrases to manipulate the debate about the ills of social collectivism in the 
1980s, '26 the Monnetists have their own set of linguistic tools which they 
employ in their critique of British European policy. Prime amongst these are 
the charges that Britain `missed chances' 127 to lead Europe after the Second 
World War and, according to recent reformulations, that Britain has 
historically been the `awkward' or `reluctant partner' in the European 
Union. ' 28 
125 Quoted in Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 93. 
126 Howarth, `Discourse Analysis', op. cit., pp. 124-7. See also David Marsland who notes that 
Thatcher's ideology was in part `constituted into innovative arguments' which 'provided a 
challenging alternative to the political orthodoxy'. The word `constituted' suggests this 
dichotomy between action and words. David Marsland, `A Nanny no, A Medusa... maybe', 
Times Higher Education Supplement, 3 March 2000, p. 20. 
127 `Britain and Europe's "Third Chance"', op. cit. It was a common criticism to be found in 
many works: Boothby, My Yesterday, op. cit., p. 73; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., p. 790; 
Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit., pp. 122-3; Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain and 
the World 1900-1990 (London: Penguin, 1996), p. 236; Edmund Dell, The Schuman Plan and 
the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 303; 
Denman, Missed Chances, op. cit.; Earl of Kilmuir, Political Adventure: The Memoirs of the 
Earl of Kilmuir (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1964), p. 186; Anthony Nutting, Europe 
Will Not Wait: A Warning and a Way Out (London: Hollis and Carter, 1960), p. 34. 
128 Stephen George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit.; David Gowland and Arthur Turner, 
Reluctant Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945-1998 (Harlow: Pearson, 2000). 
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The community of writers which gave voice to the orthodoxy can, for purposes 
of analysis, be split into three groups. First, it is the product of Monnetist 
criticisms on the continent and in the United States about the myopic policy 
pursued by British decision-makers. It is therefore firmly rooted in moralising 
by supranational integrationists on the continent and across the Atlantic about 
the `right course' for European integration. That Britain was not part of this 
supposed virtuous path to unity led to the virulent criticisms that characterise 
orthodox historiography. 129 Like its historiographical counterpart in Germany, 
Wolfram Kaiser explains, the British 'Sonderweg' thesis about `a historically 
unique departure from the apparently normal path of democratic virtue' in 
Europe is a further example of a nation hunting down scapegoats, or `guilty 
men' to explain its past. 130 
The second tie among writers in the orthodox school is among the British 
Monnetists, the community of commentators in the media, notably the 
Economist Intelligence Unit and in the Federal Union and associated bodies, 
responsible for bringing the- language of `missed opportunities' into 
fashionable use to describe the entire course of British European policy since 
the Second World War. 131 The third community of writers forming the 
orthodox school includes British contemporaries of Monnet who, while not 
129 Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit.; Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation: My Years in the State 
Department (New York: Signett, 1969), pp. 385-7. 
'30 Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., introduction, p. 16. 131 As the first chapter shows, the objective of the Federal Trust, now called Federal Union, as 
its name suggests, is to offer federal solutions to regional and global security problems. Despite 
fractiousness over time and disagreement among members on specifics one can compare its 
broad outlook to that of the continental and American supranationalists, hence the term `British 
Monnetists'. 
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sharing his federalist outlook, nonetheless shared in the despondency 
surrounding British foreign policy, supporting the criticisms of British 
European policy in the 1960s for a variety of personal and political reasons. 132 
The final community of writers which has contributed to orthodox 
historiography consists of journalists, political scientists and historians writing 
during this period of intense unhappiness with British European policy. What 
their shared outlook suggests is that, at least in the early phase of the 
historiography, differences of approach between political scientists and 
historians had less of an impact on interpretation than one might presume in 
the light of a supposed division between the disciplines in terms of their 
approaches to the study of International Relations. The language they 
employed reflects the climate of opinion at the time of writing, up to the end of 
the 1980s, when the `missed opportunities' approach was sustained by the 
linkage that was commonly drawn between the deep economic recessions and 
Britain's failure to join the EEC sooner. Had Britain been `in' from the start, 
the argument goes, at least the economy would have benefitted. 133 It is clear 
that the `missed opportunities' discourse became the accepted interpretation of 
132 Boothby, My Yesterday, op. cit., p. 73; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., p. 790; Denman, 
Missed Chances, op. cit.; Dell, The Schuman Plan, op. cit., p. 303; Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs 
of Lord Gladwvn (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), p. 3; Nutting, Europe Will Not 
Wait, op. cit., p. 34; Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit., p. 186. This verdict is nicely captured 
in Charlton's volume of oral testimony, The Price of Victory, op. cit. Lord Home likewise 
recalled that `we could have had the leadership of Europe, but let it slip from our grasp'. 
Quoted in Maclean, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 75. 
133 Miriam Camps in Britain and the European Community, op. cit., p. 45; Camps, European 
Unification in the Sixties, op. cit.; Barker, Britain in a Divided Ewope, op. cit., p. 152. See also 
Joseph Frankel, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975), 
p. 319; Peter Hennessy, ` The Attlee Governments, 1945-1951', in Peter Hennessy and Anthony 
Seldon (eds. ), Ruling Performance: British Governments from Attlee to Thatcher (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1987), pp. 28-62 (p. 47). 
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Britain's approach to Europe by a generation of commentators in Britain 
railing against the establishment neglect of Europe. Supposed European policy 
failings achieved mythical status for politicians and officials disillusioned with 
Britain's relatively poor economic performance, the dismantling of Empire and 
exclusion by Russia and America from Cold War diplomacy. 
One can infer similarly tight connections among writers in the revisionist (and 
post-revisionist) schools. 134 One of the major reasons why there was a shift 
from the orthodoxy to revisionism seems to be that in the mid-1980s, under the 
relaunch of the Community with the Single European Act, academic interest in 
`Europe' exploded. As Young put it: academic interest only really picked up 
c. 1984-5 as the EEC itself recovered from the doldrums of the 1970s'. 135 In 
Britain the issues surrounding the relaunch were put into sharper focus by 
Thatcher's rhetoric against the `Brussels bureaucracy'. 136 Despite being a 
prime mover behind the Single European Act she continued to reject the 
political implications of integration. 137 One can compare this to what happened 
in Denmark. Until this time, notes Knud Erik Jorgensen, `The unspoken 
assumption was that "reluctant Europeans" do not need to do research [into 
European integration]... Research on the EC was a latecomer to the social 
134 It is not necessary at this stage to analyse revisionism and post-revisionism separately, 
because while they differ on interpretation the social construction of the schools is broadly 
similar. For `revisionism', therefore, read `post-revisionism' too. 
'35 Permission granted to quote from email correspondence, 27 January 1999. 
'36 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years 1979-1990 (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 
pp. 742-6. 
7 Yves Mbny and Andrew Knapp, Government and Politics in Western Europe: Britain. 
France. Italy Germany 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Ptess, 1998), pp. 374-5. 
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sciences in Denmark'. 138 The paucity of studies on the history of Britain and 
European integration at this time is alluded to in Roger Bullen's 1985 review 
of texts by Young and Ritchie Ovendale in which he wrote `It is to be hoped 
that they stimulate a wider European debate'. 139 
One can overstate this case, however. It is necessary to distinguish between the 
rise of European studies and the burgeoning of interest in Britain and Europe, 
with which this study is centrally concerned. Evidence from key revisionist 
writers- analysed in chapter four- suggests that it was the release of documents 
under the Thirty Year Rule that had greater impact on historians paying 
attention to Britain and Europe in the 1980s. The dearth of primary source 
accounts of the period spurred a generation of historians into seeking the 
reasons for how Britain had got where it was in Europe. 140 In January 1985 the 
official government material in the PRO to 1954 was already available for 
inspection. This wealth of material suited historians trained in Britain on 
Eltonian principles of hard factual evidence as the soundest foundation of our 
knowledge about the past. 141 As Jack Levy summarises this ideology: `the 
historian's aim is to show history "as it really was", to recreate the past that 
exists independently of the preconception and prejudices of the historians. 
138 Knud Erik Jorgensen, ` European Integration as a Field of Study in Denmark', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 33,1 (1995), pp. 157-62 (p. 157). 
139 Roger Bullen, review, `Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951. By John W. 
Young; The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-1951. Edited by Ritchie 
Ovendale', Journal of Common Market Studies 24,1 (1985), pp. 77-8 (p. 78). 14° Young explains this twin motivation as follows: `it fitted into my interests in the origins of 
the Cold War as an undergraduate AND it was an area just opening up in the archives (so no- 
one could beat me to it)'. Email correspondence, 27 January 1999. 141 Elton, The Practice of History, op. cit. 
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Through immersion in the documents and application of the critical 
hermeneutic method, the historian [can] recreate the past through narratives 
and achieve value-free, scientific certainty'. 142 Beloff likewise: `no documents, 
no history'. 143 Just as the orthodoxy has to be situated in the context of the 
particular time, the political climate of opinion and all that that entails in terms 
of the type of study and method behind the school, understanding the 
revisionist school requires analysis of the academic community which gave it 
its voice. This is pertinent because it undercuts the argument that revisionist 
historiography is any less positioned than its orthodox predecessor. 
Professional academic histories are, Jenkins remarks, history in the lower case. 
Is such historiography any more `innocent' than the orthodoxy? No, claims 
Jenkins, because their deference to sources is an artificial intellectual closure 
that makes revisionist, and by extension post-revisionist, historiography as 
ideological as the orthodoxy. 144 As Ferdinand Braudel argued also: `historical 
narrative is not a method, or even the objective method par excellence, but 
simply a philosophy of history like any other'. 145 To argue that the study of the 
past should not have anything to do with the present/future is as present/future 
oriented as saying it should. Campbell makes this point about the positioned 
142 Jack S, Levy, `Too Important to Leave to the Other: History and Political Science in the 
Study of International relations', International Security, 2,1 (1997), pp. 22-33 (p. 26). 143 Beloti An Historian. op. cit., p. 10. See also Max Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreign Policy: 
A Study in British Administrative Experience 1947-59 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1961), p. 12; Palme Dutt, Problems of Contemporary History, op. cit., p. 38. `The seeker after 
the truth', he argues, `has often to delve in documents and archives'. 144 Jenkins, ` Introduction', op. cit., pp. 5-6. 145 Quoted in Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 45. On p. 51 he goes on to 
paraphrase White's position: `Historical writing must thus be understood primarily as a form of 
ideology'. 
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nature of `scientific history' as follows: `especially in International Relations, 
when many people argue in reified terms about epistemologies and 
methodologies they are more often than not delineating positions which 
themselves are ethico-political and cannot, in terms of their own logic, be 
epistemologically defended and secured'. 146 
Jenkins continues in the same vein: `In fact liberal pluralism restricts its 
tolerances to those histories and historians who subscribe to the values of "the 
academic" lower case. For if liberal pluralism accepts that any sort of 
representation of the past is permissible... then clearly other types of 
historiography such as upper case versions... are not "not history" but just 
"different". Consequently at this point lower case history has to lose its 
innocence and become as positioned and interested as any other history. In 
preventing just anything counting as history, a tolerant liberal pluralism in the 
lower case becomes an intolerant Liberal Ideology in the upper. Accordingly, 
what we have here is the ideologisation/politicisation of all histories'. 147 
The `say it with documents' approach, 148 getting at Watt describes as `the real 
archival evidence''149 or what G. M. Trevelyan termed, in true Eltonian 
146 Campbell, ` Contra Wight', op. cit., p. 318. 
147 Jenkins, ` Introduction', op. cit., p. 15. 
14s A term taken from Anne Deighton, `Say it with Documents: British Policy Overseas 1945- 
1952', Review of International Studies, 18,4 (1992), pp. 393-4-2. Such an ideology shows in 
Shlaim's 1978 book in which he advised `The writing of authoritative history of this subject 
cannot precede, it can only follow, the opening of the official papers for research... [T]he 
interpretation is necessarily tentative in that it is not underpinned by primary sources. Shlaim, 
Britain and the Origins of European Unity op. cit., p. 4. 149 D. Cameron Watt, `Demythologising the Eisenhower Era', in Louis and Bull (eds. ), The 
Special Relationship, op. cit., pp. 65-85 (p. 72). 
86 
fashion, ` the facts of history', 150 is also positioned because it can be taken as a 
manipulation of professional historians by the officials who choose and weed 
all the documents deposited in the PRO, giving them an artificially important 
place in British history which, it could be argued, they feel they deserve after 
years of neglect in the press and on television. As one diplomatic historian, 
Constantine Pagedas, has summarised: `the Thirty Year Rule governing the 
release of archival material.... has meant that historians are now able to piece 
together systematically the events... more accurately than ever before'. '5' But 
whose history is this? Further, professional histories could be said to impose 
artificial order on history, a sense of `managed decline' of British power and 
influence which necessarily results from the narrativisation of events. 
As White suggests, narrating the past imposes on it a `continuity, wholeness, 
closure and individuality that every "civilised" society wishes to see itself as 
incarnating'. 152 Yet to base judgments on `an apocalyptic objectivity' is, 
Foucault maintains, a futile ambition. `Truth', he argues, `is produced only by 
multiple forms of constraint', 153 in this case the narrow selection of surviving 
documents and the weeding of those documents by those with a vested interest 
in presenting a particular representation of events. The shortcomings of the 
diplomatic historians' reliance on documentary evidence is revealed in Rodney 
Lowe's critique of Lamb's claim that `the release by the Public Record Office 
'so Trevelyan, An Autobiography and Other Essays, op. cit., p. 68. 
'S' Constantine A. Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations and the French Problem 196O- 
1ß63: A Troubled Partnership (London: Frank Cass, 2000), p. 7. 
152 White, The Content of the Fbnm, op. cit., p. 87. 153 Quoted in Rainbow (ed. ), The Foucault Reader, op. cit., pp. 72-3 and p. 87. 
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on 1 January 1994 under the Thirty Year Rule of the final official archives 
relating to the Macmillan Government enables historians to write the truth'. ' 
This, Lowe notes, `is of course nonsense'. 155 The reason he gives for Lamb's 
nonsensical claim is not that his publisher forced him to put it in as a 
memorable opening to the book, or that he was being overly confident, but 
simply that `By no means all the documents were released in 1994'. 1 Overtly 
political tracts have given way to professional histories which now dominate 
the historiography of Britain's relations with Europe. The question of whether 
the `say it with documents' approach is more or less positioned than open 
political tracts is a worthy digression, but should not detract attention from the 
first key divide between the schools: sociological context. Jordanova makes 
this point well: `publications are never free-standing, although they are often 
seen in this way, but rather are parts of elaborate conversations with other 
historians, living and dead. They are also conversations with governments, 
political parties, interest groups and so on'. 157 
" Competing Views about the Foreign Policy Process 
The second gulf between orthodox and revisionist (post-revisionist) 
historiography exists in their approaches to the foreign policy process. The 
foreign policy process itself has in the last ten years become the object of 
inquiry as much as policy content, hence the emphasis in the current 
154 Lamb, The Macmillan Years, op. cit., p. 1 155 Rodney Lowe, review, `The Macmillan Years, 1957-1963: The Emerging Truth. By Richard 
Lamb', Contemporary British History, 10,2 (1996), pp. 239-41 (p. 240). 
156 Ibid. 
157 Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., p. I. 
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historiography on the role of civil servants, bureaucracies and departments on 
the formation of policy. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary are 
secondary in many of these accounts. This development has coincided with the 
use of primary sources and reflects academic interest in what David Vincent 
calls `the culture of secrecy' in British political life. As Clive Ponting points 
out, Britain's culture of secrecy `ranges much wider than the Whitehall 
machine'. 158 Foreign policy analysts and historians working on Britain and 
Europe have been as keen to investigate the form of the foreign policy machine 
as much as the substance, or policy output. '59 
Explanations for this tendency in the historiography are not just rooted in the 
inquisitive academic mind and the `culture of secrecy' in Britain. It reflects 
three additional trends. The first is historians' epistemological preference for 
understanding particular events over explaining trends across time. There was 
never full agreement on the explanatory power of realism, but the end of the 
158 Clive Ponting, review, `The Culture of Secrecy: Britain 1832-1998. By David Vincent', 
Times Higher Education Supplement, 3 March 2000, p. 25. 
159 Peter Hennessy, Cabinet (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986); Peter Hennessy, Whitehall (London: 
Secker and Warburg, 1989); Anthony Adamthwaite, `Britain and the World, 1945-9: The View 
from the Foreign Office', International Affairs, 61,2 (1985), pp. 223-35; Clarke, `The Policy- 
Making Process', op. cit.; Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreiggi Policy, op. cit., especially pp. 22- 
56; Anthony Adamthwaite, `Introduction: The Foreign Office and Policy-Making', in John W. 
Young (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration. 1951-55 (Leicester: 
Leicester University Press, 1988), pp. 1-28; Anthony Adamthwaite, `Overstretched and 
Overstrung: Eden, the Foreign Office and the Making of Policy, 1951-1955', International 
Affairs, 64,2 (1988), pp. 241-59; Merrick, `The Russia Committee', op. cit.; Avi Shlaim, ` The 
Foreign Secretary and the Making of Policy', in Avi Shlaim, Peter Jones and Keith Sainsbury (eds. ), British Foreign Secretaries Since 1945 (London: David and Charles, 1977); a nice 
companion to this is Hennessy and Seldon (eds. ), Ruling Performance, op. cit.; Zametica (ed. ), 
British Officials and British Foreign Poli cy, op. cit. For a political science perspective on policy- 
making see Simon Bulmer and Martin Burch, `Organising for Europe: Whitehall, the British 
State and the European Union', Public Administration 76,4 (1998), pp. 601-28; Colin Hay and 
David Richards, `The Tangled Webs of Westminster and Whitehall: The Discourse, Strategy, 
and Practice of Networking of within the British Core Executive', Public Administration, 78,1 
(2000), pp. 1-28. 
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Cold War certainly hastened its demise. If key individuals such as George Bush 
and Mikhail Gorbachev ` catalysed' such key transformations as the democratic 
transformation in Eastern Europe, initiated military withdrawals from the 
region, facilitated agreement on the unification of Germany and helped to 
codify parity in weapons systems through the Conventional Armed Forces in 
Europe Treaty, 160 how could structures still be held responsible for the action 
of agents in the foreign policy arena? Was British foreign policy the result of 
rational actors holding a `structural-realist' Weltanschauung, or is that too 
simplistic a model which ignores the workings of the Whitehall machine, its 
permeation by outside sources of power and influence? The very formulation 
of the question raises doubts about the generalising tendencies of the structural 
realist approach to British foreign policy. 
So there is 'a political explanation, revolving around the impact of the world 
system on the academic study of international relations. Michael Scriven has, 
however, noted the problems of extrapolating interpretation from structural 
forces at work on writers. `Surely to say C caused E logically commits one to 
the view that anything identical to C in every respect including the time will 
produce something similarly identical to E'. 161 There is, secondly, a more 
fundamental dimension to consider: methodological input. 162 The very nature 
of the subject matter on which revisionist and post-revisionist accounts are 
based- primary archives in the PRO- presents a persuasive explanation for the 
160 William C. Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
1992), preface p. 13. 161 Quoted in Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 30. Emphasis in original. 162 If one includes in the term `method' the sources utilised by historians, not just the research 
design, aims and objectives. 
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interest these historians show in the Whitehall machine. Scrutinising individual 
and departmental exchanges has prompted archival researchers to take an avid 
interest in who were the prime movers in British foreign policy, rendering 
revisionist and post-revisionist historiography qualitatively different in texture 
from orthodox accounts of British foreign policy. This word `texture' 
introduces the third explanation: the type of study and the questions one asks of 
history have a massive bearing on the interpretation offered. 16' General studies 
written about foreign policy gave only superficial attention to the machinery of 
Whitehall because of a lack of time and space; studies of the European 
dimension of British foreign policy gave it more weight; articles on one or two 
year periods in that relationship have been more incisive still. Hence, the 
greater attention now being paid in the historiography to the workings of the 
British foreign policy process can be explained using a combination of three 
factors: paradigmatic shifts in the study of international relations, pragmatic 
issues associated with methods and sources and the type of study produced. All 
of these affect how each school treats the issue of the foreign policy process. 
" 
Perceptions of Intentions and Outcomes in British Foreign Policy 
The third distinction one can draw between orthodox and revisionist and post- 
revisionist schools centres on the issue of intentions and outcomes in foreign 
policy-making. Orthodox historiography tended to see British foreign policy as 
a direct function of what British ministers and officials willed it to be. For 
revisionists, by contrast, the execution of British foreign policy is not nearly so 
163 Beloff An Histori an. op 
. 
cit., pp. 33-4. 
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neatly captured. The aims of British policy-makers were not always achieved, 
not because of what British policy-makers did wrong (the conventional 
wisdom, so easy to believe in light of opposition criticism and complaint) but 
sometimes because of events beyond their control. Foreign policy, they argue, 
is made and projected in an uncertain, complex international environment. 
Many claims of the orthodoxy rely on the distorting rhetoric of politicians 
rather than on a considered examination of the original intentions of British 
decision-makers. 
An offshoot of this development has been growing historiographical 
recognition in Britain that British foreign policy is made in a global 
environment. '" It has, however, taken a relatively long time for the global 
influences at work on British European policy to be recognised. A relatively 
recent research area, it is natural that British historians first aspired to 
investigate the British side of the argument thoroughly. They could, for 
example, have gleaned more evidence from the Economist, which offers many 
revealing insights about the interaction between multilateral diplomacy and the 
164 This development is shown in recent historiography which takes into account the impact on 
Britain's European goals of the foreign policy strategies of Britain's partners in Europe and the 
United States. See the contributions in George Wilkes (ed. ), Britain's Failure to Enter the 
European Community 1961-637 The Enlargement Negotiations and Crises in European 
, 
Atlantic 
and Commonwealth Relations (London: Frank Cass, 1997). It was also prevalent in earlier 
revisionist historiography which stressed the positioned nature of the criticisms of British 
European policy, opening the debates about the difference between rhetoric and reality and how 
one defines 'Europeanism'. See Young, `Churchill's "No" to Europe: The "Rejection" of Union 
by Churchill's Post-War Government, 1951-1952', Historical Journal, 28,4 (1985), pp. 923-37. 
See also Anthony Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer: The Conservative Government 1951-55 
(London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1981), especially pp. 381-483; Melissen and Zeeman, ` Britain 
and Western Europe', op. cit. 
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British approach to European integration. 165 The globalism of its articles (its 
Brussels, Paris and Bonn correspondents providing much of the evidence) is 
similar to what is now paraded as revisionism, the `new' or `original' approach 
to British European policy. Likewise, there could be greater appreciation of the 
global picture through analysis of secondary texts by foreign writers on alliance 
diplomacy and British European policy as the function of international 
developments. To take just one example explored below, studies of de Gaulle, 
American foreign policy in Europe and nuclear defence discussions all argued 
that the fate of the first British application to the EEC policy was out of British 
hands, determined by competing American and French designs for Europe. 166 
That such sources are so underused by historians in Britain reflects their 
fascination with primary evidence and the recollection of key British players. It 
also shows the penetration of history by empiricism: the need for a rigorously 
scientific evidential base. Stoker sets out this broader position within the social 
161 It is no coincidence that writers such as Young who made use of media sources, provided a 
revisionist account of British European policy. See his Britain and European Unity, op. cit.; 
George offered more than a hint of revisionism, but was less explicit than Young. In An 
Awkward Partner, op. cit. 
'6 George W. Ball, The Discipline of Power (London: The Bodley Head, 1968), pp. 198-220; 
Brian Crozier, De Gaulle: The Statesman (London: Eyre Methuen, 1973), p. 539; John Dickie, 
`Special' No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, 1994), pp. 105-32; Alan Dobson, `The Years of Transition: Anglo-American Relations 
1961-1967', Review of International Studies. 16 (1990), pp. 239-58 (pp. 243-6); Alfred Grosser, 
The Western Alliance: European-American Relations Since 1945 (New York: Continuum, 
1980), pp. 183-208; Stanley Hoffinann, Decline or Renewal?: France Since the 1930s (New 
York: The Viking Press, 1974), pp. 283-399; Robert Marjolin, `What Type of Europe? ', in 
Brinkley and Hackett (eds. ), Jean Monnet, op. cit., pp. 163-83; Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy 
(London: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 594-619; Jean Lacouture, De Gaulle: The Ruler 1945- 
e 1970, trans. Alan Sheridan (London: Horvill, 1990), pp. 334-75; Bernard Ledwidge, De Gaull 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), pp. 259-84; Macridis, De ulle op. cit.; David 
Nunnerley, President Kennedy and Britain (London: The Bodley Head, 1972); Andrew 
Shennan, De Gaulle (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 118-24; Alexander Werth, De Gaulle: A 
Political Biography (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1965); Pascaline Winand, Eisenhower. Kennedy. 
and the United States of Europe (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 210-338. 
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sciences, using the words of A. Zuckerman to argue that `Political science 
demands from its practitioners that they will produce arguments and evidence 
that will convince others. "Emotional attachments, personal hunches and 
intuitive understanding do not justify knowledge claims... logical coherence 
and adequate evidence are the most widely adopted criteria by which we judge 
claims to knowledge'. 167 `Facts' gleaned from primary sources tend to be 
considered more `scientific' than media accounts which are considered 
secondary not primary sources. That Camps, Barker and Beloff are considered 
`academic' despite their journalistic background shows the import of being 
seen to be academic. Such points associated with the professionalisation of the 
writing of British European policy will be developed below. What is crucial to 
understand at this point is the widening scope of the historiography in recent 
years and the concurrent observation that this could theoretically have occurred 
before the release of documents under the Thirty Year Rule. 
" Removing Hindsight from Historical Accounts 
The use of hindsight in the writing of history is a particular feature of British 
political memoirs which form the backbone of the orthodox school. 168 This 
167 Stoker, 'Introduction', in Marsh and Stoker, 1h§=AW-Mtlhod 
, 
op. cit., pp. 1-18 (p. 3). In 
history, Iggers notes, the parallel assumption is that 'methodologically controlled research 
makes objective knowledge possible'; Iggers. HiztofJQ&npbpe, op. cit., p. 2. I6$ One can include diaries alongside memoirs in this category See Clement Attlee, As it 
Happened (London: William Heinemann, 1954); Tony Benn, The Benn Diaries. W. Ruth 
Winstone (London: Arrow, 1996); Boothby, My Yesterday, op. cit.; George Brown, In My 
The Politicýt Memoirs of Lid Goorgc-Browe (London: Victor Gollancz, 1971); Barbara 
Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-1976 (London: Papermac, 1990); Richard Crossman, The 
Crossman Diaries, 2" edn, ed. Anthony Howard (London: Mandarin, 1991); Anthony Eden, 
Full Cirde" The Memoirs of Sir Anthony bEden (London: Cassdl, 1960); Edward Heath, f 
Course of My Life My Autobiogra_ýhv (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1998); Dennis Healey, 
The Time of My Life (London: Penguin, 1990); Lord Home, The the Wind Blows: An 
Autobi_ ography (London: Collins, 1976); Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit.; Ivone 
Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle: The irs of Ivone Kirkpatrick (London: Macmillan, 1959); 
Harold Macmillan, Tides of Fortune. 1945-1955 (London: Macmillan, 1969); Harold 
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should come as no surprise. Looking back with the advantage of ten, twenty or 
even thirty years distance the detail of events will be lost, even with the help 
of personal papers, researchers and ghost writers. An extra reason for this is to 
be found in the character of memoirs which are, by definition, centrally 
concerned with highlighting (or suppressing) the author's involvement in 
events. This leaves little room for consideration of the parts played by 
ministerial colleagues and officials. But memoir-writers also suffer from 
`convenient' memory loss. The distortion of events to suit a particular political 
line, to hide personal embarrassment, or to make an apologia for policy. 
Hence Austen Morgan's damning indictment: `Politicians belong to that 
special class of liar who seem to be genuinely unable to discriminate between 
special pleading, the suppression of material evidence, and outright 
falsification of the record'. 169 
Politics is a fickle occupation. Members of the ruling elite tend to make more 
enemies than friends, both in opposition parties and their own. Europe is an 
issue that tends to cut across party divides and one discovers in memoirs a lot 
of personal and political antagonism. Another concern may, of course, be that 
controversy boosts book sales. Memoirs full of criticism, intrigue and 
`revelations' are likely to sell more copies and induce lucrative serialisation 
deals than dense chronological narrative. The insights political recollections 
Macmillan, Riding the Storm. 1956-59 (London: Macmillan, 1971); Harold Macmillan, At the 
End of the Dav 1961-1963 (London: Macmillan, 1973); Harold Macmillan, Pointing the Way 
1959-61 (London: Macmillan, 1972); Lord Moran, Winston Churchill: The Struggle 
Survival (London: Constable, 1966); Harold Wilson, A Prime Minister on Prime Ministers 
(London: Book Club, 1977); Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal 
Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971). 169 Morgan, Harold Wilson, op. cit., p. 389. 
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give us into the making and implementation of British European policy are 
generally scant for a number of reasons. They tend to repeat the conventional 
wisdom about individuals rather than analysing the substance of policy itself. 
But this is more than made up for by vitriol and personal antagonism that 
demonstrates the intense personal rivalry among British politicians. 
Memoirs can therefore be misleading both for unintentional and intentional 
reasons. On one hand human memory loss and egotism sway former 
practitioners to eschew detail in favour of recounting their own involvement in 
events. On the other, personal bias, antagonism and the use of hindsight can 
distort historical events to such an extent that Morgan's criticism would seem 
nearer the mark. On key issues such as Britain and Europe the link across 
memoirs is that they tend to propagate the conventional wisdom about 
decision-makers, the events themselves relegated to a position of secondary 
importance. Whether this be hostile approaches to Eden or more favourable 
verdicts on Edward Heath's policy, the key point is that all the personal 
tensions resulting from the practice of politics have had a massive bearing on 
the historiography. 170 
The fourth divide between orthodox and revisionist and post-revisionist 
schools is to be found in the latter two's explicit attempts to eschew hindsight. 
170 Biographies of the key players- especially official- are rarely willing to question the ideology 
of the subject. See Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit.; Kenneth Harris, Attlee, 2"d edn. (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1995); Alistair Home, Macmillan 1894-1956: Volume 1 of the 
Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1988); Alistair Home, Macmillan 1956-1986: Volume 
2 of the Official Biography (London: Macmillan, 1991); Kenneth Young, Sir Alec Douglas- 
Home (London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1970); Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of 
Lord Wilson ofRievaulx (London: Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1993). 
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Historical training in Britain teaches that one should tell the story as it was 
using the remnants of events available to us in the present. Scholars therefore 
attempt to empathise with the predicament in which individuals found 
themselves, trying to reconstruct events through the eyes of politicians and 
officials rather than imprinting the concerns of the present on the past. 
Whether they achieve such detachment is a separate matter. This in turn raises 
a crucial point about the debunking of the received wisdom about Britain and 
Europe. 
" 
Myth-Making in Contemporary History 
Intimately linked to the professional aspiration to avoid hindsight, the fifth gulf 
between orthodox and revisionist approaches to British European policy is 
their willingness to question and debunk conventional political wisdom. There 
appears to be something in the human psyche that makes us ultra-critical of 
figures in the public eye. Many politicians are now treated with disdain, "' 
reminding one of a nostalgic `golden age' when they were treated with, and 
deserved, respect. The Wilson administrations were, it seems, a watershed 
experience. 172 The alleged opaqueness in the policy process- characterised in 
171 This is not purely a British phenomenon. Politicians across Western Europe in general have 
come under sustained attack from the media on the grounds of sleaze and corruption. The loss 
of legitimacy of domestic politicians has been reflected and, reinforced by, by the increasing 
disdain shown towards politics at European Union level. As Palme Dutte observes, humans do 
tend to look back nostalgically on the past, whatever the difficulties at the time. See Problems of 
Contemporary Histly, op, cit., p. 28. 172 Wilson was Prime Minister from October 1964 to June 1970 and March 1974 to April 1976. 
That the Fulton Report on civil service reform, published in June 1968, made the Prime Minister 
`responsible for senior appointments, the machinery of Government and security matters' may 
have had the paradoxical effect to the one intended. That is, while it raised the levels of initiative 
and responsibility for junior members of the civil service, it donated greater powers of patronage 
to the Prime Minister through the changes listed above. The Earl Jellicoe, `Lord Edward Arthur 
Alexander Shackleton', Biographic Memoirs of Fellows of the Royal Society. 45 (1999), 
pp. 485-505 (p. 494). 
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the literature by charges that the premier presided over a kitchen cabinet-13 
stimulated suspicion in Britain about the state of political life, the quality of 
those elected to lead the country. The common theme of the diaries by Richard 
Crossman, Barbara Castle and Tony Benn is the detachment of the Prime 
Minister from Cabinet and Parliamentary scrutiny, stimulating interest amongst 
academics in the debates about the power of the civil service and Prime 
Ministerial versus Cabinet Government in Britain. 174 
Yet if one looks back to their predecessors, the verdict on them was not always 
as kind as one would expect. At the time European policy was just one of a 
number of political issues greeted with disdain by the opposition and the back 
benches of the governing party. The rhetoric about that policy, the criticisms 
levelled against it have had strong repercussions in the literature, because they 
have set in motion the discursive formation it is all too easy for writers to 
repeat without question. Personal antagonism, pithy soundbites for headline 
writers and dismissive one-liners about policy in the House of Commons have 
'73 Castle, The Castle Diaries, op. cit., p. 3 (26 January 1965), p. 11 (18 March 1965); Joe 
Haines, The Politics of Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1977), p. 157; Jay, Change and Fortune. 
op. cit., p. 378; Morgan, Harold Wilson, op. cit., p. 390; Kenneth O. Morgan, Labour People: 
Leaders and Lieutenants: Hardie to Kinnock (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 256; 
Clive Ponting, Breach of Promise: Labour in Power 1964-1970 (London: Hamish Hamilton, 
1989), pp. 33-5. 
14 Sixth-formers and undergraduates are made well aware of their arguments. See for example 
Patrick Dunleavy, `Government at the Centre', in Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble and Gillian 
Peele (eds. ), Developments in British Politics 3 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990), pp. 96-125. 
There is continuity into the next edition. See Keith Dowding, 'Government at the Centre', in 
Patrick Dunleavy, Andrew Gamble, Ian Holliday and Gillian Peele (eds. ), Developments in 
British Politics 4 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993), pp. 175-93. See also Dennis Kavanagh, 
British Politics: Continuities and Chan ge, 3rd edn. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 
pp. 247-76; Donald Shell and Richard Hodder-Williams (eds. ), Churchill to Major: The British 
Prime Ministership Since 1945 (London: Hurst and Co., 1995); Geoffrey Fry, `Is the Civil 
Service Too Powerful?: The Case Against', Contemporary Record, 3,4 (1990), pp. 10-2 (p. 11); 
Mark Wickham-Jones, `Is the Civil Service Too Powerful?: The Case For', Contemporary 
Record, 3,4 (1990), pp. 9-10; R. W. Johnson, review, `Digging Up the Ancestors: Hugh 
Gaitskell. By Brian Brivati', London Review of Books, 18,22(1996), pp. 13-4 (p. 13). 
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set the tone for much orthodox historiography, apparently reinforced by 
criticisms from continental Europeans intimately involved in the construction 
of Europe. 
Jeremy Richardson argues that `The job of academics is to debunk 
conventional wisdom'. 175 This sentiment applies extremely strongly to 
revisionist approaches to Britain's relationship with Europe. They have been 
unhappy with the generalising tendencies of the conventional wisdom, 
attacking the twin inconsistencies in the orthodoxy: its charges of crude 
`negativity' towards the continent levelled at successive governments and the 
`missed opportunities' approach to European policy. They seem to have been 
reacting against what Brian Harrison describes as the `over-personalised, 
present-oriented "who was to blame and how can we do better next time? " 
agenda? '. 176 Some of the personal political antagonisms are easy to identify 
without recourse to the documentation. Macmillan, Robert Boothby and David 
Maxwell Fyfe against Eden, for example; the Labour diarists against Wilson; 
Thatcher against Heath. When such antagonisms flow over into broad 
criticisms of European policy revisionists have found it relatively easy to 
uncover the motivations. These were convenient rhetorical myths at the time. 
However, they argue, charges that policy-makers were `anti-European' could 
equally apply to those making the accusations. Revisionists have therefore 
175 Quoted in Baty, `Labour Policy Poses Threat to Freedom', Times Higher Education 
Supplement, op. cit. 
176 Brian Harrison, `The Wilson Governments 1964-1970. Edited by R. Coopey, S. Fielding and 
N. Tiratsoo', Contemporary Record, 7,2 (1993), pp. 490-1 (p. 490). 
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have been challenging the conventional wisdom on the grounds of hypocrisy. 
David Dutton's reassessment of Eden is lapidary: `If the Foreign Secretary is to 
be blamed for a lack of vision as to what the forces of supranationalism could 
achieve, his guilt must be shared, with very few exceptions, by a whole 
political generation'. 177 
" 
The Use of Sources 
The sixth gulf between orthodox and revisionist historiography is in the 
different sources used by each school. The orthodox school is dominated by 
political memoirs, autobiographies, diaries and early secondary accounts. It is 
harder to generalise about biographies because they are increasingly becoming 
`contextualised', 178 setting interpretations in the context of broader academic 
discourse about the individual and politics at the time. 179 This enables the 
writer to incorporate current trends in the historiography into their studies, 
making them hard to locate in any one school. 180 
Revisionist and post-revisionist accounts, by contrast, have followed closely 
the release of primary documentation under the Thirty Year Rule. This is not to 
say historians necessarily needed official archives to construct a revisionist 
case. The thesis argues that the foundations of their approaches are to be found 
"' David Dutton, Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 301; He 
echoes Young's earlier judgment that `not all in Whitehall were blindly "anti-European"'. See 
Young, Britain and European Unity, p. 40. 178 This term was coined by Patrick O'Brien, Is Political Biography a Good Thing? ', 
Contemporary British History, 10,4 (1996), pp. 60-66 (p. 66). 
19 Hence Dutton's awareness of revisionism, noted above. 
'80 The best examples of this are John Campbell, Edward Heath: A Biography (London: Pimlico, 
1994); Dutton, Anthony Eden, op, cit.; Morgan, Harold Wilson_ op. cit.; Peter Weiler, Ernest 
Bevin (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). 
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in the internal contradictions and inconsistencies of argument in orthodox 
accounts. The contrast lies in the emphasis placed on competing explanations 
of European policy by the different schools. This raises interesting questions 
about the nature of contemporary history in Britain: why do explanations 
tacitly acknowledged but not developed in orthodox works take so long to 
develop into revisionism? It is argued below that for latent revisionism and 
post-revisionism to develop into distinct alternative historiographical schools 
of writing, requires generational change, changes in the dominant social 
construction of history and a new range of evidence to be brought to bear on 
historical events. 
5. Conclusion: The Significance of Questions and Answers in History 
The preceding analysis alerts us to the six major influences at work on 
historical interpretation in Britain. It has been shown that underpinning all the 
interpretative divides between schools are differences resulting from the type 
of study written. Seventh and finally, therefore, one needs to understand 
historiographical progression in the context of R. G. Collingwood's `logic of 
question and answer'. That is, the interpretation one places upon history can 
only be as good, or bad, as the questions one asks of it. Callinicos summarises 
Collingwood's position as follows: `Historical facts are... not the starting point 
of the process of inquiry but its result... Conceiving the historian's practice in 
this way, as the interplay of question and answer, in which the autonomy of the 
process is established when the historian poses her own questions, rather than 
taking them ready-made from the sources, displaces the attempt to reduce 
historiography to narrative'. 181 
What Collingwood is driving at is highly relevant to historiographical inquiry 
into the connection between interpretation and the type of study written. This 
can be tabularised as follows: 
Table 1: The Foundations of the Historiography of British European 
Policy, 1945-73 
ORTHODOXY Parliamentary debate; political memoir and autobiography; 
political diaries; oral testimony; political biography (especially 
official) 
Academic studies written before (or not using) primary 
archives released under the Thirty Tear Rule 
REVISIONISM Academic studies based on research into official archives, 
especially government records from the political branches 
of central government; `contextualised biography' 
`Contextualised biography' and studies based on research in 
foreign archives (a new methodological advance) 
POST- Academic studies based on additional PRO sources to those 
REVISIONISM consulted by revisionists, usually files from the economic 
departments 
What emerges from this introductory chapter is that the historiography of 
Britain's relations with Europe has been driven by different genres of 
literature, political memoir and general accounts gradually being replaced by 
181 Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op, cit., pp. 76-8. 
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academic tracts analysing British foreign policy over increasingly narrow 
periods of time. These authors are all asking different questions of the past. As 
Joseph Bleicher writes: `All interpretative activity involves us in inventing the 
object by "finding" it in a particular way. The object is never available to us in 
pristine form "out there" but is made available to us through the way we 
approach it'. 182 
Politicians are not necessarily interested in European policy per se; biographies 
similarly reflect the lack of attention or interest their subjects had in the 
making of European policy; general studies and textbooks have relatively little 
time to devote to detailed analysis of the machinery of Whitehall; academic 
studies are, by contrast, concerned with the detail over broader trends. They 
are, in short, asking different question of history. The phrase `asking questions' 
of history goes even deeper than the genre of study. It also involves how one 
researches, what research design is employed, which sources consulted, which 
ignored, who is interviewed and who one collaborates with in the writing 
process. As Callinicos observes, `every narrative is a theory in that, by 
selecting only certain events for inclusion, it imposes a structure on them'. 183 
This raises important questions about the dominant conception in the social 
sciences of the term `method'. 
fez Joseph Bleicher, `Invention and Community: Hermeneutic Politics in Europe', in Terrell 
Carver and Matti Hyvarinen (eds. ), Interpreting, the Political: New Methodologies (London: 
Routledge, 1997), pp. 143-53 (pp. 147-8). 
183 Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 90. 
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`Method' is a term about which, Campbell argues, social scientists now talk in 
`reified' terms. 's' The assumption is that having a `method' means one's 
conclusions are empirically sound, logical and testable by one's colleagues in 
the field. It can reasonably be argued on the basis of this thesis that the 
constituent elements of `method' are in fact much harder to capture. The 
interpretative processes that occur in the human brain vis-ä-vis narrative 
reconstruction are in most urgent need of attention. This is where historians 
can fruitfully converse with philosophers and psychologists to understand 
better the nature of their craft. The factors involved in deciding which sources 
to consult can also be dependent upon pragmatic matters of accessibility, 
avaliability, time and financial resources as to a planned choice of research 
design. Even less well analysed has been how long-held ideological or political 
outlooks and sociological factors distort the interpretation of historical 
evidence. That the same document in the PRO has been put to different 
interpretive ends by different schools of historians, and even historians in the 
same school, shows that identifying method is not always the most appropriate 
way of identifying output. Such are the complexities of the human mind and 
necessary processes of historical imagination that go into the reconstruction of 
historical events. 
Thus, to say one has a `research method' can actually mask deeper influences 
at work on historical research. This necessarily requires reflection on which 
alternative methods could be used, which additional sources consulted and 
184 Campbell, ` Contra Wight', op. cit., p. 318. 
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who one might interview to gain a clearer understanding of events. That the 
historiography of Britain and Europe contains little discussion to this end is 
testament to the theoretical malnutrition of British historians as well as to the 
relative isolation of history not just from political science but from critical 
theory and the reflectivism embodied in postmodern approaches to history. 
Ironically, David MacCannell observes, `the one path that still leads in the 
direction of scholarly objectivity, detachment and neutrality is exactly the one 
originally thought to lead away from these classic virtues: that is, an openly 
autobiographic style in which the subjective position of the author, especially 
on political matters, is presented in a clear and straight forward fashion. At 
least this enables the reader to review his or her position to make the 
adjustments available for dialogue'. '85 
The next three chapters are devoted to analysis of the three schools of writing 
of Britain and Europe, 1945-73. The next chapter analyses the foundation and 
development of the orthodox school, the fourth the challenge presented by the 
emergence of the revisionist school, the fifth the- smaller- post-revisionist 
school. Taking a thematic, school-oriented, approach seems to allow the most 
detailed analysis of the influences at work on writers in each school and 
therefore the strongest links binding writers together in schools. What it also 
demonstrates is the generational progression that characterises the 
historiography. The supplanting of one dominant community of writers by 
'" Quoted in Jenkins, On `What is History? ', op. cit., p. 14. 
another, it is argued, is perhaps the defining reason why the interpretation of 
one school becomes dominant in the field and then fades into the background. 
That different communities of writers ask different questions of the history, 
uncover fresh evidence, bring new practices to the field and write different 
types of study are thus intimately bound up with social change. The chapters 
address each influence in turn, while reminding the reader that they are all 
evidence of the same phenomena: the turn in the literature from politically 
geared tracts to professional historical accounts. Thematically analysing the 
three schools of writing on Britain and Europe, one finds that Jenkins' concern 
to raise the discussion of political influences on writers fails to grasp the 
remaining fundamentals of the historiographical process. There is at least as 
much to discover about the financial constraints within the discipline, the 
nature and constraints of the sources historians use and, as significant, those 
they ignore. 
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Chapter 2 
THE ORTHODOX SCHOOL: 
INVENTING THE RECORD 
Table 2: Key Writers in the Orthodox School 
Name Institution/Background Sources 
Elisabeth Barker Journalist Eye-witness account 
John Baylis University College of Wales 
(hereafter UCW), Aberystwyth 
PRO, especially 
F0371, CAB,. CoS* 
Nora Beloff Journalist Eye-witness account 
Alan Bullock University of Oxford Ernest Bevin's papers 
Miriam Camps US State Department official, 
research fellow at the RIIA 
Eye-witness account 
Michael Charlton Journalist Oral testimony 
Joseph Frankel Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 
Secondary 
Uwe Kitzinger EC official, University of 
Oxford, RITA 
Eye-witness account 
Richard Mayne EC Official, University of 
Cambridge and UCW, 
Aberystwyth 
Eye-witness account 
F. S. Northedge LSE Secondary 
Anthony Nutting Civil Servant Eye-witness account 
Ritchie Ovendale UCW, Aberystwyth CAB, Ernest Bevin's 
papers 
* These abbreviations tand, respectively, for the minutes and papers of the Cabinet 
and its committees, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff 
A cursory glance at the leading names in the orthodox school suggests the 
widespread appeal of this interpretation of British European policy to 
politicians, journalists and academics. A table such as this cannot hope to 
capture either the entire range of individuals who have expounded the 
orthodoxy, nor all of their personal backgrounds, sources and methods of 
research. Historians naturally combine political testimony and recollection, 
eye-witness experience, reflection on secondary sources and primary sources in 
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their accounts of contemporary history. Rarely do they outline to what extent 
each determined their ultimate interpretation of events. The identification of 
`sources' with writers therefore involves a judgment about which appear to 
have been most fundamental to that particular historian. Even with such 
simplifying assumptions, however, this table tells us much about the principle 
argument which will be developed in this chapter. 
The first section considers what initially appears to be a diverse collection of 
writers in the orthodox school. After exploring the broad interpretation of 
events offered by orthodox writers, centring on the contention that Britain 
`missed opportunities' to lead the process of integration in European after the 
Second World War, it examines the problem the diversity of writers associated 
with the school poses for schoolifying the literature. It argues that despite the 
eclecticism of backgrounds, there are multiple connections among writers in 
the orthodox school. Analysing these factors supports the core argument of the 
thesis, that history-writing is subject to a host of sociological pressures, 
implicit theoretical assumptions and personal influences. 
The second section analyses the sociological ties among orthodox writers. It 
asserts that the school has been driven by a mixture of those sympathetic to 
Monnet's vision of European unity and those in Britain resentful of the 
politico-economic position in the world in which Britain found itself in the 
1960s and 1970s. Political recrimination from across the spectrum of 
ideologies, which fed into contemporary journalistic and academic accounts of 
this period, has been a key stimulus to the historiography. The third section 
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moves on from the sociological underpinnings to analyse the implicit 
theoretical underpinnings of the orthodox school. This term is taken to imply 
the conceptual lenses through which orthodox writers have approached the 
study of international relations in general and British foreign policy in 
particular. These are examined under the following headings: structural 
explanations of the making of foreign policy, the definition of `British foreign 
policy', hindsight and historical entrenchment of the conventional wisdom. 
The section thus confirms the dominant theme to emerge from its predecessor 
on the sociology of the orthodox school. That is, the agenda and outlook of 
politicians and civil servants has been crucial in determining the realist, power- 
oriented, backward-looking approach of the orthodox school to British 
European policy. Academics following the defence-oriented approach to 
British European policy have echoed this preoccupation in their studies. 
The fourth section lays the foundations for the next chapter by analysing the 
interpretative inconsistencies, the hints at alternative explanations, in orthodox 
works. It explores the underlying tensions in historical texts, making the 
argument that what divides writers into schools is their prioritisation of some 
explanations over others. This is not the same, it warns, as saying that all the 
literature is post-revisionist. The dividing line between schools is thin, it can be 
and is transgressed by writers over time. The shift from school to school occurs 
because of changes in the dominant communities of historians at particular 
times, and is usually an explicit choice made by successive generations of 
writers. The concluding section raises the question of method and 
interpretation in history. It argues that training how to research is different 
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from the practice of research. It argues that historians, political scientists and 
their counterparts across the social sciences should be more aware of the 
influence on interpretation stemming from the paradox between the human 
desire to understand the past and'the human mind's capacity to reconstruct 
effectively the events one purports to describe. In so doing, it provides an apt 
summary to this chapter which is centrally concerned with the simplifying 
assumptions placed on historical events by politicians, their proteges and 
academics attempting to come to terms with Britain's standing in Europe in the 
first thirty years after the Second World War. 
1. Introduction: The Heterogenous World of Orthodox Historiography? 
The orthodox school breathed historical life into the conventional wisdom on 
Britain and Jurope. It invented the record, setting the tone for all the 
subsequent historiography. This chapter explores the dynamics by which 
historical invention and myth-making have been a crucial driving force behind 
the development of the orthodox school of writing on British European policy. 
Reassessing the motivations behind orthodox writers allows us to expose their 
implicit theoretical assumptions about the British foreign policy process and 
the application of it, against which revisionist historians would later revolt. 
This is not to denigrate the work of orthodox historians, to argue that all 
historiographical progression is advancing to a better or more astute 
interpretation of events. Indeed, this study supports the argument of Gwyn 
II1 
Prins that: `The invention of tradition is neither surprising nor dishonest, 
especially not in cultures with no single criterion of truth'. ' The terms `myth' 
and `invention' are meant rather to imply the intellectual processes by which 
all histories are written, applying as much to revisionist and post-revisionist as 
orthodox historians. 
The role played by orthodox accounts in guiding subsequent writing is 
underscored by the recognition that they have set the tone for `event history' 
which dominates the historiography of Britain and Europe. We cannot 
understand recent developments in the literature without examining the nature 
of earlier historiography. Burke's definition of `event history' captures well 
how historians in the field of Britain and Europe have approached their 
subject. `[T]raditional historians think of history as essentially a narrative of 
events, while the new history is more concerned with the analysis of 
structures' 
.2 The latter is anathema to the majority of writers on Britain and 
Europe who debate along lines set down by orthodox historiography, 
`emphasising the deeds and decisions of the leaders, which furnish a clear story 
line'. 3 Replicating discussion of events and personalities, revisionists have 
become embroiled in the traditional form of historical narrative we associate 
1 Gwyn Prins, `Oral History', in Peter Burke (ed. ), New Perspectives on Historical Writing 
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 114-39 (p. 126). 2 Peter Burke, `Overture: The New History', in Burke (ed. ), New Perspectives, op. cit., pp. 1- 
23 (p. 4). 
3 Peter Burke, `History of Events and the Revival of Narratives', in Burke (ed. ), New 
Perms, op. cit. pp. 233-48 (p. 235). The dictum that `history is the biography of great men' 
dies hard, notes Carr in What is History?. op. cit., p. 45. 
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with event history. `Like history', Burke concludes, `historiography seems to 
repeat itself- with variations'. 4 
Before examining the interpretation placed upon events orthodox writers of 
British European policy, it is useful to reflect on the apparent heterogeneity of 
the school. The eclecticism of the writers that breathed life into the school, 
implies that there may be problems with schoolifying the literature. If we 
assume that the orthodoxy of this period was at its height in the period between 
1950 and 1985, after which revisionist accounts began to command the field, 
this covers a huge amount of writing. The bulk of the school consists of 
political memoir, diary and autobiography, official and unofficial biography 
and, less commonly, oral testimony, supporting Deighton's observation on 
American scholarship that `many orthodox works were memoirs or eye-witness 
accounts'. 5 Clement Attlee, Ernest Bevin, Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, 
Harold Macmillan, Harold Wilson and Edward Heath draw most attention, a 
point which underscores Burke's remark that history has traditionally been 
associated with `the deeds and decisions of the leaders'. 6 In addition there is 
4 Burke, `History of Events', op. cit., p. 233. 
s Deighton, `The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 83. Key accounts include Attlee, As it 
Happened, op. cit.; Benn, The Benn Diari es, op. cit.; Boothby, My Yesterday, op. cit.; Bullock, 
Ernest Bevin; op. cit.; Castle, The Castle Diaries, op. cit.; Crossman, The Crossman Diaries, op. 
cit.; Denman, Missed Chances, op. cit.; Dell, The Schuman Plan, op. cit.; Eden, Full Circl op. 
cit.; Harris, Attlee, op. cit.; Horne, Macmillan Volume 1, op. cit.; Home, Macmillan Volume 2, 
op. cit.; Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit.; Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, op. cit.; 
Macmillan, Tides of Fortune op. cit.; Macmillan, At the End of the Day, op. cit.; Macmillan, 
Pointing the Way, op. cit.; Macmillan, Riding the Storm, op. cit.; Moran, Winston Churchill, op. 
cit.; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit.; Ben Pimlott (ed. ), The Political Diary of Hugh 
Dalton. 1918-40 1945-60 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987); Roberts, `Ernest Bevin', op. cit.; 
Williams, Ernest Bevin, op. cit.; Harold Wilson, The Labour Government 1964-1970: A 
Personal Record (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971). 6 Burke, `History of Events', op. cit., p. 235. 
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the official history to 1950, general works on post-war British foreign policy, 
notably those by Joseph Frankel and Frank Northedge, 8 and some specifically 
on Britain and Europe. 9 
How, given the acute diversity of works that make up the orthodoxy, can we 
call it a `school'? One scholar has claimed that: `proper historical research on 
British European policy cannot be classified into schools, at least not in the 
categories the author suggests'. 10 The intrinsic eclecticism of the 
historiography presents a persuasive case against our ability to delineate 
schools. Paradoxically, however, it is just this diversity in the literature that 
makes the schoolification process both necessary and interesting. The reasons 
why certain interpretations are glossed over by some writers and not others are 
what binds those writers together in schools. That is, the schools are driven by 
7 Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly (eds. ), Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1,1,1945 (London: HMSO, 1984); Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly (eds. ), Documents on British Policy 
Overseas, 1,2,1045 (London: HMSO, 1985); Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly (eds. ), Documents 
on British Policy Overseas, 1,3,1945 (London: HMSO, 1986); Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly 
(eds. ), Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1,4,1945 (London: HMSO, 1987); M. E. Pelly 
and H. J. Yasamee (eds. ), Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1,5,1945 (London: HMSO, 
1990); M. E. Pelly and H. J. Yasamee (eds. ), Documents on British Policy Overseas. 1,6,1945- 
1946 (London: HMSO, 1991); H. J. Yasamee and K. A. Hamilton, Documents on British Policy 
Overseas, 1,7,1946-1947 (London: HMSO, 1995); Roger Bullen 9nd M. E. Pelly, Documents 
on British Policy Overseas 2,2,1950 (London: HMSO, 1987). 
S Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit. Frankel completed his PhD at the London School of 
Economics in 1950, and went on to lecture and then head the Politics Department at the 
University of Aberdeen, in the period 1951-73. Amongst others he held senior posts at St. 
Anthony's College Oxford, and the Universities of Wales and Southampton. Information from 
Who Was Who 1971-1980 (London: Adam and Charles Black, 1981), p. 266. F. S. Northedge, 
Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945-1973 (London: George Allen and Unwin, 
1974). See also Kenneth O. Morgan, The People's Peace: British History 1945-1990 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1990). 
9 Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit.; Nora Beloff, The General Says No: Britain's 
Exclusion from Europe (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1963); Miriam Camps, Britain and the 
European Community 1955-1963 (London: Oxford University Press, 1964). 
10 Anonymous referee's report on a draft article which placed the writers on British European 
policy on the development of Plan G, 1955-7, into the three schools identified in this thesis. 
Received 11 October 1999. 
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competing agendas which dictate what evidence is used and what is ignored, 
which personalities are criticised and who habilitated, which definitions of 
`foreign policy' subscribed to and which ignored. It is possible to reflect on the 
underlying similarities in the accounts produced on Britain and Europe. But 
recognising the similarities should not blind us to the very real differences that 
divide writers into schools. Indeed, admitting the presence of similarities 
actually strengthens the secondary argument in this study, that schools exist 
because we can embrace them but still make a clear distinction between the 
various waves of writing that have been produced on Britain and Europe. Since 
the schools are divided according to the interpretation they place upon the 
history of British European policy it is necessary to analyse the interpretative 
content of the school before exploring the dynamics behind it. Laying bare the 
empirical face of the orthodox school will help us establish the salience of 
events and personalities to its writers and how this has set the tone for the 
`event history' that dominates the field. 
The orthodox school condemns British European policy. Its underpinning 
assumption is of bipartisan consensus in the field of foreign policy, the `belief 
that post-war Britain was characterised by an absence of serious policy debate 
in any significant area'. " Its charge is that a succession of British governments 
`missed opportunities' to lead the process of European integration after 1945. 
" Harriet Jones, ` The Post-War Consensus in Britain: Thesis, Antithesis, Synthesis? ', in Brian 
Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (eds. ), The Contemporary History Handbook (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), pp. 41-9 (p. 44). Jones is one of a number of 
revisionist historians in Britain to disagree with the view that consensus has in fact prevailed in 
British political and economic life since the Second World War. See Kevin Jefferys, review, 
`The Myth of Consensus: New Views on British History, 1945-64. Edited by Harriet Jones and 
Michael David Kandiah', Contemporary British History, 11,1 (1997), pp. 157-8 (p. 157). On the 
115 
The argument is made using a number of metaphors for `missed opportunities', 
notably `missed chances', a phrase first used by the Economist in 1955, 
`missed buses' and `missed boats'. 12 The assumption, however, is the same: 
British policy towards Europe was deeply flawed in the post-war era. Frankel 
asks the question which is at the heart of the school: `How are we to explain 
Britain's neglecting to take a lead in Western European affairs when it was 
open to her in the later 1940s and in the 1950s? In retrospect, this seems to be 
the fundamental and most costly mistake in post-war policies... its causes must 
be sought in the faulty perceptions, anticipations and priorities of the 
successive British governments'. 13 
Smith and Smith argue that the `traditional' approach to British foreign policy 
is centrally concerned with the concept of `decline' which was dominant in 
British society in the 1960s and 1970s. `[A] central argument', they write, `was 
question of Europe this notion has yet to be seriously challenged, and revisionist historians are 
still taken by the concept. 12 `Britain and Europe's "Third Chance"', Economist, op. cit., p. 633; Boothby, My Yesterday, 
op. cit., p. 73; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., p. 790; Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit., 
pp. 122-3; Peter Clarke, Hope and Glory: Britain and the World 1900-1990 (London: Penguin; 
1996), p. 236; Dell, The Schuman Plan. op. cit., p. 303; Denman, Missed Chances, op. cit.; 
Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit., p. 186; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit., p. 34; 
Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 319. See also Nicholas Henderson's verdict quoted in 
Sanders, Losing an Empire op. cit., p. 73. It was a phrase first used in academic texts by Camps 
in Britain and the European Community, op. cit., p. 45; Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. 
cit., p. 152. The `Europeans' in the American State Department also cleaved to this line of 
thinking. Acheson's criticism was that Britain's rejection of the Schuman Plan was `the greatest 
mistake of the post-war period'. See Acheson, Present at the Creation, op. cit., p. 502. David 
Bruce (Ambassador to London, 1961-8) likewise thought that the failure to create the European 
army in the 1950s was `the greatest lost opportunity in modern European history'. Quoted in 
John Ramsden, review, `The Last American Aristocrat: The Biography of Ambassador David 
K. E. Bruce. By Nelson Lankford', Contemporary British History, 11,2 (1997), pp. 166-8 (p. 168). The contention that Britain `missed the bus' has appeal in other areas, and has been 
used to describe Britain's refusal to jointly work on nuclear weapons projects with the United 
States during the war. See Margaret Gowing, `Nuclear Weapons and the "Special 
Relationship"', in Louis and Bull (eds. ), The Special Relationship, op. cit., pp. 117-28 (p. 119). 13 Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 233-4. 
that by the 1970s there was little left for Britain but to throw in her lot with the 
Europeans... [I]n a world of radical change the inability to take fundamental 
choices and to reassess priorities constitutes a fundamental weakness'. 14 For 
their use of the term `traditional' one can substitute the term `orthodox' to suit 
the demands of this study. David Allen concurs. `In most academic writing', he 
argued in 1988, `and amongst the public at large, Britain's post-war 
relationship with Western Europe is seen as reflecting decline and retreat'. 15 
Orthodox criticisms stem, it appears, from the growing awareness in the 1960s 
of Britain's estrangement from European integration which began in the 1940s 
and 1950s. Britain's aloofness resulted, the argument goes, from a series of 
`misjudgments' in policy vis-ä-vis the Council of Europe, the Schuman Plan, 
the European Defence Community (EDC) and the Messina negotiations which 
culminated in the Treaty of Rome. 16 Policy in the 1960s and 1970s was 
reacting to this `failure' of not being at the heart of Europe, a pis aller to make 
up lost strategic and, Nicholas Crafts points out, economic ground. '7 A further 
stimulus to this line of thinking was, it seems, Whitehall's preoccupation with 
Anglo-American relations after 1945. David Watt describes this sentiment with 
reference to the `Europeanists in British public life, to whom it has become 
virtually axiomatic that our failure to "catch the European bus" in the mid- 
14 Smith and Smith, `The Analytical Background', op. cit., pp. 16-7. 15 Allen, `Britain and Western Europe', op. cit., pp. 168-9. 16 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., p. 98. 17 Nicholas Crafts, Britain's Relative Economic Decline 1870-1995: A Quantitative Perspective 
(London: The Social Market Foundation, 1997), pp. 43-62. 
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1950s was almost entirely due to a national obsession with the special 
relationship'. 18 
Such views have intertwined, giving rise to the charge that Britain fatally 
neglected the European option. Lamb believes, for example, that `In 1955 Eden 
could have sailed freely into the still malleable Common Market, and obtained 
substantial concessions for the Commonwealth. Not for another twenty years 
was Britain able to negotiate entry and then on worse terms than would have 
been available under Eden's Prime Ministership'. 19 The implication is that 
policy-makers could have hurdled the barrier put before them by Charles de 
Gaulle had they done more to persuade the French President that Britain was 
`European'. Whether it be policy, in the late 1940s or 1970s, the lost 
opportunity metaphor sums up an entire generation's sense of tragedy about 
British foreign policy. The term is an emotive linguistic symbol of Britain's 
reduced impact on the world stage-20 The orthodoxy is synonymous with 
Boothby's lament that 1945 ` was the moment when Britain could and should 
have taken the undisputed leadership of a united Western Europe... We did 
nothing'. 21 Thus, Harrison's summary is that this is an `over-personalised, 
18 David Watt, `Introduction: Anglo-American Relations', in Louis and Bull (eds. ), The Special 
Relationship, op. cit., pp. 1-14 (p. 7). 19 Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government, op. cit.; p. 101. See also Shlaim, `Anthony 
Eden', op. cit., pp. 108-9. 
20 It is almost as if writers were trapped within this discursive framework. Annette Morgan, 
reviewing the edited volume by Jowell and Hoinville published in 1976, observes that in the 
historical introduction to the book `the joint authors had little scope for originality and little 
pretension to it'. Annette Morgan, `Britain into Europe: Public Opinion and the EEC 1961-75. 
Edited by Roger Jowell and Gerald Hoinville', Journal of Common Market Studies, 15,3 (1977), pp. 221-2 (p. 221). 21 Boothby, My Yesterday, op. cit., p_73. 
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present-oriented "who was to blame and how can we do better next time? " 
agenda'. 22 
Before examining the dynamics behind the interpretation placed on events by 
orthodox writers it will be useful to analyse the four leading threads of the 
argument in this chapter. The first is that the orthodox school is trenchantly 
critical of British European policy, discussed above. Leading policy-makers 
and, less, officials, were, it claims, politically `myopic' in not joining European 
integrative efforts from the outset. 23 The second theme is that the Europeans 
were following the `correct' path in the post-war era: they had seen the light 
offered by federal solutions to regional and world problems. 24 Britain, by 
contrast, as one critic of the orthodox school, puts it, was `dysfunctional' for 
not joining them. 25 Alan Milward also takes issue with the orthodoxy: `Early 
historical accounts of the Community divided politicians into those who 
still... inhabited the benighted world of European nationalism and those around 
26 who the great light had shone, the prophets of the new order'. He is referring 
22 Harrison, `The Wilson Governments 1964-1970. Edited by R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. 
Tiratsoo', Contempor La-1y a Record op. cit., p. 490. 23 A word commonly associated with orthodox criticisms of British policy-makers. See, for 
example, Dell, The Schuman Plan, op. cit. 24 The implication being that London's preference for the `concept of intergovernmentalism has 
a particularly damaging and distorting impact upon the relevance of federalism to the European 
Community'. Michael Burgess, Federalism and European Union: Political Ideas. Influences and 
Strategies in the European Community, 1972-1987 (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 2. 
zs Wolfram Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., introduction, p. 16. That Britain has forged a separate 
path, and adopted a `different' approach to integration from the continentals, is summed in 
David Allen's observation that Britain's commitment to European integration is of a 
`fundamentally different order from that of its European counterparts'. In `Britain and Western 
Europe', op. cit., p. 170. 26 Alan Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe. 1945-51, (London: Methuen, 1984), 
p. 17. 
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to the `pioneers' of European unity such as Jean Monnet and Robert Schuman 
who ignited the orthodox school. 27 Bullen goes further: `The founding fathers 
of the European federal movement of the second half of the twentieth century 
have assiduously propagated a number of myths about the origins and purpose 
of integration 7.28 Criticisms of British policy have been inextricably linked to 
the accusations made in live political debate about the events now being 
described. 
White has observed that `it seems possible to conclude that every historical 
narrative has as its latent or manifest purpose the desire to moralise the events 
of which it treats'. 29 The third theme of the chapter draws on the mixture of 
historical narrative with normative judgments about who was `right' and 
`wrong'. There is a strong sense in which the orthodox school has been driven 
by those sympathetic to the cause of European unity. One must refrain from 
using the term `pro-European' because it is not value-neutral, holding different 
meanings for different people at different times and in different countries. The 
point is that the notion of `missed opportunities' sprang directly from the 
assumption that successive British governments should have been sympathetic 
to the supranational approach to European unity espoused by the `founding 
27 ` Monet is very much the hero of the book', writes Murray Forsyth in his review, `The 
Recovery of Europe: From Devastation to Unity. By Richard Mayne', International Affairs, 48, 
1 (1972), pp. 100-1 (p. 100). Milward also notes that `All previous lives of Schuman have been 
simple hagiographies' in his review, Robert Schuman: Homme d'Etat 1866-1963. By Raymond 
Poidevin', Journal of Common Market Studies, 26,2 (1987), pp. 344-5 (p. 344). 28 Bullen, review, `Britain, France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951. By John W. Young; 
The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government 1945-1951. Edited by Ritchie Ovendale', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, op. cit., p. 77. 29 White, The Content of the Form, op. cit., p. 14. This, Nigel Hamilton argues, is only natural: 
`Life is full of monsters and heroes... we cannot blind ourselves to human nature'. See ` The 
Role of Biography', in Seldon (ed. ), Conte=or 
, 
History, op. cit., pp. 165-9 (p. 167). 
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fathers' who aimed, in Christopher Brewin's words, to `convince British civil 
servants and journalists that the federal idea has been the correct path since 
1939'. 30 Publications such as the Economist, one has to remember, are what 
Richard Gardner refers to as `pillars of Establishment opinion', organs of 
political ideas, ` opinion-formers' in Hill's words, 31 as much as political report. 
They are held in high regard not just among the elite in London, but, crucially, 
in Washington. 32 Hence, opposite to the orthodoxy on the Cold War in the 
United States which `provided important support for post-war US foreign 
policy', 33 the earliest works in Britain were intent on changing the direction of 
British foreign policy. 
Against this, Kaiser argues that the British 'Sonderweg 34 thesis not only 
oversimplifies the political and social development of the West in general... but 
fails to recognise that there is no one path to modernity'. 35 The final theme 
running through the orthodoxy is its tendency to generalise and complain about 
British policy from the vantage point of the present. Explaining how we got 
where we are is an extremely significant part of understanding the dynamics of 
the orthodox school on Britain and Europe. With hindsight it is easy to argue 
30 Christopher Brewin, review, `The United States of Europe. By Ernest Wistrich', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 33,2 (1995), pp. 300-1 (p. 301). 
31 Hill, `Academic International Relations', op. cit., p. 8. 32 Richard N. Gardner, `Sterling-Dollar Diplomacy in Current Perspective', in Louis and Bull 
(eds. ), The Special Relationship. op. cit., pp. 185-200 (p. 188). See also Ernest R. May and 
Gregory F. Treverton, `Defence Relationships: American Perspectives', in Louis and Bull (eds. ), 
The Special Relationship, op. cit., pp. 161-82 (p. 163). 33 Melanson, Writing History, op. cit., p. 7. 34 The term 'Sonderweg' means, in Kaiser's words, `a historically unique departure from the 
apparently normal path of democratic virtue', and is lifted from German historiography in the 
1960s and 1970s which attempted to explain why Germany acted as it did in the last century. 
Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., introduction, p. 16. 35, ggers 
, 
Histori ography, op. cit., p. 69. 
, 71 
that Britain should have been ` in' at the beginning, 36 particularly when in the 
1970s the world suffered from severe economic recession. Britain in the 1980s 
was seen to be gaining very few economic advantages from being `in Europe'. 
Had Eden joined in 1957- or earlier- Britain could have reaped the rewards 
from the post-war economic boom. This might have made the EC more 
palatable to the British public and we might not now be seen as the `awkward 
partner' in the EU. The use of `presentism' in contemporary history has been 
unavoidable for many orthodox historians, whose accounts of Britain's 
relationship with the continent are laced with acid comment on what they see 
as severe policy failure at the elite level. 
Orthodox historiography on Britain's relations with Europe is, in summary, a 
potent mix of criticism and apologia, underpinned by the assumption that 
Britain in the post-war era departed from the path of democratic virtue by 
pouring scorn on the integrative efforts taking place on the continent. The 
intrinsic individuality of historical accounts makes each orthodox narrative 
differ slightly from the other, in terms of both the language and evidence used 
to criticise British policy. But this is a natural repercussion of writing historical 
narratives. Reconstructing historical events requires leaps of faith to fill in the 
inevitable gaps in our knowledge. Iggers captures this concept of fluidity in 
36 Take, for example, Dell's argument that the European Coal and Steel Community was less 
supranational than Britain had initially feared, and therefore that London should have joined. `It 
is a pity that the perception of what was, in fact, inevitable did not permeate Labour government 
thinking in 1950'. Dell, The Schuman Plan op. cit., pp. 181-2. At the time, how were policy- 
makers expected to see into the future with such clarity? Mayne is critical of Dell's use of 
hindsight in his review, `The Schuman Plan... By Edmund Dell', International Affairs, 72,2 (1996), pp. 396-7. See also Janne Taalas, `The Schuman Plan 
... 
By Edmund Dell', 
Contemporary British History, 10,2 (1996), pp. 248-9. For this reason one has to question 
Milward's judgment that Dell's `first-class research' was combined with `persuasive 
argumentation'. See Alan S. Milward, review, The Schuman Plan 
... 
By Edmund Dell', Journal 
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interpretation across generically similar works in his remark that `every 
historical account is a construct, but a construct arising from a dialogue 
between the historian and the past, one that does not occur in a vacuum but 
within a community of inquiring minds who share criteria of plausibility'. 37 In 
this sense, Dunne's definition of the term `school'- a body of writers producing 
interpretations joined by a set of `family resemblances'- is particularly 
prescient. The orthodox school contains writers who, while individual to a 
certain extent, interpret British European policy in ways `which are interwoven 
and distinct'. 38 Having introduced the interpretation placed on British 
European policy 1945-73, the chapter will now examine the sociological, 
political and (implicit) theoretical linkages among writers in the school. 
2. The Social Construction of the Orthodox School 
Behind the apparently amorphous collection of British writers in the orthodox 
school- politicians, civil servants, journalists and academics- there is a 
common intellectual thread: advocation of the federalist vision espoused by 
Monnet and given voice in Britain via the think tank Federal Union39 and its 
`immediately associated bodies', the Federal Trust for Education and Research 
and Wyndham Place Trust. 40 As one of its members and historian of this 
of European Integration History op. cit., p. 100. 3 Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p. 145. 38  Dunne, Inventing International Society, op. cit., p. 5. 39 Launched in January 1939. For an official history see Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. 
cit. 
40 The latter was set up in 1960 'to work on the federal idea in a religious context'. Ibid., p. 69. 
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period, Uwe Kitzinger, described the broad appeal of the British Monnetists: 
`They came from a wide variety of backgrounds: one the son of a peer, another 
who left school at fourteen, one the son of a small tailor, another the son of a 
bank clerk, several with family origins on the continent, some candidates or 
local councillors of the Labour, some of the Liberal and some of the 
Conservative Party, some full-time trade unionists, some lawyers, some in 
public relations, one who worked for the British Council of Churches, another 
for the Economist, several at universities or various research institutions'. " 
Analysing the sprawling network of individuals in or associated with Federal 
Union supports the contention that many writers in the orthodox school are 
bound by a shared Monnetist outlook about the most desirable future for 
Europe, a federal future which Britain resisted in the post-war era. Hence their 
concern with what Duchene calls the `bottomless pit of a question' as to why 
the British `were so resistant to European integration', 42 and the pervasiveness 
of historical accounts that chastise politicians and civil servants whose 
`misjudgments... led their European policy so grievously astray'. 43 The thesis is 
not directly concerned with the push for federalism at the national and global 
levels, rather with the issue of regional federalism, and in particular the 
4' Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion, op. cit., p. 190. Kitzinger himself would know many of 
them. He worked at the Economic Section of the Council of Europe between 1951 and 1958, 
worked up through the University of Oxford between 1956 and 1976, before taking leave of 
absence in1973-5 to work for Christopher Soames, then Vice-President of the European 
Commission. He sat on the National Council of the European Movement between 1974 and 
1976 and was a member of the RIIA between 1973 and 1985. See Who's Who 2000, (London: 
A and C Black, 2000), p. 1153. 42 Duchene, Jean Monnet, op. cit., p. 208. He was a Federal Trustee. See Mayne and Pinder, 
Federal Union, op. cit., p. 113. 43 Ibid., p. 98. 
intellectual concern of its members with `Britain's relationship to the emerging 
European Union'. 44 
Perhaps the most significant associate body to consider is the Federal Trust. 45 
Its constitution proclaims that it `acts as a forum in which the suitability of 
federal solutions to problems of governance at national, continental and global 
level can be explored'. 46 It has been credited with bringing Britain `into 
Europe' and leading `the British section of the European movement to a 
federalist stand in the British political debate on the future of Europe'. 47 of 
particular interest also is the impact of the Regional Commission, `a group 
containing the hard core of its supporters of the Monnet approach to 
Community-building'. It was set up in 1956, to plan `how to change British 
opinion and policy'. 48 All branches of Federal Union have voiced the critique 
by the `Eurosaints'49 of the traditionally `British' preference for looser 
intergovernmental co-operation in Europe. 50 Having established the concern of 
Federal Union and its associated bodies with the British approach to European 
integration, one can infer three links to orthodox historiography. 
44 Ibid. 
45 Founded in 1945, out of the idea that Federal Union `ought to engage in educational work. 
Political action and propaganda had their part to play; but deeper and (in the best sense) more 
academic study, reflection, and research were essential too'. Ibid., p. 109. 46 ` A Note for Friends About the Federal Trust', October 1999, p. 1. 47 Andrea Bosco, review, `European Unity and World Order: Federal Trust 1945-1995. By 
John Pinder', Journal of Common Market Studies, 35,2 (1997), p. 325. See for example Europe 
Against de Gaulle (London: Pall Mall, 1963). 
48 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., pp. 146-7. 49 A name coined by W. E. Paterson in his review, `Eminent Europeans: Personalities who 
shaped Contemporary Europe. Edited by M. Bond, J. Smith and W. Wallace', Journal of 
Common Market Studies 35,3 (1997), pp. 488-9 (p. 488). 
so Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit. 
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The first is, simply, that many of the key individuals in the orthodox school 
have, or have had, links with Federal Union. (See the Appendix for its 
widespread social and political influence). Individuals such as Pinder and 
Mayne who now write on the history of European integration have, Andrea 
Bosco notes in one review, `been for four decades loyal to the European 
construction' 
.51 Thus, Mayne argues in true Monnetist fashion, `Scepticism, 
based partly on lack of interest and partly on ignorance, was the characteristic 
reaction of British officials to the initiatives proposed by Monnet, Schuman 
and the Six'. 52 Pinder consistently issues, another reviewer observes, `a 
characteristically well-argued appeal to British policy-makers to abjure their 
intergovernmentalism'. 53 His judgment that Britain `remained coldly aloof 
from the Europeans' ideas' also has a Monnetist flavour to it. 54 Another critic 
in this group is Roy Pryce, Director of the Federal Trust, 1983-90.55 Michael 
Gehler thus suggests ` that one should not underestimate the influence of the 
51 Bosco, review, `European Unity and World Order: Federal Trust 1945-1995. By John 
Pinder', Journal of Common Market Studies, op. cit., p. 325. Mayne was an official in the 
ECSC, 1956-8 and in the EEC, 1958-63 before being personal assistant to Monnet 1963-6. 
Pinder has been chairman of the Federal Trust since 1985, and was previously press officer of 
Federal Union, 1950-2, worked at the Economist Intelligence Unit, 1952-64 and was President 
of the Union of European Federalists, 1984-90. See Who's Who 2000. op. cit., p. 1390 and 
p. 1623. 
52 See Richard Mayne, review, `The Price of Victory. By Michael Charlton', International 
Affairs, 60,2 (1984), pp. 326-7 (p. 327). His key publications include Postwar: The Dawn of 
Today's Europe (London: Thames and Hudson, 1983); The Community, of Europe (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1962); The Recovery of Europe: From Devastation to Uniri (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970). 53 Christopher Brewin, review, `Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union. By A. 
Duff, J. Pinder and R. Pryce', Journal of Common Market Studies 34,1 (1996), p. 134. 54 John Pinder, Europe Against de Gaulle (London: Pall Mall Press for Federal Trust), p. 68. 55 He was previously Head of Information Office of High Authority of ECSC, 1957-60, and 
Head of the Joint Information Office of the European Communities, 1960-4. See Who's Who 
2000, op. cit., p. 1664. His publications include The Political Future of the European Community (London: John Marshbank, 1962); The Dynamics of European Union (London: Routledge, 
1990). 
European federalists in setting up different ideas, concepts and programmes on 
European integration'. 56 
The second link brings in Federal Union's transnational connections. 
Significantly, Mayne and Pinder recall, the Regional Commission was set up 
just after `Federal News welcomed the establishment of Jean Monnet's Action 
Committee for the United States of Europe'. 57 It must be remembered, Nigel 
Ashford observes, that one of the main driving forces behind integration and 
our subsequent interpretations of it was Monnet, the Action Committee for a 
United States of Europe and his `network of friends and colleagues who 
influenced US policy in favour of supranational European integration'. 58 
Richard Aldrich finds an American intelligence connection here, locating the 
European movement in the broader context of American Cold War strategy. He 
presents evidence that between 1949-60, American sources injected $3-4 
million into `European federalist activity'. 59 Milward also argues that `the 
ultimate purposes of the Marshall Plan were almost entirely political albeit that 
56 Michael Gehler, review, `Interdependence Versus Integration: Denmark, Scandinavia, and 
Western Europe, 1945-1960. By Thorsten B. Olesen', Journal of European Integration History, 
3,2 (1997), pp. 100-2 (p. 102). 
57 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., p. 146. 58 Nigel Ashford, review, `Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe. By Pascaline 
Winand', Journal of Common Market Studies, 33,2 (1995), p. 309-10 (p. 309). This web of 
personalities should not surprise us: the Conservative Party is renowned for being dominated by 
a few hundred families `bound together by class and kinship', a network which impacts both 
upon their politics and rhetoric. See Harriet Jones, review, `Bob Boothby: A Portrait. By Robert 
Rhodes James', Contemporary Record, 6,2 (1992), pp. 403-4 (p. 403). 
59 Richard J. Aldrich, `European Integration: An American Intelligence Connection', in 
Deighton (ed. ), Building Post-War Europe, op. cit., pp. 159-79 (p. 159). He concludes on p. 173 
as follows: `A surprising number of the political elite concerned with the emerging European 
Community in the 1940s and 1950s were also sometime members of the Western intelligence 
community'. It is a point not lost on William Wallace who notes the importance of the United 
States in pushing its `West European clients towards political integration as it provided them 
with the means for national reconstruction'. In William Wallace, review, `Inside the Foreign 
Office. By John Dickie; The European Rescue of the Nation-State. By Alan S. Milward', Times 
Literary Supplement, 30 April 1993, p. 25. 
its mechanisms were almost entirely economic'. 60 Given that many former 
American politicians cleave to the `missed opportunities' approach to British 
European policy, one can conclude from this that Federal Union's transnational 
connections have played a crucial role in setting the orthodox school in motion. 
It must also be remembered, writes Sean Greenwood, that `until the 1970s the 
British press tended to be pro-Community'. 61 There is an important link, 
finally, between the Economist Intelligence Unit (ElU) and the goals of 
Federal Union. It consistently advocated closer British involvement in the 
process of European integration and was, it appears, the first to coin the term 
`missed chances' to describe the history of British European policy after the 
Second World War. 62 Take Christopher Layton, son of Lord Layton who was a 
Federal Union activist, Vice-President of the Consultative Assembly of the 
Council of Europe, 1949-57 and a former employee of the Economist. 63 In 
1958 he was `on the staff of the Economist after a spell at the Economist 
Intelligence Unit [and] was close to John Pinder [another who worked for the 
EIU] and other federalists in the EIU and had written in World Affairs about 
the blindness of Britain's negative policy towards European integration'. 64 Not 
60 Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 5. See also Milward, The 
European Rescue op. cit., p. 348; Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar, op. cit., 
p. 1; Perkins, `Unequal Partners', op. cit., pp. 55-7. Aldrich's findings on the covert side could 
thus be said to reinforce the established finding that the Marshall Plan was overtly federalist. 
This approach is well explained in Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan: America. Britain and 
the Reconstruction of Western Europe. 1947-1952 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1987), pp. 26-53; Hogan, A Cross of Iron, op. cit., pp. 2-3. See also Watt, `Demythologising the 
Eisenhower Era', op. cit., pp. 80-1; Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, op. cit., pp. 236- 
57. 
61 Sean Greenwood, review, `Britain for and Against Europe: British Politics and European 
Integration. Edited by D. Baker and D. Seawright', Journal of Common Market Studies, 36,4 (1998), pp. 603-4 (p. 603). 
62 ` Britain and Europe's "Third Chance"', Economist, op. cit., p. 633. 63 Gladwyn, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 142; Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., p. 147. 64 Ibid., p. 153. 
only that, he was in the EIU 1953-4 and was the editorial writer on European 
affairs between 1954-62 and later, amongst other responsibilities, Chef du 
Cabinet to Altiero Spinelli. 65 This is the sort of personal connection that helps 
explain the permeability of historical writing by political and sociological 
connections. A shared outlook on events has sprung from a shared ideology on 
how to maintain peace in Europe and the world. Writing in 1990, Mayne and 
Pinder summed up this meeting of minds thus: Christopher Layton, Richard 
Mayne, John Pinder and Roy Pryce still remain members of the Council [of the 
Federal Trust]. They, in fact, have formed part of the core of the Trust's 
leadership for over a quarter of a century-66 `Higher' journalists such as Nora 
Beloff and Camps, G7 the latter praised by Mayne and Pinder as `one of the 
shrewdest observers of Europe during this period, 68 could also be included in 
this group, journalists who made strong attacks on British European policy in 
texts which sparked the historiography of Britain and Europe into life. 69 
Their hopes that Western Europe would take on a federalist structure after the 
Second World War meant, of course, little sympathy for a British policy which 
aimed, broadly, at an intergovernmental process of integration. Mayne and 
65 Who's Who 2000 op. cit., p. 1197. See also Christopher Layton, `One Europe: One World: 
A First Exploration of Europe's Potential Contribution to World Order', Journal of World 
Trade Law, Special Supplement 4,1986. 
66 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., p. 113. 
67 The term `higher journalism' has been used by Hill to describe academic forays into media 
appearances, and might well apply to the academic-type studies penned by Barker, Beloff and 
Camps. See Hill, `Academic International Relations', op. cit., p. 6. 68 Ibid., p. 143. 
69 Beloff, The General Says No, op. cit.; Camps, Britain and the European Community, op. cit. 
As Camps put it in a later text: `the arguments for British membership in the Community seem 
to me, as a resident of that country, to be quite compelling'. This gives her work a similar 
campaigning dimension to that of the Economist. See Camps, European Unification in the 
Sixties, op. cit., preface, pp. 6-7. 
Pinder's volume is on the surface a history of the `pioneers' of Federal Union. 
It is, additionally, interspersed with vitriolic sideswipes about the post-war elite 
in Britain, their shortsightedness and their crude negativity towards the 
continent. An apt summary comes in the form of Jo Josephy's concern that 
Britain `would find herself perched precariously on the perimeter of a united 
Europe'. 70 Josephy, finds Pinder, was right: `But it was to be some time before 
British governments were to learn that lesson- if indeed they have'. 71 It also 
contains a foreword by Roy Jenkins in which he berates Macmillan for only 
`belatedly seeing the light' and Britain for not being `wholeheartedly in 
Europe'. 72 The message is clear. Federalism was the `right' solution for the 
post-war settlement because it would take national interests out of national 
hands. ` Non-believers' in Britain receive short shrift, particularly the political 
and bureaucratic elites, ably supported by what Milward terms `snobbish' and 
`elitist' educational establishments `notable for the irrelevance of the 
knowledge they imparted to the task at hand'. 73 
Kaplan has warned that `We do not know how intuitions are produced, 
although we can speculate about this'-74 It is not that the orthodoxy on Britain 
and Europe stems solely from affiliation with Monnet or the Federal Union. 
For example, politicians such as Edmund Dell, 75 Macmillan, Boothby and 
70 Josephy was a founding director of Federal Union in 1941. 71 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., p. 94. 
72 Ibid., foreword, p. 8. 
73 Milward, The European Rescue, op. cit., p. 354 and p. 431 
74 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 
75 He was one of the British Labour Party members who rebelled against Party instructions in 
October 1971 and voted for UK membership of the EEC. See Alan S. Milward, review, The 
Schuman Plan and the British Abdication of Leadership in Europe. By Edmund Dell', Journal 
of European Integration History, 3,2 (1997), pp. 99-100 (p. 99). 
I -in 
Maxwell Fyfe76 have their own reasons for criticising British European policy, 
but have joined the Monnetists to level similar criticisms about the myopia of 
British European policy. Another poignant example in this context is de 
Gaulle, who was profoundly suspicious of British policy, but who would hardly 
be termed a Monnetist. 77 What further clouds the debate is that one 
occasionally discovers self-styled `sceptics' such as Nicholas Ridley, 78 
addressing the Federal Trust in 1969 on the merits of approaching federalism 
`through the front door, not the back door'. 79 The many contradictory ways in 
which `Europeanism' has been defined in Britain appears to have contributed 
to the different communities of writers who have voiced the missed 
opportunities approach to British European policy. 80 However, they have 
contributed to rather than led the orthodoxy which was originally fired by the 
federal approach to European integration. The social construction of history is 
therefore the crucial starting point for any exploration of what drives the 
historiographical process. 
76 Their agendas are personal rather than political. They develop their disenchantment in the 
context of the European question, despite not being of Monnetist outlook. See Macmillan, 
Tides of Fortune, op. cit.; Macmillan, Pointing the Way, op cit.; Boothby, My Yesterday, op. 
cit.; Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit. 77 De Gaulle, Memoirs of Hove op. cit. 
'S Famous for comparing giving up sovereignty to the EEC with giving up sovereignty to Hitler. 
See Pilkngton, Britain in the European Union, op. cit., p. 99. 79 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., p. 187. On p. 165 they observe that Max Beloff 
gave a lecture at the 1961 Easter Seminar of the Cambridge Federal Union group. It is 
interesting that he later contributed an article in 1996 to Martin Holmes' edited volume, TTh 
Eurosceptical Reader (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996). The concluding chapter in this thesis 
returns to the interesting issues raised by the rise of `Eurosceptic' scholarship in Britain. S0 What is interesting, Thomas Barman notes, is that Barker argues `The real charge against 
Britain was not "un-Europeanness" so much as a mistaken belief that a skilful diplomacy could 
be an efficient substitute for solid military alliances or for forward-looking economic policies'. 
For the Monnetists Britain was `un-European' precisely because these were integral parts of 
their European project, highlighting Barker's muddled thinking on the subject. See Thomas 
Barman, review, Britain in a Divided Europe 1945-1970. By Elisabeth Barker', International 
Affairs, 48,1 (1992), pp. 105-6 (p. 106). 
3. Underlying Assumptions of the Orthodox School 
The definition of `method' employed in this thesis is founded on Stoker's 
definition. He takes it as a `particular way of producing knowledge', raising 
questions of philosophical concern, notably how can we know the social 
world? What counts as an adequate explanation of social phenomenon? 8' This 
study has refined this definition to give writers' `method' two dimensions: 
documentary, the sources they consult, and personal, the host of lower level 
individual influences at work on writers: bias, prejudice, oversights and 
sociological contacts. 
In this revised context, method involves the process of research and the 
narrativisation of findings into historical texts. Entering the complexities of the 
human mind raises all sorts of difficult questions about. how we know what we 
do and philological concerns about how we convey that knowledge to others. 
The secondary argument of this thesis is that, despite the inherent individuality 
of historical narratives there are general patterns across them that enable them 
to be grouped into schools according to the interpretation placed on events in 
British European policy. It is now necessary to look beyond the social 
construction of the orthodox school, to the underlying assumptions its writers 
hold about the British foreign policy process. 
81 Stoker, `Introduction', op. cit., p. 13. 
" Structural Explanations of the Making of Foreign Policy 
The emphasis in orthodox historiography on Britain's standing in the world 
stems in part from political rhetoric on Europe since 1945. Hans Morgenthau 
observed that statesmen `make a habit of presenting their foreign policies in 
terms of their philosophic and political sympathies in order to gain support for 
them'. 82 Politicians after 1945 hid behind the national interest as a way of 
explaining away London's reluctance to absorb itself in continental integration. 
Britain, they claimed, was `victorious' in the Second World War. It had neither 
been occupied nor economically ravaged and still gained economic and 
political prestige and economic benefits from the Commonwealth. Allied with 
London's close relationship with Washington, the national interest was 
apparently best served by remaining aloof from far-fetched European schemes 
for integration with `clubs of losers' on the continent. 83 
John Cockroft defines this stance as follows: "A thousand years of history" and 
the fact that it was the apparent winner of the 1939-45 war, made Britain more 
nationalistic, more conscious of its ostensible sovereignty, than any other 
European nation's' Denis Healey's 1949 observation that `The European 
Movement is likely to disappear or disintegrate in the near future' was, it 
82 Quoted in ibid.; Realism as a feature of the historiography is also discussed in Shlaim, `The 
Foreign Secretary and the Making of Policy', op. cit., p. 13. 83 A term used to denote how the British elite commonly saw the continent in Michael Gehler, 
review, `Interdependence Versus Integration... By Thorsten B. Olesen', Journal of European 
Integration History op. cit., p. 102. 
sn John Cockroft, review, `From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 1945. 
Edited by Brian Brivati and Harriet Jones', Contemporary Record, 9,1 (1995), pp. 265-8 (p. 267). 
seems, a widely held opinion in the corridors of Whitehall. 85 Thus, Brewin 
notes, both Socialist and Conservative leaders before the 1960s were as one in 
making sure that British fortunes were not dependent on what they thought was 
a poverty-stricken and internally unstable Europe'. 86 This has been summed up 
by Perry Anderson thus: `for fifteen years after the war British policy towards 
European integration was essentially settled by rulers who put calculations- or 
rather miscalculations- of political power and prestige before estimates of 
economic performance'. 87 
This emphasis in political thinking and informed debate on `power and 
balance', 88 meant, David Sanders argues, that realism `represents the [theory] 
that has been used most frequently by mainstream analysts of postwar British 
foreign policy'. 89 Hill also points out the dominance of realism in the study of 
International Relations in the post-1945 era. `After the Second World War', he 
argues, `the return to the balance of power between the major powers was 
reflected in the universities in the dominance of realism'. 90 Most orthodox 
studies were penned before the end of the 1980s, when, Deighton observes, the 
shadow of the Cold War `lay across every significant area of international 
85 Quoted from his speech at the Baarn Conference, May 1949, in Aldrich, `European 
Integration', op, cit., p. 168. 86 Brewin, review, `The United States of Europe. By Ernest Wistrich', Journal of Common 
Market Studies, op. cit., p. 301. 87 Perry Anderson, review, `Under the Sign of the Interim: The European Rescue of the Nation- 
State. By Alan Milward; The Frontier of National Sovereignty: History and Theory 1945-1992. 
By Alan Mil 
. 
ward, Jean Monnet: The First Statesman of Interdependence. By Frangois 
Duchene', London Review of Books, 18,1 (1996), pp. 13-7 (p. 16). 
sa Deighton, The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 89. 99 Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., p. 13. Published in 1990 he was writing before 
revisionism became the vogue. 90 Hill, `Academic International Relations', op. cit., p. 6. 
'I ow 
politics'. 91 It was unsurprising that approaches to European policy were so 
intertwined with `structural' or `functional' explanations of causation in which 
`outcomes are explained, not in terms of the motivations and intentions of the 
actors involved, but in terms of the consequences of their effects'. 92 `Realists 
and neorealists', Deighton continues, `are not primarily concerned with 
causality and process, but concentrate on interests and outcomes and their 
relationship to the structure of the international system'. 93 
Politics is, after all, about the control, distribution and manipulation of power 
at all levels of human interaction. Orthodox historiography reflects the Cold 
War environment in which European policy was developed and implemented. 
In many political and official recollections, the Cold War and strategic defence 
matters take clear precedence over consideration of the European question. 
`RAB' Butler's declaration that he was `bored' with European integration, and 
that Eden was `even more bored than I was', is a telling insight into the 
widespread apathy towards the European question in Whitehall in the 1950s. 94 
This is reflected in the lack of sustained attention to the European question in 
many memoirs, or only sporadic attention compared to the discussion of Cold 
91 Deighton, `The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 89. See also Tickner, Gender in International 
Relations. op. cit., pp. 10-2. 92 Colin Hay, `Structure and Agency', in Marsh and Stoker (eds. ), Theory and Methods, op. 
cit., pp. 189-206 (p. 194). 
93 Deighton, `The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 81. See also p. 89. For more on the realist 
approach to International Relations see Bruce Russett and Harvey Starr, World Politics: The 
Menu for Choice, 0 edn (New York: W. H. Freeman, 1992), p. 187; McGrew, `Security and 
Order', op. cit., p. 99. The prevalence of realist theory is shown by Mearsheimer who claimed in 
1990 that `factors of military power have been most important in shaping past events, and will 
remain central in the future'. Mearsheimer, ` Back to the Future', op. cit., p. 11. 94 He was Chancellor of the Exchequer between October 1951 and December 1955, a crucial 
period in the relationship with Britain and the continent. Quoted in Chariton, The Price of 
Victory, op. cit., p. 195. 
War politics. 95 It is as if aloofness from Europe was predetermined 
geographically, a policy decision-makers could have done little to alter. 96 
Orthodox interpretations of European policy during the 1945-51 Attlee 
governments are a good example of the way in which the orthodox 
understanding of European policy has been dominated by structural approaches 
to Cold War politics. John Baylis published two seminal articles on Britain and 
the formation of NATO in 1982 and 1984.97 Perhaps not coincidentally at the 
height of the Reagan-Thatcher offensive against the Soviet Union, he was not 
the first to search for reasons behind what Kenneth Morgan calls `the majesty 
of [Bevin's] overall grand design': entangling America in the defence of 
Western Europe. 98 British European policy, Baylis argued, was guided by 
Bevin's vision and foresight in showing Europe's willingness to share the 
burden of defence costs in creating the Dunkirk and Brussels Pacts in 1947-8. 
His studies were representative of the major trends in orthodox, or `consensus' 
accounts of British European policy explored in this chapter. ' First, it took 
Europe as a pawn on the chessboard of Cold War politics. As David Calleo and 
Benjamin Rowlands have pointed out most succinctly: `Popular memory 
95 Eden, Full Circle, op. cit., devotes little attention to European integration, the Messina 
conference receiving only one page (p. 337) amidst discussion of his visit to Washington in 
February 1956. Butler fails to mention Europe at all in Lord Butler, The Art of the Possible: 
The Memoirs of Lord Butler (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973). 
Hill provides a succinct summary of this position in `The Historical Background', op. cit., 
28. 
John Baylis, `Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO', in Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 5,2 (1982), pp. 236-47; John Baylis, ` Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental Commitment', International Affairs. 60,4 (1984), pp. 615-29. 98 Kenneth O. Morgan, review, `Ernest Bevin. By Alan Bullock; The Diary of Hugh Gaitskell 
1945-1960. Edited by Philip Williams; Breach of Promise. By John Vaizey', Times Literary 
Supplement, 11 November 1983, pp. 1243-4 (p. 1244). 99 The label `consensus' for the orthodoxy on Bevin was first coined by critics of the Baylis 
approach. See John Kent and John Young, `British Policy Overseas', op. cit., p. 41. 
dwells upon the Cold War'. 100 Bevin was seen to be acting as any defender of 
the British national interest would have. The `consensus' view which Baylis 
put forward was fulsome in its praise for a policy that helped save Western 
civilisation from the Communist menace. 101 Second, Baylis' account reflected 
the political gloss retrospectively put on British policy by Bevin's supporters, 
showing how political rhetoric feeds orthodox interpretations of contemporary 
British history. 102 Third, a tendency to explain history by looking back, 
drawing conclusions about earlier policy from later events and the concerns of 
the present. The motivating question of such studies is apparently: what role 
have Britain and NATO played in the Cold War? Using hindsight the answer is 
relatively clear. At the time, however, and this was where revisionists have 
made their most potent challenge, the transition from the Dunkirk and Brussels 
Pacts to NATO was not nearly so smooth, or even envisaged at all by Bevin in 
1947-8.103 
It is an oversimplification to argue that orthodox writers have no interest at all 
in the process of policy-making. This can be explained by the prominence of 
100 Quoted in Bradford Perkins, `Unequal Partners: The Truman Administration and Great 
Britain', in Louis and Bull (eds. ), The Serial Relationship, op. cit., pp. 43-64 (p. 5 1). 101 Eden, Full Circle op. cit., p. 5; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., pp. 132-3. See also 
Sidney Aster, Anthony Eden (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1976), pp. 90-1; Kirkpatrick, 
The Inner Circle, op, cit., p. 205; Anthony Montague Browne, Long Sunset: Memoirs of 
Winston Churchill's Last Private Secretary (London: Indigo, 1996), p. 79; Nutting, Europe Will 
Not Wait, op. cit., p. 21 and p. 125; William Rees-Mogg, Sir Anthony Eden (London: Rockliff, 
1956), p. 99; Robert Rhodes James (ed. ), Chips: The Diaries of Sir Henry, Channon (London: 
Penguin, 1970), entry for 20 August, 1945, the occasion of Bevin's first major speech as 
Foreign Secretary, p. 502; Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs (London: Collins, 1958), p. 51 1; 
Williams, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., pp. 266-7; Harold Wilson, Memoirs: The Making of a Prime 
Minister 1916-64 (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Michael Joseph, 1986). 
102 Miriam Camps, `Missing the Boat at Messina and Other Times? ', in Brian Brivati and 
Harriet Jones (eds. ), From Reconstruction to Integration Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), pp. 134-43 (p. 134). 103 It is only with the benefit of hindsight that, they argue, one can link the three in a neat 
success story. 
key Foreign Office officials in the period concerned. What many take as the 
seminal text on Britain and Europe, Camps' Britain and the European 
Community was, she later admitted, `read in draft by three officials- Sir Frank 
Lee, Russell Bretherton and Sir Frank Figgures', as well as by Richard Mayne, 
another prominent orthodox writer. '04 Naturally when such contact is a part of 
one's daily routine as a journalist, and when one operates in the same 
ideological prism as those individuals, these will have a considerable influence 
on the final record of events one narrates as history. Writers' connections, in 
this case the intimate links between journalists, academics and key officials, 
has thus had a bearing on lower levels of explanation creeping into orthodox 
historiography. 
Orthodox histories are, however, texturally different from revisionist accounts 
which, it will be shown in the next chapter, analyse foreign policy-making in a 
multipolar international system. This implies uncertainty, interdependence and 
greater exploration of the roles of individuals and bureaucratic wrangling in the 
formation of policy. While not lacking entirely from orthodox works, this 
dimension has been assigned a priori importance by revisionists whose 
research findings bear the signs of post-Cold War uncertainty and primary 
source input. 
" Definition of `British Foreign Policy' 
104 Miriam Camps, `Missing the Boat at Messina and Other Times? ', in Brian Brivati and 
Harriet Jones (eds. ), From Reconstruction to Integration: Britain and Europe Since 1945 (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1993), pp. 134-43 (p. 134). Camps served during the war 
in the US State Department, before moving into the journalistic and academic fields. See Brivati 
and Jones, From Reconstruction to Integration, op. cit., p. 7, list of contributors. 
One of Ranke's methodological prescriptions was, Iggers notes, that `human 
actions mirror the intentions of the actors and that it is the task of the historian 
to comprehend these intentions in order to construct a coherent historical 
Story,. 105 The second distinguishing feature of orthodox historiography is that it 
takes British foreign policy as a direct function of what British ministers and 
officials willed it to be, echoing Barber's `formal office holder perspective on 
foreign policy-making'. 106 The underlying assumption is that blame for 
Britain's `missed opportunities' in Europe can be placed on the key policy- 
makers who were myopic towards the continent, clinging to outdated notions 
of great power status and grandeur, spurning a regional role for Britain. For 
revisionists, by contrast, the link between intentions and outcomes is not nearly 
so neatly captured, the process of policy-making fitting Barber's `departmental 
negotiated order perspective'. 107 But there is even more to it. In an 
interdependent international system, revisionists argue, British intentions often 
foundered on the rocks not of London's own making but, very often, of others. 
This facet of revisionism will be elucidated in the next chapter but it is crucial 
to recognise the dichotomy between the orthodox emphasis on intentionality 
and the revisionist stress on uncertainty in the foreign policy arena, where 
things do not always go according to plan. 
This assumption shows itself in orthodox interpretations of British European 
policy in two ways. First, it emerges in studies that explain foreign policy in 
'°5Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p. 3. 106 Barber, Who Makes British Foreign Policy?, op. cit., p. 7. 107 Ibid., p. 34. 
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terms of a co-ordinated Whitehall structure. Orthodox accounts focus mainly 
on the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary as the originators of foreign 
policy, with civil servants and the Foreign Office occasionally involved, but 
usually in rather vague and ill-defined ways. The responsibility for British 
policy failure, the orthodoxy has it, lays with the top executive. Bevin, for 
example, is taken by orthodox writers as `the Emperor' in foreign policy 
matters. 1°8 Anthony Eden and the Foreign Office are commonly said to have 
overridden Churchill's `Europeanism' in the period 1951-5.109 The common 
thread running through all these approaches to foreign policy making is that 
responsibility lay in the upper echelons of a coherent, highly organised 
Whitehall decision-making structure. Put succinctly: `British federalists faced 
real difficulties, given the post-war mood of key civil servants and 
politicians'. 10 
There are other explanations for the focus on the top executive as the 
originators of policy. It is on one hand hagiographically appealing to stress the 
domination of foreign, policy by one or two individuals as a way of praising 
their achievements. Orthodox historiography of Bevin and Heath both exhibit 
this orthodox trait, stressing a single-minded foreign policy, albeit with 
different aims. Bevin is praised for his role in entangling America in the 
108 Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, op. cit., p. 202. 109 This is an argument made by orthodox writers and revisionists. See Home, Macmillan Vol l 
op. cit., p. 349; Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit., p. 189; Macmillan, Riding the StoreOP- 
cit., p. 65; Maudling, Memoirs. op. cit., p. 63; Montague Browne, IQng Sunset, op. cit., pp. 122 
31; Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit., p. 129; Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever Hanoe» Q 
the Tories, op. cit., pp-66-8. On the revisionist side see Richard Lamb, The Macmillan-YOO 
1957-63: The Emerging Truth (London: John Murray, 1995), p. 104; Seldon, Churchill's Ifld1an 
Summer, op. cit., p. 38; Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, op. cit., p. 260. 110 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union, op. cit., p. 95. 
defence of Western Europe; '" Heath for pursuing EEC entry with unswerving 
determination, his one `success story' in an otherwise calamitous 
premiership. ' 12 On the other there is the orthodox tradition of criticising 
leading policy-makers for dominating and manipulating the policy process to 
such an extent that the voices of ministers lukewarm to the process of 
European integration went unheard in Cabinet. This trend began, it seems, with 
Macmillan, Maxwell Fyfe and Boothby's criticisms of Eden. 13 It was 
continued by the Labour diarists under Wilson and has come to form the 
backbone of the view that Cabinet government over the European question 
withered away during the 1960s. 114 Accusations about `inner cabinets' and 
"' In addition to Kirkpatrick on Bevin see Elisabeth Barker, The British Between the 
Superpowers 1945-50 (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1983), p. 43; Bullock, Ernest 
Bevin, op. cit.; Michael Foot, Aneurin Bevan 1897-1960 (London: Indigo, 1999), pp. 238-428; 
Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 185-6; Roberts, `Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary', 
op. cit. 
112 Arthur Aughey, review, `The Heath Government, 1970-74. Edited by Stuart Ball and 
Anthony Seldon', Contemporary British History, 10,4 (1996), pp. 162-4 (p. 162). See for 
example Campbell, Edward Heath, op. cit., pp. 74-86; Heath, The Course of My Life, op. cit., 
p. 356; George Hutchinson, Edward Heath: A Personal and Political Biography (London: 
Longman, 1970), p. 90; Margaret Laing, Edward Heath: Prime Minister (London: Sidgwick and 
Jackson, 1972), pp. 124-47; John Ramsden, The Winds of Change: Macmillan to Heath 1957- 
1975 (London: Longman, 1996), p. 337; Anthony Seldon, `The Heath Government in History', 
in Stuart Ball and Anthony Seldon (eds. ), The Heath Government 1970-74: A Reappraisal (London: Longman, 1996), pp. 1-19; Sainsbury, ` Lord Home', in Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (eds. ), British Foreign Secretaries, op. cit., pp. 144-73 (p. 159, pp. 167-8). 13 Boothby, My Yesterday, op. cit., pp. 83-4; Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit., p. 186-7; 
Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., pp. 410-413. In his biography Nigel Fisher- a self- 
confessed admirer- is happy to swallow Macmillan's account. See Nigel Fisher, Harold 
Macmillan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 307. See also Sked and Cook, Post- 
War Britain, op. cit., p. 112; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit., p. 40; Barber, Who Makes 
British Foreign Polic 
, 
op. cit., p. 47; Gilmour and Garnett use Maxwell Fyfe and Nutting's 
accounts in their criticism of Eden in Whatever Happened to the Tories, op. cit., pp. 67-8. 114 Particularly pertinent accusations on the manipulation of the European policy agenda arise 
over the Prime Minister's power of patronage. Writers of all schools debate the significance to 
European policy of the Cabinet reshuffles of July 1960 and August 1966, coming to conflicting 
conclusions. On Macmillan's reshuffle see Richard Aldous, "'A Family Affair": Macmillan and 
the Art of Personal Diplomacy', in Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (eds. ), Harold Macmillan 
and Britain's World Role (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 9-35 (p. 15); Barber, Who Makes 
British Foreign Pofi gy, ? op. cit., p. 16; Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., p. 170; John 
Barnes, `From Eden to Macmillan, 1955-1959', in Hennessy and Seldon (eds. ), Ruling 
Performance, pp. 98-149 (p. 109); Beloff, Britain and the European Union, op. cit., p. 60; Beloff, 
The General Says No op. cit., p. 97; Campbell, Edward Heath, op. cit., p. 114; Camps, Britain 
and the European Community op. cit., p. 314; Charlton, `How (and Why) Britain Lost the 
Leadership of Europe (3): The Channel Crossing', Encounter, 57,3 (1981), pp. 22-33 (p. 29); 
`kitchen cabinets' become increasingly common from opponents of entry after 
1964. Jay is, moreover, convinced that Wilson ignored and suppressed his 
`sceptical' views on the EEC. 115 European policy, remarked Barbara Castle at 
the time, was `ruthlessly stage-managed'. 116 To the apologies of ministers 
lamenting that Britain was too distant from Europe, therefore, one also 
discovers a line of `sceptic' retirees arguing that European policy was regularly 
left off the Cabinet agenda. 
The combination of hagiography and odium that fires orthodox accounts are 
stark reminders of the multiple and conflicting reasons why historical accounts 
Anne Deighton, `La Grande-Bretagne et la Communaute Economique Europeene (1958-1963)', 
Histoire. Economie at Societe 1 (1994), pp. 113-30 (p. 123); David Dutton, `Anticipating 
Maastricht: The Conservative Party and Britain's First Application to Join the European 
Community', Contemporary Record, 7,3 (1993), pp. 522-40 (p. 526); George, An Awkward 
Part ner, op. cit., p. 30 Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., p. 136; Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, `From 
Macmillan to Home, 1959-1964', in Hennessy and Seldon (eds. ), Ruling Performance, pp. 150- 
85 (P. 159); Ramsden, The Winds of Change. op. cit., p. 24; David Reynolds, Britannia 
Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 
1991), p. 219; Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A Study in Ambiguity (London: Allen 
Lane/Penguin, 1967), p. 216. Kristian Steinnes, 'The European Challenge: Britain's EEC 
Application in 1961' Contemporary European History, 7,1 (1998), pp. 61-79 (p. 65); Young, 
Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 72; Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe 
from Churchill to Blair (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1998), pp. 119-24. On Wilson's reshuffle see 
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Benn Diaries, op. cit., p. 265 (23 September 1966); Howard, insert in The Crossman Diaries, op. 
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Secretaries, op. cit., pp. 205-20 (p. 205); Morgan, Harold Wilson. op. cit., p. 291; Ben Pimlott, 
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69,3 (1993), pp. 586-7 (p. 586); John Grigg, review, `Policies of Impotence', International 
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116 Barbara Castle, The Castle Diaries 1964-1976 (London: Papermac, 1990), p. 125 (27 April 
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are written. Highlighting the dominance over the foreign policy process by top 
ministers is used either to praise them or, commonly in the historiography of 
Britain and Europe, to blame them for policy failures. There is also the 
argument, espoused by Crossman and Healey, that they let Wilson pursue entry 
because they knew it would crash on the rocks of de Gaulle's hostility to 
Britain. "7 In this context, hindsight has also been used by politicians to show 
publicly how they were justified in the long-run, supporting the oft-made 
criticism of autobiographies, memoirs and diaries that they constitute poor 
historical records. 118 
Orthodox historiography also emphasises the political over economic inputs to 
foreign policy. Where, in all the discussion of Prime Ministerial and Foreign 
Secretarial intent, is the view from the Treasury, Board of Trade and the Bank 
of England and from business organisations? Frankel provides part of the 
answer in his comment that `The last war was an all-out national effort in 
which security completely overrode economic considerations; security 
continued to overshadow them during the early period of the cold war and they 
gradually shifted to the foreground of British foreign policy only in the 
1960s'. 19 This quote serves as a reminder that orthodox historiography was 
written in a period when the threat of war and the need for security were the 
dominating characteristics of the international system. Economic 
"7 Crossman, The Crossman Diaries, op. cit., p. 349 (2 May 1967); Denis Healey, The Time of 
My Life (London: W. W. Norton, 1990), pp. 329-30. 
"g John Barnes, `Books and Journals', in Seldon (ed. ), Contemporary History. 
, 
op. cit., pp. 30- 
54 (pp. 34-40). 
19Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 255. 
considerations were, it seems, simply less important to the politicians and 
historians of the time. 
The other part of the explanation lies in the divorce between economics and 
politics at policy-making level, pointed out by William Wallace: `The 
separation of foreign economic policy from the traditional concerns of foreign 
policy has been deeply embedded in British policy and practice'. IN For 
practitioners and historians of this epoch the reality was of a decision-making 
process in which, as Beloff observed, the Treasury and Foreign Office were 
rivals. Back as far as the 1930s, he argued, the Treasury was of the view `that 
economic affairs were its concern alone and that the Foreign Office should be 
confined to the more traditional spheres of diplomacy'. 121 This has been 
supported by historians of the constitutional role of the Treasury in the foreign 
policy process. George Peden, for example, notes that former members of other 
key Whitehall departments, especially the Foreign Office, have tended to 
emphasise the Treasury's `meanness'. The image this generates reinforces 
Beloff's focus on the rivalry between the economic and political branches of 
government. 122 
120 William Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process in Britain, 2°" edn. (London: The Royal 
Institute of International Affairs, 1977), p. 156. See also Beloff, New Dimensions in Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., pp. 23-4; Adamthwaite, Introduction', op. cit., p. 17. 121 Quoted in ibid., p. 170. See also Clarke, 'The Policy-Making Process', op. cit., p. 87. 122 G. C. Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury: 1932-1939 (Edinburgh: Scottish 
Academic Press, 1979). He continues the theme of the practical and academic separation of 
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and Social Policy: Lloyd George to Margaret Thatcher, 2°" edn. (London: Phillip Allen, 1985). 
A good example of the separation of economics from politics is to be found in 
the historiography of the devaluation of sterling in September 1949. There are 
many political and official accounts of the British economy and economic 
policy-making which refer to the economic causes and consequences of 
devaluation, without mentioning the foreign policy consequences. 123 It was a 
position reaffirmed at a 1991 Witness Seminar on devaluation, when Edwin 
Plowden124 was tackled on the political waves he thought devaluation might 
make abroad. `To be honest', he admitted bluntly, `I don't think they played 
much part'. 125 Only in 1984 did the foreign policy significance of the 
devaluation receive attention in the pioneering research of Scott Newton. '26 
Comparing the approaches to devaluation of the two schools supports the 
observation made through this study, that they are asking different questions of 
123 On the key players in the 1949 crisis see Brian Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Richard 
Cohen, 1997), pp. 84-6; Chris Bryant, Stafford Cripps: The First Modem Chancellor (London: 
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1967 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983), pp. 129-52; Alec Cairncross (ed. ), The Robert Hall 
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Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), pp. 446-7; Foot, Aneurin Bevan. op. cit., pp. 269-77; Harris, 
Attlee, op. cit., pp. 434-6; Jay, Change and Fortune. op. cit., pp. 185-91; Pimlott (ed. ), The 
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history. Practitioners are concerned to elaborate on their involvement with 
particular events, not reflect on the implications of their actions. Scholars, by 
contrast, are concerned with the machinery, with gaining a full account of the 
policy process and collating that data into a coherent story. This, they argue, 
must take account of the economic influences on foreign policy. This stance is 
explained by Roger Tooze as follows: `Interdependence as it has developed in 
the post-war system makes the policy and conceptual distinction between 
"foreign" and "domestic" and between "political" and "economic" largely 
redundant, mainly because of the interpenetration of national economies and 
the centrality of economic and welfare goals to the continued legitimacy of 
contemporary governments'. 127 Comparing the weight attached by Tooze to the 
economic determinants of foreign policy with Frankel's assertion above, one 
can discern the sea-change in academic approaches to the study of British 
foreign policy which have influenced historians in the 1980s. 
Having said that, when politicians and officials were forced to confront the 
political implications of economic crises such as devaluation, orthodox 
historians of Britain and Europe also paid them attention. This is evidence that 
key lines of historical inquiry are stimulated by live political debate about 
events. Sanders summarises the confluence of economics and politics in 
explaining Macmillan's entry bid by arguing that: `At the decision-making 
level, the crucial factor was the apparent benefit which it was believed EEC 
membership would bestow on the British economy; at the structural level, the 
127 Roger Tooze, `Security and Order: The Economic Dimension', in Smith, Smith and White (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 124-45 (p. 132). 
major causal influence was the autonomous shift in the pattern of Britain's 
external trade- away from the Empire and towards the Commonwealth'. 28 
Wilson's bid has also been explained with strong reference to economic 
factors, notably the poor economic performance of EFTA compared to the 
EEC, a favourite theme of the Economist from 1964 which was still 
campaigning for membership. 129 The pertinence of economics in the Wilson 
era was heightened by the emphasis he placed on science and technology as 
part of his reasons for wishing to join the Community. In line with the 
orthodox inquisition of the `European' credentials of leading policy-makers 
some have taken the line set down by Heath who, via Campbell's biography, 
repeated his slur that it `was right to be sceptical of Wilson's technological 
jargon, which was quite as superficial as [Heath] alleged. Wilson. was 
thoroughly conservative in his personal tastes and habits and a devout Little 
Englander at heart'. 130 Also unconvinced about the veracity of his commitment 
128Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., p. 136. He thus identifies the two main reasons given in 
the historiography for joining: findings on the `stop-go' cycle of the British economy and, 
looking to the future, reports on the economic threat from continuing exclusion from Europe. 
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to `the white heat of revolution' was Barker, who argued that `Wilson's 
enthusiasm for European technical co-operation was counter-balanced by 
British refusal to carry through joint projects which were proving over-costly 
or unlikely to give worthwhile results'. 131 Grosser made the more telling 
observation that although Wilson `suddenly declared that Great Britain was on 
its way to becoming the industrial helot of the United States' he never rejected 
a single investment application from across the Atlantic. '32 
Wilson's `technological community' has, however, received a more 
sympathetic hearing elsewhere. The Economist was in no doubt. It was `an 
article of faith', it reported, that the Six wanted to boost Europe's 
competitiveness vis-ä-vis the United States in technological matters. 133 There 
was widespread acceptance in Britain, it argued in August 1966, that `Europe 
will never develop rockets or computers or aircraft that can match America's 
unless the European government commit themselves to a minimum of common 
budgets and joint policies'. "' Peter Shore, Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs 1967-9 also gave the `technological community' a sympathetic 
hearing. 135 Literature on industrial reorganisation and rationalisation also 
persuades us that the creation of the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) in 
1964 and the 1966 Industrial Reorganisation Corporation Act were geared to 
131 Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., p. 221. 132 Grosser, The Western Alliance, op. cit., p. 224. 133 'The Wilson Community', Economist, 21 January 1967, pp. 197-8 (p. 197); `Let's Try 
Again', Economist, op. cit., p. 796. See also Grosser, The Western Allian ce, op. cit., pp. 218-9. 134 
`Let's Try Again', Economist, op. cit., p. 796. 135 Peter Shore, Leading the Left, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1993), pp. 88-90. 
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support Mintech and the Science and Technology Act of 1965, however 
unsuccessful they were in the long-run. 136 
The `technological community' has also had a broadly sympathetic hearing 
from historians. Frankel wrote that it `loomed large in Wilson's platform'. 137 
David Homer agreed that `the deployment of the "scientific revolution" as the 
keynote of the Labour campaign was rooted in a longer running discourse on 
the social relations of science which had been developed by radical socialist 
and communist scientific intellectuals in the 1930s and 1940s'. 138 Wilson's 
biographers were just as certain about the premier's commitment to a 
`technological revolution'. 139 Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo are therefore 
wrong to argue that `most commentators have assumed that there was no real 
commitment... and dismiss it as another example of Wilson's cynical political 
expediency'. 140 There is a better balance in the historiography than they 
suggest. The literature on science policy and industrial reorganisation has 
largely been kind to Wilson, only a few historians saw no substance behind the 
rhetoric. It remains to be seen what a revisionist approach to Wilson's 
136 In particular, observed P. Mottershead, it was hoped that `selective intervention to 
modernise industry would help to solve the balance of payments problems without resorting to 
devaluation'. P. Mottershead, `Industrial Policy', in Blackaby (ed. ), British Economic Policy, 
op. cit., pp. 418-83 (p. 432). Wilson reportedly told Frank Cousins, the first Minister of 
Technology in 1964, that he had `about a month to save the British computer industry'. Ross 
Hamilton, `Despite Best Intentions: The Evolution of the British Microcomputer Industry', 
Business History, 38,2 (1995), pp. 81-104 (p. 89). See also Wilson, The Labour Government, 
op. cit., p. 300. 
137 Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 59. See also Maclean, British Foreign Policy Since 
Suez, op. cit., p. 27. 
138 David Horner, `The Road to Scarborough: Wilson, Labour and the Scientific Revolution', in 
R. Coopey, S. Fielding and N. Tiratsoo (eds. ), The Wilson Governments 1964-1970 (London: 
Pinter, 1993), pp. 48-71 (p. 49). See also Richard Coopey, `Industrial Policy in the White Heat of 
the Scientific Revolution', in Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo (eds. ), The Wilson Governments 
op. cit., pp. 102-22. 
139 A. Morgan, Harold Wilson, op. cit., p. 246; Pimlott, Harold Wil son. op. cit., p. 274. 140 Coopey, Fielding and Tiratsoo, `Introduction', op. cit., p. 5. 
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economic and science policy under Wilson will look like. The signs are that 
the Economist's relatively positive approach will be sustained, rather than 
Heath's critical appraisal. "' This would fit the trend in the historiography of 
earlier periods. The major point to take from this is that the 1960s do seem to 
have been the period when the British were made fully aware of the politicised 
nature of economic decisions. This has been echoed loudly by orthodox writers 
on the Macmillan and Wilson applications to join the EEC. 
It is surprising, then, to find Sanders in 1990 offering a neo-orthodox account 
of devaluation. Amidst the turn to revisionism in the historiography, he argues 
that `not only are self-evidently "political" strategies frequently shaped by 
economic objectives and constraints, but decisions about economic policy are 
equally often guided by political criteria'. 142 This exception highlights the 
individuality inherent in constructing historical narratives, the host of pressures 
at work on writers. The exigencies of producing a broad, textbook study of 
British foreign policy since 1945 perhaps militated against a thorough 
consideration of the literature on devaluation and European integration. 
Judging by his bibliography, it seems he was unaware of Newton's work and 
the historiographical foundations it had put in place for challenging the 
conventional wisdom on Bevin's Atlanticism. 
141 John W. Young, `The "Technological Community" in Wilson's Strategy for EEC Entry', 
conference paper delivered at The Second Try: Harold Wilson and Europe, 1964-67, Institute 
of Historical Research, London, 13 January 2000. 
142 Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., p. 197. On devaluation see p. 203. 
This highlights a significant influence on historiographical interpretation: 
general studies of British European policy cannot always capture the essence of 
archival findings. `[A]ny historian', observes Brian Brivati, `is only as good as 
his or her sources'. 143 They work their way into mainstream literature 
sometimes after several years have elapsed, and even then only if they fit in 
with the predilections of those who consult them. The breakout from one 
school to another has less to do with sources than the willingness of individual 
historians to state the case more boldly than it has been stated already. 1 ather 
than toying with the alternative explanations hinted at by orthodox writers, 
revisionists lead with them. It only takes one or two individuals to do this 
before many more find evidence to back them up in the documents. A further 
explanation for Sanders' oversight may be the self-imposed epistemological 
chains he put on his study. By explicitly choosing a state-centric realist 
approach to foreign policy he, like many orthodox writers, sought explanations 
for British foreign policy in `high politics', national security issues. The year 
1949 is more commonly remembered not for devaluation but the signing of the 
Washington Treaty. 
Hence, two explanations for why economics and politics were separated in 
orthodox studies of British European policy up to 1960 are that it reflected 
policy-making structures and relative public inattention to the relationship 
before 1960. As a result, the two were separated in the worlds of British 
politics and academia. Revisionist historians, too, have been somewhat limited 
143 Brian Brivati, `Introduction', in Buxton, Brivati and Seldon (eds. ), The Contemporary History Handbook, op. cit., pp. 15-24 (p. 22). 
in their use of economic papers. How fast one expects primary sources to be 
devoured in the quest for a `complete' historical picture, is one to which the 
next chapter pays close attention. What this analysis of the orthodox school's 
portrayal of a coherent, tightly controlled Whitehall machine, with politics 
dominating economics shows, is the emphasis the school places on 
intentionality. British European policy, it assumes, can be defined largely in 
terms of the political ideology and aims of the major foreign policy actors. 
" Hindsight 
This chapter has so far identified three ties among writers in the orthodox 
school: sociological, a realist outlook on foreign policy and an assumption that 
foreign policy outcomes can be deduced from the intentions of key political 
players. Orthodox historiography contains two further features which now need 
to be analysed: a reliance on hindsight to reconstruct historical events and the 
entrenchment of the conventional wisdom about personalities and policies. It 
will be shown that such qualities are associated with the overtly politicised 
accounts which dominate the orthodox school. 
To assert that a defining feature of the orthodoxy is its use of hindsight is 
another way of arguing that the concerns of the present influence 
interpretations of the past. To fully understand the impact of hindsight on 
orthodox historiography thus requires analysis of two factors: the social and 
political climate which spawned orthodox works and the goals of the studies 
which dominate the school. On the issue of the climate of opinion, most 
orthodox works contained, it can been argued, politically driven criticisms of 
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British personalities and policy, based on the assumption that London had 
diverged from the righteous path of continental integration in the post-war era. 
British writers in particular were extremely introspective, taking 
disappointment with Britain's failure to join the EEC in the 1960s as the 
starting point for attempts to explain why London was hovering on the fringes 
of European integration. In the 1980s, academics became increasingly 
interested in whether Thatcher's `Gaullist unwillingness to cede any further 
sovereignty to the EC's institutions' was representative of Britain's post-war 
European policy. 144 
Appleby, Hunt and Jacob observe that `The fascinating thing about telling a 
story is that they start with the end. It is a conclusion that arouses our curiosity 
and prompts us to ask a question, which then leads back to the beginning from 
which the eventual outcome unwound'. las That there has yet to be a conclusion 
to the process of European unity makes contemporary historical judgment even 
more acutely susceptible to the vagaries of individual interpretation. Living 
through history makes it harder than usual to reconstruct events free from 
personal and political prejudice. For writers today the present is different from 
the present experienced by writers thirty years ago. Writing about history 
necessarily involves looking back on the past with the benefit of hindsight and 
experience. The question is how much writers let these factors impinge on 
their interpretations of the past. 
'aa Sanders, Losing an Empir op. cit., p. 9. gas Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, Telling the Truth About History, op. cit., p. 263. 
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This is made clearer by assessing the three generic groups of study that are the 
lifleblood of orthodox writing. The first group consists of several closely 
related genres of literature: political memoirs, autobiography (what John Grigg 
calls those `monumentally egocentric' studies) 146 and writing based on oral 
testimony. The human memory is less than perfect. What interests us here is 
forgetfulness and loss of memory, policy-makers' inability to remember with 
precision the course of events in which they were involved decades ago. `There 
are', notes Prins, `certain sorts of memory which may be forever irrecoverable 
because of the manner of their loss'. 147 Further, contemporary events can 
always have an impact on our interpretations of the past. In the case of 
politicians (and officials who form the bulk of our insights in Charlton's 
widely used volume of oral history) 148 criticism and apologia are enmeshed in 
their assessments of the key events in British European policy. It may seem 
overly simplistic to associate political memoir with official recollection. Is 
there a difference between what each group says about Britain and Europe? 
Officials tend to take what Mayne calls the `mea cu/pa ' approach, 149 discussing 
what more they could have done to develop a constructive European policy. 
They are also more reticent about publishing their views which tend to gain 
public voice through their presence at academic conferences and witness 
seminars. Politicians, by contrast, are more concerned with the allocation of 
blame and the value of their own contribution, seamlessly extending the 
146 Grigg, review, `Policies of Impotence', International Affairs, op. cit., p. 73. 147 Prins, `Oral History', op. cit., p. 126. 149 Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit. 149 Mayne, review, `The Price of Victory. By Michael Charlton', International Affairs, op. cit., 
p. 327. 
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personal animosity they felt for other decision-makers into a critique of 
European policy. Their interpretations tend to be weighted towards political 
not bureaucratic recollection. So there is a division between the volume and 
style of official and political recollections. However, a combination of the two 
sets of practitioners has set the tone for orthodox historiography of Britain and 
Europe. It is thus convenient to take the two together for analytical purposes. 
What muddies the waters still more is that political memoir and recollection 
are not exclusively concerned with the European question. Politicians usually 
carry many responsibilities during their careers, in several areas of policy 
competence. The fact for researchers of British European policy is that most 
simply did not take a keen interest in Europe in the 1950s, and only marginally 
more so in the 1960s when it was thrust onto the agenda with successive 
British applications to join the Communities. It is easy for them to replicate the 
conventional wisdom because the sections or passages on Europe in their 
publications are likely to be thin. As R. K. Middlemas argues, political 
recollection can too often be dull and uninformative: `Some parts of 
[Macmillan's memoirs] read like extracts from the Annual Register, of from 
the lengthy Foreign Office briefs which Bevin used to read out in the House of 
Commons'. 150 They neither have the time nor the interest, even with the aid of 
a team of researchers and ghost writers, to devote much attention to Europe, 
when the conventional wisdom has been established for a number of years. It is 
easy to forget that for many practitioners the European question was not the 
150 R. K. Middlemas, review, Tides of Fortune, 1945-1955. By Harold Macmillan', International 
Affairs, 46,3 (1970), pp. 568-9 (p. 568). 
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dominating factor in their thinking. The Cold War, relations with Russia, 
America, the Commonwealth, Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, the Middle East and, 
later, Rhodesia and China all impinged on the time devoted to Europe. To take 
one crucial period, the Messina conference, John Barnes notes that `In their 
differing ways, Eden Butler and Macmillan were all part of a broad consensus 
within Whitehall which recognised the growing importance of Europe to 
Britain but which was not prepared to narrow its horizons to Europe alone'. 151 
But this is being kind. Politicians also suffer from `intentional' memory loss, 152 
a reminder that `forgetting is about something real'. 153 Austen Morgan's 
criticism is representative of the majority verdict on political memoir: 
`Politicians belong to that special class of liar who seem to be genuinely unable 
to discriminate between special pleading, the suppression of material evidence, 
and outright- falsification of the record'. 154 A. J. P. Taylor recoiled in similar 
fashion: `Old men drooling about their youth? No! '. 155 Politics is a fickle 
business, and politicians can make as many enemies as friends. For this reason, 
argues Nick Crowson, remember `how "personality" and personal enmity 
influence the "rise" of individual politicians'. 156 They tend in their memoirs to 
151 Echoing the point made above that Butler and Eden were, by 1955, `bored' with the 
European question. Barnes, ` From Eden to Macmillan', op. cit., p. 131. See also Young, "'The 
Parting of Ways"? ', op, cit., p. 209; Simon Burgess and Geoffrey Edwards, `The Six Plus One', 
op. cit., p. 413; Dutton, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 307; Kaiser, Using Europe. op. cit., pp. 43-4; 
Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, op. cit., pp. 197-8. 152 Anthony Seldon, `Interviews', in Seldon (ed. ), Contemporary History, op. cit., pp. 3-16 (pp. 6-7). 
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be alternately bland and controversial as a means of obscuring their own 
personal involvement with sensitive issues and to sell books. Newspaper 
editors appear to prefer literary atom bombs over hand grenades, controversy 
over dull and verbose recollection. In the historian's point of view, political 
memoirs, autobiography and oral testimony analysis of Britain and Europe too 
often relegate in-depth discussion of the European policy process below 
personal vitriol and the obfuscation of the policy process. Even more so for 
politicians who had little to do with the foreign policy process, where their 
opinion on European policy is necessarily dictated by what they heard in the 
lobbies and read in the media. 
The second type of study that dominates orthodox historiography is closely 
related to political testimony: biography in which, Mark Steyn notes, there is 
often a `morphing of biographer and subject'. 157 This, Campbell has 
communicated, is for the key reason that `In my experience it is usually a waste 
of time interviewing politicians who have written their memoirs, because all 
they ever do is repeat what they have written; and much the same I think 
applies to historians'. It is very hard for biographers to escape the confines of 
the subject's mind-set because they have generally `forgotten' alternative 
explanations for their action or policy, sticking to an established version of 
events. 158 
"' Mark Steyn, `Is Hillary Hurting?: Hillary's Choice. By Gail Sheehy', Sunday Telegraph, 19 
December 1999, p. 18. See also Walker who argues that `As is usually the case in biographies, 
most cold war scholars sympathised with the positions espoused by their subjects'. Walker, 
`Historians and Cold War Origins', op. cit., p. 224. 158 Permission received to quote written correspondence with John Campbell, 6 March 2000. 
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Biography, notes Hamilton, takes ` multitudinous forms and genres... as the way 
we look at real lives and have looked at them throughout history'. 159 It is useful 
at this stage to distinguish between three different biographic genres: official, 
unofficial and `contextualised'. The orthodox interpretation is more often 
sustained in the first two, but far less in the third. So this chapter concentrates 
on official and unofficial biography, leaving contextualised for the next. The 
question is why do these genres of writing more often than not lead to a 
replication of the often well established views of the `subject', that is, the 
politician whose life is being investigated? In the case of `official biography' 
the reasons are not hard to locate. Often sponsored by the subject or his or her 
relatives, the official biographer is under immense pressure to convey honour 
on the individual whose life is being written, to bow to the demands of the 
`keepers of the flame'. 160 `Part of the implicit understanding in "official" 
biography', explains Ben Pimlott, `is that the author should be counsel for the 
defence'. 161 Such a process can be unplanned or unconscious. To take the 
example of Alistair Home's two volume portrait of Macmillan: official 
biographies that collate interview evidence from the subject rely on a 
combination of hours of with the subject. Pimlott's verdict is that `Home 
comes perilously close to going native... Macmillan's snobbery spills on to the 
author'. 162 The common charge is that official biographies too often represent 
159 Hamilton, `In Defence of the Practice of Biography', op. cit., p. 86. 160 This term has been coined by Ian Hamilton in Keepers of the Flame: Literary Estates and the 
Rise of Biography (London: Pimlico, 1992). It is also known as the `Defender of the Faith' 
thesis. See Elms, Uncovering Lives, op. cit., p. 30. 161 Pnnlott, Frustrate Their Knavish Tricks, op. cit., p. 26. On the need to preserve political 
reputations after the death of the subject because of family pressures see also p. 155. 16 Ibid., p. 28. 
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the views of the subject and lack analytical insights into those views. 163 It is 
perilous to assume all official biography suffers from these traits, but for the 
purposes of picking out broad characteristics, official political biography in 
Britain has developed largely on hagiographic lines. This, writes Elms, should 
come as no surprise: `For much of its history [biography] was largely 
hagiographic, recording the saintly practices of genuine or putative saints'. 164 
`Unofficial biography' is much harder to encapsulate because so many types of 
writer attempt it. In addition to academic studies, politicians, usually proteges 
or admirers of the subject, often present interim verdicts on their mentors at or 
about the time they rise to positions of power. They tend to be personal 
accounts aimed at the general public to inform them of the sort of person that 
has come to lead them. By definition there is little policy content, because they 
are penned before the subject has spent long in government. 165 On the other 
side there are (fewer) critical accounts written by opponents of the subject to 
`warn' the public about who is about to govern them. As political polemic 
often penned before terms in office these are less use to the historian of 
Britain's relations with Europe, but invaluable contributions to the 
conventional wisdom on particular politicians. ý66 
163 The best examples are Harris, Attlee, op. cit.; Home, Macmillan. Volume 1, op. cit.; Horne, 
Volume 2, op. cit.; D. R. Thorpe, Alec Douglas-Home (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1996); 
Philip Ziegler, Wilson: The Authorised Life of Lord Wilson of Rievaulx (London: Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, 1993). 
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Taking official and unofficial biography together, one can draw out two 
fundamental reasons why they voice the conventional wisdom on Britain and 
Europe. The first turns crucially on the questions biographers ask of their 
subject and therefore of history itself. `Most modem biographies', observes 
Pimlott, `for all their revelations of promiscuity and personal disorder, have 
barely departed from the Victorian, and medieval, tradition of praising famous 
men. Nowhere is this more true than in the comparative backwater of political 
biography'. 167 Because of the chronologically ordered account each offers, the 
issue of Europe tends to be treated only spasmodically, and only then in the 
context of the `big' decisions that were made in London. The rejection of the 
Schuman Plan, the turn from the EDC, the withdrawal from Messina, the 
failure to win over de Gaulle- these are the major themes around which debates 
among orthodox writers crystallise; other policy innovations go either 
unmentioned or are devoted only the occasional line. That `Europe' rarely 
features as a chapter in its own right militates against thorough consideration 
of all the issues involved. But one should expect this- these are after all 
expansive works. Ranging over a lifetime's political work will naturally lead to 
gaps and distortions. 
Pimlott highlights the second explanation: the support given to the 
hagiographic tradition of political biography by publishing houses. `Publishers, 
reflecting public taste, continue to want orthodox lives spiced with colourful 
167 Pimlott, Frustrate Their Knavish Tricks, op. cit., p. 154. 
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details, of orthodoxly famous people: the best contracts go to those who 
provide them'. 168 Biographers who wish to use psychoanalytical insights to 
explain individual actions are held back by the tradition of political biography 
in Britain which is geared more to public achievements than to personal lives. 
To concentrate too heavily in Freudian fashion on sexuality and personal 
relationships as explanations of political behaviour would, it seems, not be 
adequately `academic' because it is too reminiscent of the `tabloid newspaper 
treatment of modem politics and politicians'. 169 They pay attention to the 
formative experiences of politicians only as adjuncts to explanations of 
behaviour rooted in political caste or ideology. There is a case to be made that 
there has not been enough experimentation with Freudian analysis which, 
Pauline Croft argues, is in `irreversible decline'. 170 Judicious use of methods 
designed to uncover the source of political action from personal backgrounds, 
while no more testable than other influences, would be a new and interesting 
departure in British historiography, adding to our understanding of the body 
politic. Nigel Hamilton points out that some universities in Britain are now 
offering undergraduate and postgraduate courses on the practice of biography 
which will surely replenish interest in `discredited' approaches to the writing 
of political lives. 171 Thus, traditional methods of researching political 
biographies in Britain look set to stay, supported as they are by the political, 
academic and publishing communities. The next chapter will analyse a new 
168 Ibid., p. 159. 69 O'Brien, 'Is Political Biography a Good Thing? ', op. cit., p. 62. 170 Pauline Croft, `Political Biography: A Defence (1)', Contemporary British History, 10,4 
(1996), pp. 67-74 (p. 72). 171 Nigel Hamilton, `In Defence, of the Practice of Biography', Contemporary British History, 
10,4 (1996), pp. 81-6 (p. 82). 
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development, contextualised biography, that endeavours to align the study of 
6 great men' more closely with textually rich historical narrative. 
The third type of study that forms the backbone of the orthodox school are the 
early studies of British foreign policy, notably those by Frankel and 
Northedge. 12 General studies, or survey histories, of the entirety of Britain's 
multilateral relations from 1945 suffer from the same limitations that hamper 
the study of historical events in the context of political memoir and biography. 
They are by necessity unable to cover each relationship in detail. Just as 
biographies cannot deal with the subject matter as rigorously as historians 
would like, general histories of a long period such as 1945-73, are not 
concentrated histories of Britain and Europe, but wider studies of the entirety 
of Britain's external relationships. The pioneering studies by Barker, Beloff 
and Camps did, however, devote entire books to Britain and Europe. Yet, these 
works reinforced the orthodox interpretations of British European policy. Why 
was this? It was not necessarily the time of writing or constraints imposed by 
the Thirty Year Rule. That Camps later admitted archival evidence `contained 
few surprises' shows that the weight of preordained convictions can easily 
override the consultation of `new' sources of evidence. 17' Their sympathy for 
Monnet's European project suggests there is a political agenda running through 
these texts. Their journalistic background adds further weight to the argument 
that these were histories of Britain's attempts to come to terms with Europe, 
172 Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit.; F. S. Northedge, British Foreign Policy: The Process 
of Readjustment (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1962); Northedge, Descent from Power, 
oT. cit. 
' Camps, ` Missing the Boat', op. cit., p. 134. 
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tacitly sponsored by the `Europeans' in Whitehall and the parliamentary 
lobbies campaigning for Britain to be nearer the epicentre of integration. It is 
no coincidence that the same officials who later bemoaned Britain's missed 
opportunities on the continent were those with whom these historians would 
have had daily contact both during and long after the events they described. 
Camps, wrote a reviewer in 1965, `is, or was, a "European" and her 
convictions are not concealed. Yet, he continued, `this rarely leads to bias'. 174 
Revisionists would strongly disagree. 
The orthodox school has set the tone for the historiography of Britain's 
relations with Europe. Its points of reference, the language it employs, its 
symbolism and emotion, make it a compelling adjunct to the literature on 
Britain's post-war decline. Even in recent texts that contain significant allusion 
to revisionist material, the overarching orthodox theme is Britain's 
awkwardness, its reservations, its reluctance to join the Europeans in their 
integrative adventure. 175 Not only does this make the schoolification of writers 
according to the date of publication hazardous- politicians are as likely to 
sustain the conventional wisdom whether they publish in 1950 or 1990- it 
introduces us to the final link across orthodox writers to be analysed below: the 
admission but suppression of revisionist interpretations. Its widespread appeal 
can be seen by examining other writers apart from Camps who place an 
orthodox interpretation on the history despite using primary sources, which 
174 S. C. Leslie, review, `Britain and the European Community 1955-1963. By Miriam Camps', 
International Affairs- 41,1 (1965), pp. 121-2 (p. 121). 
"s George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit.; David Gowland and Arthur Turner, Reluctant 
Europeans: Britain and European Integration 1945-1998 (Harlow: Pearson, 2000). 
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have been the lifeblood of revisionism. What this reveals is that it is not just 
sources, or methods of research, that determine historiographical progression 
in Britain, but sociological forces, the willingness by certain writers to 
decisively break out of the interpretative mould set by their predecessors in the 
field. Three accounts make this point about the pervasiveness of the discursive 
framework set up by the orthodox school: those by Victor Rothwell, Alan 
Bullock and Alan Milward. 16 
Rothwell's was the first study in Britain to use PRO documents- mainly 
Foreign Office correspondence- as the major source of evidence. Bullock a 
year later built on the foundation he had laid in a biography of Bevin that 
included also reference to Bevin's private papers and interview material. Yet, 
to take one key debate in the literature on Britain and Europe where a 
revisionist school using primary sources is well established, they never went so 
far as to argue that Bevin was primarily interested in creating a Third Force 
despite admitting in several places that it was indeed a consideration for Bevin 
in his approach to British foreign Policy. 177 
176 Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941-1947, op. cit.; Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit.; 
Milward, The European Rescue, op. cit. Other waverers on this issue include Beloff, Europe 
and the Europeans, op. cit., p. 158; Donald C. Watt, Succeeding John Bull: America in Britain's 
Place 1900-1975 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 109-22; Hennessy, ` The 
Attlee Governments', op. cit., pp. 39-43; Beloff, Britain and the European Union, op. cit., 
pp. 52-4; George, An Awkward Part ner, op. cit., pp. 18-9; Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever 
Happened to the Tories, op. cit., p. 45; Alan Dobson, `The Special Relationship and European 
Integration', Diplomacy and Statecraft, 2,1 (1991), pp. 79-102 (pp. 63-5); Edward Fursdon, The 
European Defence Community A History (London: Macmillan, 1980), pp. 29-40; Howard, 
`Introduction', op. cit., p. 12; Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., pp. 13-23; Manderson-Jones, The $Qecial Relationship, op. cit., pp. 22-6 and pp. 65-74. 
Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., 358,395-6; Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, > P" P" pp. > 
op. cit., pp. 449-50. 
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Why did they not go the whole way? For Rothwell, like Bullock, the first part 
of the answer is to be found in the aim of the study. They were most concerned 
with the Cold War, not Bevin and Europe, so one cannot have expected them 
to explore Bevin's `Europeanism' at length. They asked different questions of 
the history from revisionists. Bullock in particular was more intent on praising 
Bevin for his vision in saving Western civilisation through the creation of 
NATO, evidence of the hagiography that can dominate political biography: 
`Bevin's part in creating the Atlantic Alliance crowned his achievement'. 178 
The second centres on the issue of closure. Rothwell's study ended in 1947. He 
did not analyse the archives for 1948, the year when for revisionists the Third 
Force conception was at its apogee in the Foreign Office. 179 This limitation on 
his work could be due to oversight, time, length of book or financial 
constraints. The crux is that whatever Rothwell's sources, or belief that 
primary sources were the best sources in the reconstruction of history, the shut- 
off point of his study militated against him examining evidence for what has 
since become the crucial year of 1948. Consequently, he never felt comfortable 
about actually naming the `Third Force'. A further reason takes us onto 
Bullock's work. It is associated with the goal of study, the underlying agenda 
of analysing Britain's role in the Cold War rather than his European policy per 
se. 
"g Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., p. 840. See also Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, op. cit., 
pp. 413-50; Adamwthwaite, `Britain and the World', op. cit., p. 228. `The flirtation', he argues, 
`ended almost as soon as it began'. 179 Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 18. 
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So there are issues surrounding the major goals of each study. However, their 
reluctance to pursue the Third Force seems to require deeper explanation. 
Perhaps they were hesitant because the term was not in general usage in the 
early 1980s. It has been argued by Kaplan that the labelling of theories and 
concepts can have powerful repercussions on their acceptance by scholars who 
are inherently conservative. `Ideological belief systems', he writes, `often have 
powerful psychological appeal, for they offer answers to questions that people 
feel a need to ask'. 180 The symbolism of the language employed, the 
simplifying function provided by the use of labels to describe of Bevin's `Third 
Forcism' did, it seem, play a significant role in determining the timing of the 
rise of revisionist scholarship in this area. 18' Language and symbolism are vital 
elements of discursive formations which help us understand complex historical 
realities around which writers coalesce into schools. The simpler 
interpretations are to understand, the more compelling they are to scholars who 
are short on time and resources to check for primary evidence of it themselves. 
Thus it is that Kent and Young have become the benchmark for Third Force 
revisionism, 182 not Rothwell and Bullock who only alluded to Bevin's interest 
in it. That they also named the writers against which they set their new 
interpretation helped set the historiographical boundaries of schools even more 
clearly. Academic fads and fashions, the rise and fall of discursive formations 
ßßo Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 83. 8' This is supported by White's point that we find in the theory of language and narrative itself 
the basis for a more subtle presentation of what historiography consists of than that which 
simply `tells the student to go and "find out the facts" and write them up'. Quoted in Jenkins, 
On ` What is HistoW. ', op. cit., pp. 1534, 182 Kent, 'Begin's Imperialism', op. cit.; Kent and Young, `British Policy Overseas', op. cit.; 
Kent and Young, `The "Western Union" Concept', op. cit.; Young, `The Foreign Office, the 
French', op. cit.; Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., pp. 12-8. 
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about the past, therefore play a pivotal part in the nature of historical 
interpretation, because they determine the time at which one school supplants 
another in the historiography. 
Milward was another to use a vast array of primary documentation, this time 
economic statistics on European reconstruction after the war. His argument 
was not centrally about British European policy, but naturally he did make 
more than passing reference to it. In the penultimate chapter on the role of 
sterling and the dollar world Milward traces British hopes for a world role for 
sterling, particularly through accommodation with the American dollar. 183 The 
parallels with Newton's work are evident. Yet he concurred with the orthodox 
account of British attitudes to the continent, using the emotive language of 
`missed opportunities'. It was, he argues, a `serious mistake' not to sign the 
Treaty of Rome because Britain was economically and politically marginalised 
from the continent after 1957.184 We see here many properties of orthodox 
historiography, notably analysis of Britain and Europe in the context of a 
broader study which is not hinged on British European relations per se. 
Milward was, it seems, unaware of Newton's work. 185 Had he been, would he 
have taken a more revisionist approach? It is hard to tell. That he did not pay 
183 Milward, The European Rescue, op. cit., pp. 345-433. 
184 Ibid., p. 433. There is an interesting comparison to be drawn with Peter Clarke's Hope and 
Glory. `[O]n p. 403', one reviewer notes, `it is established that "the most obvious missed 
opportunity" of the twentieth century was Britain's failure to enter Europe in the Fifties- and 
with this the book ends'. Ghosh, ` How We Got Where We Are', London Review of Books, op. 
cit., p. 18. 
'85 This in itself is interesting: Newton's articles were published in the Economic History Review 
and Review of International Studies. Had they been showcased in the `bigger' International 
Studies, might they have had more recognition? 
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detailed attention to state diplomacy, concerned as he was with economics, his 
core research aim was not to investigate the political ramifications in the same 
way as revisionists have done. The chances are that as a peripheral area of 
inquiry, Milward would not have even been aware of his contribution to the 
debate about Britain and Europe, so knowledge of Newton's work would have 
made little difference. Milward was deepening our understanding of Newton's 
economic findings in another direction. Historians' use of evidence has a 
crucial bearing on interpretation and can have significant ramifications on 
historiographical development. New evidence does not necessarily bear the 
fruits of revisionism when preordained beliefs are brought to the study of 
history. 
`Political and ideological control', observes Southgate, ` is an essential 
aspect of historical study, and it is concerned not only with... conscious and 
deliberate manipulations... but also with the often unconscious controls 
exercised in the very language or "discourse" in which history is written'. 186 
The words of Appleby, Hunt and Jacob are extremely relevant to Milward's 
conclusion on `missed opportunities': `The fact that authors do not intend all 
that they say does not render their intentions uninteresting or irrelevant; it 
merely highlights the subterranean quality of many of the influences that play 
upon word choices'. 187 
" Historical Entrenchment of the Conventional Wisdom 
186 Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, Telling the Truth About History, op. cit., p. 267. 
Quoted in `What Jim Knew and Henry Did', Times Higher Education Supplement, 12 
November 1999, pp. 24-5 (p. 24). 
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A. J. P. Taylor observed in Who Burned the Reichstag? that `Events happen by 
chance and men mould them into a pattern. That is the way of history'. 188 
Taylor's reference is to the essential reliance of history-writing on the use of 
imaginative mental reconstruction in the narration of events, the evidence of 
which is usually left to us in fragmentary and haphazard form. There is a case 
for arguing that there is an in-built revisionist tendency in historiography, as 
successive generations of politicians and scholars interpret and reinterpret the 
past to suit their own ideological predilections. Such is the nature of 
historiographical evolution. This is where the analytical element of Taylor's 
use of the word `mould' becomes significant, because it implies that all 
historical facts are malleable, subject to different interpretations and 
understandings. In essence, Taylor was expounding a postmodern approach to 
history. 
The fifth link among writers in the orthodox school is that their interpretation 
tends to represent a reification of the conventional wisdom. Contemporary 
political criticisms of British European policy have come to be moulded into 
the earliest historical accounts of events, accounts revisionists hotly dispute. 
To understand this link between the received wisdom and subsequent 
interpretations of British European policy one needs to explore further the 
three ways in which `politics', that is, the ebb and flow of political debate, 
personal recrimination and propaganda, has inspired orthodox interpretations 
of events. The first strand of this argument has already been examined: the 
188 Quoted in `What Jim Knew and Henry Did', Times Higher Education Supplement, 12 
November 1999, pp. 24-5 (p. 24). 
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trend of criticising British policy set in motion by Monnet and those 
sympathetic to his vision of European unity. The orthodoxy was spawned to a 
large extent by activists in the Federal Union and associated bodies in Britain, 
Western Europe and the United States, who were unimpressed with Britain's 
apathy about joining the nascent Communities. The rhetoric they used about 
Britain being `awkward' in Europe and hostage to reminiscence about the 
`special relationship' and the power of the Commonwealth became, as we have 
seen, the established critique of British European policy in the discursive form 
of `missed opportunities'. 
The reasons why this found fertile ground in Britain represents the second way 
in which politics has impinged on the orthodox interpretation. There is 
something in the human psyche that makes us revel in opprobrium towards 
figures in the public eye. Carr observed, in the historical context, that 
`Russians, Englishmen, and Americans readily join in personal attacks on 
Stalin, Neville Chamberlain, or McCarthy as scapegoats for their collective 
misdeeds'. 189 In the 1990s our politicians are generally treated with disdain, 
and we hark back to a `golden age' when they were treated with, and deserved, 
respect, `before some strange demon... brought it to an end'. 190 The Wilson 
administrations, October 1964 to June 1970 and March 1974 to April 1976, 
were a watershed experience in this respect, marking in Pimlott's words the 
`effective end of noblesse oblige in British politics'. 191 The alleged opaqueness 
in the policy process- characterised in the literature by charges that the premier 
189 Can, What is History?, op. cit., p. 78. 190 Palme Dutt, Problems of Contemporary History, op. cit., p. 28. 191 Pimlott, Frustrate Their Knavish Tricks, op. cit., p. 30. 
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presided over a kitchen cabinet- stimulated suspicion in Britain about the state 
of political life, the quality of those elected to lead us. Yet if we look back to 
the time when the supposed `great' politicians were in power (Attlee, 
Churchill, Eden, Macmillan) the contemporary verdict on them was not much 
more kind, despite what we like to believe many years on. At the time 
European policy was just one of a number of foreign and domestic policies 
greeted with disdain by the opposition and on the backbenches. 
The rhetoric surrounding government policy and the criticisms levelled against 
it have had important repercussions on the literature, because they have set a 
trend it is all too easy for orthodox writers not focused on the European 
question to repeat without question. Personal antagonism, pithy soundbites for 
headline writers and dismissive one-liners about policy in the House of 
Commons have set the tone for much orthodox historiography, apparently 
reinforced by criticisms from continental Europeans intimately involved in the 
construction of Europe and amplified in the press. In Greg Knight's 
compilation of `honourable insults' over the dispatch box there is a sharp 
resemblance to how we now perceive key figures in the post-war governments: 
through rhetoric. This shows the way in which humorous quips and labelling of 
events can come to stand for the reality, even if there is dispute over what is 
actually implied by the label. 192 This prompted Kaplan's observation that `It is 
amazing how often simple models are offered as the conventional wisdom 
192 Greg Knight, Honourable Insults: A Century of Political Invective (London: Arrow, 1991). 
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even in the face of contrary evidence'. 193 Palme Dutt remarked on the `official 
myths' which 'by dint of incessant repetition are presented and often accepted 
by many sincere people... as the Gospel truth'. 19' Barraclough also observed 
that `The history we read, though based on facts, is, strictly speaking, not 
factual at all, but a series of accepted judgments'. 19s All these points of view 
are summarised appropriately by Hill who comments of political practice that 
`Long-established perceptions and conventional wisdoms can become more or 
less objective parts of an individual's environment'. ' There is strong 
evidence to support the postmodern position here, that the language and 
symbolism one uses to describe historical events can be of greater importance 
to subsequent interpretations of events than the external reality one purports to 
describe in the first place. 
In a globalised society where we are bombarded with information at an 
alarming rate we cannot hope to understand or remember the detail in 
everything we hear, see and read. What we do remember are strong images and 
pithy descriptions of personalities and policies. Criticisms of individuals carry 
much weight and can lead to criticisms of a given policy, even when little of 
that policy behind the scenes is actually known or made public. Attlee is 
remembered as an unassuming premier, so it is conventionally assumed he held 
no sway over the domineering Bevin. As Churchill remarked: `An empty taxi 
193 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., pp. 106-7. This need to simplify events 
so that the historian can `order' historical facts is taken up in Southgate, His o, op. cit., pp. 63- 
4. 
194 Palme Dutt, Problems of Contemporary History op. cit., p. 38. 
'95 Quoted in Carr, What is History?, op. cit., p. 14. 
'%Hill, 
`The Historical Background', op. cit., p. 30. 
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cab drew up outside the House of Commons and Clement Attlee got out. 197 
Eden is treated with disdain for his Suez policy, his European policy tarred 
with the same brush. He will be remembered, A. J. P. Taylor trumpeted, `as the 
prime minister who steered the ship of state onto the rocks'. 198 Much like his 
flaws on the personal front, Wilson remarked, he `hardly ever said boo to a 
goose. When he did say boo, he chose the wrong goose and said it far too 
roughly'. 199 Wilson's manipulation of his Cabinet has, likewise, been extended 
to include a dishonest European policy. The crux is that to conclude one from 
the other is a logical non sequitur. One can admit, for example, that Eden's 
policy on Suez was seriously flawed without condemning all his other policies. 
One can acknowledge that Wilson was obsessed by his public image, 200 
without concluding that his commitment to the `technological community' was 
a merely a thinly veiled oratorical stunt to impress the watching Europeans. 
This is not a zero-sum game. 
The orthodox school, however, tends not to split policy areas but view them 
through the same critical lens. This approach is reinforced by the final impact 
of political comment on orthodox interpretation: opposition jibes about a 
myopic British European policy. As Benjamin Disraeli said, `The duty of the 
opposition is to oppose'. 201 Opposition politics can often exaggerate the 
artificial dichotomy between rhetoric and reality, form and substance. What 
197 Quoted in Knight, Honourable Insults, op. cit., pp. 46-7. 
198 A. J. P. Taylor, introduction to Aster, Anthony Eden, op. cit. 
199 Quoted in Knight, Honourable Insults, op. cit., p. 100. 200 Ian Macleod's insult was that ` He is a man whose vision is limited to tomorrow's headlines'. 
Ibid., p. 95. 201 Quoted in Kavanagh, British Politics, op. cit., p. 294. 
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this implies is that opposition parties have an interest in creating party 
divisions over the dispatch box where none exist in practice. There are several 
examples of parties being lions in opposition and lambs in power. `It is', 
Camps states, ` of course always easier to advocate bold policies out of office 
than in office'. 202 These can now be analysed to demonstrate the long-lasting 
effect mischievous opposition rhetoric can have on the interpretation of 
historic events. As Michael Clarke has observed, `the whole range of Britain's 
relations with the EC is subject to domestic perceptions of that institution and 
to the vigorous party political debate which has accompanied Britain's every 
step in respect of the EC before Britain joined'. 203 
Take the historical debate which sprung up around the Conservative jibe that 
Labour should have joined the ECSC on the same terms of the Netherlands. 
The intention was clearly to embarrass the government and win points for the 
Conservatives by saying `we would join if we were in power'. That the 1951 
Churchill administration refused to join the coal-steel pool shows the 
disingenuousness of their taunts. `While the [Conservative] Party could 
proudly talk of "Mr. Churchill's United Europe Movement"', writes John 
Ramsden, ` there was not much substance in it as a policy'. 204 Many, however, 
were inclined to take seriously this recommendation. 205 It was openly admitted 
that the criticisms were part of a Conservative conspiracy to oust the 
government. The aim, as Boothby later put it, was to `harry the life out of 'a 
202 Camps, European Unification in the Sixties, op. cit., p. 165. See also pp. 128-9. 203 Clarke, `The Policy-Making Process', op. cit., p. 83. Emphasis added. 204 Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden. op. cit., p. 195, p. 220. 205 Dell, The Schuman Plan op. cit., p. 161; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit., p. 29. 
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Labour government with a majority of only six in the House of Commons. This 
meant haranguing the government on every issue in every debate to force 
another general election. 206 But it took many years for writers finally to admit 
that comparing Britain's political and economic circumstances with the 
Netherlands in 1950 was hardly viable. 207 
Many strands of orthodox historiography did, however, flow from this dispatch 
box taunt, demonstrating the extent to which intensely political concerns can 
have a large impact on historical interpretation. Writers have generally been 
slow to question the rhetoric of opposition parties but quicker to swallow their 
criticisms of British European policy. That opposition rhetoric supported and 
in some cases gave birth to whole strands of orthodox writing suggests a strong 
correlation between political rhetoric and orthodox historiography. 
Revisionists, as shown in the next chapter, were unhappy with the moulding of 
political oratory into historical reality. 
Using Europe as a stick with which to beat the government had two effects on 
the historiography. First it lent weight to Monnet's charges of British bad faith 
over Europe. Governments came to power on the back of lofty rhetoric about 
European unity, 208 only to dash the hopes of Monnet and his followers by 
pursuing a policy not unlike their predecessor's. Politicians and some academic 
206 Aster, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 98. See also Roger Makins' words in Chariton, The Price 
Of Victon+, op. cit., p. 102. 207 Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., p. 783; Northedge, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 149; 
Rhodes James, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 333. 208 Take Churchill's speeches on the European Army. Max Beloff, Europe and the Euro eans: 
An International Discussion (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), pp. 155-7. 
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commentators were fooled by lofty rhetoric into thinking that it was a guide to 
policy intentions, so historiographical opinion has levelled charges of crude 
`anti-Europeanism' at successive British governments, reflecting the let-down 
felt among the founding fathers and those associated with Federal Union at the 
apparent divergence between intention and practice. 
Not only did oppositionism reinforce suspicion of British intentions on the 
continent, live political debate has in certain cases taken writers off down 
historiographical cul-de-sacs. That is, academics and retirees have debated the 
`if only' question in history without paying sufficient attention to the 
circumstances within which criticisms were levelled. A good example is again 
to be found in the literature on the Schuman Plan. Orthodox writers take the 
post hoc justification for British European policy, set out in the European 
Unity pamphlet of June 1950, as evidence of Britain's opposition to the 
Schuman Plan. 209 The Economist was just the first to moan that the pamphlet 
left the impression that `the Labour Party stands for socialism or nothing in its 
dealings with the continent'. 210 Such broad policy statements cannot, for 
revisionists, tell the whole story. Young remarks that, because the pamphlet 
had been prepared before May, `references to the Schuman Plan had been 
209 See Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 314-5; Lieber, British Politics and European Unity, op. 
cit., pp. 18-9; Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., pp. 87-8; Diebold, The Schuman 
Plan, op. cit., pp. 55-8; Louis Lister, Europe's Coal and Steel Community: An Experiment in 
Economic Union (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1960), p. 8; Northedge, British Foreign 
Policy op. cit., p. 148. 210 `Socialism Contra Mundum', Economist, 17 June 1950, pp. 1313-5 (p. 1313); Times, 13 June 
1950, p. 4. See also Ernst B. Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political. Social and Economic 
Forces 1950-1957 (London: Stevens and Sons, 1958), p. 159; Acheson, Present at the Creation, 
op. cit., pp. 504-5; Fursdon, The European Defence Community, op. cit., pp. 58-61; Gihnour and 
Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories, op. cit., pp. 41-5; Henry Pelling, Britain and the 
Marshall Plan (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1988), p. 100. 
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added to it'. 211 Aldrich also remarks that key members of the American 
intelligence community concluded `erroneously' that the pamphlet had been 
released to destroy the Schuman Plan. 212 One therefore needs to treat historical 
texts, as the primary sources on which they are based, with caution, bearing in 
mind the difficult processes by which `facts' are constructed into historical 
stories. 
5. Sowing the Seeds of Revisionism 
The final key feature of orthodox historiography is a flirtation with but 
ultimate rejection of alternative interpretations of British European policy. 
From what has been argued in the chapter already, it is clear that schools of 
writing on Britain and Europe are not polar opposites. Virtually all orthodox 
works contain the seeds of what would later develop into a full-blown 
revisionist school interpretation. The term `seeds' means unexplored 
alternative explanations or interpretations that might challenge the dominant 
`missed opportunities' paradigm. One can point to two obvious examples in 
the literature. First, on Eden's European policy, Camps, it is generally 
assumed, argued that Plan G was `not maliciously conceived'. 213 She had 
earlier admitted, however, that the line between a defensive and offensive 
foreign policy is `almost impossible' to draw. 214 It is precisely this problem of 
211 Young, Britain and European Unix, op. cit., p. 34. 212 Aldrich, 
`European integration', op. cit., p. 169. 213 Camps, Britain and the European Community, op. cit., p. 510. See also Barker, Britain in a 
Divided urone op. cit., p. 153. 214 Camps, Britain and the European Community op. cit., p. 217. 
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perception that sparked the revisionist school into life. In a departure from the 
established pattern, revisionist writers agreed, on the basis of PRO sources, 
with the argument of Monnet and his followers that British policy was an 
`engine of war' designed to strangle the EEC at birth. Critics from across the 
Channel, they observed, were right to condemn the FTA proposal. 215 Camps 
had planted the seeds of revisionism but conveniently failed to explore the 
tension she had produced in her account by applying her caution about the 
problems of policy projection abroad to the rest of her study. Maybe she did 
not recognise it. But perhaps she knew that if she admitted that policy 
presentation was the problem for Britain it would undermine her central claim 
that British policy was myopic. Revisionists and post-revisionists would later 
argue that British policy was only `malicious' when seen through the eyes of 
continentals such as Monnet who had a particular view of how Europe should 
integrate. Such an admission could, however, have damaged the credibility of 
her broader account which on other issues was Monnetist in outlook. 
The second example of the potential for revisionist interpretations to emerge 
from orthodox accounts comes in the literature on Bevin's foreign policy. It 
has been shown how some orthodox writers argued that Bevin flirted with the 
215 This is one of the strongest revisionist criticisms, given in Anne Deighton, `La Grande- 
Bretagne', op. cit., pp. 113-9. For the political verdict rife at the time see Monnet, Memoirs, op. 
cit., pp. 449-50; Ball, The Discipline of Power, op. cit., p. 80; Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of 
Hope: Renewal 1958-62, trans. Terence Kilmartin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), 
pp. 179-80; Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 105; Heath, The 
Course of My Life op. cit., p. 202. On the academic side see Lamb, The Failure of the Eden 
Government, op. cit., p. 95. Greenwood's `spoiling tactic' echoes Lamb who he uses for his 
evidence. See Sean Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation Since 1945 (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1992), p. 68; John W. Young, "'The Parting of Ways"?: Britain, The Messina 
Conference and the Spaak Committee, June- December 1955', in Dockrill and Young (eds. ), 
British Foreign Policy pp. 197-224. 
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idea of creating a Third Force in Europe until 1948. In the end, however, they 
maintained that he preferred all along the Atlantic Alliance. That they refused 
to develop the revisionist interpretation is evidence of the structural and 
political forces at work on historical narratives. 
These are just two examples of the seeds of revisionism being sown in key 
orthodox texts. Could one not, therefore, argue that all the literature is post- 
revisionist, in the sense that virtually all studies incorporate elements of the 
orthodox and revisionist interpretations of British European policy? No. The 
crucial distinction between schools is that some writers prioritise orthodox 
interpretations over revisionist approaches and vice-versa. That Camps flirted 
with revisionism in some respects does little damage to the observation that the 
impression one has from reading her studies are of a flawed British policy. One 
does not emerge with the same picture after reading revisionist historiography. 
To label all the literature `post-revisionist' is to misunderstand how the various 
parts of the historical narrative fit together, to overlook the issue of 
intentionality in historical interpretation and neglect the weighting each 
historian allocates competing explanations of policy. It may sometimes be only 
the weighting that is different, but this is enough to delineate schools of 
writing. 
The shift from one school to another is crucially dependent on a combination 
of generational and sociological forces. While sources of evidence and the 
political inputs to British historiography also need to be analysed in any 
explanation of historiographical evolution, they are necessary but not sufficient 
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conditions for the break between schools. What appears to be of greater 
consequence, and what therefore has to be considered the vital factor in 
defining the shift from one school to another, is the will by individual scholars 
to break decisively from the orthodoxy on crucial points of conflict. The will to 
do this stems from historiographical awareness on the part of a new generation 
of scholars who are reacting against the received wisdom. The role played by 
language and symbolism in this is crucial, because just as the orthodox school 
hides behind the discursive formation associated with `missed opportunities', 
one finds revisionism and post-revisionism starting to gain most acceptance 
after one or two scholars have labelled their approach and set it explicitly 
against orthodox interpretations. British historiography has thus been less 
dependent than American on political upheaval. It is more closely linked to 
evidentiary bases and, most significantly, sociological divisions and the 
symbolic linguistic formations associated with them. 
6. Conclusion 
On closer reading, then, orthodox works often contain the sources of evidence 
or throw-away one liners that later flourish into the revisionist interpretation. 
Similarly, revisionist writers often pay more than mere lip-service to the merits 
of the orthodox approach, before rejecting and subsuming it in a critique of the 
missed opportunities approach to British European policy. The division 
between the schools, what makes the historiographical study of Britain's 
relations with Europe so revealing, turns on why the revisionist approach 
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remained submerged beneath the orthodoxy for so long. Orthodox texts are 
qualitatively different from revisionist texts in terms of focus, texture and 
depth of analysis. The questions they ask of history are different, resulting in 
different aims, objectives, sources and methods of narrativisation. 
Officials and politicians from both parties first voiced, and still repeat, the 
conventional wisdom. Academic studies tended to focus on the whole web of 
Britain's post-war contacts, not simply the European. To counter the view that 
this disparate coalition of writers cannot be termed a `school', it must be 
remembered that writers do not necessarily have to be aware of their 
relationship to others in the field, to the historiographical landscape on which 
they tread, or to contemporary historical opinion to be a member of a school. 
The process of schoolification is necessarily a retrosepctive judgment. Behind 
the two schools there are intensely revealing sociological links among writers 
that it is hard to overlook in explaining historiographical evolution. It is only in 
the past fifteen years that the study of Britain's relationship with Europe has 
come to be studied as an area in its own right. It has, to be sure, been 
professionalised, bringing with it new methods of study, sources and 
epistemological concerns. 
In this light, the term `research method' needs to take greater account of all the 
sociological pressures and processes of imaginative reconstruction that go into 
the writing of history. As the term currently stands it is insufficiently aware of 
the practice of research, concentrating instead on the theory. If one can identify 
one's method, it seems, one has the ability to produce a scientifically objective 
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and logical interpretation of events. What this thesis shows, by contrast, is that 
there is an intrinsic individuality to all historical narratives, yet an overarching 
link among writers in schools which stems not from research design, or 
sources, or particular approaches to the study of political history. By contrast, 
interpretation is as much the product of language, symbolism and rhetoric, 
which, taken together, represent the discursive formations associated with 
particular communities and generations of writers. Research methods courses 
do not take sufficient account of the individual who narrates the history. 
Historiography, the study of the individuals and communities who produce 
waves of historical writing, is ideally situated to shed light on the gap that 
currently exists in academic training between the theory of and practice 
research. The construction and writing of narratives are not as strongly linked 
to how one gathers data as they are to how one imaginatively collates that data 
into a coherent story. Historians and political scientists can learn much from 
dialogue with psychologists, anthropologists, postmodernists and critical 
theorists about how our interpretations shape and are continuously shaped by 
both the events we analyse and the language we use to narrate them. `The past 
as an object will be read differently from one generation to another', note 
Appleby, Hunt and Jacob presciently. 216 Professional historical attention to the 
subject of Britain and Europe brought new approaches and language to the 
historiography. This is the subject of the next chapter. 
216 Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, Telling the Truth About Histor+, op. cit., p. 265. 
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Chapter 3 
THE REVISIONIST SCHOOL: 
CHALLENGING THE RECEIVED 
WISDOM 
Table 3: Key Writers in the Revisionist School 
Name Institution/Background Sources 
Anne Deighton University of Oxford PRO, especially 
F0371, Bevin's 
papers, CAB 
John Kent LSE PRO, especially 
F0371, CAB, 
CO* 
Piers Ludlow University of Oxford, Archives of European 
LSE Commission and 
PRO, especially 
MAFF* $ 
Scott Newton University College, Cardiff PRO, especially 
T, F0371 and CAB 
Victor Rothwell Edinburgh University PRO, especially 
F0371 
Geoffrey Warner Open University PRO, especially CAB 
and F0371 
Hugo Young Journalist PRO, especially CAB, 
PREM and F0371 
John Young LSE, University of Leicester PRO, especially CAB, 
PREM, F0371 
* CO stands for Colonial Office archives 
** BT stands for the various departments of the Board of Trade; T stands for the various 
committees and divisions of the Treasury; MAFF stands for the papers of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food 
Compare this table of key writers with that at the beginning of the last chapter. 
What one discovers is that there is a striking difference between the 
sociological connections of the key writers in the revisionist school with those 
in the orthodox school. The domination of the revisionist school by 
professional historians, as opposed to the political, journalistic and eye- 
witnesses who form the backbone of the orthodox school, is intensely revealing 
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about the core argument advanced in this thesis. That is, the key influence on 
historiographical progression in Britain has been sociological. The dominance 
of the field of Britain and Europe by different communities of writers is thus 
the first variable to be considered in any account of the process of history- 
writing. The remaining influences on interpretation all seem to flow from this 
connection, but are split from it analytically for simplicity and because of the 
need to understand fully their impact on the methods and approaches to the 
study of history taken by revisionist writers. 
This chapter is divided into six sections. The introductory section analyses the 
broad interpretation of British European policy offered by revisionist writers. 
This permits immediate contrasts to be drawn with the orthodoxy. Moreover, it 
reinforces the secondary argument advanced in this thesis, that the 
identification of clear schools of writing, based on published interpretation, is 
an extremely useful way of analysing this body of writing. The second section 
focuses on the significance of understanding historiographical progression in 
the context of different communities of writers asking different questions of 
the historical evidence put before them. The third examines the most obvious 
manifestation of the professionalisation of the field of Britain and Europe: the 
use of PRO sources by academic historians. It argues that for a combination of 
epistemological and practical reasons, documentation in the PRO has been the 
major source on which revisionist accounts have been built. In addition, it is 
pointed out, the identification of practical reasons governing the widespread 
use of PRO material reveals much about considerations of money and time in 
the process of historical research. Such constraints on the pace and direction of 
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historical understanding in Britain cannot be overlooked. Yet, it is argued, they 
have yet to be systematically considered either by historians or philosophers of 
history. The fourth section turns attention to the assumptions that are implicit 
in much of the historical research undertaken by revisionist historians. It 
asserts the significance of the level of analysis on which they locate their 
accounts of British European policy, their approach to intentions and outcomes 
in the foreign policy arena, the new sources of evidence brought to bear on the 
past and the implications all this has had for their attack on the use of 
hindsight in orthodox historical accounts. 
The fifth section takes a step back, inquiring whether it has been sources 
leading revisionist accounts, or revisionists seeking new evidence in the 
primary documentation simply to reinforce their unhappiness with orthodox 
interpretations. While it is difficult to make decisive judgements about cause 
and effect, it is argued that one can discern from the weight of evidence 
provided, the importance of primary sources to revisionist interpretations of 
British European policy. Without the release of documents under the Thirty 
Year Rule, it is unlikely that such a bold revisionism as has appeared in the last 
decade would yet have emerged. This section goes on to reflect further on the 
premium placed by professional historians on PRO sources, arguing that other 
potential sources- notably the media- have too often been overlooked. This, it 
shows, may have retarded the development of the new historical 
understandings one now finds in the literature. The conclusion to this chapter 
reflects on the limits to historical understanding imposed by the individuality 
of historical research and the natural tendency of historians to examine history 
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with the preoccupations of their own country in mind. Such introspectiveness, 
for which they are hardly to be blamed, tends to mean that `global' 
perspectives on history have worked their way only slowly into the 
historiography of Britain and Europe. The chapter ends by speculating that this 
arguably more balanced perspective could be achieved by transnational teams 
of historians working on the material. 
1. The Revolt Against the Conventional Wisdom 
`It is not without significance', Elton remarked wryly, `that the one historian 
among the ancients for whom no-one has a bad word seems to be Asinius 
Polio, of whose writing nothing survives'. 1 Human beings are naturally 
inquisitive, investigative and argumentative animals. Academia in particular 
possesses, Morrow and Brown note, an `inherently competitive character'. 2 
Historiographical evolution can in this context be taken as one of scholarship's 
givens. One explanation for an event or events is bound to be met with 
suspicion by a host of critics who will propose alternatives. As Kaplan 
explains: `history has no meaning except the meaning it has for certain 
individuals within the context of matters that have importance for 
them... History has no independent existence. Nor is there any unity that can 
Elton, The Practice of History, op. cit., p. 2. 
Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, op. cit., preface, p. 14. See also 
Southgate, History, op. cit., p. 69. Elton also remarked that the only certainty in history is that 
`there will be more said and that, before long, others will say it'; The Practice of History, op. 
cit., p. 63. Rhodes James agreed that `There will be further and different assessments. This is in 
the nature of historiography', in Anthony Eden, op. cit., preface, p. 14. See also Carr, What i History?, op. cit., p. 124. 
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single-mindedly be imposed upon it, for history is analysable from many 
different perspectives that can be applied only within limited frameworks'. 3 
The typology of historiographical development identified by John Gaddis on 
the origins and evolution of the Cold War suggests that an orthodox 
interpretation will be followed by a revisionist critique. Post-revisionists will 
then blend elements of the two in a balanced synthesis which agrees partially 
with orthodox and partially with revisionist accounts. 4 But is there more to 
revisionism than the dynamics of human understanding and inquiry? This 
chapter explores the intertwining factors in the development of the revisionist 
school of writing on Britain's relationship with Europe since 1945. 
In doing so, it supports Kaplan's observation that `The uses that are made of 
history will be no better than the questions put to it'. 5 One of the core 
assumptions of this study is that there is no single `truth' about what happened 
in the past, but a number of competing claims to the truth made by all the 
individuals who narrate historical events. The writing on Britain and Europe 
provides a compelling demonstration of this assertion, because the 
professionalisation of research in this field has led to a whole new set of issues 
being examined in the light of fresh primary evidence. Revisionists asked a 
whole new array of questions about Britain and Europe, using new sources to 
answer them. The accounts they have produced are different both in 
orientation, tone, substance and texture from the orthodoxy. Ritchie 
3 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowin op. cit., p-99- 4 Gaddis, ` The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis', op. cit. 5 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 105. 
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Ovendale's criticism of Frankel's British Foreign Policy, what Jordanova 
classes as a `survey history', 6 akin to textbooks in their propensity to 
generalise, is representative of the view diplomatic historians in Britain have 
generally had of the historical content of broad studies, and those from the 
pens of political scientists, of Britain's foreign relations since 1945: ` This work 
is probably of interest to social scientists concerned with "paradigms", 
"parameters" of action and "saliences". It's value to historical scholars is more 
limited'. 
There are three broad themes running through the writing and interpretation of 
the revisionist school. It will be helpful introduce these before showing how 
they manifest themselves in the revisionist school's core sociological and 
theoretical underpinnings. The first is the challenge it poses to orthodox 
conceptions of British European policy. The previous chapter showed how 
orthodox writers were vehement that British policy-makers pursued a flawed, 
myopic policy towards European integration in the post-war era. While there 
were debates about when Britain had the best `opportunity' to seize the 
leadership of Europe, the broad consensus among them was that Britain did 
miss opportunities to pursue a leadership role in Europe after 1945. 
6 Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., p. 19. 7 Ovendale, review, British Foreign Policy 1945-1973. By Joseph Frankel', International 
Affairs, op. cit., p. 575. Historians in general tend to take issue with `the stereotypes peddled by 
many journalists and most politicians' about the past. See Stefan Collini, English Pasts: Essays 
in History and Culture (Oxford: oxford University Press, 1999), p. 1. It is a theme he takes up 
again in the first chapter, `Writing "the National History": Trevelyan and After', pp. 10-37. 
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Revisionists, by contrast, have treated the subject, in the words of Michael 
Hopkins, in a `broadly sympathetic' way. " They have questioned what David 
Reynolds refers to as `the anti-reputation of British leaders'. 9 Clearly unhappy 
with the. missed opportunities discourse, revisionists see in it an unnecessarily 
crude simplification of events to suit particular political ends. Stuart Croft 
notes, for example, that `What the critics have done is essentially accept the 
continental and North American agendas' when criticising British governments 
after 1945.10 The very language employed by revisionists, attacking Britain's 
`anti-reputation' highlights the contrasting approaches to the writing of history 
taken by each school. They attack the `spurious unity that has been imposed on 
the construct "consensus"'. " There is, argues Wilkes, need for a clearer 
perspective: ` The weight given to the UK's mistakes in historical accounts has 
had some unfortunate side-effects: historians have tended to pass quickly over 
important episodes in British-Six relations which did not involve conflict, and 
have been more concerned to explain the inadequacy of the motivation or 
vision behind British European policies than to analyse their causes and effects 
thoroughly'. 12 Bradford Perkins attempts to explain this dominance in the 
historical record of discord over unity thus: `Historians are drawn, almost 
8 Michael Hopkins, review, `Britain and European Unity 1945-1992. By John Young', 
International Affairs, 70,4 (1994), p. 811. Nicholas Rees uses the same word to describe 
Greenwood's approach in his review, Britain and European Co-operation Since 1945. By Sean 
Greenwood', International Affairs. 69,4 (1993), pp. 792-3 (p. 792). 
9 David Reynolds, review, `The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, 1951- 
1955. Edited by John W. Young', International Affairs, 65,1 (1989), p. 144. 10 Stuart Croft `British Policy Towards Western Europe, 1947-9: The Best of Possible 
Worlds? ', International Affairs, 64,4 (1988), pp. 617-29 (p. 618). 1º Jonathan Hollowell, review, `Callaghan: A Life. By Kenneth 0. Morgan', Contemnorarv 
British Histoy, 11,4 (1997), pp. 129-33 (p. 130). The same, Watt argues, might be said of 
Britain's `decline' after 1945. See Watt, `Demythologising the Eisenhower Era', op. cit. 12 George Wilkes, `The First Failure to Steer Britain into the European Communities: An 
Introduction', in George Wilkes (ed. ), Britain's Failure, op., cit., pp. 1-32 (p. 4). 
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necessarily by the nature of their sources, to emphasise discord. Position 
papers, correspondence, memoirs- all are far more likely to record 
disagreement than agreement. Tacit understandings, by their nature, are rarely 
documented'. 13 It might usefully be observed, bearing in mind Wilkes' 
previous assertion, that in the historiography of Britain's relations with Europe 
it has been left to the historians to draw out the areas which `did not involve 
conflict'. 
The revisionist approach has also been elucidated by Hill. He reflected that `It 
is not enough in the late 1980s to recite a list of apparent failures in British 
foreign policy since the last war and to link them to an inability to let go of 
past attitudes and commitments'. 14 It is also worth reflecting further here on 
David Watt's observation- introduced in the last chapter- to make this point. 
The missed opportunities orthodoxy is, he argues, the preserve of 
`Europeanists in British public life, to whom it has become virtually axiomatic 
that our failure to "catch the European bus" in the mid-1950s was almost 
entirely due to a national obsession with the special relationship. Closer 
investigation... shows that things were much more complicated'. 15 Neither the 
course of Anglo-European nor Anglo-American relations can be described in 
the general terms adopted by the orthodox school of writers on Britain and 
Europe. Margaret Gowing also has little sympathy for `counter-factual history- 
what might have happened but didn't'. 16 
13 Perkins, `Unequal Partners', op. cit., pp. 63-4. 14 Hill, `The Historical Background', op. cit., p. 33. 15 Watt, `Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship', op. cit., p. 7. 16 Gowing, 
`Nuclear Weapons', op. cit., p. 125. 
1Q1 
By analysing the `sympathetic' approach to the debate about Britain and 
Europe, one immediately begins to identify some of the major ties binding 
writers in the revisionist school. John Colville, in a departure from what Mayne 
describes as the `painful mea culpa on the part of the British officialdom' 
which characterises the orthodox school, " reached to the heart of revisionism 
with these words to Charlton: `People now talk as if there were great 
opportunities missed. I doubt there were those opportunities. Nobody wanted 
that particular [European] solution'. 18 Young echoes this sentiment: `The fact 
is that Britain could not have had the leadership of Europe on its own terms 
because Britain saw no need to abandon its sovereignty to common 
institutions, whereas the Six saw this as vital. Britain could only have played a 
leading role in European integration, paradoxically, if it had accepted the 
continentals' terms and embraced supranationalism, but very few people 
advocated this before 1957'. 19 Thus, writes Hill, `it is pointless to spend too 
much time berating dead or ennobled Prime Ministers for missing the boat'. 20 
17 Mayne, review, `The Price of Victory. By Michael Chariton', International Affairs, op. cit., 
p. 327. 
18 Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit., p. 23. See also Keith Sainsbury, `Selwyn Lloyd', in 
Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (eds. ), British Foreign Secretaries, pp. 117-43 (p124). Here he 
argues that `Britain was not psychologically ready to "enter Europe" in 1955; and that her 
interests and commitments were then probably irreconcilable with the essential EEC concept. 
This was certainly the general view at the time'. Emphasis added. In so doing they draw out hints in other orthodox works, such as Barker's Britain in a Divided Europe. that few policy- 
makers realised they were missing opportunities at the time. See pp. 152-3. See also Northedge's 
comment on the Schuman Plan: `there were intelligible reasons why British opinion could not be 
wildly enthusiastic about the coal and steel pool'- was there an opportunity missed here, then? 
Northedge, British Foreign Poli cy, op. cit., p. 152. 19 Youpg, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 54. Emphasis in original. See also Burgess and 
Edwards, `The Six Plus One', op. cit.; Sainsbury, `Selwyn Lloyd', op. cit., especially pp. 124-33; 
Warner, ` The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe', op. cit. 20 Hill, `The Historical Background', op. cit., p. 45. 
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Beloff picked out a further discrepancy in the orthodox position. It was, he 
commented, the Franco-German, not Anglo-French or Anglo-German axis, 
which was central to the success of integrative efforts in Europe after the 
Second World War. `We are told that a historic opportunity was missed'. But 
`it is hard to see how any British government, even one in which trade union 
influence was less strong, could have accepted entering upon such a venture'. 21 
The continentals preferred that Britain joined the integration process but would 
not halt if she decided not to. In sum, revisionists delineate three 
inconsistencies in the orthodox interpretation of British European policy. First, 
British policy-makers were not wedded to a strictly European role for Britain 
after 1945. But when they were, secondly, they could be more constructive 
and, by implication, less `negative' than orthodox writers made allowance 
for. 22 Deighton's verdict is that `it is a fallacy to believe that Britain turned her 
back on continental Europe during the fifteen years or so that followed the 
Second World War. Europe always remained at or near the forefront of British 
decision-makers' minds'. 23 Finally, the Six were not simply waiting for Britain 
to take the lead. Rather, they were capable of considerable achievements 
exogenous from Britain's influence, as innovations such as the Messina 
process which followed so soon after the collapse of the EDC in the French 
parliament demonstrated. ` The truth of the matter was seen when Britain did 
try to take the lead in Europe: Bevin tried to "lead" Europe after 1948, but was 
21 Beloff, Britain and the European Union, op. cit., p. 7, p. 55. 22 Anne Deighton, `Missing the Boat', Contemporary Record, 3,3 (1990), pp. 15-7 (p. 15). See 
also Geoffrey Warner, `The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe', in 
Ovendale (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, op. cit., pp. 61-82. 23 Deighton, `Missing the Boat', op. cit., p. 15. 
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unable to prevent the Schuman Plan; Eden tried to establish institutional co- 
operation with the Six through the 1952 "Eden Plan"', yet, as Spaak put it, 
Europe by this time was in a `whole hog mood'; British proposals were only 
`half-way houses'. 24 
To characterise this period in Britain's relationship with Europe as one of 
`missed opportunities' is for revisionists to misunderstand the politics and 
policy of the majority of key decision-makers in Britain at this time. The 
charge of missed opportunities is, they argue, a normative political judgment 
based largely on Monnetist premises that the `right' or `enlightened' 
integrative course for the continent to follow after the war was federal or 
supranational. Kaiser puts it thus: the orthodox position is `based on the 
normative assumption that the path taken by the Six in the 1950s was not only 
successful but natural, and also morally superior to the British preference for 
trade liberalisation within intergovernmental institutional structures 
. 
25 In 
Britain the preference for intergovernmentalism in the Council of Europe, the 
Schuman Plan, the European Army and the EEC contrasted with the thinking 
of the Monnetists, but is that any reason to make sweeping criticisms based on 
hindsight? 26 David Dutton thinks not: `it has become common to suggest that 
24 Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., pp. 53-4. See also Raymond Aron, `Historical 
Sketch of the Great Debate', in Lerner and Aron (eds. ), France Defeats EDC, op. cit., pp. 2-21; 
Winand, Eisenhower. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 23; John Gillingham, `Jean Monnet and the European 
Coal and Steel Community: A Preliminary Appraisal', in Brinkley and Hackett (eds. ), in 
Monnet, op. cit., pp. 129-62; Marjolin, `What Type of Europe? ', op. cit. 25 Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., introduction, p. 16. Hill likewise argues that `The search for 
roles... encourages an emphasis on "turning points" or the obverse, "missed opportunities", 
which casts a misleadingly apocalyptic light on the process of change'. In Hill, `The Historical 
Background', op. cit., p. 45. 26 The use of hindsight to construct the missed opportunities critique is crucial, as Lord 
Gladwyn later revealed to Michael Charlton in The Price of Victory, op. cit., pp. 55-6. 
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Britain, through a combination of neglect and wilfulness, missed the 
"European bus" waiting to transport her to her rightful destiny. But Eden 
would have wanted to know the precise destiny of such a vehicle'. 27 
Revisionists would argue that such `glib criticism' has been wrongfully 
levelled at many other politicians and officials directing British European 
policy since 1945,28 John Charmley summarising this as follows: `Those who 
cleave to the "lost opportunities" myth show, by so doing, an inadequate 
appreciation of the situation in which Britain found herself in 1950-1'. 29 
Reynolds takes this argument the furthest, arguing that Britain did not need to 
pay serious attention to its regional concerns to remain a power of genuine 
world standing. ` Britain was exerting itself as a power more energetically than 
at any time outside the world wars, certainly far more than in its supposed 
Victorian heyday'. 30 This displays an overconfidence in Britain's post-war 
standing from which many revisionist writers would recoil, Jan Melissen and 
Bert Zeeman highlighting the generally accepted interpretative dichotomy 
between the schools in succinct fashion: `Britain did not miss the European 
bus; it just declined to board one which was going in the wrong direction'. " 
This definition of the interpretation placed by the revisionist school of writers 
27 David Dutton, Antho Eden: A Life and Reputation (London: Arnold, 1997), p. 302. 29 Robert Shepherd, review, `Alec Douglas-Home. By D. R. Thorpe; Anthony Eden: A Life and 
Reputation. By David Dutton', Contemporary British Historvl 1,1 (1997), pp. 153-5 (p. 154). 29 John Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance: The Anglo-American Special Relationship 1940- 
57 (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1995). 30 Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, op. cit., p. 198. The stridency with which he makes this claim 
marks him apart from revisionists who are not nearly so sure about Britain's future outside the 
Community. 
31 Melissen and Zeeman, `Britain and Western Europe', op. cit., p. 93. See also Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, op. cit.; Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit. 
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upon events in British European policy is the first theme running through this 
chapter. 
The second theme running through the chapter is that the community of writers 
dominating the revisionist school is different from that dominating the 
orthodox school. In contrast to the politicians, officials and journalist dominant 
in the orthodoxy, the revisionist school has been driven by professional 
historians researching Britain's relationship with Europe. A significant link 
among revisionist writers is their positivist outlook and judicious use of 
primary sources in the PRO. This suggests a shared assumption about the value 
of `hard `facts' and `testable evidence' as the foundations of historical 
knowledge. As Jordanova observes: `The general assumption is that for 
something to count as knowledge, whatever the field, it has to go through a 
series of evaluation and checks such that authors are felt to be somehow 
accountable to their readers. At the most basic level this is why scholarly 
works have footnotes and bibliographies'. 32 
In this context, there is a strong connection between revisionism and 
establishment institutions such as Oxford and the LSE. 33 Cambridge is a 
different case, and one can speculate as to the reasons why. Primarily it seems 
that its weaker tradition in the field of International Relations and European 
Studies has impeded it from rivalling Oxford and LSE as a bastion of 
revisionism. Cambridge has a stronger link to the natural sciences, a tradition 
32 Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., p. 16. 33 Students writing now are following the tradition of scholars such as William Wallace and F. 
S. Northedge who have been at the forefront of British international studies. 
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which has continued recently with the University `putting its efforts into a 
different kind of power base, joining the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
in a £68 million science enterprise project and developing a computer lab with 
34 £12 million of funding from Bill Gates'. 
The third theme running through the chapter is revisionists' dissatisfaction 
with the political use and abuse of the labels `European' and `anti-European'. 
It is developed in their attack on the crude negativity attributed to successive 
governments' European policies. They argue that it is hypocritical and 
intentionally misleading for British `Europeans' such as Maxwell Fyfe and 
Boothby to characterise Eden as `anti-European' by suggesting that their own 
views were any more palatable to the Monnetists. From the Monnetist 
perspective there were, notes Greenwood, `no real "pro-Europeans"'35 in 
Whitehall in the 1950s, despite their later pleas to the contrary. Few at the time 
advocated joining integrative efforts in the 1950s; only later did they claim 
they did. 36 
These are the leading threads running through the argument of this chapter. A 
corollary of revisionist critiques of missed opportunities, is that orthodox 
34 Swain, 'Blair's Capital Hearing Aides', op. cit. 35 Greenwood, Britain and Eurocean Co-operation, op. cit., p. 78. 361bid., p. 50; Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 38; David Carlton, Anthony Eden: 
A Biography (London: Allen Lane, 1981), op. cit., p. 309; Dutton, Anthony Eden, op. cit., 
p. 295. 
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writers have allowed personal political antagonism to obscure considered 
reflection on European policy; that they use hindsight and selective quotation 
to manufacture the historical record to suit certain ideological predilections; 
and that there is lack of `empathy' in the construction of orthodox historical 
narratives which ignore the complexities of the domestic and international 
systems within which foreign policies are developed and projected. 
Revisionists would agree with Brivati's assertion that empathy `is a virtue in 
historical writing and not a vice. It is built of small things: of hand-written 
notes, of glimpses of the ordinary humanity behind the historical facade: it is 
built up in the direct interaction between the evidence and the historian'. 37 This 
chapter will elaborate on all the factors that have stimulated the revisionist 
critique of the `missed opportunities' orthodoxy and the assumptions that 
underpin it. It is most appropriate to begin with the social construction of the 
school. 
2. The Social Construction of the Revisionist School 
Beloff wrote that `Much of the impetus to revisionism arises from the mere 
expansion of the historians' profession'. 38 Kaplan likewise argued that ` It may 
37 Brivati, `Cd-Rom and the Historian', op, cit., p. 477. See also Jordanova, History in Practice, 
op. cit., p. 7. She discusses here the importance of `empathy' in the teaching of history from the 
early school years onwards, showing that it is of paramount importance to the way we think 
about and reconstruct events. Herbert Butterfield also argued (in the context of the history of 
Cold War origins) that `In historical perspective we can learn to be a little more sorry for both 
parties than they knew how to be one another', a quote which highlights the empathetic 
approach historians can apparently take with distance and care to consult the primary sources. 
See Herbert, Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), p. 17. 39 Beloff, An Historian, op. cit., p. 32. 
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even be... that an interlocking directorate of foundations, corporations and 
universities determines the direction in which social science goes and even the 
subjects it explores'. 39 Jon Turney has continued this theme recently, arguing 
that `There is still much more to discuss [in the context of why scientific 
theories rise and fall], notably the role of communities of researchers, not just 
individuals, in building epistemic standards into scientific practice'. 40 They 
were all alluding to the sociological dynamics of historiographical progression, 
the advances in historical understanding brought about by conscious or 
unconscious decisions on the parts of individuals and funding bodies about 
what areas to study and how to study them. It would be historiographically neat 
and convenient if the revisionist school came from a completely contrasting 
sociological grouping and there is plenty of evidence to suggest that this has 
indeed been the case. The core argument of this thesis is that the two dominant 
schools in the historiography of Britain's relationship with the continent are 
first and foremost divided along a sociological fault line. Watt summarises this 
distinction between the social construction of the schools by noting that there 
is a `first wave of writers who reviewed this period, that curious melange of 
backward-looking commentators, political fixers, myth-makers and second- 
guessers whose initial occupation of the field makes the task of the 
professional historian so much more difficult'. 41 
39 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 134. 40 Jon Turney, `Values in Scientific Ventures', op. cit. 41 Watt, `Demythologising the Eisenhower Era', op. cit., p. 72. 
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It was argued in the last chapter that what lay behind many orthodox accounts 
was a direct or indirect link with the political vision espoused by Monnet. 
Flowing from this was an interpretation of British European policy that was not 
at all kind to those who had been centrally involved in planning and executing 
Britain's approach to the continent after 1945. That the writers were came 
from political, official and journalistic backgrounds suggested that the school 
was at least in part socially constructed. 
Even before the Single European Act reinvigorated the EEC, British historians 
realised that there were research opportunities in post-1945 international 
history away from conflict, into peacetime relations. As Deighton has 
communicated: ` I don't think [the] relaunch of [the] EC is a reason as much as 
the availability of documents. The Thirty Year Rule plays such a powerful role 
in the generation of contemporary historical research 
... 
I certainly don't 
remember being infected by some kind of passion for Europe as the SEA was 
being negotiated! Indeed, it is worth remembering that, at the time, the possible 
impact of the SEA was underestimated'. 42 Young is in full agreement: `I 
started off seeing the Cold War as a focus to my PhD in 1979 but realised in 
1980-81- long before any revival of the EEC- that the unity theme was 
essential to Anglo-French relations, and completed in 1982 with that focus'. 43 
In general, Brivati, Buxton and Seldon note, `The 1980s saw a significant 
expansion in the study of contemporary, which increasingly meant post-war, 
42 Permission to quote from email message of 6 May, 2000. 43 Permission to quote email message of 8 May 2000. 
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British history'. Hitler no longer dominated the international relations 
research agenda, but the Cold War was still proving a financially attractive 
area. Thus, there was an intermingling of research into Britain's Cold War and 
as European policies, the one acting as a stimulus to the other. 
Recalling how he came to research the history of Britain's relations with 
Europe, Young has also written: `it fitted into my interests in the origins of the 
Cold War as an undergraduate AND it was an area just opening up in the 
archives (so no-one could beat me to it)'. 46 There is, according to this 
evidence, only a vague sense in which the revisionist school has been driven by 
the fads and fashions in the academic world of international studies. It has been 
driven more fundamentally by the release of documents into the PRO. Some of 
the leading names were originally interested in the origins of the Cold War, but 
linked their research into Anglo-French relations to the unity of Europe, it 
seems, before the revival of the EEC in 1985. Given the vast number of books 
on Britain, the division of Germany and the origins of the Cold War, this was a 
h 
44 Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon, `Preface', in Brivati, Buxton and Seldon (eds. ), The Contemporary History Handbook, op. cit., pp. 11-14 (p. 12). 
as Observe how leading revisionist scholars also have a list of publications in the field of Cold 
War Politics. Young, Britain. France and the Unity of Europe 1945-1951, op. cit.; Young, Co 
War Europe 1945-1989, %. cit.; Young, `Cold War and Detente with Moscow', in Young (ed. ), 
The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, op. cit., pp. 55-80; Young, `The 
Foreign Office, the French and the Post-War Division of Germany, 1945-46, Review of 
International Studies 12 (1986), pp. 223-34. His publications on Britain and Europe include 
`Britain and the EEC 1956-73: An Overview', in Brivati and Jones (eds. ), From Reconstruction, 
pp. 103-13; `British Officials and European Integration', op. cit.; `Churchill's "No" to Europe', 
op. cit.; `German Rearmament and the European Defence Community', in Young (ed. ), The 
Foreign Pow of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, pp. 81-107; `The Heath Government and 
British Entry into the European Community', in Ball and Seldon (eds. ), The Heath Government, 
pp. 159-84; "'The Parting of Ways"? ', op. cit.; `The Schuman Plan and British Association', in 
Young (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, pp. 109-34. 
46 Email correspondence, 27 January 1999. 
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useful career move! 47 There is a case to be argued, then, that revisionist 
historiography is intimately connected to the political climate in Europe in the 
1980s. 
Iggers argues that, `while postmodern thought increasingly called into question 
[in the last twenty years] the authority of the professional scholar, historical 
work in fact felt the pressures of increasing professionlisation'. 48 The major 
revisionist writers have been diplomatic historians testing orthodox 
propositions against primary evidence discovered in the PRO. The archives 
subject to the closest scrutiny have been those of the Foreign Office, Cabinet 
and the Prime Minister's Office. Recently there have been moves into the 
Treasury and Board of Trade papers and greater awareness of evidence from 
colonial histories and archives abroad. 
Kaplan warned that `explanatory frameworks in the social and physical 
sciences run the risk of merely skimming the surface of the particularity to be 
explained; and this is especially true the closer we come to the level of 
microevents'. 49 Specialisation and all that that entails vis-ä-vis the need to 
publish new accounts, to build academic reputations and careers, to criticise 
established orthodoxies, to be methodologically rigorous, has had the effect of 
47 Deighton's trajectory is also from Cold War to European unity. See Deighton, TTh 
Impossible Peace, op. cit.; Deighton (ed. ), Britain and the First Cold War (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1990); Deighton, `Cold War Diplomacy', op. cit.; Deighton, `The "Frozen Front", 
op. cit. Her studies on Europe include the edited volume Building Post-War Europe, op. cit.; 
and the articles `Harold Macmillan, Whitehall, and the Defence of Europe', op. cit.; `La Grande- 
Bretagne', op. cit.; `Missing the Boat: Britain and Europe 1945-61', Con empporary Record, 4, 
10 990), pp. 15-7. 
48 Iggers, Historiography, op. Cit., p. 15. 49 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 44. 
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adding new dimensions to our understanding of British European policy. As in 
the process of painting a water-colour scene, the orthodox school covered the 
canvas with broad sweeps of the brush. Revisionists have been filling in the 
detail, adding new individuals to the scene, depicting the shape of existing 
individuals more sharply. In short, revisionists argue, they have been giving the 
picture of Britain's relationship with the continent its perspective. To the 
orthodox `truth' we can add the revisionist version of the `truth'. This supports 
Kaplan's observation that: `When one theory replaces another, it is usually 
because the previous theory has been shown not to offer a genuine explanation. 
Thus, although the domain of a new theory may be smaller than the previously 
accepted domain of the old theory, its new domain is larger than the now 
(often) zero domain of the old theory'. 50 It is clear that the communities of 
writers dominant in each school are different. Can one conclude, therefore, that 
this is the most significant distinction between the schools? Not necessarily. 
The sociological division between schools is conceptually neat but overlooks 
several issues which will be drawn out in this section. First, there is no single 
revisionist interpretation of events. Beneath agreement on the flaws in the 
orthodoxy, revisionists debate among themselves the weighting to assign each 
potential explanation of British European policy. Second, one cannot date 
revisionism to a certain point in the mid-1980s when it was `born'. Most 
studies of Britain and Europe contain the seeds of revisionism. More 
damagingly still, the Economist thirty years ago and works by foreign writers 
50 Ibid., p. 17. 
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examining, if only in passing, Britain's attitude and relationship with the 
continent, picked out factors in the creation of British European policy that 
now form central tenets of the revisionist school 
. 
51 Alluding to this, Donald 
Watt called at an International History conference in the PRO52 for scholars to 
be more aware of the `informed debate' in the press when they construct 
historical narratives. Wm Roger Louis also warned against the dangers of 
primary research producing `knowledge for the sake of knowledge'. 53 
Their pleas are particularly relevant to the historiography of Britain's relations 
with Europe. What Louis has identified is the phenomena of professional 
historians waiting until the archives are open before offering interpretations of 
the past. Yet, reading the `informed debate' in opinion-setters such as the 
Economist offers a version of events as they happened which rivals the 
documentary evidence. It may not contain insights into the workings of the 
Whitehall machine, but by commenting on the oft forgotten officials and 
ministers active in Europe at the time, such journalistic accounts present the 
opportunity for historians to get round the problem of hindsight and begin to 
narrate events ` as they happened' before the Thirty Year Rule releases official 
government sources to the public. 
51 Examples of this are to be found throughout its articles on the 1945-73 period. It is not 
necessarily that it proposed revisionist explanations, but the detail it contains on bilateral 
contacts between British officials and their colleagues on the continent later to appears at the 
forefront of revisionist interpretations of policy and policy-making. These individuals rarely 
appear in professional histories until primary sources are consulted. 
24 June 1999. 
53 Their presentations were reminiscent of watt's 1978 call for British historians to reformulate 
their goals and refine their methods. See ` Re-thinking the Cold War: A Letter to a British 
Historian', Political arterly. 49,4 (1978), pp. 446-56. 
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That the workings of the foreign policy machine are not always revealed by the 
press is one reason why many professional historians eschew it as a primary 
source. The decision-making machinery has developed into one of their major 
lines of interest. 54 Fascination with processes rather than outcomes is not, 
however, confined to British diplomatic historians. This suggests a shared 
epistemological outlook across different academic communities about how to 
reconstruct historical events. 55 The second reason is that the press does not 
have the same respectability as an empirical source for British historians. Peter 
Hennessy's verdict is representative: `historians are likely to find newspapers 
poor witnesses to much contemporary history'. 56 It is well known that the 
`printed text has come to enjoy [an] assured status of certainty, authority and 
reliability'. More importantly, Christopher Phipps continues, `books have 
become trustworthy disseminators of knowledge'. 57 The work that goes into 
54 Studies which highlight the preoccupation of historians with the process of foreign policy- 
making include Zametica (ed. ), British Officials and British Foreign Policy 1945-50, op. cit.; 
Adamthwaite, 
`Britain and the World, 1945-9: The View from the Foreign Office', op. cit.; 
Adamthwaite, `Introduction: The Foreign Office and Policy-Making', op. cit.; Adamthwaite, 
`Overstretched and Overstrung: Eden, the Foreign Office and the Making of Policy', op. cit.; 
Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic Relations, op. cit.; John W. Young, `British Officials and 
European Integration, 1944-60', op. cit.; Shlaim, `The Foreign Secretary and the Making of 
Policy', op. cit. The continuing allure of the machinery of policy is a theme taken up by Tim 
Garden who notes the interest of recent scholarship on British defence policy to those fascinated 
in `the machinations of Whitehall'. Tim Garden, `The War Baby Grows Up: Modern Strategy. 
By Colin S. Gray; The Politics of British Defence 1979-98. By Lawrence Freedman', Times 
sHigher 
Education Supplement 18 February 2000, p. 29. 
Sabine Lee, `German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration: German 
"Europolitik" During the Years of the EEC and Free Trade Area Negotiations', in Deighton (ed. ), Building Post-War Europe op. cit., pp. 39-54; Gerald Boussat, `The French 
Administrative Elite and the Unification of Western Europe, 1947-58', in Deighton (ed. ), 
Building Post-War Europe, op. cit., pp. 21-37; Thierry Grosbois and Yves Stelandre, ` Belgian Decision-Makers 
and European Unity, 1945-63', in Deighton (ed. ), Building Post-War Europe, 
op. cit., pp. 127-40;. 
56 Peter Hennessy, ` The Press and Broadcasting', in Seldon (ed. ), Contemýary History, op. 
cit., pp. 17-29 (p. 22). He uses as his example the media verdict on Britain and the EEC, which is 
interesting in the context of the findings in this study that the Economist contains many useful insights that could be used by historians. S' Christopher Phipps, review, `Printing Practice Done by the Book: The Nature of the Book: 
Print and Knowledge in the Making. By Adrian Johns', Times Higher Education Supplement, 3 
March 2000, p. 32. 
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the writing and printing of books apparently renders them better purveyors of 
knowledge because they deliver an `authority, veracity and textual reliability 
[which] have had to be grafted on over time through the concerted, often 
thwarted, efforts of author and printer'. -58 It is books and archives which are 
taken as `trustworthy' sources. Newspapers do not have the same appeal to 
historians labouring under the notion that `scientific' and `scholarly' are 
synonymous. 59 
The academic and publishing communities demand hard evidence and 
sustainable theories. But historians tend to shrink from reconstructing history 
directly in the wake of events. They prefer to wait for the Thirty Rule on the 
release of documents to take effect rather than relying on hunches, oral 
testimony or the media which they perceive to be less reliable a source. Book 
reviews which stress the fallibility of interpretations on periods for which 
primary material is not available reinforce the caution with which historians 
generally approach the post-Thirty Year Rule period. On Young's Britain and 
European Unity, for example, George remarked that `While the treatment of 
the early period is reliable, Young's foray into more contemporary scholarship 
does not enhance his reputation as a scholar'. 60 Conservativism in the 
discipline of history is possibly related to the loneliness which traditionally 
58 Ibid. 
59 Morrow and Brown, Critical Theory and Methodology, op. cit., p. 4. 60 Stephen George, review, `Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992. By John W. Young', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 33,2 (1995), pp. 306-7 (p. 307). Of the similar work by 
Greenwood, George makes the same observation: `his judgements are more questionable the 
nearer the book approaches to the present'. See Stephen George, `Britain and European Co- 
operation Since 1945. By Sean Greenwood', Journal of Common market Studies, 31,1 (1993), 
p. 128. 
characterises the pursuit of scholarly knowledge. Southgate draws an analogy 
between the historian and the farmer: `the historian may, and often does, 
plough a solitary furrow, but comfort can be taken from providing some 
contribution to the tilling of the whole field. The process will never be 
complete: there is no final solution'. 61 The loneliness that has traditionally 
characterised historical research is also an important part of why historians 
have been slow to engage with the morass of available primary material on 
Britain and Europe, a point that will be developed further below. 
The twin requirements of professionalism and hard evidence can clearly be 
seen in the type of study penned by revisionist historians. Their accounts have 
been published in academic journals, monographs and edited volumes. In 
contrast to the orthodoxy, revisionist historiography has been coincident with 
specialist studies, using evidence assiduously gathered in the PRO. The 
footnotes, endnotes and bibliographies in these studies reveal the difference in 
sources. Biographies, memoirs and general secondary studies are not now the 
lifeblood but are used to contextualise and frame research designs which centre 
instead on primary sources. The revisionist school has been coincident with the 
professionalisation of the study of Britain and Europe. This in turn has had far- 
reaching effects in the literature, causing some orthodox scholars to shift their 
interpretations. It is a phenomenon which further demonstrates the impact of 
interpretative fads and fashions on historiographical interpretation and the 
inherently competitive character of academia. 
61 Southgate, History, op. cit., p. 131. 
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The impact of revisionist historiography on the ebb and flow of academic 
debate can be elucidated in two ways. First, it has become the vogue for other 
academics to incorporate revisionist interpretations into their accounts of 
Bevin's Third Force strategy in 1945-50. It also shows in biographic 
representations of key politicians. To begin with the literature on the Third 
Force. In the 1980s, Baylis gave academic voice to the prevailing `consensus' 
interpretation that Bevin was disinterested in economic co-operation in this 
period, using the fishing metaphor that the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties were 
`sprats' to lure the American `mackerel' into the defence of the West. 62 It was 
an interpretation that appealed to all shades of the political spectrum. First, to 
left-wingers who felt Labour had become entangled in the Cold War against 
62 Historians who pursue this line include Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., pp. 117- 
27; Camps, Britain and the European Community, op. cit., p. 21. Croft uses Barker to come to 
the same conclusion- which belies his general criticism of the orthodox position, in `British 
Policy Towards Western Europe', op. cit., p. 619; Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit., pp53- 
66; Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar, op. cit., pp. 1-2; Frankel, British 
Forei Policy op. cit., pp. 186-237, pp. 284-97'; Lawrence Kaplan, `An Unequal Triad: The 
United States, Western Union, and NATO', in Riste (ed. ), Western Security, op. cit., pp. 107- 
27; Walter LaFeber, America. Russia. and the Cold War 1945-1992,7's edn. (New York: 
McGraw-Hill, 1993), pp. 51-80; Northedge, British Forei Poli 
, 
op. cit., pp. 46-58; Ovendale, 
`Britain, the United States', op. cit.; R. Ovendale, `Introduction', in Ovendale (ed. ), The 
Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, pp. 1-17; Terry H. Anderson, The United 
States. Great Britain and the Cold War 1944-1947 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 
1981). See also Robert M. Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America. 1944-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), p. 270; Perkins, `Unequal Partners', op. cit., 
p. 57; Shlaim, Britain and the Origins of European Unity, op. cit., pp. 68-115; Sked and Cook, 
Post-War Britain, op. cit., pp. 50-76. The pervasiveness of this interpretation has been shown 
recently by Hugo Young who uses Bullock's Bevin to offer the conclusion that `Bevin was 
Britain's first peacetime Atlanticist'. See Young, This Blessed Plot, op. cit., p. 31. It is not 
surprisingly the line taken in the official history: Rohan Butler and M. E. Pelly (eds. ), 
Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1,1,1945 (London: HMSO, 1984); Roger Bullen and 
M. E. Pelly (eds. ), Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1,2,1045 (London: HMSO, 1985); 
Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly (eds. ), Documents on British Policy Overseas. 1,3,1945 
(London: HMSO, 1986); Roger Bullen and M. E. Pelly (eds. ), Documents on British Policy 
Overseas, 1,4,1945 (London: HMSO, 1987); M. E. Pelly and H. J. Yasamee (eds. ), 
Documents on British Policy Overseas. 1,5,1945 (London: HMSO, 1990); M. E. Pelly and H. 
J. Yasamee (eds. ), Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1,6,1945-1946 (London: HMSO, 
1991); H. J. Yasamee and K. A. Hamilton, Documents on British Policy Overseas, 1,7,1946- 
1947 (London: HMSO, 1995). 
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Russia 1945.63 Second, to the political establishment in Britain and America 
which praised Bevin for saving Western civilisation. 64 Amongst the latter 
group there was, Perkins observes, `broad satisfaction with the foreign policy 
of the Labour government'. 65 By 1990 Baylis, however, was less sure his 
findings held true. He had, one reviewer noted, changed his `emphasis and 
interpretations'. 66 Not now the view that Bevin single-mindedly wanted to 
entangle America in the defence of Western Europe from 1945. Instead, He 
directly referred to writers such as Kent and Young to argue that Bevin was 
more interested in European co-operation and colonial exploitation than he had 
63 Leon D. Epstein, Britain: Uneasy Ally (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1954), 
p. 81; Plitt, The Labour Government, op. cit.; Wayne Knight, `Labourite Britain: America's 
"Sure Friend"? The Anglo-Soviet Treaty Issue, 1947', Diplomatic History, 7,4 (1983), pp. 267- 
82 (pp. 267-8); Eugene J. Meehan, The British Left Wing and Foreign Policy: A Study of the 
Influence of Ideology (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1960), pp. 30-4; Jonathan 
Schneer, Labour's Conscience: The Labour Left 1945-51 (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988); 
Brian Brivati, Hugh Gaitskell (London: Richard Cohen, 1997), p. 166; Michael Foot, Aneurin 
Bevan: A Biography Volume 2 1945-1960 (London: Davis-Poynter, 1973), p. 32; Mark M. 
Krug, Aneurin Bevan: Cautious Rebel (London: Thames Yoseloff, 1961), p. 102. His verdict 
sums up the Marxist view that Bevin was `if anything, less conciliatory than Eden would have been' in dealing with Russia. 64 Attlee, As It Happened op. cit., p. 171; Eden, Full it I, op. cit., p. 5; Healey, The Time of 
My Life, op. Cit., p. 114, Jenkins, Mr. Attlee op. cit.; Kirkpatrick, The Inner Circle, op. cit., 
p. 205; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., pp. 132-3; Montgomery of Alamein, Memoirs, op. 
cit., p. 511; Roberts, `Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary', op. cit.; Wilson, Memoirs_ op. cit., 
p. 125. On this issue even Herbert Morrison stood 'firmly behind the hard line of his old enemy 
Benin'. Bernard Donoghue and G. W. Jones, Herbert Morrison: Portrait of a Politician (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), p. 433. Ben Pimlott argues that most leading 
ministers were `almost unreservedly on the side of the United States', and uninterested in a 
`Third Alternative' for foreign policy. See Ben Pimlott (ed. ), The Political Diary of Hugh 
Dalton_ 1918-40 1945-60 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1987), linking remarks, p. 469. See also 
Mark Stephens, Ernest Bevin: Unskilled Labourer and World Statesman 1881-1951 (Stevenage: 
SPA Books, 1985), pp. 109-24; Aster, Anthony Eden, op. cit., pp. 90-1; Harris, Attlee, op. cit., 
p. 295; Rees-Mogg, Sir Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 99; Robert Rhodes James (ed. ), Chips: The 
Diaries of Sir Henry Channon (London: Penguin, 1970), entry for 20 August, 1945, the 
occasion of Bevin's first major speech as Foreign Secretary, p. 502; Montague Browne, Long 
upset op. cit., pp. 59-60; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit., p. 21; Williams, Ernest 
Bevis, op. Cit., pp. 266-7. 65 Perkins, `Unequal Partners', op. cit., p. 46. 66 Jay Wagner, review, `The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO, 1942-49. By John Baylis', International Affairs, 69,4 (1993), pp. 781-2 (p. 781); John Baylis, 
The Diplomacy of Pragmatism: Britain and the Formation of NATO 1942-49 (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1993). 
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previously thought. 67 The signing of the North Atlantic Treaty (NAT) was an 
admission that the building of a European unit between the superpowers had 
failed, not a success story built on one man's skill and diplomatic vision. One 
can see evidence here of the historiography being propelled by the 
interpretative fads and fashions of the time. Had Baylis remained unaware of 
Kent and Young's contributions he might well have continued to uphold the 
`mythical halo' that often hangs over the 1945 Attlee administrations. 68 The 
alacrity with which the revisionist interpretation became incorporated into 
mainstream academic discourse meant that Baylis could no longer ignore the 
challenge. The community of academics demands analytical rigour and source 
coverage. As revisionism gained credence among fellow academics, orthodox 
writers began to incorporate it into their accounts. 
67 Economic and Commonwealth inputs to the development of European policy, as well as domestic considerations, come through very strongly in P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, British 
Imperialism: Crisis and Deconstruction 1914-1990 (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 260-76; 
Dockrill and Young (eds. ), British Foreign Policy, 1945-56 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989); 
Fieldhouse, 
`The Labour Governments and the Empire-Commonwealth', op. cit.; Sean 
Greenwood, 
`Ernest Bevin, France and "Western Union": August 1945- February 1946', 
European History Quarterly, 14,3 (1984), pp. 319-37; Greenwood, Britain and European Co- 
operation, op. cit.; Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit.; Kent, `Bevin's Imperialism', op. cit.; Newton, 
`The Sterling Crisis of 1947', op. cit.; Newton, `The 1949 Sterling Crisis', op. cit. See also 
Curtis, The Ambiguities of Power op. cit., pp. 13-24; John Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and 
Eden. 1940-1957 (London: Longman, 1995); John Ramsden, The Winds of Change, op. cit.; 
Wilkes (ed. ), Britain's Failure op. cit.; Young, This Blessed Plot, op. cit.; Young, Britain and 
Euro 1LUnity, op. cit. Some American accounts support the argument that Labour was keen 
on the Third Force and had the State Department's support for burden-sharing reasons. See 
Gaddis, ` The United States and the Question of a Sphere of Influence in Europe', op. cit., p. 70; 
Winand, Eisenhower. Kennedy op. cit., pp. 15-8. Research into Anglo-American relations also 
attacks the hagiographic British assumption that Bevin skilfully lured America into the defence 
of Greece and Turkey in 1947. See also Terry Howard Anderson, `Britain, the United States, 
and the Cold War, 1944-1947', Indiana PhD, 1978), pp. 277-9; Edmonds, Setting the Mould, 
OP- cit., pp. 157-60; Hathaway, Ambiguous Partnership, op. cit., pp. 299-302; Dimbleby and 
Reynolds, An Ocean Apart, op. cit., pp. 171-2; Pelling, Britain and the Marshall Plan, op. cit., 
p. 6; Perkins, `Unequal Partners', op. cit., p. 54; A. N. Porter and A. J. Stockwell, Bri i 
Imperial Policy and Decolonisation. 1938-64: Vol 1 1938-51 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1987), 
p. 47. 
68 The verdict of Eric Hobsbawm, quoted in Hennessy, `The Attlee Governments', op. cit., p. 29. 
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The second way in which academic specialisation and the rise of revisionism 
have been impinging upon historiographical interpretation is through the 
medium of academic biography. The last chapter showed the extent to which 
traditional political biography in Britain, especially official biography, has 
tended to operate on hagiographic lines, often interpreting events similarly to 
the subject. Recently, there has been a shift towards what Hamilton describes 
as `contextualised' biography, studies which ground the individual in the 
broader context of the history of the epoch in which he or she lived and 
worked. 69 This style of biography resembles a history of the period that 
happens to centre on one individual rather than a study of an individual, 
containing incidental historical snapshots. Indeed, some such biographies split 
the areas of concern to their subject, taking a thematic not chronological 
approach. A chapter on `Europe' in thirty pages tends to divulge more insights 
than sporadic mention of it over the course of a thousand. 
Thus, in Peter Weiler's biography of Bevin, one might expect him to praise the 
Foreign Secretary for saving Western civilisation by signing the NAT. 70 
Writing at the turn of the 1990s, however, Weiler, like Baylis, was apprised of 
the revisionist turn in scholarship and took Bevin's Third Force rhetoric more 
seriously. " He contextualised his research using revisionist literature which 
69 Hamilton, `In Defence of the Practice of Biography', op. cit., p. 84. See also O'Brien, 'Is 
Political Biography a Good Thing? ', op. cit., p. 66; John Derry: Political Biography: A Defence (2)', Contemporary British History, 10,4 (1996), pp. 75-80 (p. 76). 70 As a reminder, previous biographers who took the consensus interpretation include Bullock, 
Ernest Bevin, op. cit.; Stephens, Unskilled Labourer and World Statesman. op. cit.; Roberts, 
`Ernest Bevin as Foreign Secretary', op. cit.; Williams, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., pp. 266-7. 71 Weiler, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., pp. 144-87. 
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had taken a grip of the field. This resulted in a nuanced account that balanced 
Bevin's concern with security against what many now regarded as his genuine 
interest in building a `Euro-African bloc' in the period 1945-9.72 
A further example from the field of biography is that of David Dutton's 
Anthony Eden: A Life and Reputation and Rothwell's Anthony Eden, both 
published in the 1990s. 73 Taking a part thematic, part chronological approach, 
Dutton eschewed the usual biographic approach of tracing the subject's life 
from birth to death. The result is a fully contextualised study for which Dutton 
utilised a synthesis of sources: a smattering of Cabinet, Prime Ministerial and 
Foreign Office papers, many private papers, Eden's own records and secondary 
sources as background. What one finds in the section on Europe is, as with 
Weiler's approach to Bevin, a revisionist account which rescues Eden from 
charges that he was crudely `anti-European'. Dutton saw little difference 
between the speeches by Eden and Maxwell Fyfe on 28 November 1951 which 
has led to much of the vitriol towards Eden. Revisionists had already argued 
that Maxwell Fyfe's speech was condemned by Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak as 
"disappointing" and "derisory"'. 74 Dutton echoed this: `there was no difference 
72 Other studies of post-war co-operation in Europe to emerge at this time cite among others 
Fieldhouse, Kent and Young as key influences. See Charles P. A. de Brabant, 'Anglo-French 
Colonial Co-operation Principally in West African Affairs, 1943-1954', Oxford M. Litt, 1989; 
Martin Francis, `Labour Policies and Socialist Ideals: The Example of the Attlee Government, 
1945-51', Oxford PhD, 1992). 
73 Dutton, Anthony Eden. op. cit.; Victor Rothwell, Anthony Eden: A Political Biography 1931- 
1957 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992). 
74 Young, Britain and European Unity, P. 38. See also Greenwood, Britain and European Co- 
operation, p. 50. This betrayed his hostility to British European policy, which Aldrich traces back 
to his overthrowing of British leadership of the European Movement. See his `European 
Integration', op. cit., pp. 159-64. 
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in substance between the messages conveyed by the two men', a line towards 
which revisionist historiography has long been tending. 75 
Could it therefore be argued that political biography belongs to a different 
school of writing altogether? In terms of method, there is a distinction between 
biography and diplomatic history, especially if one examines the volume of 
oral history and private papers that are used more in the writing of the former 
compared to the latter. However, in terms of interpretation there is less to 
recommend placing political biography in a separate school from historical 
narratives. Despite the different sources used, there has always been cross- 
fertilisation from history to biography and vice-versa. Biographies are treated 
as historical sources along with the other sources scrutinised by historians. 
They inform historians of the political climate within which policy was made, 
of the personal animosity within the Whitehall machine and remind them of all 
the other actors on the stage. Biographies are in turn informed by the 
community of historians whose continuous reinterpretation of the past presents 
opportunities to reassess the outlook of biographic subjects. 
Another example of this continual cross-fertilisation between biography and 
diplomatic history is to be found in the most recent biography of Heath, by 
Campbell. 76 He seems to want to revise existing interpretations of Heath, but 
only manages to flirt hesitantly with alternative explanations of his 
73 Dutton, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 293. See also Ramsden, The Age of Churchill and Eden, 
Op. cit., pp260-1, pp. 304-5; George Wilkes, `The First Failure', op. cit., p. 8; Hugo Young 
argues, in This Blessed Plot, op. cit., p. I 15, that Macmillan was a `European only of his time 
and place, which is to say a tormented and indecisive one'. 76 Campbell, Edward Heath. op, cit. 
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`Europeanism'. He confronts the conventional wisdom about Heath's outlook 
on America and Europe. 77 Ultimately, though, he agrees with what has, if 
previous trends are a good indicator of which works set down the received 
wisdom, to be regarded as the orthodoxy in this area. 78 A future edition of 
Campbell's biography may be bolder, especially if other historians begin to 
reassess Heath's opinion of America, engaging with Campbell's claim that 
Heath in no way `saw himself as... anti-American'. 79 By drawing out this 
constant tension between British policy-makers' perceptions of themselves and 
perception of them abroad, one could develop the revisionist contention that it 
is only with hindsight and generalisation that Heath `inhibited the "special 
relationship"'. 80 Perhaps any British Prime Minister faced with problems over 
dollar convertibility, the international Monetary Fund crisis, nuclear burden- 
sharing, the Kennedy Round of GATT negotiations, the October war in the 
Middle East and Washington's declaration of the `Year of Europe' would have 
had their enthusiasm for Anglo-American relations dampened 
. 
S1 As Robert 
Schaetzel, the American Ambassador to the EC, put it in 1971: the Americans 
77 Ibid., pp. 74-115. 
78 That Heath was a `European' of long-standing and that the `special relationship' was to be 
`abruptly ended'. Ibid., p. 115 and p. 336. For exposition of this view see Anthony Barber, 
Taking the Tide" A Memoir (Norwich: Michael Russell, 1998); Brandt, People and Politics, op. 
cit.; Home, The Way the Wind Blows, op. cit.; Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises: Sketch of a 
Government 1970-74 (London: Collins, 1979); Hutchinson, Edward Heath, op. cit.; King, TTh e Cecil King Diary 1970-1974, op. cit.; Margaret Laing, Edward Heath: Prime Minister (London: 
Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972); Andrew Roth, Heath and the Heathmen (London: Routledge, 
1972); Sainsbury, ` Lord Home', op. cit.; Thatcher, The Path to Power, op. cit.; Thorpe, Alec 
Dou as-Home op. cit. 
79 Campbell, Edward Heath, op. cit., p. 336. 80 Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Michael Joseph, 
1982), p. 140. See also Henry Kissinger, The White House Years (London: Weidenfeld and 
Nicolson, Michael Joseph, 1979); Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: 
Grosset and Dunlap, 1978); John Dickie, `Special' No More: Anglo-American Relations: 
Rhetoric and Reality (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1994); Alistair Home, `The Macmillan 
Years and Afterwards', in Louis and Bull (eds. ), The Special Relationship op. cit., pp. 87-102 (. 101); Watt, `Introduction: The Anglo-American Relationship', op. cit., p. 13. 
Cromwell, The United States and the European Pill ar, op. cit., p. 71. 
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had come to see the Community `as a hard bargainer, an adversary'. 82 Friction 
in relations between Heath and Kissinger and Nixon were perhaps the 
symptom of growing disunity in the Atlantic Alliance which started earlier, 
particularly with Britain's withdrawal from `East of Suez' under Wilson, rather 
than the cause they have become in the history. 
The debate, therefore, about whether biography is a `good' or `bad' thing is to 
falsely draw disciplinary boundaries around `history' and 'biography' 
. 
83 The 
one is intrinsically bound up to the other; cross-fertilisation across genres is 
crucial to historiographical development. To say that there is a distinctive 
biographic method of research overlooks other factors in the construction of 
narratives. Interpretation stems not just from the method one uses, but who one 
speaks to, the political climate of opinion about the subject, current academic 
views on the subject and how one arranges the evidence (chronologically or 
thematically). Method therefore only explains a fraction of how lives and 
histories are reconstructed. Rather than drawing up barriers between them, 
historians and biographers should use each others' work to increase our 
understanding of the past collaboratively. This would enrich the study of 
contemporary history. 
This digression into the role played by fads and fashions in historiographical 
development raises the issue of break-out between schools. It has been 
admitted that some writers change schools of writing over time. It is, 
sz Quoted in Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar, op. cit., p. 71. $3 O'Brien, `Is Political Biography a Good Thing? ', op. cit.; Hamilton, `In Defence of the 
Practice of Biography', op cit. 
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moreover, conceded throughout this study that there are unresolved tensions 
and inner contradictions in many historical accounts which give them an 
implicit post-revisionist flavour. Does this not damage the secondary argument 
of this thesis that, despite innate individuality of narratives, it is possible to 
delineate distinct schools of writing on Britain and Europe based in part at 
least on sociological differences? Surely if we can include under the umbrella 
of `revisionism' the explanations offered by foreign politicians and studies 
dating back to the 1960s, how can the current wave of writing possibly be 
termed a `school'? 
There are two responses to these challenges. First, this is not a zero-sum game. 
It does not necessarily follow from the acknowledgement of break-out between 
schools that no schools exist. One can draw general inferences about the 
impact of professionalisation on historiographical revisionism, without having 
to concede that the latter is only extant upon the former. Second, it is a 
distortion of the term `school' to suggest that they can only exist within 
specific temporal contexts. The term encompasses generational change. When 
one school is supplanted by another, the first does not die out, but particular 
writers continue to expound its interpretation. It so happens that the most clear 
version of revisionism has been a product of the study of British European 
policy at university level in the 1990s. That is not to ignore the earlier 
manifestations of it in British and foreign accounts, or the numerous works, 
especially political memoirs, that continue to propound the orthodox 
interpretation. Earlier histories have not been excluded merely to fit an 
artificial framework which puts contemporary academic studies at the cutting 
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edge of revisionism. It in fact strengthens the claim put forward in this study, 
that one can identify interpretative overlap across communities and generations 
of historians, and yet still be able to identify schools. The overlap makes the 
resulting differences between schools even more poignant, their delineation 
more significant. 
That writers come down on one side or the other, playing up the role of certain 
`facts' over others is what divides them into schools. The prioritisation of some 
explanations over others- the crucial distinction between schools- rests, it has 
been shown, in no small part on sociological factors. Specialisation and the 
professionalisation of the study of British European policy have played their 
part in determining the pace and timing of revisionism. This has been driven by 
academic researchers using shared sources and methods to develop new 
understandings of the past. The social construction of history is therefore of 
great significance to understanding historiographical evolution. Flowing from 
the professionalisation of the study of Britain and Europe have been a number 
of assumptions about how to study contemporary history. The chapter now 
seeks to analyse these assumptions, beginning with the assiduous use of PRO 
sources by revisionists. 
3. The Allure of the PRO to Revisionists 
sa This draws on Viktor Shklovski's point that new hegemonies (or schools to use the language 
of this study) do not totally reject earlier explanations, but draw out neglected aspects of them 
to formulate a new approach. See Holub, Reception Theory, op, cit., pp. 21-2. 
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Kevin Jefferys explicitly identifies `revisionist historians with full access to 
official records at the Public Record Office'. 85 That primary sources are such 
an attraction for scholars is, Iggers argues, understandable. `The assurance with 
which professional historians after Ranke had assumed that immersion in the 
sources would assure a perception of the past that corresponded to the past has 
long been modified. However, historians have not given up the basic 
commitment to historical honesty that inspired Ranke'. 86 Examining why the 
PRO has been such a draw for historians reveals the double impact of 
academic approaches and mundane personal influences on the study of history 
in Britain. It makes the constituent elements of `method' harder to capture, 
because the factors involved in deciding which sources to consult can be as 
much down to matters of exigency, time and money, as to a considered choice 
of research design. Thus, to say one has a `research method' can actually mask 
deeper influences at work on historical research, and necessarily requires 
reflection on which sources are not being consulted, as on those which are. The 
`PRO method' constitutes a research design, but prompts as many questions 
about source coverage as it answers. However, that it has been so dominant 
requires explanation. 
There are four reasons why the PRO has proved such a popular source for 
British historians. First, the PRO houses the `official record' of events and is 
not ashamed to sell itself as such. It proclaims on the cover of its advertising 
brochure that inside the PRO are `Centuries of history at your fingertips. The 
BS Jefferys, review, `The Myth of Consensus... Edited by Jones and Kandiah', op, cit., p. 157. 96 Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p.. 144. 
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Public Record Office', it continues, `is the archive of the United Kingdom. The 
records and images of a nation are preserved on its 167km of shelving, from 
Domesday book to the latest Government papers to be released to the public'. 87 
Behind the rhetoric of this glossy advert lays a telling observation about how 
historians have tended to view the records contained in the PRO. That is, if one 
concentrates on the final part of the advert which trumpets the PRO's 
collection of government papers, PRO material appears to present the most 
likely way of recreating the `truth' of what happened in the past. Alternative 
sources include the media, oral testimony, political diaries and memoir, 
autobiography, private papers and the records of parliamentary debate 
contained in Hansard. The ideology among British historians is, and always has 
been it seems, that none of these offer as much neutrality and as the papers in 
the PRO. Dominated by this ideology, revisionist school has been crucially 
dependant on the release of primary archive material, which is footnoted 
densely in their works. 
It is no coincidence that a recent article in the Times Higher Education 
Supplement highlighted `Integrity, the search and respect for truth' as the 
fundamental goals of a civilised society. 88 In this light, PRO sources fare better 
than others available to the historian. Iggers has also made the point that 
despite the postmodern challenge to the nature of history, historians still see 
their art as reliant on `facts' and traceable sources of evidence. Despite an 
increasing awareness of the interconnectedness between history, literary 
87 PRO introductory brochure, distributed at PRO academic induction days. 88 James Armstrong, `A Case of Pricking the Nation's Conscience', Times Higher Education 
implement, 14 January 2000, p. 16. 
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discourse and reflectivist approaches to the social sciences there lingers, he 
argues, `the conviction that the historian deal[s] with a real and not an 
imaginary past and that this real past, although accessible only through the 
medium of the historians' mind, nevertheless called for methods and 
approaches that followed a logic of inquiry'. 89 The key phrase here is the 
italicised portion: `methods and approaches'. The historical method in Britain, 
following Cartesian logic, is ideally suited to the pursuit of `facts' in the PRO 
mainly because they are testable, that is, written down. The historian can assert 
that in the margin of a particular document the British Foreign Secretary had 
commented X. He or she can do this safe in the knowledge that others can go 
and check the veracity of this claim. 
Such `facts' appears to be `harder' than many competing sources of evidence 
on offer. History written without `facts' obtained in the PRO could be 
dismissed as a form of bias, a pungent critique usually reserved for reviews of 
political memoir and biography which lament their `superficiality and super- 
abundance'. 90 Take Grigg's verdict on `instant history', or is it `auto- 
hagiography'? He judges that `there are degrees of partiality, and any account 
of a practising politician, given either by himself or by someone he has 
99 Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p. 15. Italics added. 90 Hollowell, review, `Callaghan: A Life. By Kenneth 0. Morgan', Contempor British 
Hlstorv, op. cit., p. 129. 
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authorised, must necessarily [involve] partiality to an exceptional degree'. 91 
`Memoirs', he continues, `make the worst of all worlds, being less reliable as 
source material than diaries or other strictly contemporary documents, while 
lacking any of the credentials of objective history'. 92 Evans is just as 
dismissive: most people, unless they are politicians, go to some trouble to 
make sure that they do express themselves in a reasonably consistent and non- 
contradictory way'. 93 Graf von Schwerin was of the opinion that memoir 
writers `often wrote with the benefit of hindsight, not of the facts as they 
actually happened, but of the role they wished history to record of them in 
relation to the events in question, often allowing themselves the license of 
adjusting the facts'. 94 Harriet Jones also `wonders to what extent we are being 
given enough material to understand the subject'. 95 
The media is not a trusted source in Britain. Even the Times and Economist are 
not scrutinised as much as the volume of evidence they contain might suggest 
they would. Professional historians prefer the judgement of other professional 
historians. It is not that historians believe everything written in the PRO, nor 
that they are blind to the many omissions and gaps in its documentation. But, 
91 Grigg, review, `Policies of Impotence', International Affairs, op. cit., pp. 72-3. Wilson is an 
interesting exception to the hagiographic tendency of biography, and he has received, Kevin 
Jefferys notes, an `anti-Wilson tirade' from certain biographers. This is in keeping with the 
general consensus on Wilson which has not been countered by biographic portraits by his friend 
Ernest Kay, Pragmatic Premier: An Intimate Portrait of Harold Wilson (London: Leslie Frewin, 
1967), or by his official biographer, Philip Ziegler, Harold Wilson, op. cit.; See Kevin Jefferys, 
review, `Harold Wilson. By Austen Morgan; Harold Wilson. By Ben Pimlott', Contempora X 
Record, 7,1 (1993), pp. 198-200 (p. 198). 92 Ibid.. The `objective history' to which he refers is presumably that penned by the professional 
historian. Such can be the arrogance towards the press and other historical sources. 93 Evans, In Defence of History, op. cit., p. 112. 94 Quoted in Fursdon, The European Defence Community, op. cit., p. 3. 95 Jones, review, `Bob Boothby... By Robert Rhodes James', Contemporary Record, op. cit., 
p. 404. 
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with working on their own and with such an amount of material to survey, this 
leaves little time for reflection on the limitations of the PRO as a source of 
historical evidence. This makes historians even more inclined to take this 
primary material at face value. 
To summarise, then, the first reason why PRO documents are such compelling 
sources for historians is that they represent a corpus of hard, traceable official 
`facts' about the past. They would presumably concur with Fred Inglis who 
states that the life of the scholar `is simply the pursuit of the virtues as 
embodied in the free search for truth, the struggle to achieve rationality, the 
honouring of the facts to be found in the fictions of our lives according to 
passable accounts of goodness and beauty'. Other sources available to the 
contemporary historian have weaker claims to be `hard' and for this reason 
tend be used less used by historians trained according to Rankean 
prescriptions. 
This begs the question, would orthodox writers have produced different 
interpretations had they had access to (or used) the PRO for evidence? Can we 
split the schools according to the date of publication, pre-Thirty Year Rule 
studies making up the orthodoxy, post-Thirty Year Rule the revisionism? It 
would be neat if this were the case, but alas it is too simplistic a classification. 
Not all studies penned in the 1990s are revisionist, just as some, indeed many, 
penned decades earlier contained the seeds of revisionism. The schoolification 
96 Fred Inglis, `A Nanny No, A Medusa... Maybe', Times Higher Education Supplement, 3 
March 2000, p. 21. 
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process relies not just on dates but on the type of work written. Politicians 
writing their memoirs now are no more likely to take the revisionist approach 
than their colleagues writing in the 1960s. Camps, writing in 1993, was 
adamant that the official record `contained few surprises' and reinforced her 
account from 1964.97 Elisabeth Kane, meanwhile, consulted the files of the 
Western Organisation Department, released to the PRO in 1997, but 
interpreted British European policy in the 1955-7 period in orthodox fashion. 98 
The pre- and post-Thirty Year Rule juxtaposition is useful, but only as long as 
we bear in mind the interpretative overlap across schools and the ideological 
predisposition that is brought to the writing of history which makes this a 
necessary but not sufficient explanation for the division between schools of 
writing on Britain and Europe. 
Gustave Flaubert once commented that `writing history was like drinking an 
ocean and pissing a cup'. 99 The second reason why the PRO dominates 
revisionist historiography is bound up with the volume of evidence it houses: 
there is always the chance of finding something `new'. It can be argued that the 
choice of topics for doctoral and other forms of advanced research is strongly 
determined by pragmatic as well as academic concerns. Scholars are not shy of 
admitting that they become involved in particular research domains because 
their supervisors suggest there is a lacuna in the literature, or because it opens 
97 Camps, ` Missing the Boat', op. cit., p. 134. 98 Liz Kane, `European or Atlantic Community?: The Foreign Office and "Europe" 1955-1957', 
Journal of European Integration History, 3,2 (1997), pp. 83-97; Elisabeth Kane, `The Myth of 
Sabotage: British Policy Towards European Integration, 1955-6', in du Reau (ed. ), Europe 
E, fites, pp. 291-301. See the next chapter for further discussion of her work. 99 Quoted in Evans, In Defence of History, op. cit., p. 23. 
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up the most career doors at a later stage, or because it was acknowledged that 
funding bodies were looking sympathetically on that particular domain at that 
particular time. The reasons vary from scholar to scholar but fundamental to all 
these concerns for the `professional' academic is the drive to produce 
something original, to add a new theory, dimension, paradigm or source of 
evidence to the existing literature in one's field, boosting one's attractiveness 
in terms of publication and career options. 
Historians, not being acutely interested in the development of new theories 
(that, the argument has traditionally gone, is for `political scientists') tend to be 
judged on what fresh evidence they can uncover. In the field of Britain and 
European integration this has meant a rapidly expanding source base in the 
1990s. From Cabinet, Foreign Office and Prime Ministers' files, historians are 
now beginning to analyse the records of the economic departments and what 
the Americans and. Europeans had to say about British European policy. 
Whether this shift is rooted in the changing conception and study of 
International Relations at university level is, it has been argued above, 
debatable. Iggers supports this case: `Historians felt compelled to go into the 
archives, which contained not only official documents of state but also much 
information of an administrative, economic or social nature, which they mostly 
ignored'. 100 There is a stronger case for arguing that acutely pragmatic 
concerns have been the motor force behind recent developments in the 
historiography. Stoker's observation in the context of political science is 
100 Iggers, Historiography, op. cit., p. 30. 
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equally applicable to history: ` different approaches within [history] emphasise 
different types of evidence, but none denies the need for evidence'. 101 
The twin demand for evidence and originality is a potent mix. Historians have 
the luxury of the PRO in their attempts to respond to that demand. Its shelves 
play host to numerous government documents and papers on all spheres of 
political, economic and social life. Hence, using PRO sources offers the 
attraction that one may uncover a previously unscrutinised source. If not, there 
is enough extra evidence to hold out the prospect that one will be able to bring 
a new perspective to existing historical thought. There is the added bonus that 
one gets to see how previous historians have handled and manipulated the 
evidence as one searches the documentation. 
The third attraction of the PRO for historians is that it allows them to 
empathise with historical figures. Appleby, Hunt and Jacob capture this notion 
well: `scholars in the practical realist camp are encouraged to get out of bed in 
the morning and head for the archives, because they can uncover evidence, 
touch lives long passed and "see" patterns in events that might otherwise 
remain inexplicable'. 102 When one asks `what is in a method? ' these factors 
further hamper our ability to answer it purely in terms of research design, 
epistemology and ontology. Most often in historical works the choice of 
method is dictated by the personal circumstances of the individual. Who is to 
say that the same concerns do not affect their colleagues in other social science 
101 Stoker, `Introduction', op. cit., pp. 3-4. Emphasis in original. 102 Appleby, Hunt and Jacob, Telling the Truth About History, op. cit., p. 251. 
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disciplines? The key point is that there is a gap between the method, or 
research design, and output. That gap is filled by the interpretative ability and 
the historian's imagination. To argue one's method is, in this case, the archival 
historical method based on the principles of historical institutionalism, 103 gets 
us no nearer understanding the interpretative quality of one's output. The 
emphasis in the social sciences on methodological rigour is scientifically 
worthy but distorts how historical narratives are constructed. Under 
scientifically objective, laboratory conditions, the argument goes, gases act in a 
certain way in response to changing temperatures. How do we translate such 
conditions to, or recreate them in, the social sciences? 
The postmodern challenge has not ignored the natural sciences-'04 In the social 
sciences its warnings are even more pertinent because of the properties of the 
variables under scrutiny. These `variables' are human beings or bodies or 
organisations comprising them. Historians are every day faced with the 
prospect of uncovering motives, attitudes, beliefs and ideologies of a plethora 
of politicians, civil servants and diplomats. Laboratory conditions simply do 
not apply. To say that one utilises the historical method based on reading the 
Foreign Office papers for the period 1945-51, for example, only tells us a 
fraction of what is needed to understand how the research was carried out and 
what ultimate interpretation might be. Did the researcher go into the archives 
103 Historical institutionalism being the traditional diplomatic historians' approach to explaining 
`specific events, eras, people and institutions'. See Rhodes, `The Institutional Approach', op. 
cit. This quote is from p. 43. 104 See for example Turney, review, `Mystery of Mysteries', Times Higher Education 
npplement, op. cit. Such books are strong indicators that postmodernism has affected the 
natural sciences. 
226 
already aware of existing debates about European policy in this period? Being 
alert to existing literature can influence which documents subsequently 
become important in the course of primary PRO research because one can, 
however unintentionally, begin to seek out documents which demonstrate a 
preconceived hypothesis about events. '05 
That the same primary document or speech is put to different uses by historians 
is evidence of this feature of historical research. As Can put it: `No document 
can tell us more than what the author of the document thought- what he 
thought had happened, what he thought ought to happen or would happen, or 
perhaps only what he wanted others to think he thought, or even what he 
himself thought he thought. None of this means anything until the historians 
has got to work on it and deciphered it'. 106 Understanding the interpretative 
mechanisms of the mind is crucial to understanding the process of 
historiographical evolution, and takes us beyond the research design element of 
`method' as the paramount goal of historiographical reconstruction. That we 
have to expand the term to include the intellectual, psychological and 
intellectual pressures at work on writers is clear. Stoker's definition of method 
as a `particular way of producing knowledge' in a widely used text on methods 
for political scientists falls some way short of capturing the diversity of opinion 
about events that can result from the use of a specified method. 107 Having a 
method is one thing, operationalising it is another. 
105 The post-revisionist school to be analysed in the next chapter has developed strongly in this 
way. 
106 Carr, What is History?, op. cit., p. 16. 107 Stoker, `Introduction', op. cit., p. 13. 
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It is possible to explore conflict between the schools over the European Army 
speeches to demonstrate this point. 108 Orthodox writing has been driven by 
supposed ` European' British ministers who claim that Eden's speech in Rome 
on 28 November 1951 directly contradicted the positive reception of the 
European Army idea given by Maxwell Fyfe in Strasbourg earlier the same 
day, fitting neatly into the broader accusations that a narrow-minded Eden 
missed here another opportunity to board the European bus on one of its early 
journeys. 109 Orthodox writers thus gathered evidence from Eden's host of 
utterances on the import of the `special relationship' and Commonwealth to 
Britain to boost their case which rested on Eden's clear but thinly disguised 
`anti-Europeanism'. A favourite which often appears in orthodox works is his 
January 1952 warning that to get wholeheartedly in Europe `is something we 
know in our bones we cannot do'. Here rests the orthodox case. Compared to 
Maxwell Fyfe's speech, Eden's `frigid sentiments' `shocked the federalists and 
the supranationalists'. 110 
108 Another example is Bevin's `Western Union' speech of 22 January, 1948 which, because of 
its ambiguity, has been interpreted differently by the different schools. The ambiguity in 
Churchill's speeches on European integration at Zurich (September 1946) and Strasbourg (August 1950), have also had repercussions on the historiography. 1°9 Boothby, My Yesterday, op, cit., pp. 83-4; Kilmuir, Political Adventure, op. cit., p. 186-7; 
Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, p. 40; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, pp. 410-413. In his 
biography Fisher- a self-confessed admirer anyway- is happy to swallow Macmillan's account. 
See Fisher, Harold Macmillan, op. cit., p. 307. Macmillan also made this point to his official 
biographer: Home, Macmillan Volume 1, op. cit., p. 349. See also Butler who agrees, saying 
that Eden, in `typically British' fashion was `nervous of foreigners'; see Michael Charlton, `How (and Why) Britain Lost the Leadership of Europe (2): A Last Step Sideways', in Encounter. 57, 
3 (1981), pp. 22-35 (p. 23); On the secondary side see Barber, Who Makes British Foreign 
Policy, op. cit., p. 47; Frankel, British Foreign Policy, p. 166; Gilmour and Garnett use Maxwell 
Fyfe and Nutting's accounts in their criticism of Eden in Whatever Happened to the Tories, op. 
cit., pp. 67-8; Manderson-Jones, The Special Relationship, p. 106; Shlaim, ` Anthony Eden', p. 89; 
Sked and Cook, Post-War Britain. p. 112. 110 Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, op. cit., p. 463; Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., 
p. 109. See also Beloff, The General Says No, op. cit., p. 63. She argues that the statements of 
the two were `totally opposite'. 
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Revisionists, by contrast, reassesses the hypocrisy of the British `Europeans' in 
criticising Eden. To argue that Eden's speech was the antithesis of Maxwell 
Fyfe's is, they claim, a distortion of the evidence. Carlton argues that only by 
the use of `selective quotation' have those with an interest in denigrating Eden 
made Maxwell Fyfe's speech seem so forthcoming. He observes that 
Macmillan only quotes the following extracts of the Strasbourg speech in his 
memoirs: `I cannot promise full and unconditional participation but I can 
assure you of our determination that no genuine method shall fail for lack of 
thorough examination which one gives to the needs of trusted friends'. 
However, Carlton continues, `what Macmillan did not admit was that the 
speech as a whole was open to an interpretation that did not please the non- 
British "Europeans"'. "' To this end, he quotes Peter Calvocoressi's damning 
analysis, that Maxwell Fyfe merely `told the Consultative Assembly that it was 
quite unrealistic to expect Great Britain to join a European federation and held 
out no hope that Great Britain might establish anything more than some minor 
form of association with a European Defence Community'. "2 Young agrees, 
writing that the Home Secretary's speech went `no further than the much 
vilified [Herbert] Morrison had done in September in expressing the desire to 
associate with the Six'. Maxwell Fyfe's words were, he observes, `condemned 
by Belgium's Paul-Henri Spaak as "disappointing" and "derisory "'. 13 Dutton 
cites the equally uncomplimentary verdict by former French premier and 
"'Carlton, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 309. Italics added. See also Eden, Full Circle. op. cit., 
p 33. i2.. 
_ ý-anton, Anthony Men, op. cit., p. 3cg. Ii, 
"' Young, Britain and European Unity op. cit., p. 38. See also Greenwood, Britain and 
European Co-operation, op. cit., p. 50; Rothwell, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 198. 
`convinced European' Paul Reynaud. 114 `Maxwell Fyfe might insist that Britain 
was "not closing the door"', writes Charlton, `but Eden spoke for the reality- 
no fundamental changes in the British position of "close association"'. ' 15 
Dutton agrees, and in doing so provides an apt summary of the stance taken by 
the revisionist school: `there was no difference in substance between the 
messages conveyed by the two men'. ' 16 This is a far cry from Nutting's claim 
that the speech was well received. ' 17 Contemporary historians have been 
persuaded by the revisionist interpretation. ' 8 
This reveals two influences on historiographical progression. First, it is 
important to recognise how factual sources of evidence can be put to different 
uses according to the ideological, personal or political motivations of the 
observer. This is a clear instance of intentional manipulation of the evidence 
for political and personal reasons, yet it is not always as obvious. Telling 
evidence from speeches, for example, can sometimes be innocently overlooked 
because one is looking for particular portions of the speech for material. 
The second is that political, personal and intellectual conflicts have a crucial 
bearing on the writing of contemporary history. That many in the school, most 
notably Maxwell Fyfe, Macmillan and Boothby, neglected to understand that 
their own strain of Europeanism was no more acceptable to the Monnetists 
14 Dutton, Anthony Eden op. cit., p. 294. Spaak's reaction is given on p. 295. 
s Charlton, The Price of Victory. p. 148. 116 Dutton, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 293. 
7Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit., pp. 40-6. 
R. amsden, The Awe of Churchill and Eden, op. cit., pp. 260-1, pp. 304-5; Wilkes, `The First 
Failure', op. cit., p. 8; Young, This Blessed Plot, op. cit., p. 115. He notes that Macmillan was a 
`European only of his time and place, which is to say a tormented and indecisive one'. 
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than Eden's, has had considerable repercussions on the literature. It has 
become inextricably intertwined with the secondary analysis of Camps and her 
contemporaries who chastised Eden for missing opportunities to lead Europe 
while conveniently ignoring the paucity of people in Whitehall who proposed 
plans that would have been acceptable to the continental and American 
Monnetists in the 1950s. Crude charges of `anti-Europeanism' have been 
levelled at successive Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries. However, on 
very few occasions do the accusers explain how their own concept of `Europe' 
could have put Britain at the heart of European integration. Supranationalism, 
after all, was the method perceived most likely on the continent to extinguish 
the flames of national passion that had led to two world wars in the first half of 
the century. That so-called `Europeans' in Britain had only hazy or muddled 
conceptions of the sort of Europe they wanted Britain to lead, makes one 
suspect that it would not have been any more acceptable to the Monnetists. 
The major point of departure in this section is, remember, that the PRO is so 
liked by revisionists because it allows them to engage directly with primary 
archival material. It allows them to `get inside the heads' of the individuals 
whose policy they are attempting to piece together. It is problematic to assert 
that this is the prime factor in scholars' decisions to use the PRO for historical 
research, but it suggests that they prefer to narrate British European policy by 
consulting the original record of events. Physically handling the documents 
gives the impression that one is, literally, `bringing history to life'. 
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This may seem unduly romantic but it is an interesting postscript to the Eden 
example. They have discovered, on reading the records of events, that Eden 
was constrained by a Cabinet which was lukewarm to supranational integration 
and which reinforced his own preference for intergovernmental solutions to 
European unity. They have little sympathy for the Maxwell Fyfe position 
precisely because beneath the rhetoric they find him no more Monnetist in his 
Weltanschauung on Europe, frivolously and retrospectively criticising Eden for 
a policy he himself may well have pursued, or been forced to pursue had he 
been premier. By the time of the European Army discussions British European 
policy was already laced with vitriol, according to the supranationalists. Any 
proposal shorn of supranational structures would have received short shrift on 
the continent. 
It is not simply that the orthodox school criticises, revisionists rehabilitate. 
Indeed, on Eden, revisionist writers are in general agreement that, as Young 
puts it, `his tone too often gave the appearance of being anti-European'. 19 
Implied in many revisionist texts is that the presentation of British European 
policy left much to be desired. In diplomatic exchanges, which rely 
fundamentally on negotiation and concession as much as co-operation, rhetoric 
can hide reality. This is especially so across different countries which have 
different benchmarks about what is an acceptable international solution to 
particular problems. Understanding others' positions in advance can be 
119 Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 40; Greenwood, Britain and European Co- 
operation, op. cit., p. 78. See also Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., pp. 42-3. 
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advantageous in the conduct of international relations. The revisionist position 
on Britain and Europe is sympathetic to some extent, but consistently makes 
the point that Whitehall's presentation of European policy was flawed. The 
empathy scholars have taken to their study of PRO records, instilled in them by 
the historical training they have received in traditional British universities, has 
replaced the ideological dogma displayed by orthodox writers in their 
discourse on Britain and Europe. One cannot underestimate the centrality of 
this relationship between training and the methods employed in the practice of 
history by academic historians. As Jordanova argues: `university courses have 
a... far-reaching effect on the values, attitudes, and intellectual frameworks of 
professional historians'. 120 
The PRO aims in the next few years to go on-line with a `virtual PRO' on the 
World Wide Web. In theory, all the documents currently available at Kew will 
soon be accessible on the Internet. The most obvious offshoot from this will be 
an increased output on all periods of British history. Scholars will no longer 
have to travel to London, order files and wait for them to be collected; they 
will have much speedier access to the array of documents housed in the PRO. 
Volume is one thing, quality another. So it is worth reflecting on what 
implications a `virtual PRO' might have for the writing of history based on 
empathy. Will this approach to the documents (unconscious as it may be) still 
prove fruitful in the years ahead as historians begin to scrutinise documents 
scanned onto the Web? 
120 Jordanova, History in Practice. op. cit., p. 8. 
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It can be argued that it will be harder to empathise with historical figures when 
researching is done wholly or mostly on the Web. Looking at a document on a 
monitor comes nowhere close to handling it personally. More research needs to 
be done into the role of empathy in the process of historical narrativity. But 
whichever of the two it is, some of the quality of historical analysis may be lost 
in a virtual PRO. The other reason one might argue this, is that a virtual PRO 
may unravel some of the sociological ties between writers in the various 
schools. The use of e-mail and academic conferences will still promote 
dialogue between writers in the same field. Scholars attend conferences, 
Harvey Kaye notes, for `the most basic of human reasons- to see old friends, 
have a few drinks together, share a good meal and tell a few 
tales... Conventions afford annual reunions'. '21 Yet, conferences could in the 
near future be screened live on the Internet and so lose their interpersonal 
dimension. If we accept the sociological underpinnings of the revisionist and 
post-revisionist schools of writing these might also be lost as scholars and 
historians no longer meet up at the PRO. The impromptu conversations over 
lunch there, and at academic conferences, have played important parts in 
binding together a community of researchers who work alone. Had such a 
community not developed, researchers might have been more hesitant about 
publishing `new' interpretations without the benefit of discussing them first 
with others in the field to gain confidence in their explanatory powers. 
121 Harvey Kaye, `Conference Notes to Spend', Times Higher Education Supplement, 18 
February 2000, p. 9. 
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In this context, the cement holding up the wall of revisionism appears to be 
sociological. The prospect of a `virtual PRO' brings into doubt the long-term 
prospects for a discipline which so benefits from dialogue among its 
practitioners. Even more worrying is the retardation it may bring to dialogue 
across disciplines. The separation of history from political science, economics, 
sociology and psychology has long been recognised. Although it is slowly 
being realised that synthesis across disciplines, involving dialogue as well as 
the exchange of ideas and methods of research, is beneficial to all, it is only 
hesitantly occurring in Britain. As more and more research is carried out in the 
comfort of one's home, and the sheer volume of potential material to devour 
becomes greater, the prospects of practitioners within these various disciplines 
looking beyond the confines of their area of specialisation look bleak. The 
third reason why the PRO is such an attractive source to historians is that it 
helps historians empathise with their research subjects; a virtual PRO brings 
into doubt whether such empathy will still be as forthcoming in the future. 
The final reason why the PRO has such a hold over revisionist historiography 
takes us even deeper into the pragmatic methodological considerations of the 
current generation of historians: time and money. Whatever is said about 
different generations of historians possessing different methods or theoretical 
perspectives on how best to undertake the study of history, one cannot escape 
the pressing factor in the choice of method: cost effectiveness. This is not to 
reduce the value of historical scholarship to absurd levels. It is a reminder that 
methods and research designs are often constrained by purely pragmatic 
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concerns. One can put a gloss on mundane factors in the pursuit of scholarly 
knowledge, but only with hindsight, or with a careful manipulation of the 
evidence. When one chooses a research design and method of analysis time 
and money have to be considered crucial variables. Hitherto they have been 
overlooked in academic discussion of what makes a methodologically 
acceptable study. 
Harriet Swain has recently commented that the whole community of academics 
are `obsessed by research ratings'. 122 The significance of the time factor in 
history-writing has long been pertinent with the deadlines imposed by the 
Research Assessment Exercise (RAE). 123 Historians are under pressure both 
from funding bodies and departments to produce publishable monographs in 
the shortest time possible. Doctoral research students are under similar 
pressures to convey honour on their supervisors and satisfy the requirements of 
PhD criteria within a three year period, when external sources of funds run dry. 
Looking at the range of sources available to contemporary historian, the PRO 
is extremely attractive because a vast amount of hard material can be gathered 
in a few days. Once the complex ordering procedures have been fully mastered 
and research conducted at the most efficient rate, it is possible in two or three 
days to glean enough material to write for up to two months. Compare this to 
the time it takes to amass two months writing out of interview material, private 
papers or statistical analysis. The only source comparable in time effectiveness 
is the use of secondary sources, but in the field of contemporary history it is no 
122 Harriet Swain, 'Blair's Capital Hearing Aides', op. cit. 123 A point taken up in Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., pp. 23-4. 
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longer acceptable to use secondary texts as primary sources when there is such 
an array of primary documentation waiting to be devoured. The emphasis is on 
`new' or `original' research. 
The effectiveness of the PRO over, say, interviews and the consultation of 
other sources such as private papers with respect to time applies equally in the 
context of funding. It is, quite simply, cheaper to visit the PRO than it is to use 
these competing sources. It is expensive to travel all over the country (or 
world) interviewing eye-witnesses and the insights one gleans can sometimes 
be disappointing. Private papers are crucial historical sources. That they are 
spread around the country makes them less appealing to the cash-strapped 
scholar than the PRO. As Jordanova observes: `The costs of travelling to work 
on sources of which there are no copies... should not be underestimated'. '24 
They suffer, moreover, from differing levels of accessibility and copyright 
laws. It can be costly to cite them or difficult to gain permission to do so at all. 
The PRO is near London, and one can scrutinise a lot of material there in a 
short space of time. 
Hence, one can discuss why the PRO has proved attractive to historians on two 
levels. On the first level one find the first three reasons given above: it houses 
the `official' record of events; there is the chance of discovering a new source 
of evidence; and it offers the opportunity of empathising with the predicaments 
facing historical figures. These represent historians' epistemological and 
124 Jordanova, History, in Practice, op. cit., p. 24. 
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methodological considerations. On a second, personal level, one finds equally 
compelling explanations for why the PRO has been so important in the 
historiography of Britain's relations with Europe. The PRO, in sum, is a cost 
effective source. In an area of research in which funds are tight and publication 
deadlines pressing the PRO offers a method of publishing a highly original 
study in a short space of time. 
Paul Anand has commented that `Perhaps science is like riding a bike- thinking 
deeply about the process, as opposed to the performance, just does not help'. 
He continues: `That models mediate between theory and the world does not, of 
itself, tell us very much'. 125 What both these quotations show is the growing 
awareness in the natural and social sciences that saying what one does and 
actually doing it, are two quite different things. Modelling events or 
phenomena according to a given `method' in theory, is different from the 
process of conducting research, where personal and intellectual factors enter 
the equation. A historical narrative is more than the sum of its methodological 
parts. Ex post historiographical arguments about methods and academic shifts 
in the study of history and International Relations can obscure as much as they 
reveal. It is time to understand the mundane pressures at work on scholars and, 
by extension, the historiographical process. They are too often eschewed in 
favour of ornate explanations about methodological, epistemological and 
ontological choice. These can only reveal so much about a discipline rooted in 
the personal search for knowledge in an era of financial stricture. 
1 25 pawl Anand, `A Manual of Model Behaviour: Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural 
and Social Science. Edited by Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison', Times Higher 
Education Supplement, 17 March 2000, p. 26. 
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4. Revisionist Assumptions 
`It is a truism', argue Smith and Smith, `that the facts never speak for 
themselves and that any account of social phenomena or processes will be 
based on decisions about what to include, about what is significant and about 
causes and consequences of events and behaviour. Such decisions, though, are 
not always made explicit'. 126 That historians of British foreign policy have 
been reticent about explaining the conceptual lenses through which they view 
the process and content of British foreign policy should not deter one from 
trying to understand the implicit assumptions behind their work. To return to 
Smith and Smith, and this is worth quoting at length: `The dichotomy between 
the "traditionalist" [orthodox] and "transformationalist" [revisionist and post- 
revisionist] views of the subject is in many ways overstated and artificial but it 
does expose the essentially contested nature of the field. It also exposes the 
ways in which different schools of thought use historical evidence and 
analytical devices, by confronting the "traditionalist" emphasis on continuity 
and the "special" status of foreign policy with the "transformationalist" stress 
on discontinuity and interconnectedness. Whilst this case cannot be pushed too 
far, it is one that emerges from alertness to the links between subject-matter 
and method and between the academic and the practical world'. ' 27 It can 
reasonably be argued, contrary to Smith and Smith, that the argument does 
need to be `pushed' because of the significance of understanding the implicit 
126 Smith and Smith, `The Analytical Background', op. cit., p. 22. 127 Ibid., p. 23. 
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assumptions behind the interpretations offered by the competing schools of 
writing. Indeed, their very emphasis on the term `school' suggests that it is far 
from `artificial' to uncover these influences at work on writers. Schools are 
united first and foremost by interpretation, but what lays behind that is often an 
implicit assumption about the workings of the international system, the 
rationality or otherwise of actors and so on. Hence, for the historiographer, it is 
far from `artificial' to search for the linkages among writers. 
Orthodox writers were wedded to a realist conception of foreign policy. They 
saw the goals of European policy in the context of Britain's efforts to maintain 
economic, military and political security and influence after the Second World 
War. Revisionists have taken a different approach which emphasises the 
incremental nature of foreign policy-making and the plurality of policy-makers 
and bureaucracies within the Whitehall machine, all pressing their own 
interests. There is no unitary position among revisionists on who were the most 
important actors. One reviewer has noted, for example, that `According to 
Young, British approaches to the Europe were determined by civil servants, 
whereas Deighton and Ludlow... dwell mainly on the personal diplomacy by 
Macmillan'. 128 Such differences occur less frequently than Ruggero Ranieri 
suggests. The other texts by these writers assert that foreign policy emerged 
128 Ruggero Ranieri, review, `Building Post-War Europe: National Decision Makers and 
European Institutions 1948-1963. By Anne Deighton (ed. )', Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 34,3 (1996), p. 485. 
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from a close relationship between ministers and mandarins. On specific times 
and issues the power-balance shifted, but on the whole there is a consensus that 
foreign policy outcomes were determined by a combination of many 
variables. ' 29 
Revisionists have been sympathetic to the predicament of British policy- 
makers who, they argue, developed policy in a volatile and uncertain 
environment. A particular problem, they argue, was American and European 
suspicion about British intentions towards the integration process. 130 Julian 
Bullard describes this as a `lively awareness of the realities of modern 
government and of the part played in international relations by such factors 
such as chance, instinct, habit and personality'. 131 This section will explore 
these two interconnected assumptions, addressing the question of whether it 
was the new range sources leading revisionists in this direction, or whether 
paradigmatic shifts in international relations theory in the post-Cold War era 
were at work on their approach to British European policy. 
" 
Foreign Policy Analysis 
129 Deighton, The Impossible Peace, op. cit. This is an excellent example of the way in which, 
on other periods and issues, Deighton assesses the impact of official views on foreign policy. 
She argues on p. 78, for instance, that `It is abundantly clear that the influence of Harvey, of 
Roberts in Moscow, and in particular of Orme Sargent were decisive in convincing their 
political master [Bevin] that the moment had arrived to take a firm stand and to act as a great 
power to defend Britain's interests on the continent'. See also her conclusion, pp. 224-34 where 
this is dealt with in more depth. Ludlow's Dealing with Britain and Young's Britain and 
European Unity also assume a symbiotic relationship between minister and mandarin. 130 The importance of this shift is underscored by the finding by Steve Smith and Michael Clarke 
that `the implementation process determines foreign policy'. Quoted in Michael Smith, review, 
`Foreign Policy Implementation. Edited by Steve Smith and Michael Clarke', Journal o 
Common Market Studies, 25,1 (1986), pp. 85-6 (p. 85). 
131 Sir Julian Bullard, review, ` Britain and the World. Edited by Lawrence Freedman and 
Michael Clarke', Contemporary Record, 6,3 (1992), pp. 584-5 (p. 584). 
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After the sociological, the second divide between the orthodox and revisionist 
schools can be elucidated by exploring further how that latter approach the 
process of British foreign policy-making. Orthodox writers implied that the 
state is a black box, by stressing the role of geostrategic factors in determining 
Britain's aloofness from Europe in the post-war era. Revisionists, by contrast, 
are sensitive to what Keith Johnson describes as `the complex political 
dynamics and pragmatic considerations of foreign policy decision-making 
during a period of profound systemic change'. 132 Crude charges of `negativity' 
towards Europe are exchanged for more sympathetic reflections on the 
problems facing policy-makers and how they dealt with them in a difficult 
political and financial period after the Second World War. It is not that 
structural influences are entirely absent from revisionist accounts, but that the 
individual and nation-state levels of analysis are more appealing. In short, 
revisionist stress the role of agents in the formation of foreign policy, rejecting 
`deterministic explanations which seek to account for specific events and 
outcomes in terms of theoretical abstractions... in favour of explanations 
couched in terms of the directly observable events themselves'. ' 33 
As Deighton explains this approach in the following way: `The second 
perspective lies at the level of the domestic environment of state actors. 
Research on foreign policy analysis, the cybernetics of decision-making, 
perception and misperception, belief-systems and operational codes [has been] 
breaking down the assumption that governments respond in a rational and 
132 Keith Johnson, `Britain and the Origins of European Unity, 1940-1951. By Avi Shlaim', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 18,1 (1979), pp. 83-4 (p. 84). 133 Hay, `Structure and Agency', op. cit., p. 196. 
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coherent fashion to clearly understood problems... Decisions taken were not 
simply driven by inexorable external forces'. 134 It is worth repeating that 
neither school is committed to analysis purely in terms of structure or agency; 
they are to a large extent `two sides of the same coin", 135 an observation shown 
in the mixture of implicit theories used in the historiography. One can also 
draw the general inference, however, that orthodox writers placed more weight 
on structural factors in the process of foreign policy development, revisionists 
(and post-revisionists) on agency. 136 
Revisionist writers are commonly said to handle and scrutinise their sources 
with `empathy', a critical element of historical methods training in Britain. 
Historians use empathy as a way of `getting inside the heads' of the people 
whose legacy they are now studying. Their legacy is, Brivati succinctly points 
out, policy discussion that survives in the memos and notes now in the PRO. 137 
But it is even more. It is the sometimes illegible scribbles in the margins of 
policy documents, it is the irascible comments to colleagues or officials. It is, 
in sum, what Brivati terms `the ordinary humanity' 138 epitomised by these off- 
the-cuff remarks which have been left to us to historicise. For diplomatic 
historians this is the legacy around which accounts of Britain's relationship to 
the continent must be built, not bland critiques based on hindsight and political 
prejudice. When Hopkins stated that Young's was one of the first 
134 Deighton, `The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p-86- 
: 35 Hay, `Structure and Agency', op. cit., p. 197. 36 Burke's observation that `narrative historians' couch their explanations in terms of 
'individual character and intention' rather than in the structures that shaped than, echoes this 
point well. See Burke, 'History of Events', op. cit., p. 236. 137 Brivati, 'Cd-Rom and the Historian', op. cit., p. 477. 139 Ibid. 
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`sympathetic' accounts of Britain and Europe, he might equally have 
mentioned that it was one of the first `empathetic' accounts. 
So why do revisionists base their accounts on the lower levels of analysis? One 
could put it down to the post-Cold War era and the dissatisfaction in the 
academic world with realism as an explanatory tool of international relations. 
The `Velvet Revolutions' in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet 
Union brought with them greater fluidity in the international system than the 
relatively stable bipolarism that characterised international relations between 
1945 and 1989. That individuals such as Bush and especially Gorbachev were 
credited with `ending the Cold War' was a reminder of the impact individuals 
could have on momentous political and economic events. How, then, could 
political structures be taken as the major determinants of state behaviour, when 
so many bureaucratic and individual agencies hastened events in 1989-90? 
In Britain the question was particularly poignant because of the impact 
Thatcherism was having on British political, economic and social life. In the 
European arena she found herself in the paradoxical position of extolling the 
economic virtues of the Single European Market while maintaining that Britain 
was unwilling to share wholeheartedly in the political dimensions of the Single 
European Act. Her juxtaposition of antipathy to `Brussels' against enthusiasm 
for closer unity in the economic sphere was not lost on a generation of students 
avidly trying to come to terms with how Britain got where it was in the EU. 
There was never full agreement in the academic world either on the 
explanatory power of realism, which level of analysis best explains foreign 
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policy behaviour, or the importance of structure and agency in the making of 
foreign policy. The end of the Cold War and the individual impact of 
Thatcherism on British life confirmed and exaggerated the unease in academic 
circles about rigidly adhering to one or other side of the debate. The 
dominance of realism was challenged and with it the value of structures, the 
international system level of analysis implicit in so many orthodox works on 
Britain and Europe. The role of agents in determining the course of world 
politics was upgraded accordingly. This is shown in a recent article by Colin 
Hay and David Richards on policy networks. They set their approach against 
the determinism of earlier ones. `The former body of literature tends to 
emphasise the structural character of networks of organisational forms... we 
hope to have demonstrated the utility of a perspective which emphasises the 
strategic content of networking as a social and political practice and networks 
as dynamic institutional forms'. 139 Individuals and bureaucracies, it seems, 
have been receiving greater attention from political scientists and historians in 
the last decade. 
But there are several reasons to doubt that post-1990 academic theorising 
provides the whole explanation for the revisionist emphasis on individuals and 
departments in shaping foreign policy. The most obvious is that the rise of 
revisionism was not a post-Cold War historiographical development. It has 
been shown how revisionist approaches to British European policy can been 
found in studies dating back to the 1960s. In Britain, orthodox historiography 
139 Hay and Richards, ` The Tangled Webs of Whitehall and Westminster', op. cit., p. 25. 
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sowed the seeds of what is now the revisionist interpretation, but was cautious 
about offering it as the first choice explanation. Revisionism has always been 
latent in the historiography and although we cannot date it to a particular time, 
studies that have had the most dramatic impact on the revisionist turn in the 
historiography of Britain, the Cold War and the origins of European unity were 
published in the mid to late 1980s. 140 That these same writers did not publish 
monographs until the early 1990s should not fool us into believing that they 
were stimulated only by the end of the Cold War. The date of publication is 
just that- a date. It generally takes several years to research a book and even 
longer until it is published, 141 and one has to look to earlier manifestations of 
writers' work to achieve a full picture of how they perceived the events they 
later gathered together in book form. 
So for the second, more compelling, reason why revisionists eschew realism 
and the international system level of analysis in their accounts of British 
European policy we have to look at the evidence they scoured to construct their 
accounts. The empirical revelations in revisionist historiography have 
coincided with the use of new primary sources to argue that the evolution of 
British European policy was more complex than orthodox historians asserted. 
One could, of course, question whether revisionists were travelling to the PRO 
with preconceived ideas about what they wanted to find there- evidence to 
140 Deighton, `The "Frozen Front"', op. cit.; Greenwood, 'Bevin and "Western Union"', op. 
cit.; Kent, `Bevin's Imperialism', op. cit.; Warner, `The Labour Governments and the Unity of 
Western Europe', op, cit.; Young, `The Foreign Office, the French and the Post-War Division 
of Germany', op. cit. 14' There is, inevitably, a delay between finishing writing and the book reaching libraries and bookstores. 
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debunk the conventional wisdom. That certain documents and speeches have 
been interpreted in different ways by different schools suggests that historians 
can manipulate evidence to prove many points of view. However, the 
reconstruction of events necessitates imaginative reconstruction of fragmentary 
relics left to us by their originators. Revisionists have been able to build a 
distinctive new interpretation based on documentary sources either unavailable 
to or not consulted by orthodox writers. 
What this shows is the impact of sources on British historiography. 
Enlightenment prescriptions about hard evidence leading to `the truth' still grip 
British historians. The revisionist school has made use of the political sources 
in the PRO to challenge the conventional wisdom on Britain and Europe, 
reconstructing events from the perspective of ministers and officials involved 
in the making of policy. Reading how policy was constructed has presented an 
extra area of concern to them. There is little documentation in the PRO, it 
seems, on the precise structure of decision-making within Whitehall. 
Committees rise and fall, appear and disappear over time, allusions are made 
to a host of them, but there is rarely archival evidence on, precisely, the 
reasons for these changes and developments in the Whitehall machine. 
Reading the remnants of intricate policy discussion and draft papers on policy 
within Whitehall naturally leads archival researchers to the lower levels of 
foreign policy making. In the light of the sources, they argue, decisions were 
not the product of an invisible hand directing foreign policy, but the 
culmination of individual disagreements, the sending of minutes, debate in 
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sub-committees and discussion over the Cabinet table. Explanations set on the 
highest level of analysis simply do not speak to revisionists who try 
consistently to empathise with the individuals they study. Governments come 
and go, they conclude, but the civil service in London and in its Embassies 
abroad, was intricately involved in the policy process at all times. British 
European policy, moreover, was not as negative when we look at the oft- 
forgotten advances and gestures London made to the Europeans. They were 
especially common in the period 1950-4 where revisionists find that it is a non 
sequitur to argue that Britain's reluctance to involve itself in supranational 
integration necessarily implies an awkward or obstructive European policy. '42 
In sum, there are two potential explanations for why revisionist historians have 
analysed British European policy on the level of agents and departments rather 
than international structures. It seems that the sources they use explain this 
phenomenon better than the date of writing. This is because revisionism has 
been more heavily dependent on the release of sources than it has been a 
specific post-Cold War development. The groundwork was evident in many 
orthodox accounts. But there is more to consider in explaining the evolution of 
the revisionist school than either dates or sources. What also has to be explored 
is the approach taken by revisionists to the issue of intentions and outcomes. 
The latter, they argue, cannot be taken as a function of the former. 
142 Young, "`The Parting of Ways"? ', op. cit. 
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" Defining `British Foreign Policy' 
Michael Smith has observed that `the stress [in foreign policy analysis] has 
been laid on the formulation of policy and on decision-making rather than on 
what Joseph Frankel calls the "post-decisional phase"'. "' The orthodox school 
was driven by the politics of blame. That is, its writers took `British foreign 
policy' to be the intentional outcome of an orderly process directed by the 
executive. British foreign policy, they assumed, was what policy-makers in 
London intended it to be. This fitted the highly politicised nature of their 
argument, that British policy-makers misguidedly neglected to involve Britain 
in European integrative endeavours after 1945, preferring instead to cling to 
outdated notions of the special relationship and Empire. In short, they argued, 
the three circles of British foreign policy were only partially and belatedly 
eclipsed in the 1960s as the Macmillan and Wilson governments recognised 
the futility of continuing to ignore the `promised land' of supranational 
integration on the continent. The conclusion drawn is that `it is Britain, not 
Germany, which has taken a Sonderweg in the last two centuries and with 
uneasy consequences'. '44 
Revisionists give this approach short shrift, emphasising instead the dynamics 
of policy presentation abroad. `This leads', Smith argues, `to an emphasis on 
the evaluation of performance and to the generation of questions about the 
143 Smith, review, `Foreign Policy Implementation. Edited by Steve Smith and Michael Clarke', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, op. cit., p. 85. 
144 Margaret Sherman, review, `National Histories and European History. By Mary Fulbrook', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 32,1 (1994), pp. 111-2 (p. 111). This is exactly why Kaiser 
criticises the `awkward partner' thesis in Using Europe, op. cit., pp. 16-8. 
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control of policy in complex settings'. 145 The crux of their interpretation is a 
sympathetic evaluation of the constraints under which foreign policy is 
devised. They take a nuanced approach, which highlights the key role of 
officials and the constant interchange of ideas with Foreign Secretaries. 
Revisionists are intent on reconstructing the process of policy-making to the 
best of their ability given the evidence available. If this involves criticism of 
policy intent, such as the claims that many in Whitehall wanted to `sabotage' 
the nascent EEC in 1955-6, then so be it. They are content to agree with 
Monnet's view if they find documentary evidence to support his view. He was 
quite right about British policy in the mid 1950s, remarks Deighton. `Plan G', 
the proposal for a free trade area in Western Europe was not an innocent 
attempt to foster co-operation in Europe or an attempt to build bridges between 
the Six and the Seven, but an `engine of war'. 146 On the basis of policy in the 
winter of 1955-6, Young neatly concludes, `British policy pursued since 1950, 
based on benevolence towards but non-involvement in, supranational 
discussions, was abandoned'. The policy emphasis evolved instead into one of 
sabotage. 147 
The criticisms of British European policy by revisionists do not just centre on 
1956. But rather than concentrating on content, it is the `tone' of European 
policy pronouncements that leave revisionists room for admonishment. The 
145 Smith, review, `Foreign Policy Implementation. Edited by Steve Smith and Michael Clarke', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, op. cit., p. 85. 146 Anne Deighton, `La Grande-Bretagne et la Communaute Economique Europeene (1958- 
1963), Histoire. Economie et Societe, 1(1994), pp. 113-30 (pp. 113-9). 107 Young, "`The Parting of Ways"? ', op. cit., p. 217. See also Kaiser who uses the same 
language in Using Europe, op. cit., p. 53. 
250 
tone of a politicians' speeches is, it seems, a vital part of how it is received. 
Political oratory for public consumption tends to be thick on form but thin on 
substance and sketchy on detail. Confusion among orthodox writers arose, he 
argues, because they took government rhetoric to stand for reality. 
Churchill's Strasbourg speech on the European Army in 1950 is an apt 
example of the content of British European policy being criticised in the basis 
of a grand speech. As Keith Robbins puts it, `it should not be supposed that 
Churchill's consistent advocacy of a "United Europe", at home and abroad, 
indicated any belief that the United Kingdom could or should join in the 
enterprise of European reconciliation at an institutional level'. '48 After all, he 
said, he did `not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the 
liquidation of the British Empire'. 149 Political rhetoric about Britain's world 
role in the post-war era often belied a more constructive European policy, 
revisionists claim, than such rhetoric suggests. Even more problematic is the 
confusion surrounding the term `European'. The term is essentially contested 
in Britain, but one which has rarely been defined in political tracts. 
Recriminations about `anti-European' British leaders, revisionists assert, have 
too often flowed from conflicts outside the European arena. Some of the 
individuals (especially Macmillan, Boothby and Maxwell Fyfe) who criticised 
Attlee, Bevin, Churchill, Eden, Macmillan and Wilson, were no more 
149 Keith Robbins, Churchill (New York: Longman, 1992), p. 153. 149 Quoted in Anthony Adamthwaite, `Introduction: The Foreign Office and Policy-Making', in Young (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, op. cit., pp. 1-28 (p. 11). 
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Monnetist in their European outlook, and were hazy about how much 
supranational ism they were prepared to accept vis-ä-vis European integration. 
This debate has been played out both in biographies and histories of the Eden 
and Macmillan governments. On the biographic side David Carlton puts the 
recriminations mainly down to `personal and political antagonisms'. 150 Even 
Macmillan's official biographer had to concede that it was down to 
Macmillan's resentment at being sacked from the Foreign Office by Eden as 
premier. `The fact remains that they simply did not like each other'. i51 Away 
from personal animosity another of Eden's biographers, Rothwell, has argued 
that his opponents' vision of Europe was `hopelessly inconsistent'. 152 Eden's 
Private Secretary Evelyn Shuckburgh agreed: `It is very nice to have been right 
in hindsight, but Maxwell Fyfe and Duncan Sandys didn't carry the nation with 
them, did they? '. 153 Hence, Dutton surmises, `the debate between the two men 
was never as clearly defined along pro- and anti-European lines as 
Macmillan... later implied'. '54 
Revisionist historians have generally sympathised with the view that Eden's 
opponents were intellectually muddled on the question of Europe. `Even those 
Conservatives 
... 
who regarded themselves as better Europeans than Eden were', 
'50Carlton, Anthony Eden p. 310. `Fyfe considered that he had been let down', observes Robert 
Rhodes James in Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 350. See also Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer, 
o cit., p. 413. 
" Horne, Macmillan V01.1, op. cit., pp. 374-5. See also Nigel Fisher, Harold Macmillan (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1982), p. 148, where the `friction' in their relationship is 
noted, as it is in John Turner, Macmillan (London: Longman, 1994), p. 96. 152 Rothwell, Anthony Eden, op. cit.; p. 112. 
's3 Oral evidence quoted in Charlton, The Price of Victory, p. 149. 154 Dutton, Anthony Eden op. cit., p. 297. 
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Greenwood asserts, `no more willing to adopt supranational solutions to 
European co-operation than was Eden' and that `the differences between the 
views of the `pro-European' Conservatives and those of the Foreign Secretary 
and his predecessor were largely illusory'. 155 Young concurs. `To blame Eden 
and the Foreign Office alone for "missing the European bus" would certainly 
be unfair, since even those ministers who did show some sympathy for 
European co-operation were unwilling to carry this very far1.156 John Turner 
also remarked that Macmillan's preference for European unification `of a sort' 
was not sufficiently well thought through to appeal to the federalists. 157 
This is absolutely crucial, for it challenges all the evidence put forward by the 
orthodox school to explain Eden's antipathy to the `European' ideal. It draws 
upon a considerable body of evidence that there was very little support in 
Britain, among the public and political elite alike, for Britain to enter a federal 
European body in the early to mid 1950s. ` Boothby and Macmillan singularly 
failed to translate into practical terms their idea of a middle course between 
Eden's notion of intergovernmental co-operation and the federalism of Spaak 
and Monnet, which they themselves rejected'. 158 Thus, Young writes, `it is 
155 Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, p. 43 and p. 50. See also James R. V. 
Ellison, "'Perfidious Albion"?: Britain, Plan G and European Integration, 1955-1956', 
Contemporary British History, 10,4 (1996), pp. 1-34 (p. 22). 156 Young, `The Schuman Plan', op. cit., p. 131. 157 Turner, Macmillan, op. cit., p. 74. Robbins observes the analogous tensions in Churchill's 
position: `although he caught a glimpse of a new Europe, he could not bring himself to 
contemplate the reorientation of national identity which its creation would entail'. Robbins, Our-C-' op. cit., p. 171. 159 Dutton, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 313. Emphasis added. 
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significant that none of (Eden's) three critics themselves advocated a surrender 
of British sovereignty at this time'. 159 
Revisionist historiography has on one hand, then, investigated the hypocritical 
accusations levelled at European policy-makers by political opponents. On the 
other, it has shed light on the consistently benevolent aims of British European 
policy, even though they were aims not amenable to Monnet and his followers. 
Thus, revisionists take British foreign policy as a combination of what British 
policy-makers willed but crucially also how policy was perceived abroad. 
Kaplan made an extremely apposite remark in this context. `That individuals 
often produce the opposite of what they intend, that results are often 
inadvertent, or that accidents often determine history is not something that 
should surprise anyone'. 160 What London perceived as an inoffensive policy 
could and often was viewed with suspicion by the Monnetists. One of the 
central planks of the revisionist interpretation is that orthodox writers allow 
these suspicions to colour their approach to the entirety of British European 
policy. Revisionists assert that while we are right to chastise policy-makers on 
159Young, Britain and European Unity p. 38. Dutton quotes a note from Boothby to Eden that 
highlights this. See Dutton, Anthony Eden, op. cit., p. 312. Sainsbury argues the same about 
Macmillan. `There is little evidence... that he markedly differed from Eden on the main basis of 
policy'. See Keith Sainsbury, ` Harold Macmillan', in Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (eds. ), British Foreign Secretaries, op. cit., pp. 110-6 (p. 110). 160 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing; op. cit., p. 98. 
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some counts, we have to be chary of erecting a damning indictment of policy 
on the evidence of hindsight. 161 
It has therefore been established that revisionists define `British foreign policy' 
in a different way from orthodox writers. The crucial point to understand is 
that the schools treat the intentionality issue differently. Orthodox writers took 
British policy as a direct function of what policy-makers intended. For 
revisionists the matter was less clear cut. British policy was subject to a host of 
distorted interpretations at home and abroad. They look to the British 
documentation in the PRO to construct the case that London's European policy 
was both more constructive and `European' minded than orthodox writers 
hold. This begs the question, of course, which sources in the PRO? The answer 
exposes much about the research methods employed by contemporary British 
historians. 
" Sources Used by Revisionists 
Cabinet minutes, Prime Ministers' files and Foreign Office correspondence are 
the most commonly used sources by revisionists. What, then, of the economic 
departments, the Treasury, Bank of England, the Board of Trade, a neglect 
which validates Wallace's point that: `The separation of foreign economic 
policy from the traditional concerns of foreign policy has been deeply 
161 On each of the debates about British European policy they propose instances of British 
European policy being more constructive than orthodox historiography allows. The most 
prominent cases include the widespread support for the Third Force, association agreements 
with the ECSC and the EDC, the development of the Western European Union, exclusion (not 
withdrawal) of Britain from the Messina negotiations, Selwyn Lloyd's 1957 Grand Design, 
Macmillan's Grand Designs in December 1959 and Wilson's `conversion' to Europe during his 
tour of EC capitals 1967. 
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embedded in British policy and practice'. 11 Why has there been this 
essentially `political' definition of foreign policy? The obvious explanation is 
that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) has traditionally had the 
role of being the co-ordinating department of foreign affairs. `The most 
important agency is', remarks Northedge, `the Foreign Office'. 163 Smith and 
Smith argue that `traditionalists' focus on the dominance of `Number 10' and 
the FCO over the foreign policy process. Revisionists (whom they call 
`transformationalists') have also been taken by the central role of the Downing 
Street-Whitehall axis. It is a sentiment that can be captured as follows: `When 
it comes to the implementation of foreign policy, that is essentially the task of 
the FCO... one of the "great departments of state" which takes the lead on all 
matters of external relations'. 1TM Clarke is of the same opinion: `the 
administration of foreign policy is concentrated around the centre of 
government and directed through the cabinet system'. '65 
There is also a pragmatic concern for historians. With the documentation for 
all branches of government available for scrutiny in the 1980s, how could they 
justify applying for funding to study British European policy using papers from 
the Treasury, Bank of England or the Department of Agriculture and Fisheries, 
when the Foreign Office correspondence had yet to be scrutinised? Out of 
sheer exigency it was always likely that the study of British European policy 
162 Wallace, The Foreign Policy Process, op. cit., p. 156. See also Beloff, New Dimensions in 
Foreign Policy, op. cit., especially pp. 22-33. 163 F. S. Northedge, review, 'The Foreign Policy Process in Britain. By William Wallace', 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 15,3 (1977), pp. 219-20 (p. 219). 164 Smith and Smith, 'The Analytical Background', op. cit., p. 18. 165 Clarke, 'The Policy-Making Process', op. cit., p. 73. 
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would be led by studies based on Foreign Office correspondence. This tells us 
much about the role of funds in determining historiographical interpretation: 
what the funding bodies deem desirable and worthy areas of study have 
powerful repercussions within the discipline of contemporary history. One can 
infer that had the British Academy at the turn of the 1980s been intensely 
interested in the input of economics to the British foreign policy process, we 
would have seen many more of the economics-first studies we are currently 
witnessing in this field. The key role of money can never be overlooked as a 
determining factor in the direction of historical research. 
Surely, it could be argued, the use of papers from the economic branches of 
government shows that revisionists are well aware of the economic dimension 
of foreign policy? That economic hardship in Russia and increased 
interdependence in the international system proved vital to the end of the Cold 
War might explain scholarly interest in the economic dimension of foreign 
policy. It could even be interpreted as Marxist historians paying attention to the 
economic stimuli behind foreign policy. Perhaps, but it could also be a case of 
exigency. The need to fill in gaps in the literature and satisfy the agendas of 
funding bodies could also explain the current trend towards using papers from 
the major economic departments to explain the policy process. An extra 
concern that deserves attention centres on the historian's wish to interpret the 
past in the light of new sources. 
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Scholars know that the pioneers in the field have long been using Foreign 
Office correspondence, so how better to write an original study than to use 
government sources in the PRO which have yet to be analysed by others in the 
field? Thus, the term `method' is ambiguous. Saying that one's research design 
is driven by theoretical conceptions of who makes British foreign policy, for 
example, could in fact hide the mundane reality that it is academically 
pragmatic to use economic sources. In Britain, where historians have little 
theoretical awareness, the mundane explanation is the more likely. Rhetoric in 
both the political and academic worlds can obscure as much as it reveals about 
individuals' motivations and intentions. As Kaplan observed: `there are surely 
few social scientists who are unaware that the very choice of which projects to 
carry out involves some kind of value choice, if only with respect to what 
interests them or to what advances their professional career (or to some other 
criterion)'. 166 
5. The Inevitable Rise of Revisionism? 
To date this chapter has discussed the features of revisionist historiography 
which distinguish it from its orthodox predecessor. It has been argued that the 
schools centre on different communities of writers; that the levels of analysis 
on which each bases its analysis of British foreign policy are lower for 
166 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 130. 
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revisionist than orthodox writers; that revisionists stress the fluidity, the 
uncertainty within the international system while orthodox writers assumed 
European policy outcomes were intended by policy-makers. In general, it has 
been argued that revisionist historians hold greater sympathy for the 
individuals whose actions and motivations they attempt to reconstruct. Taking 
these key distinctions between schools together add up to considerable 
interpretive conflict between the schools. 
This section will consider two remaining questions that help us understand 
historiographical progression in this field: was revisionism preconceived? and 
why did it take so long to come emerge? There is a strong argument to suggest 
that in the ultra-competitive world of academic scholarship revisionist works 
might all be artificial intellectual constructs designed and written to make 
names for the authors rather than contribute seriously to the historiography on 
any particular subject. It is dangerous (and libelous! ) to issue such a strong 
falsifying claim against historical scholarship. It is useful instead to examine 
the weaker form of this judgement by reflecting further on the generational 
context of the revisionism on Britain and Europe. 
Consider this observation from Kaplan: `older scientists have built their 
reputations on the theories they have developed, accepted and based their work 
upon. Thus it is plausible that they would resist new theoretical formulations'. 
He goes on: `scientists, particularly theoretical scientists, seem by 
psychological inclination to be disposed to reject established beliefs. The 
incentives for this to operate upon young scientists would seem greater than 
259 
upon older scientists, who have become members of the scientific 
establishment... [I]t is easier for a young scientist to establish his reputation by 
means of a theoretical innovation than by building on the work of an 
established figure. All these considerations would make it more likely that 
young, rather than old, scientists would be innovators'. 167 Beloff also argues 
that `Young people seeking to get their foot on the academic ladder in history 
as in other disciplines must show their capacities for research. While some 
topics for these arise from the overall view and requirements of the young 
researcher, supervisor or patron... it is probable that more attention will be paid 
to his work if it is of a kind to challenge accepted notions'. 168 
Kaplan and Beloff have highlighted one of the motivating forces behind 
historiographical progression: generational change. It is in the tradition of 
scholarly inquiry for successive generations to contest the established 
orthodoxies out forward by their academic forebears. It is only a short way 
from Kaplan's terminology of `scientists', `theoretical' frameworks and 
`establishment', to understand the relevance of his comments to the 
historiography of Britain and Europe. He picks out the in-built resistance of 
`older scientists' to new theories. The work of writers such as Camps, one of 
the `older' players in the writing of British European policy, supports this 
argument. Even after visiting the PRO, she maintained, `What I have seen so 
far has contained few surprises'. 169 
167 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., pp. 13-4. 168 Beloff, An Historian, op. cit., p. 32. 169 Compared to the interpretation she set out in Britain and the European Community. See Camps, ` Missing the Boat at Messina and Other Times? ', op. cit., p. 134. 
Here is a good example of a historian so dominated by one conception of 
events, that a morass of evidence used to construct an alternative set of truth- 
claims does nothing to shift her belief-system. For the self-styled `mother' of 
the OEEC, 10 federalism was, and remains, the solution to world peace. She is 
hardly likely to develop a new ideology overnight just because official 
documents are released. Quite the contrary, she was devoted to changing 
establishment opinion. For professional historians, on the other hand, keeping 
up with the ebb and flow of advanced academic debate is a crucial way of 
keeping your name at the cutting edge of the field. It has thus been easier for 
professional historians such as Baylis to discard their early beliefs about 
Bevin's European policy in favour of the `new' approach. 
Successive generations which construct their own `truths' about how to explain 
historical events. The question of intent, or falsehood, in the development of 
new theories is to some extent misleading. Who is to say one account is any 
more `truthful' than another? Each individual presents his or her version of the 
truth. As long as one is aware of the different forces at work on writers, as well 
as their reason for writing, one can accept several competing truth claims about 
the past. History is accessible only through the fragmentary evidence left to us 
by its creators. Reconstructing exactly what each individual and bureaucracy 
intended at any particular time is impossible. The moment when decisions 
were taken is unclear. The input from numerous possible sources is hard to 
170 Ibid. 
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quantify. The importance of imaginative reconstruction of events is, therefore, 
crucial. 
The second question to be discussed in this section is why did it take so long 
for revisionism to take off? It has been shown how it was latent in many 
orthodox works, so why did it take until the late 1980s to become so popular? 
The answer sheds further light on the sociological context of history-writing in 
Britain as well as on the methodological limitations of British contemporary 
historians. The pertinence of this question arises from the understanding that 
the Thirty Year Rule released most of the official documentation on the Attlee 
Labour governments by 1982. Even allowing for a lag between the release of 
archives and their scrutiny and the inevitable delay in publishing findings, it is 
surprising that the revisionist approach to Bevin's Third Force concept of 
British foreign policy only gripped the historiographical field in 1989. To be 
sure, the seeds of a revisionist approach were planted in several early works, 
the example of Bullock being particularly relevant here. The Third Force, he 
argued, was in Bevin's thinking for a short time, but events soon directed him 
to overlook such ambitious schemes. His `unrealistic' flirtation ended almost 
as soon as it started. '' One cannot compare these hazy conceptions of the 
Third Force with the much bolder claims of writers such as Kent and Young 
The two approaches clearly merit these writers being placed in different 
schools, especially because the latter place themselves in opposition to 
historians who previously dismissed Bevin's Third Forcism. 12 
"' Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., p. 153, p. 358, pp. 395-6. 72 Greenwood, `Ernest Bevin', op. cit.; Kent, `Bevin's Imperialism', op. cit.; Kent and Young, British Policy Overseas', op. cit. 
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Primary sources, and therefore the lag in historical understanding produced by 
the Thirty Year Rule, are not the sole factors rousing revisionist accounts into 
life. Historical interpretation is not produced in a vacuum. Historical narratives 
are extremely complex multilayered texts containing multiple internal tensions. 
Interpretation is the result of the individual's ability to imaginatively 
reconstruct events from the vantage point of the present. Collecting `facts' is 
one thing. It is quite another to assemble those facts into a meaningful 
interpretation of the past. Interpretation and all that it entails in terms of the 
reasons for writing and publishing is reliant on a host of external and internal 
pressures, and it is therefore only partially correct to argue that historians' 
interpretations are as good as the sources they use. Ultimately, interpretation 
results from a constant interplay between the historian, his or her sources, 
background and personal and academic connections, the aim of writing, time 
constraints and accessibility to funds for research. 
Of all these factors the social construction of this field is especially revealing. 
Greenwood's 1986 article on Bevin and Western Union built on Bullock's 
conception of the Third Force in Bevin's thinking, and Newton's economic 
history studies in 1984 and 1985 subsequently came to enhance the growing 
scepticism about the consensus approach to British European policy in the 
period 1945-50. But without the strident criticisms of the school from Kent and 
Young at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s the revisionist 
approach to Bevin's foreign policy may not have evolved as it has done into a 
clearly defined, distinctive approach. The key to understanding this is partly 
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source-oriented. Colonial Office documentation was the bedrock of Kent's 
analysis, a new departure in the historiography which long ignored the imperial 
and strategic inputs to European policy-making. But the school was also 
crucially developed by two scholars- Kent and Young- who knew each other 
well, who obviously discussed their archival findings and came to a shared 
understanding about the significance of the Third Force to the Foreign 
Secretary. The sociological links among writers and the developing community 
of scholars who have come to form the backbone of the revisionist school have 
been factors in the timing of revisionism. The similar training they have 
received and methods they have employed are important, but cannot be the 
whole story. Few scholars are willing to set out on a brand new interpretive 
adventure without confidence in its merit gleaned from others in the field. 
Without the security of being part of a community of researchers all sharing 
similar outlooks on events, perhaps the nearest historians could get to 
revisionism before 1989 was Bullock's wavering approach. Thus, to answer the 
question of why revisionism did not emerge for more than four years behind 
what one might expect in a country such as Britain which has a tradition of 
writing history using primary sources, one has to conceptualise and define what 
a `method' of research entails. It incorporates explicit choice of research 
design, sources and agenda. But there is also a hidden dimension which tells at 
least as much about historiographical evolution. That scholars came to be 
researching in particular areas is due to a number of factors, of which the 
political climate of opinion, lacunae in the literature, publication needs and 
funding constraints all play their parts. 
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Could revisionism have emerged sooner by consulting press sources? At first 
sight the Economist may appear to be a good example of the orthodoxy on 
Britain and Europe. The majority of its post-war editors and contributors 
appear to have been of Monnetist outlook, 173 their leading argument, since the 
announcement of the Schuman Plan, 174 being that Britain should play a fuller 
role in European integration. An article on 9 December 1950 is exceptionally 
revealing both about the views of `Europeanists' in Britain about British 
European policy and the generic criticisms which came to dominate orthodox 
historiography. The confluence with the views of other contemporaries such as 
Barker, Beloff, Camps and British `Europeans' in Whitehall who later set the 
orthodox school on its path is stark: `The British have frittered away an 
immense amount of goodwill on the continent since 1945. By hanging back at 
Strasbourg, rejecting the Schuman Plan and, to some extent, siding with the 
Americans over German rearmament, they have appeared to show themselves 
unwilling to treat Europe's problems as their own. People on the continent are 
hardly to be blamed if they react by condemning the British attitude with the 
vigour of despair'. 175 
Amidst the failed attempts to create a European Army the Economist in 1951 
complained that the British government was `wrongly sceptical of the whole 
173 As shown by the contributions of Christopher Layton. 170 `The Schuman Scheme', Economist, 20 May 1950, pp. 1105-8; `Inverted Micawbers', 
Economist 10 June 1950, pp. 1257-9; `Socialism Contra Mundum', Economist. 17 June 1950, 
pp. 1313-5; `Thoughts Behind the Schuman Offer', Economist. 17 June 1950, p. 1335; ` Ripples 
from the Schuman Pool', Economist. 24 June 1950; `Schuman Plan in Perspective', Economist, 
2 December 1950, p. 953. 175 
`Closing the Ranks in Europe', Economist, 9 December 1950, p. 988. 
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drive towards European integration'. 176 By the spring of 1952 it had concluded 
that the Foreign Office `has a sworn vendetta against Europe'. 177 By October 
1954 Britain was being blamed for the collapse of the EDC. 178 When the 
negotiations on forming the EEC were in full swing in November 1955 one 
finally finds the `missed bus' approach to describe British European policy. 
`Those who are most deeply committed to the "European" approach have now 
begun to refer to these two new proposals as the "third chance" to "build 
Europe"' `Unless', the article warned, `the British government will say what it 
will do, not simply what it will not do, a time may soon come when it will find 
that it has missed a bus that it will wish it had caught'. 179 This prophetic 
warning could have come Monnet himself. 
This reveals two fundamental things about the historiography of Britain's 
relations with Europe. First and most obviously the interpretation and language 
of the orthodoxy is born in live political debate and contemporary journalistic 
comment on British policy. The community of individuals working on the 
Economist clearly had a shared outlook with Monnetist Europeans, many of 
whom later narrated histories of Britain and Europe. Second, the same internal 
176 `Towards Europe's Army', Economist. 28 July 1951, pp. 194-6 (p. 195). See also `The 
Defence of Britain', Economist. 31 March 1951, pp. 723-4; `Small Expectations', Economist, 22 
December 1951, pp. 1509-10; `Three Years Ahead', Economist, 29 December 1951, pp. 1561-4; 
`The Six Power Army', Economist. 5 January 1952, pp. 3-4; `Defence of the Defence 
Community', Economist. 2 February 1952, p. 265. 177 `Vendetta in Downing Street', Economist, 12 April 1952, pp. 79-80 (p. 80). See also `Major 
and Minor Risks', Economist, 19 April 1952, pp. 142-4; `Europe in a Hurry', Economist, 12 
July 1952, pp. 67-8; `Challenge from the Capital', Economist 24 January 1953, pp. 183-5. 178 `Britain was an Island', Economist. 9 October 1954, pp. 132-3; `A Vote for Paralysis', 
Economist, 4 September 1954, pp. 711-3. See also Beloff, Europe and the Europeans, op. cit., 
p. 165. 
179 `Britain and Europe's "Third Chance"', Economist, op. cit., pp. 633-4. 
inconsistencies of argument that pervade orthodox texts are also to be found in 
the Economist. Like historical texts, the weekly is riddled with intellectual 
inconsistency, as the leader writers and editors grappled with competing 
explanations but lead with their favoured, Monnetist ones. Alongside the 
Economist's bombastic comment on British European policy one discovers 
alternative explanations which are relegated below that of `missed 
opportunities'. Revisionists would later exploit these inconsistencies, which 
operated on two levels. 
On the level of interpretation, its analysis of the collapse of the EDC is 
revealing. Throughout 1951-4 the Economist bemoaned British reluctance to 
be involved in the process of European integration heralded by discussions 
about a European Army and EDC. It concluded that `The failure of the EDC is 
as much the failure of Britain's willingness to take matters to their logical 
conclusion as it is the failure of France'. 180 Yet over the previous years the 
weekly had toyed repeatedly with the major problems France was having 
coming to terms with a defence entity, at a time when its troops were being 
sucked into Indochina and which involved German rearmament, no British 
counterweight and unsubtle American pressure to rearm. It was also critical 
ISO `Britain was an Island', op. cit., p. 133. See also `A Vote for Paralysis', Economist, 4 
September 1954, pp. 711-3. 
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also of the military logistics of the proposed schemes. 18' On the intellectual 
level, the Economist repeatedly warned that Britain should only join loose, 
intergovernmental forms of European integration, not supranational designs. It 
was clear about this: `Britain cannot and should not be a full member of 
Western European federal structures'. 182 It was also aware of `the suspicion of 
British motives that still plays an important part in relations between this 
country and the continent'. 183 
The Economist appears to have been as confused as the Tory Strasbourgers. 
Revisionist accounts of the demise of the EDC have been built on French 
domestic upheaval at the thought of joining the EDC. `The British', observes 
Greenwood, `although they were to receive a full share of the obloquy for the 
failure of the EDC were, in fact, never the central players- these were France, 
Germany and the United States'. 184 For revisionists- and writers on American- 
European relations since 1945-, the British role was peripheral, though they 
agree that its willingness to participate and a positive rhetorical reception of 
181 `Collective Defence', Economist, 4 November 1950, pp. 679-80; `Germans and Russians', 
Economist, 23 December 1950, pp. 1125-6; `A Political Authority for Europe', Economist, 5 
July 1952, pp. 10-1; M. Schuman's Chances', Economist 20 September 1952, p. 678; `Between 
Devil and EDC', Economist, 25 October 1952, pp. 215-6; `The Case for France', Economist, 28 
March 1953, pp. 849-50; `Hard Choice for Europe', Economist, 23 May 1953, pp. 493-5; 
`Minuet in Paris', Economist. 30 May 1953, p. 584; `France's Crisis of Confidence', Economist, 
20 June 1953, pp. 795-6; `Those Against the Treaty', Economist, 18 July 1953, pp. 183-4; `EDC 
and the Antis', Economist, 17 March 1954, p. 796; `Those in Favour', Economist, 25 July 
1953, pp. 264-5. 182 ` The New Voice of America', Economist, 31 January 1953, pp. 257-8 (p. 257); The Six 
Power Army', op. cit. 183 Review, 
`Atlantic Crisis: American Diplomacy Confronts a Resurgent Europe. By Robert 
Kleiman; Prdhistoire des Etats-Unis de I 'Europe. By Achille Albonetti', Economist, 17 October 
1964, p. 264. 
184 Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, op. cit., p. 49. See also Young, `German 
Rearmament', op. cit.; Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., pp. 35-43; Samuel F. Wells, 
`The United States, Britain, and the Defence of Europe', in Louis and Bull (eds. ), The i 
Relationnsp, op. cit., pp. 129-49 (p. 130). 
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the EDC may have helped its cause. But in the final analysis, they approach the 
material from a different perspective. That is, Britain could never have joined 
supranational integrative efforts. 
The example of the Economist provides a microcosm of the processes by 
which historiographical evolution occurs. It offers a multitude of `facts', 
interpretations, insights and dogma. Current historical texts offer a similar 
interpretive blend of general observations under which one can find internal 
contradictions. What separates the two schools of writing is not complete 
disavowal of the evidence on which competing interpretations are based, or a 
dialogue of the deaf in which the merits of one school go unheard, shouted 
down by the other. The difference between schools is, paradoxically, stark yet 
fascinatingly subtle when one searches beneath the headline rhetoric of each. 
Submerged beneath the broad interpretation of events is more sympathy for the 
opposing position than one might suspect. 
This is why the academic, methodological and sociological contexts are central 
to any explanation of the process of historiographical evolution. It is necessary 
but not sufficient to recognise the significance of new `facts' gleaned from 
PRO sources. Other elements also have an impact. They include the empathy 
the second generation historians on Britain and Europe have managed to 
achieve, consciously or intuitively; the detail and degree of specialisation in 
the subject matter accorded them by the release of primary source material; 
last, and not by any means least, there has developed a shared will to draw out 
the inconsistencies in the orthodox approach. This is hard to quantify, but the 
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community of scholars now dominating the field seem to have greater 
confidence in the alternative explanations of events. They have developed a 
(slightly more) globalist perspective which has freed them from the shackles of 
the politics of blame that spurred the reports in the Economist and Monnetist 
integrationists. The agendas of the two schools are different. But so is their 
treatment of the evidence, the mental processes by which they construct their 
narratives and the sources which influence their judgements. The `facts' of 
history have been in the public domain for some time. How these `facts' are 
treated, manipulated and imaginatively reconstituted as `history' is the crucial 
distinction between the interpretations which characterise the schools of 
writing on Britain and Europe. 
Why, it might be asked, is there a caveat to the statement that revisionists have 
been ` (slightly more) globalist'? The reason is to be found in the dearth, until 
recently, of `Grand Design' explanations for foreign policy outcomes which 
have characterised foreign studies of European relations for forty years. 181 This 
. 
further reinforces the conclusion that in theory a revisionist school could have 
emerged much sooner than it did. To get to the heart of this statement we need 
to discuss firstly what `Grand Design' interpretations of British European 
policy are and, secondly, at what stage they have impacted on the 
historiography. It will be shown that much of the foreign literature on post-war 
European politics, American-European relations, Anglo-American relations 
185 The term is taken from the historiography of Bevin and the Third Force and from other 
Foreign Secretarial and Prime Ministerial initiatives (notably Selwyn Lloyd in 1957 and 
Macmillan in December 1959) intended to solve Britain's economic and strategic ills by 
deepening the links between Britain, America and the other West European states. Discovery of 
such initiatives has stimulated revisionist historiography. 
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and biographies of key Europeans have been alert to the global explanations 
for British European policy for decades. That British writers have been 
engrossed in relatively introspective studies of what could Britain have done to 
immerse itself sooner in European integration has blinded them to some bigger 
explanations that have little grounding in British actions alone. Can remarked 
thirty years ago that `I am much concerned with our failure as historians to take 
account of the widening horizon of history outside this country and outside 
Western Europe'. 186 Only now are historians coming to terms with the 
implications of global events, freeing themselves from the intellectual shackles 
imposed by the orthodox school's obsession with the politics of blame. 
First, one needs to understand the dynamics of `Grand Design' approaches to 
British European policy. Their essence is best elucidated in the historiography 
of de Gaulle's first veto on British membership of the European Community. 
Macmillan's own reflections on the veto set the trend for the orthodoxy: `I felt 
hopeful that... [he] might be persuaded to allow... the emergence of a Western 
Europe in which Britain could play an equal part'. 187 Orthodox writers focus 
on whether Macmillan could have done more to persuade the General that 
Britain was positively attuned to the `European idea', that London was not 
subservient to Washington and that Britain could bring important economic, 
96 Carr, What is History? ý op. cit., p. 150. Macmillan, Riding the Storm, op. cit., pp. 410-1. See also Macmillan, At the End of the Day, 
op. cit., passim; Home, Macmillan Vol. 2, op. cit., pp. 328ff, Anthony Sampson, Macmillan: A 
Study in Ambiguity (London: Allen Lane and Penguin, 1967), pp. 212-23. 
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political and strategic benefits to the EEC. They concede that the chances of 
success were not good and that de Gaulle was a huge obstacle. But they are in 
broad agreement that despite the many obstacles the first bid failed at least in 
part because of Macmillan's own failings, especially in his personal meetings 
with de Gaulle at Rambouillet and Chateau du Champs in 1961-2.188 
The revisionist school is less convinced that summitry between the two leaders 
could have worked, that the Brussels negotiations were on the verge of 
success, 189 as Heath complained, 190 or that Macmillan was ever convinced that 
his application would succeed. They have been challenging the received 
wisdom that Macmillan could have done more to secure entry, exploring 
domestic constraints on the bid, especially from the National Farmers Union 
188 Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., pp. 166-97; Beloff, The General Says No, op, 
cit. passim; Camps, Britain and the European Community, op. cit., passim; Evans, Downing 
Street DiM, op. cit., pp. 172-242; Frankel, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 221-42; George, 
An Awkward Partner, op. cit., pp. 33-5; Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever Happened to the 
Tories, op. cit., pp. 161-214; Kitzinger, Diplomacy and Persuasion: How Britain Joined the 
Common Market (London: Thames and Hudson, 1973); Lamb, The Macmillan Years, op. cit., 
pp. 145-202; Pinto-Duschinsky, `From Macmillan to Home', op. cit., pp. 151-65; Sanders, 
Losing an Empire, op. cit., pp. 139-40; Sked and Cook, Post-War Britain. op. cit. pp. 164-73. 189 Their misgivings about Heath's claims reflect the media opinion at the time. One can trace 
the growing pessimism in the Economist. See `Brussels Auguries', Economist. 7 July 1962, 
pp. 13-4 (p. 14). See also `Foglamps in Brussels', Economist 19 May 1962, pp. 650-2; 'Mr. 
Menzies's Mouse', Economist, 9 June 1962, pp. 971-2; `Political Europe', Economist, 23 June 
1962, pp. 1190-1; `Europe's Dog Days', Economist, 11 August 1962, pp. 506-10; `A 
Commonwealth at Sea', Economist. 22 September 1962, pp. 1080-1; `Dangerous Corner', 
Economist, 3 November 1962, pp. 435-6; `Who Picks the Music? ', Economist. 1 December 
1962, pp. 888-9; `The British Alternative', Economist, 15 December 1962, pp. 1088-90; `One is 
One and All Alone', Economist. 12 January 1963, pp. 101-2 (p. 101). 190 Heath, The Course of My Life op. cit., pp. 225-37; Campbell, Edward Heath, op. cit., p. 129. 
See also George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit., p. 34; Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., 
p. 139; Barker, Britain in a Divided Euro op. cit., p. 182; Morgan, `Commercial Policy', op. 
cit., p. 526; Reynolds, Britannia Overruled op. cit., p. 220. 
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and the plethora of other factors that went against Macmillan. 191 To see the 
different approaches of the schools we only have to note John Ramsden's 
finding in the Conservative Research Department archives that by July 1961, a 
full eighteen months before the veto was announced, the Conservatives were 
designing a `Plan B' for British European policy should the negotiations fail. 192 
Take also Deighton's observation that Macmillan, though supportive of Blue 
Streak during his time at the Ministry of Defence and as Foreign Secretary, was 
`losing interest in the project in 1957'. 193 This calls into question the 
conventional wisdom that the Nassau accord was a shock reaction to the loss of 
one of the pillars on which Britain's claims to Great Power status rested in 
1960.194 Both are central pillars of orthodox interpretations of nuclear defence 
diplomacy'in this period. 
Revisionist approaches `present a stiff challenge to the conventional attribution 
of responsibility for the breakdown to de Gaulle or Macmillan alone'. 195 
Importantly, they note, de Gaulle's press conference on 14 January 1963 was 
191 Richard Aldous, °'A Family Affair": Macmillan and the Art of Personal Diplomacy', in 
Richard Aldous and Sabine Lee (eds. ), Harold Macmill an, op. cit., pp. 9-35; Constantine A. 
Pagedas, ` Harold Macmillan and the 1962 Champs Meeting', Diploma and Statecraft, 9,1 (1998), pp. 224-42. He expanded on this in Pagedas, Anglo-American Strategic, op. cit., pp. 56- 
273. See also Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, op. cit., pp. 72-90; Kaiser, 11sin 
Europe. op. cit., pp. 174-203; Ludlow, Dealing with Britain. op. cit., passim; Reynolds, 
Britannia Overruled, op. cit., pp. 215-21; Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., pp. 74-85; 
Young, This Blessed Plot. op. cit., pp. 129-69. Their pessimism about the state of the Brussels 
negotiations reflects the Economist's growing pessimism though 1961-3. 192 John Ramsden, The Making of Conservative Party Policy: The Conservative Research 
Department Since 1929 (London: Longman, 1990), pp. 212-3. 
193 Deighton, `Harold Macmillan, Whitehall, and the Defence of Europe', op. cit., p. 242. 
194 Horne, `The Macmillan Years', op. cit., pp. 93-8. 195 Wilkes, `The First Failure', op. cit., p. 27. 
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not just about the British application. He ranged over many problems in world 
affairs. The Grand Design approach to the veto rests on the General's aversion 
to American influence in Europe. De Gaulle's `Non', it is said, was directed at 
Kennedy's proposal for a nuclear Multilateral Force (MLF) as much as 
Britain's attempt to join the Community. It was, in Oliver Bange's words, a 
`double veto', ' or, to take an even less British-centric appraisal, a `rebuff of 
the Polaris offer'. 197 Writers analysing broader American-European or Franco- 
American relations in this period have a different set of questions and thus 
different answers about what de Gaulle was vetoing. They relegate the 
significance of British foreign policy below that of America. Macmillan's 
application, they argue, was the victim of Franco-American rivalry and 
growing Franco-German partnership in the politico-strategic field, shown by 
the poignantly-timed Elysee Treaty of 22 January 1963. 
What is interesting is that American, French and German writers, and those in 
Britain concerned with Anglo-American and Franco-German relations, have 
'% Bange, `Grand Designs', op. cit., p. 207. See also Pierre Gerbet, ` The Fouchet Negotiations 
for Political Union and the British Application', pp. 135-43; Gustav Schmidt, "'Master-Minding" 
a New Western Europe: The Key Actors at Brussels in the Superpower Conflict', pp. 70-90; 
Maurice Vaisse, `De Gaulle and the British "Application" to Join the Common Market', pp. 51- 
69; Wells, `The United States, Britain, and the Defence of Europe', op. cit., p. 132. 197 Cromwell, The United States and the European Pillar, op. cit., p. 23. 
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long assessed these global dimensions of the veto. 198 It was only in 1997, with 
the publication of Wilkes' edited volume The First Failure that British 
historians began to take seriously the Grand Design approach to the veto. It 
built on Frank Costigliola's study in 1984 in which he articulated just this 
approach to the veto. 199 Why this article remained on the periphery for so-long 
is hard to tell. The most likely reason is that it was published in an American 
journal. British historians tend to be more aware of the British than foreign 
writing in this area, and have a set of key journals in which debates about 
Britain and Europe have developed, including Contemporary British History, 
Historical Journal, International Affairs and Review of International Studies. 
Where one publishes is a determinant of the profile of one's work. What one 
can conclude from this is that revisionism in Britain was an inevitable 
development in the scholarship. The nature and timing of revisionism, 
however, have been crucially dependent on social factors, the Thirty Year Rule 
on the release of official documentation, the developing of British interest in 
European studies and the gradual incorporation of foreign sources and outlooks 
into British scholarship. Revisionism could theoretically have risen sooner. 
Such are the structural determinants of interpretation in contemporary history, 
198 Markus Schulte, `Industry Politics and Trade Discrimination in West Germany's European 
Policy 1957-1963', PhD (LSE, 1996), pp. 305-30. The veto, he argues on p. 330 was not simply 
French, it was joint Franco-German policy'. See also Ball, The Discipline of Power, op. cit., 
pp. 198-220; Crozier, De Gaulle, op. cit., p. 539; Dickie, `Special' No More, op. cit., pp. 105-32; 
Dobson, `The Years of Transition', op. cit., (pp. 243-6; Grosser, The Western Alliance, op. cit., 
pp. 183-208; Hoffmann, Decline or Renewal, op. cit., pp. 283-399; Kissinger, Diplomacy (London: Simon and Schuster, 1994), pp. 594-619; Lacouture, De Gaulle, op. cit., pp. 334-75; 
Ledwidge, De Gaulle, op. cit., pp. 259-84; Macridis, De Gaulle. op. cit., Nunnerley, President 
K_ ennedy and Britain op. cit., pp. 164-6; Andrew Shennan, De Gaull e (London: Longman, 
1993), pp. 118-24; Alexander Werth, De Gaulle: A Political Biography (Harmondsworth: 
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Diplomatic History, 8,3 (1984), pp. 227-51. See also Frank Costigliola, France and the United States: The Cold Alliance Since World War Two (New York: Twayne, 1992), pp. 118-59. 
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however, it has taken a change in the sociological context to decisively reject 
the orthodoxy. 
6. Conclusion 
Jordanova observes that `Each country tends to privilege its own history'. 200 
Put another way, each country- like each historian- has its own set of concerns, 
its own questions to ask and its own methods of discovering the past. What one 
seeks has a powerful say over what one finds out about history. The approach 
taken by what has been described by Michael Shackleton as the `British 
school'201 of scholars on Britain and Europe has been to concentrate, not 
unnaturally, on the role of British politicians and officials in the process. of 
European integration. Many of them have, after all, lived through the events 
they now describe. It is only natural that they will want to critically analyse the 
actions of key British players. What makes this tendency even harder to escape 
in Britain is that the orthodoxy was intent on analysing the other options open 
to British diplomats, alternative routes by which Britain could have led the 
process of integration. 
In this sense, revisionism can only ever be as good as the orthodoxy to which it 
replies. It is the orthodox school which sets the rules of the game, the 
200 Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., p. 12. 201 A term used by Michael Shackleton to describe the whole community of scholars which this 
thesis analyses. See `Organising Europe. By Clive Archer, Understanding the European 
Communities: The institutions of Integration. By William Nicholl and Trevor C. Salmon', 
Journal of Common Market Studies 29,2 (1991), pp. 329-30 (p. 330). 
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parameters of the debate and the questions to answer. Revisionists have been 
content to play orthodox writers at their own game. They have been sucked 
into the detail of the debate about British actions at the expense of a broader 
perspective which takes in the other available explanations for British foreign 
policy outcomes. There is, then, a specifically British approach to the study of 
European integration history which focuses on parochial questions of intent 
and quality of policy. Alternative explanations which set British European 
policy in the context of Britain's multilateral web of global relationships have 
not been ignored. But they have not until recently been accorded the 
prominence within the construction of historical narratives that foreign 
scholarship and writers examining other dimensions of British foreign policy 
give them. 
It would surely be fruitful for historians and political scientists to be more 
reflective about what questions they are asking and when they are asking them, 
for these close off other avenues of inquiry which may proffer equally 
fascinating insights. Even the date at which historical stories begin can have a 
bearing on the interpretation offered. Being `methodologically aware' does not 
necessarily open up avenues for dialogue with others in one's own field and 
across fields. It is, after all, interpretation, not method, upon which 
historiographical evolution is dependent. Interpretation lies not in theory, but 
in the practice of research. 
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Deighton, writing on the origins of the Cold War, has speculated that `for 
historians, the sheer quantity of new archival material... now ironically raises 
questions about whether a total history that recounts and explains the 
beginnings of the Cold War could be written at all, unless by a multilingual 
team of historians'. 202 In America, Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman has remarked that 
`It baffled me that historians, whose raison d'etre is to see connections 
between events, could see little connection between the United States and the 
rest of the world'. 203 Both comments are poignant in the context of what has 
been argued above about the limits to historical understanding necessarily 
imposed by a focus on national issues as the focus of analysis of issues in 
international relations which, by their very nature, can be examined from many 
different perspectives depending on the nationality of the historian and the 
historical agenda to which he or she is working. 204 
Cross-national collaboration is becoming more common in the study of history, 
reinforcing the tendency to multilinguality among British historians. 
Deighton's own involvement with European colleagues in a research project 
entitled `Les Identites Europeenes au Xxeme Siecle: Diversites, Convergences 
et Solidarites is evidence of the growing willingness of British historians to 
202 Deighton, 
`The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 93. 203 Elizabeth Cobbs Hoffman, `Bernath Lecture: Diplomatic History and the Meaning of Life: 
Towards a Global American History', Diplomatic History, 21,4 (1997), pp. 499-518 (p. 499). 204 It is a key theme of Collin, En 'sh Pasts op. cit. - it. On p. 36, for instance, he argues that 
`future narrators of "our island story" will probably opt for forms that are more essayistic, more 
frankly selective, more visual, and perhaps in some ways more overtly polemical and self- 
reflective as well'. 
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connect with their colleagues abroad. 205 The prospects for global perspectives 
taking a firmer grip on the field of British European policy will surely depend 
on this trend continuing. It would be helped by the greater availability of 
financial and other research resources and the ability and willingness of 
British historians to investigate European sources of evidence. 
Discussion of the role of transnational communities in determining the 
direction of historical research is a most apt postscript to this chapter. The core 
argument advanced in this thesis is that it is communities of researchers who 
have been driving forward the historiographical process. The shift from 
politically-oriented to academic accounts has resulted in a shift in the 
interpretation of British European policy. The charges that Britain missed the 
boat in Europe have been replaced by deeper reflection on the process of 
foreign policy-making, mixed with an empathetic appraisal of the predicament 
in which British policy-makers found themselves after 1945. 
Having grasped the social construction of history, it has been argued, one can 
deduce the implicit, but nonetheless discernible, theoretical assumptions in 
revisionist historiography. From the middle of the 1980s onwards `Britain and 
Europe' developed into an area of research among university historians. This 
brought with it new standards of practice, the aspiration to uncover new 
sources and a fresh perspective on the debates about British European policy. 
205 Du Reau's edited volume, Europe des Elites? op. cit., containing articles from historians 
across Britain and Europe, including Deighton herself, is one of the first fruits of this co- 
operation. She is also involved, amongst other things, in a University of Munich project on 
Britain and Europe in the twentieth century. 
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The approach to intentions and outcomes in the foreign policy and the 
empathetic approach to the reconstruction of historical events bear the 
hallmarks of professional historical treatment. The wish to de-bunk 
conventional wisdoms and examine the minutiae of policy have become 
inextricably intertwined in revisionist historiography. The community of 
historians which now dominate the field are asking different questions of the 
history from their predecessors. 
This observation leads one to reflect on the emergence of post-revisionism, 
which is the subject of the next chapter. It is a much newer development in 
Britain, compared to the place it established for itself in American 
historiography, and is only evident in one particular debate in the history: 
British European policy, 1955-8. Its existence, even in a single area of debate, 
is revealing about the core and secondary arguments advanced in this thesis. 
Post-revisionism has been developed by a younger generation of scholars, 
suggesting the importance to the historiography of changing communities. 
Moreover, it has been developed in the context of an awareness by its leading 
members of the conflict among the previous schools. Just as in America, then, 
there is strong evidence to suggest that the identification of schools of writing 
is a crucial part of our understanding of historiographical change. 
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Chapter 4 
THE EMERGING POST-REVISIONIST 
SYNTHESIS 
Table 4: Key Writers in the Post-Revisionist School 
Name Institution/Background Sources 
James Ellison Queen Mary and Westfield College, PRO, especially 
University of London T, F0371, CAB 
Wolfram Kaiser University of Vienna, University of PRO, especially 
Portsmouth T, BT, F0371, 
CAB 
Martin Schaad University of Glasgow PRO, especially 
T, CAB, F0371 
One can infer from the above table the significance to James Ellison, Kaiser 
and Martin Schaad of the archives of the economic branches of government. 
The sources used by historians can be crucial determinants of the interpretation 
they place on events, as this research has already shown. But what of the other 
variables that work upon the construction of historical narratives? Can one 
argue that, given the use by post-revisionist writers of Treasury and Board of 
Trade archives, the sources consulted by historians have the biggest influence 
on interpretation? The core argument of this thesis is that the historiography of 
Britain's relations with Europe has been driven by other factors. The most 
significant amongst these is the social factor. Developments in 
historiographical interpretation, which have been consonant with the rise and 
fall of competing schools of writing, are linked strongly to different 
communities of writers coming to dominate this field. 
Thus, it has been shown, the evolution from the orthodox to revisionist schools 
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of writing took place in the context of a change in the type of writer ascendant 
in the field. The interpretation of the orthodox school was based largely on 
political polemics about the failings of post-war policy-makers to come to 
terms with Britain's rapidly declining status in the world. This outlook was 
supported by many of the early commentators on British European policy, not 
least because they shared this assumption about the decline of Britain's 
political and economic power after 1945. The revisionist school, by contrast, 
challenged both the broad interpretation and detailed commentary on 
individual policy-makers offered by orthodox critics. That Britain and Europe 
emerged in the mid-1980s as an area of historical inquiry in its own right, 
meant that professional histories came to replace political tracts as the 
dominant type of study in the field. Bringing with them traditional approaches 
to historical research, they analysed the minutiae of policy discussion, the 
influence of officials and inter-departmental rivalry in the foreign policy 
process. This has influenced both the interpretative nature and texture of the 
writing of British European policy. 
It is argued in this chapter, that to explain the emergence of post-revisionism 
requires analysis of more than just the sources consulted by the current 
researchers of British European policy. The chapter is divided into four 
sections to achieve this. The first establishes a definition of post-revisionism, 
drawing on those provided by Cold War historiography. It goes on to establish 
the existence of post-revisionism in Britain, arguing that it is most clearly 
evident in the historiography of British European policy 1955-8. It compares 
the third phase in British historiography strongly to the balance and detachment 
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achieved by post-revisionists in the United States. Having established its 
existence, the second section explores the reasons behind the emergence of 
post-revisionism. It points to the fundamental influence of generational change 
on historical interpretation. That is, there has been great awareness by 
historians new to the field, of the scope for synthesis across the previously 
competing orthodox and revisionist interpretations. It reinforces this point by 
examining the internal tensions within the most widely used texts on Britain 
and Europe. It follows these with analysis of the roles played by 
methodological eclecticism and the type of study written in generating 
interpretative balance. The third section speculates on the texture of a broader 
post-revisionist account of Britain's relationship with Europe between 1945- 
73. The foundations, it argues, are in place in many existing accounts. The 
final section reflects on the thin barriers between schools of writing, which 
post-revisionism exploits, and the introspectiveness of British historians who 
are only now escaping the framework of reference imposed by the orthodoxy. 
1. Defining Post-Revisionism 
Cold War historiography in the United States reveals that conflicting orthodox 
and revisionist interpretations are eventually brought together in a post- 
revisionist synthesis, defined by Gaddis as `a third stage... in the 
historiography'. ' J. Samuel Walker expands on this, defining post-revisionism 
1 Gaddis, ` The Emerging Post-revisionist synthesis', op. cit., p. 172. 
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as `a new consensus' which `draws from both traditional and revisionist 
interpretations to present a more balanced explanation of the beginning of the 
Cold War'. 2 McKercher, studying the writing of American foreign relations in 
the interwar years, found the same pattern: `the developmental 
historiographical typology of the work in the United States mirrors that of the 
Cold War: the evolution of an orthodox school, the emergence of a revisionism 
that questioned the methodology and basic assumptions of the older school, 
and the advent of recent post-revisionist analyses'. 3 Thus, concludes Deighton, 
`two antithetical approaches [were] synthesised by post-revisionism'. 4 
The historiography of Britain's relationship with Europe is now entering the 
post-revisionist phase. Evidence for this appears in the literature on the 
development of `Plan G', 1955-7.5 Admittedly a relatively short period in the 
history, the latest interpretations of Plan G nonetheless permit broader 
conclusions to be drawn about the interpretative content of post-revisionism in 
Britain and the reasons for its emergence. Before analysing what lies behind 
post-revisionism in Britain, it is necessary to establish its existence, for it is a 
relatively recent phenomenon in the historiography. Kaiser's 1996 Using 
Europe was the first to expound this interpretation. He was followed in 1997 
2 Walker, `Historians and Cold War Origins', op. cit., p. 207. Elsewhere in the article he uses the 
terms `even-handed' and `synthesis' to convey the positioning of post-revisionism between 
orthodox and revisionist interpretations, words which echo the emphasis on `balance' and 
`consensus'. See for example p. 227. See also Melanson, Writing History, op. cit., pp. 214-5. 3 McKercher, 
`Reaching for the Brass Ring', op. cit., p. 567. For other American accounts of 
post-revisionism see Geoffrey Smith, "'Harry, We Hardly Know You": Revisionism, Politics 
and Diplomacy, 1945-54', American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), pp. 560-82. 4 Deighton, `The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 83. S Britain's proposal for a Free Trade Area (FTA) across Western Europe, announced in 
November 1956. 
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by Ellison and in 1998 by Schaad. 
Orthodox writers used what Nora Beloff calls the `officially approved 
metaphor' that the FTA would act as a `bridge' between the states involved in 
setting up the Common Market and the remainder, led by Britain, who wanted 
closer but not supranational integration. 6 The parliamentary justification was 
later repeated in the memoirs of major players such as Harold Macmillan. 7 In 
Riding the Storm he put forward this innocent version of Plan G: `I was 
anxious that the Free Trade Area... should develop an institutional basis within 
which the ideals of United Europe could be fostered and developed'. 8 He 
reiterated this in his next volume, claiming that Plan G was proposed `with the 
hope of bridging the gap which threatened to develop between two groups of 
European powers, and thus preserving, in a vital field, the concept of European 
unity'. 9 Alistair Home's official biography reiterated Macmillan's line that 
Plan G `would provide an institutional link with the EEC', an example of the 
`morphing of biographer and subject', 1° and evidence of the strong association 
that often exists between biographies and orthodox interpretations of British 
European policy. " 
A second strand to orthodox historiography claimed that the Six had agreed to 
613eloff, The General Says No, op. cit., p. 84. 7 Foreign Secretary April-December 1955; Chancellor of the Exchequer to January 1957. Of his 
four volumes the relevant ones here are Tides of Fortune, op. cit.; Riding the Storm, op. cit.; 
and Pointing the Way, op. cit. 8 Macmillan, Riding the Storm, op. cit. p. 441. 9 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, op. cit., p. 44. Prime Minister Anthony Eden was revealingly 
quiet in his memoirs Full Circle: The Memoirs of Sir Anthony Eden (London: Cassell 
, 
1960). 
' Steyn, review, `Is Hillary Hurting? ', Sunday Telegraph op. cit. Home, Macmillan: Volume 2 op. cit., p. 30. For further details see Home, Macmillan: 
Volume 1, op. cit., pp. 385-387. 
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negotiate a FTA only then to criticise the British proposal. '2 Reginald 
Maudling13 complained that `it had been explicitly agreed by the heads of the 
French and German Governments that as soon as possible after the signature of 
the Treaty of Rome, negotiations should take place to bring Britain and the 
other Western European nations into a system of European free trade'. 14 The 
sense of injustice about the French and German attitudes to the FTA 
negotiations would later resurface in post-revisionist historiography. 
British policy-makers formed a symbiotic relationship with early historians of 
the period who, while on the whole critical of British European policy, took the 
official government line on this issue. Camps sowed the seeds of later 
controversy when she wrote that despite all evidence to the contrary Plan G 
was `not maliciously conceived'. 15 That hers was a semi-official account, 
written in cahoots with Whitehall officials like Frank Lee and Russell 
Bretherton, 16 surely explains its general congruence with the interpretations of 
12 It was not without grounding Camps argued, in Britain and the European Community, op. 
cit., pp. 140-1, that a deal had been struck to undertake FTA negotiations after the signing of the 
Rome Treaty. See also Lee, `German Decision-Making Elites and European Integration', op, 
cit., pp. 43-4; Schulte, `Industry Politics', op. cit., pp. 93-127. 13 Chair of the Organisation for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) negotiations on the 
FTA. 
14 Reginald Maudling, Memoirs (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1978), pp. 68-9. See also 
Sainsbury, `Harold Macmillan', op. cit., p. 113. Nutting likewise argued that the British were 
willing to make many concessions on the FTA `still the French were not satisfied'. See Nutting, 
Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit., p. 98. 13 Camps, Britain and the European Community, op. cit., p. 510. 16 She freely admitted that her book had been read by key officials. See Camps, `Missing the 
Boat', op. cit., p. 134. There is a fascinating comparison to be drawn with the role of Herbert 
Feis in orthodox American historiography. Revisionists across the Atlantic have accused him of 
being the State Department's `Court Historian' and while Camps has not endured this sort of 
acid judgment the parallels are clear. On Feis see Melanson, Writing History, op. cit., p. 36. For 
the astute verdict on Camps see S. C. Leslie, `Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963, 
By Miriam Camps', International Affairs, 41,1 (1965), p. 121. 
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Macmillan and Maudling. 17 Another contemporary observer, Barker, also took 
the view that Plan G was a defensive reaction forced on London by the creation 
of the EEC on the continent. `In the end, a FTA seemed the only course open 
to Britain'. '8 
By contrast, many continentals were virulently critical of this new development 
in British policy. Monnet saw the FTA proposal as an effort `to dominate 
Europe from the outside', questioning `the spirit in which [British initiatives] 
were conceived'. 19 French Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville 
echoed his sentiments, criticising Plan G as a `desperate move in order to 
prevent the entry into force of the Rome Treaty'. 20 De Gaulle reflected the 
dominant foreign perception of British European policy at this time with the 
observation that Britain's initiatives `were calculated to submerge the 
Community of the Six at the outset in a vast FTA together with England and 
eventually the whole of the West' 
. 
21 They were joined on the British side by 
self-styled `Europeans' such as Roy Jenkins who describes it as `a foolish 
17 Both were intimately involved with the question of Europe, Bretherton as the British 
representative in the Spaak committee charged with forming the Common Market and Lee, in 
1960.1, as one of the main impulses behind Macmillan's entry bid. 18 Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., p. 153. 19 Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit., pp. 449-50. 20 Couve is quoted in Charlton, `How (and Why) 2', op. cit., p. 33. See also Paul-Henri Spaak, 
The Continuing Battle (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), p. 236; Robert Marjolin, 
Architect of European Unity (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1989), pp. 317-22. Richard 
Mayne likewise suggested that the FTA would have dissolved the EEC `like a lump of sugar in 
an English cup of tea'. Richard Mayne, The Recovery of Europe, op. cit., p. 252. Z' While certainly not Monnetist in his approach to unity, de Gaulle's position is interesting in 
that it shows the deep suspicion of Britain's motives even from those who were opposed to 
supranational integration. Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal 1958-62, trans. 
Terence Kilmartin (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1971), pp. 179-80. De Gaulle's is a 
telling criticism given George's observation that in preferring Plan G to the tighter EEC 
approach to integration `Britain risked appearing as the mouthpiece of the United States', 
bolstering de Gaulle's suspicions of `les Anglo-Saxons' and Britain's `subservience to the 
United States'. See George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit., p. 27. 
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attempt to organise a weak periphery against a strong core' and of Heath who 
remains irritated by Britain's persistent inability to see the political dimensions 
to integration which rendered the essentially economic FTA so contrary to the 
objectives of the Six. 22 
Academic historians in the 1990s have- on this issue- joined the `good 
Europeans', criticising Plan G in a number of ways. They base their accounts 
on evidence found in the Foreign Office, Cabinet Office and Prime Ministers' 
files in the PRO. Chariton's relatively muted `last attempt by Britain to square 
the circle with the Continental Europeans and Britain's traditional interests in 
the Commonwealth by an alternative design for European co-operation' is in a 
minority. 23 More agree with Lamb's stronger critique of Plan G as a 
"'diversion" which the British hoped to keep going for some time to prevent 
the Six agreeing to a formal treaty'. 24 Clearly the writers adopt differing 
postures, some are more acerbic than others, but the essence is the same: `It 
was designed', writes Milward, `to appeal to German opponents of the 
common market of the Six, to all in Belgium and the Netherlands anxious 
about a Franco-German hegemony, and to win American support by offering a 
larger framework for integration than the Six and one in which Britain would 
22 Roy Jenkins, A Life at the Centre (London: Macmillan, 1991), p. 105; Heath, The Course of 
My Life op. cit., p. 202. 23 Charlton, `How (and Why) 2', op. cit., p. 24. See also Michael Pinto-Duschinsky, `From 
Macmillan to Home, op. cit., p. 163; Maclean, British Foreign policy Since Suez. op. cit., p. 80; 
Milward, The European Rescue, op. cit., p. 429; Robert Holland, The Pursuit of Greatness: 
Britain and the World Role. 1900-1970 (London: Fontana, 1991), p. 286. 
24 Lamb, The Failure of the Eden Government, op. cit., p. 95. Greenwood's `spoiling tactic' 
echoes Lamb who he uses for his evidence. See Greenwood, Britain and -European Co_ 
operation, op. cit., p. 68. 
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be a leading member'. 25 Greenwood summed up the revisionist stance, directly 
challenging Camps' argument: `The view that "the period of British hostility to 
the plans of the Six was short-lived" is not easy to sustain in the light of recent 
research'. 26 
Post-revisionist writers have blended elements of these conflicting 
interpretations into a new account. 27 They argue that a malicious policy in 
1955 had, by 1957, mutated into a genuine policy of co-operation with the 
continent. James Ellison puts the case that `Plan G evolved from consideration 
of a counter-initiative to the Common Market in Autumn 1955 but that it 
eventually became an attempt to come to terms with the Six'. 28 Kaiser agrees 
that although Plan G `retained a destructive function for some time' it did 
`undergo an astonishing functional metamorphosis during 1956'. 29 Richard 
Griffiths and Stuart Ward are not quite as sympathetic, arguing that by October 
1957 when negotiations on the FTA started, `The British had modified their 
position somewhat but not in crucial areas'. 30 This is evidence of the 
25 Milward, The European Rescue, op. cit., p. 429. Given the disputes on economic policy in the 
German government between Ludwig Erhard (Minister for Economic Affairs) and Chancellor 
Konrad Adenauer, it is easy to see how suspicion of British policy developed among Adenauer 
and his network of contacts in Washington and Paris. See Lee, `German Decision-Making and 
Europe', op. cit. 26 Greenwood, Britain and European Co-o rýºg ation, op. cit., p. 67. 27 The three key works are Ellison, `Perfidious Albion? ', op. cit.; Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., 
pp. 61-87; Martin Schaad, ` Plan G- A "Counterblast"?: British Policy Towards the Messina 
Countries, 1956', Contemporary European History, 7,1 (1998), pp. 39-60. See also Piers 
Ludlow's brief post-revisionist synthesis Dealing with Britain, op. cit., pp. 26-9 and Reynolds' in 
Britannia Overruled op. cit., pp. 216-9. Zs Ellison, `Perfidious Albion? ', op. cit., p. 1. 
z9Kaiser, Using Europe. op. cit., p. 61. 30 Richard T. Griffiths and Stuart Ward, "'The End of a Thousand Years of History": The 
Origins of Britain's decision to Join the European Community, 1955-61', in Richard T. Griffiths 
and Stuart Ward (eds. ), Courting the Common Market: The First Attempt to Enlarge the 
European Community 1961-1963 (London: Lothian Foundation Press (1996), pp. 7-37 (p. 13). 
interpretative nuances in interpretation exist in all schools- post-revisionism is 
no exception. However, the overarching theme of the third stage in the 
historiography is that the motivations behind Plan G became less malicious 
towards the Six during 1956. This `balanced judgment' as Schaad describes 
his approach, 31 is the defining feature of the third interpretation to emerge on 
Plan G. It is poignant that they even employ the language of American Cold 
War post-revisionism to mark the shift in interpretation. 
2. Explaining the Rise of Post-Revisionism 
Post-revisionism in Britain is more than just a `new orthodoxy', an `orthodoxy 
plus sources', or `revisionism without teeth'. 32 Accounting for why it has 
emerged in this area needs to take account of four factors: the social 
construction of the school rooted in generational change; the slim boundaries 
between the orthodox and revisionist schools and the unconscious 
transgression of those boundaries by many writers; methodological 
eclecticism; 33 and the focus on narrower periods of the history. 
31 Schaad, `Plan G', op. cit., p. 59. 32 This is a question that has been asked of post-revisionism in the United States. See the 
collection of articles on Cold War origins in Diplomatic History, 17,2 (1993). The latter quote 
is from Deighton, `The Cold War in Europe', op. cit., p. 83. 33 Methodological eclecticism' means using an array of primary sources, not just political files 
in the PRO but economic files, private papers, oral testimony, media opinion and archives 
abroad. 
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" Generational Change and the Social Construction of the Post- 
Revisionist School 
It is troublesome to associate the post-revisionist school with particular 
institutions or sociological linkages. The three key exponents came from 
different universities. Ellison was at Queen Mary and Westfield College, 
University of London, Kaiser was then at the University of Vienna, Schaad at 
the University of Glasgow. One has to look elsewhere, to generational not 
institutional factors. 
Gaddis' model of historiographical typology is well known to university 
students who studied in the 1980s and 1990s. This has, it seems, had a direct 
effect on Ellison, even as much as the sources he consulted. Investigating with 
him about how he developed his interpretation one has the sense that he is 
acutely aware of his relationship to his predecessors in the field and the 
artificiality of previous historiographic representations of Plan G. He revealed 
that, in addition to the documentary evidence in the PRO, `I was also 
motivated by a sense of historiographical evolution more generally. For those 
of us writing now, US Cold War historiography has taught that extreme 
arguments are just that; sophistication in explanation and balance in judgment 
have proven to be scholarly watchwords in post-revisionism in general. I can't 
say that this was in my mind like some kind of dogma, but it was definitely a 
consideration'. 34 This self-awareness would appear to support one of Dunne's 
34 Email correspondence with James Ellison, 1 March 2000. Permission received to quote this 
directly. Schaad is also well aware of the debate among orthodox and revisionist writers, as his 
introductory pages show. The importance of historiographical awareness to the development of 
post-revisionism is also alluded to in Kent, review, `The End of Superpower: British Foreign 
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constituent elements of a school. 35 New generations of historians seeking to 
establish their reputation in the field have to be alert to the contributions of 
their more illustrious predecessors. If one can challenge them with new 
evidence and sharper intellectual tools there a greater chance of finding a 
distinctive place for oneself in the field. 
There is a suggestion that the revising of orthodoxies and the revising of those 
revisions into post-revisionism, is a natural tendency, built into the 
historiographical process regardless of political climate, the use of a wider 
array or new sources, or theoretical advances. Generational change has 
therefore to be considered a significant motor force of post-revisionist 
interpretations. This is particularly persuasive when we understand that the 
scope to develop post-revisionist interpretations has long been in existence. It 
has taken a generation detached from the events it now narrates to draw out the 
consensus that exists across previously polarised interpretations. That such 
synthesis exists can be seen by returning to the original texts. 
" The Impact of Derridan `Double Reading' 
Steve Smith argues that one of Derrida's key aims is `to show how there is 
always more than one reading of any text' and that a `double reading' can be a 
36 profitable way of deconstructing histories. This is not an indicator that 
Office Conceptions of a Changing World. By Stuart Croft', Contemn Record, op. cit., 
478. 
Dunne, Inventing International Society, op. cit., p. 7. 36 Steve Smith, `New Approaches to International Theory', in Baylis and Smith (eds. ), TTh 
Globalisation of World Politics, op. cit., pp. 165-90 (pp. 182-3). 
anything can be read into texts, but is an extremely prescient remark on the 
density and complexity of historical narratives, the subtle but nonetheless 
detectable internal inconsistencies of interpretation and argumentation within 
particular texts. It is possible to say that one author is `orthodox', another 
`revisionist', but still recognise the similarities across the interpretations they 
place on events. In this light, Derridan `double reading' reminds us that 
returning to the original texts offers crucial insights into how authors really 
perceived events below the broad level of interpretation that has become the 
received wisdom about them. This serves as a reminder that secondary texts 
cannot unambiguously be taken as primary historical sources. 
With this and Ellison's words in mind, the second impulse behind the post- 
revisionist interpretation of Plan G is plain to see. Camps' analysis is generally 
accepted as the `starting point' of the controversy over Plan G. 37 Yet her 
account displayed deep ambiguities which have been overlooked. Post- 
revisionists have exploited her confusion (though they used primary sources 
rather than the `double reading' approach), alerting us to the potential for a 
synthesis that existed even before they consulted the primary documentation. 
To expand the most regularly cited of Camps' justifications on Plan G, she 
argued that it `was ineptly presented and badly negotiated but it was not 
maliciously conceived'. 38 She also admitted that despite the political and 
economic benefits that would surely accrue to Britain from successfully 
37 Ellison, `Perfidious Albion? ', op. cit., p. 2. Schaad also cites Camps' studies of the FTA as the 
`most comprehensive account of British policy towards European integration'. The implication is that both writers are interrogating her interpretation. See Schaad, `Plan G', op. cit., p. 39. 39 Camps, Britain and the European Community, op. cit., p. 510. 
FTA `the line between the desire to induce the Six to negotiate by bringing 
economic pressure to bear upon them and the urge to retaliate is an almost 
impossible line to draw'. 39 In another article she even admitted that at the end 
of 1955 ` the British tried to stop the Six from going ahead by pointing out the 
dangers that would be done to relations in the OEEC and elsewhere'. 40 Here 
one sees one of the main architects of the orthodoxy admitting the plausibility 
of alternative readings of British motives in 1955-6. 
Such ambiguity is also in evidence on a closer reading of Macmillan's 
memoirs. He noted, for instance, that `we believed that our scheme could be 
made to hold the field', 41 vacillating similarly over EFTA42 between claims 
that it `was conceived of as a temporary measure preceding the final 
unification of Europe' and the pernicious vision of it as an `opposition 
group'. 43 Even key exponents of the orthodoxy, therefore, were not certain of 
the strength of their claims. 44 The boundaries between schools of writing on 
Britain and Europe are narrow. That writers can and do transgress the 
39 Ibid., p. 217. 
40 Miriam Camps, ` The Marshall Plan and European Economic Integration', in Armand Clesse 
and Archie E. Epps (eds. ), Present at the Creation: The Fortieth Anniversary of the Marshall 
Plan (New York: Harper and Row, 1990), pp. 31-43 (p. 37). See also Camps, European 
Unification in the Sixties op. cit., pp. 3-4. 41 Macmillan, Riding the Storm. op. cit., p. 81. 42 The European Free Trade Association, formed by `the outer Seven' who were not signatories 
to the Treaty of Rome. 43 Macmillan, Pointing the Way, op. cit., pp. 51-3. 44 The Economist in 1956 advocated action by London and expounded the benefits of a free 
trade area to the British economy but was extremely unsure of how to present this innovation to 
the Six. This incoherence can be traced through its various Leading Articles. `Mr. Macmillan 
and Europe', Economist, 18 February (1956), pp. 450-52; `Britain's Trade Defences', 
Economist, 2 June (1956), pp. 871-72; `Opportunity in Europe', Economist, 14 July (1956), 
pp. 105-06; ` Free Trade- Gain or Pain? ', Economist. 13 October (1956), pp. 155-58. 
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boundaries between schools reminds us that history-writing is subject to the 
vagaries of the human memory and pressures associated with narrative 
reconstruction. 45 
Is there not an onus on historians to pick up on these internal inconsistencies? 
For it can reasonably be argued that revisionism did not need to be based on 
primary sources. With a little imagination historians could have taken Camps 
to task and asserted that Plan G was offensive to the EEC before the official 
records were released? Post-revisionists could have then argued, as they do 
now, that the motivations behind Plan G differed across departments and 
individuals, and that over time even the latter changed their outlook as the EEC 
was seen to be more and more of a success. Here are three distinct 
interpretations based on no more than a reading of orthodox histories, memoirs 
and biographies. This shows the boundaries between schools are extremely 
flimsy in places, but also that distinct schools of writing are in place: it is only 
with hindsight that one can identify the boundaries between schools so clearly. 
At the time, historians of the period were operating under different conditions, 
using a different method and with different studies in mind. One can chastise 
them for missing inconsistencies in orthodox texts, but only if one also 
45 Take the big overlap between revisionism and post-revisionism on Plan G. For Ellison it is 
clear that despite the motivations behind Plan G mutating towards a more conciliatory goal in 
1956 there was still, particularly emanating from Macmillan, `discussion of less than honest 
tactics' with respect to the Messina process as late as spring 1957. Thus, he argues, `whilst Plan 
G was designed to accommodate the European Common Market, it would be inaccurate to 
suggest that British attitudes had dramatically altered from the traditional opposition to 
Continental forms of integration'. Ellison, `Perfidious Albion? ', op. cit., pp. 27-8. President of 
the Board of Trade David Eccles' echoed Macmillan in a speech to Commonwealth businessmen in which he warned the EEC was attempting to do `what, for hundreds of years, 
we have always said we could not see with the safety of our own country' Quoted in Griffiths 
and Ward, "'The End of a Thousand Years of History"', op. cit., p. 13. 
observes that historical interpretation is extant upon time, the changing climate 
of opinion, the political situation and methods of historical research and 
writing. The question remains, therefore, what exactly has been the role of 
sources in the historiography of Plan G? The answer reveals a lot about the 
positivist nature and practice of history in Britain. 
" Methodological Eclecticism 
British historians relied essentially on Foreign Office correspondence, Cabinet 
Office files and the papers of the Prime Minister to construct the revisionist 
interpretation of Plan G. The ostensive methodological link among post- 
revisionists, echoing the finding in America that `balanced accounts' are 
`based on extensive research in newly opened sources', 46 is that they searched 
the files of the Treasury and Board of Trade for extra evidence. These were 
crucial in establishing the changing motives over time of key players such as 
Macmillan who moved from the Foreign Office to the Treasury in December 
1955. As Ellison explained the significance of sources to his interpretation: 
`The evolution of my ideas was really inspired by the inconsistency that I saw 
between the literature (pre-Schaad and Kaiser) and the documents I was 
reading at the PRO. It seemed to me that the development/implementation of 
policy was too complex to be either purely an attempt to associate with the Six, 
or, an effort to delay/deter/sabotage... their efforts'. 47 
46 Walker, `Historians and Cold War Origins', op. cit., p. 207. 
47 Email correspondence, 1 March 2000. 
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It was an innovation made even more important given the revisionist 
observation that `European policy was now dominated by the Treasury and 
Board of Trade'. 48 Given the narrower range of sources utilised, revisionists 
only focussed on his motives as Foreign Secretary, missing the input to the 
FTA proposal from the economic departments. Immersed in the files from the 
political branches of government, they had neither the time nor energy to dwell 
on the economic stimuli behind foreign policy. Such are the constraints on 
historians who research alone, not as part of a team. One reviewer of Kaiser's 
Using Europe explained: `The strengths in this book are to be found in its 
economic sections. Kaiser's use of both Treasury and Board of Trade files 
makes a valuable contribution to the knowledge of the British policy making 
machinery in this period as well as providing a thorough understanding of the 
economic background of British policy'. 49 Methodological eclecticism, one 
so can argue, results in `interpretative eclecticism'. 
So how does one weigh up the relative significance of sources and generational 
change in historiographical progression? Gaddis argues that `what the post- 
revisionists have done is to confirm, on the basis of the documents, several of 
the key arguments of the old orthodox position, and that in itself is a significant 
development'. 51 Yet, to put Ellison, Schaad and Kaiser in the orthodox school 
is to misunderstand the strength of their conviction that Macmillan and the 
48 Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 50. 49 Elizabeth Kane, review, `Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European 
Integration, 1945-63. By Wolfram Kaiser', Contemporary British History, 11,4 (1997), 
ifp. 
134-6 (p. 136). 
0 Melanson, Writing History and Making Policy, op. cit., p. 214. 51 Gaddis, ` The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis', op. cit., p. 
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President of the Board of Trade, David Eccles, harboured pernicious ambitions 
for the FTA until spring 1957.52 
Neither can sources alone explain the orthodox approach to Plan G taken by 
Elizabeth Kane, who uses papers of the Foreign Office's Western Organisation 
Department, suggesting- on previous trends in the historiography- she would 
offer a revisionist or post-revisionist interpretation. Not at all: her work is an 
example of the difficulty of locating writers in schools, because she marries 
primary sources with an orthodox interpretation. `It is possible', she claims, `to 
interpret that the British decision to establish a free trade area was not a 
decision to sabotage the common market... but to improve relations with the 
Six and associate with the Messina plans. Indeed, far from attempting to 
destroy the work of Six, the British government knew that the free trade area 
improved the chance that the common market would be formed'. 53 Her 
interpretation rests on a sympathetic appraisal of the bureaucratic in-fighting 
which led to Plan G being adopted as the basis of policy, and of Selwyn 
Lloyd's `Grand Design' of January 1957.54 This, she argues, is evidence that 
Britain was trying to come to terms with the EEC, not destroy it, as the 
Monnetists maintained. 55 Yet she is not alone in taking this approach to the 
52 See Ellison, `Perfidious Albion', op. cit., pp. 27-8; Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., p. 74; 
Griffiths and Ward, `"The End of a Thousand Years of History-, op. cit., p. 13. 53 Kane, `The Myth of Sabotage', op. cit., p. 291 and p. 300. 54 Kane, `European or Atlantic Community? ', op. cit., pp. 92-7. 
ss 
`Albion in the Dock', Economist. op. cit., p. 474. A recent restatement of this line is to be 
found in Hugo Young, This Blessed Plot, op. cit., p. 116. 
Grand Design. 56 Unfortunately, complains Ellison, it seemed to the Europeans 
that `the "Grand Design" did just the opposite at a time when [they] hoped the 
Suez experience would turn Britain towards Europe'. 57 Where one begins a 
historical story and where one ends it are therefore crucial influences upon 
one's interpretation of historical events. 58 
For interpretation depends fundamentally upon how historians weigh up the 
conflicting evidence from primary sources and the importance they attach to 
each source consulted. At different stages of policy development, different 
officials and ministers had different aims for Plan G, it seems. The ambiguity. 
and temporal changes in their outlook is reflected in the deep divisions in the 
literature over which motivations were guiding policy-makers in the period 
1955-7. Ellison, Young, Schaad and Kaiser all choose to place Plan G in the 
context of Foreign Office strategy at the end of 1955, hence the underlying 
sense of sabotage which pervades their accounts. Kane, by contrast, assigns 
greater weight to the period 1956-7.59 For the same reason, it appears, Rothwell 
took a more orthodox approach to the Third Force than revisionists such as 
Kent and Young have done. His study ended in 1947, whereas they went 
36 See Young, "'The Parting of Ways"? ', op. cit.; Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., 
p. 59; Kaiser, Using Europe. op. cit., p. 98; Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, op. 
cit., p. 71. 
57 Ellison, `Perfidious Albion? ', op. cit., p. 21. 58 She is heavily critical of Kaiser for placing undue emphasis on Foreign Office strategy in June 
to December 1955. See Kane, review, `Using Europe.. 
. 
By Wolfram Kaiser', Contemporary 
British History, op. cit., p. 136. S' Ellison argues, in `Perfidious Albion', op. cit., p. 3, that `The search for a new British initiative in Europe which eventually produced the FTA proposal had its origins in the Eden 
government's Autumn 1955 decision to block the development of a European Common 
Market'; Young, "'The Parting of Ways"? ', op. cit.; Young, Britain and European U ity, op. 
cit., pp. 47-8; Schaad, `Plan G', op. cit., pp. 44-7; Kaiser, Using Europe, op. cit., pp. 48-54. 
through the records to 1948 and 1949, crucial years in the rise and fall of the 
strategy within Whitehall. 60 
What this shows is that although research methods and the sources writers use 
can explain a lot about their interpretation, there is much more one has to 
consider when analysing the production of historical accounts. It is not just the 
facts used by writers, but the way in which these facts are interpreted which 
determines the positioning of writers in historiographical debates. To say that 
one has a `method' of research utilising this particular body of evidence, does 
not even begin to explain the complex intellectual and psychological processes 
in the brain which combine to form one's ultimate interpretations of events. As 
Southgate suggests: `the "facts" we select as significant, the way we interpret 
them and compose them into a coherent and meaningful whole- these historical 
procedures will derive from the very personal character of the individual 
historian'. 61 This is the main lesson of psychology for history. 
" Interpretation and the Type of Study Written 
The personal, intellectual and psychological inputs to historical interpretation 
shed light on two further observations about what drives the historiography to a 
post-revisionist stage. First, the changing position of writers over time suggests 
that the historiography has long contained elements of a post-revisionist 
interpretation. Writers regularly transgress the boundaries between schools 
60 Compare Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War, op. cit, with Kent, 'Bevin's Imperialism', op. 
cit.; Kent and Young, `British Policy Overseas', op. cit.; Kent and Young, 'The "Western 
Union" Concept', op. cit. Where one starts and ends narratives, and the stress on events within 
the period studied, has a significant impact on interpretation. 61 Southgate, History, op. cit., p. 67. 
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both within studies and in different studies. The vacillating stances taken by 
Camps and Macmillan on Plan G heralded the revisionism and post- 
revisionism which followed. By the same token, key revisionist writers such as 
Young have not maintained a consistent intellectual position within this 
debate. In 1985 Young pioneered the revisionist approach to Plan G. 62 Eight 
years later, in Britain and European Unity, he viewed the FTA proposal in a 
more orthodox manner. His approach now was, to paraphrase one 
commentator, to view Plan G as `a sincere, if naive, attempt to redefine trade 
relations with Europe'. 63 
The switch between schools can be put down, Young later explained, to the 
exigencies of writing a textbook, or survey history of relations between 1945 
and 1992 as opposed to an article specifically on policy development in a short 
period. `As to the Macmillan full-length book, well there I'm conscious that, 
although I've a right to express a view on certain issues, I'm also presenting a 
snapshot of current thinking on the issues, so at times my own views get 
blended in with those of others- or sometimes I just set out opposing 
interpretations and don't really resolve them. In doing the second edition... I've 
been very aware of time constraints and sometimes, quite simply, haven't had 
time to think my own views through'. Stephen George, reviewing this text, 
was less kind: `The distinct impression given by this book is that it was written 
6s and produced too hurriedly'. 
62 Young, "'The Parting of Ways"? ', op. cit. 63 Schaad, `Plan G', op cit., pp. 42-3; Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., pp. 57-9. 64 Written correspondence, February 1999. Permission granted to quote letter. 
bs George, review, `Britain and European Unity, 1945-1992. By John W. Young', Journal of 
Common Market Studies, op. cit., pp. 307. The reviewer of another of Young's textbooks made 
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Textbooks are required `to be reasonably up to date, clear and accurate', notes 
David Cesarani. 66 Jordanova recognises a further constraint: `There is a certain 
innate conservatism in the very notion of a textbook, not just in terms of 
content, but in pedagogic philosophy'. That is, `textbooks present a viewpoint 
which, by the very nature of the genre, readers are discouraged from 
contesting, whereas a monograph, that is, a specialised scholarly study 
presenting the findings of original research to those who are pretty expert 
already, can evaluate diverse approaches to a subject, and acknowledge the 
depth of intellectual dimensions, even if, in the end, it puts a particular case 
67 
with a distinctive type of authority'. 
Writing general texts, as opposed to specialised studies, requires a degree of 
understanding of the general historiographical debates which naturally leads to 
the exposition of even-handed and, by extension, post-revisionist 
interpretations. Jordanova continues, tellingly using the word `synthesise' to 
explain the text book approach to the writing of history. `Because textbooks 
generalise, synthesise and seem to speak with one authority, they can be 
somewhat bland. Since they seek to be fair, and uncontentious, the sparkle, the 
sense of what the stakes are in divergent views of the past, sometimes gets 
the generic point that `Inevitably, in a book of 250 pages covering 100 years there are going to 
be oversights'. Lucas, `Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century. By John W. Young', 
Contemporary British History, op. cit., p. 125. Deighton's review of Walter Laqueur's text 
Europe in Our Time: A History, 1945-1992 betrays a similar worry: `the reader is left 
wondering whether the territorial scope of the book is not too ambitious, and its time span too 
long'. See International Affairs, 69,1 (1993), p. 149. 
66 David Cesarani, review, `When Hens and Hitler do not Mix: Understanding the Holocaust: 
An Introduction. By Dan Cohn-Sherbok', Times Higher Education Supplement: Textbook 
ide 25 February 2000, p. 6. 67 Jordanova, History, in Practice, op. cit., pp. 18-9. 
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lost'. 68 Just as Young felt compelled to dilute his sabotage approach to Plan G 
so as to present a balanced account, there is evidence that other works contain 
similar ambiguity. 69 Ian Gilmour and Mark Garnett condemn Labour's non- 
participation in the Schuman Plan which `set Britain on the wrong road'. 70 
Later, however, they use Dutton, Young and Seldon to argue that there may not 
have been opportunities to miss because ` the chances of agreement between 
[Britain] and the Six of the Schuman Plan in 1951-2 were slender' 
. 
71 That a 
politician and scholar jointly wrote this text perhaps explains the mixture of 
normative judgment with historical perspective. 
The most recent manifestation of this is in David Gowland and Arthur Turner's 
Reluctant Europeans. 72 In the introduction they show their awareness of the 
changing historiographical landscape in this area: `Britain has not played a 
uniformly laggardly role in the EC/EU'. 73 This is a direct, if un-referenced, 
allusion to the revisionist school of writing which excuses British decision- 
makers from the crude charges of `negativity' traditionally levelled against 
them. On Plan G the interpretation they put forward is, unsurprisingly given the 
reference to Ellison, that it was not as offensive as the Monnetists assumed. 
Under the influence of Kaiser a few pages later they shift to a less sympathetic 
position. 74 The point is clear: textbooks tend to switch between interpretations 
68 Ibid., p. 19. 
69 George, An Awkward Partner; Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, op. cit.; 
Reynolds, Britannia Overruled. op. cit. 70 Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories, op. cit., p. 46. 
" Ibid., p. 70. 
72 David Lowland and Arthur Turner, Reluctant Europeans: Britain and Europ Integration 
1945-1998 (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2000). 
73 Ibid., p. 4. 
74 Ibid., pp. 106-7 and p. 112. 
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from competing schools of writing rather than presenting the considered views 
of the author(s). 
The demands made of textbook writers are becoming greater. Steven Gunn 
presents the dilemma as follows: `Should they try to cater for both A-Level 
students and undergraduates in need of an introduction, when the demands of 
A-Level now include formal exercises in the interpretation of primary sources 
and a structured understanding of historiographical change? '. 75 As Manchester 
University Press' `Documents in Contemporary History' series shows, 76 the 
emphasis in textbooks is increasingly towards letting students decide on the 
most appropriate interpretation from the range of options set out for them by 
the author. 77 
This demand for textbooks to be written according to the principle of `say it 
with documents' is a reflection of two contradictory approaches to the study 
history. On one hand it suggests the continuing lure of primary material. How 
long will it be before transcripts of oral history are included in such series? On 
the other hand there is more than a suspicion that such series have been 
75 Steven Gunn, review, 'Short on Pope-Burning: The Tudor Monarchies. By John McGurk; 
Stuart England. By Angus Stroud; Culture and Power in England 1585-1685. By R. Malcolm 
Smuts', Times Higher Education Supplement: Textbook Guide, 25 February 2000, p. 6. 76 As the precis makes plain it 'is a series designed for sixth-formers and undergraduates in 
higher education: it aims to provide both an overview of specialist research on topics in post- 
1939 British history and a wide-ranging selection of primary source material'. See for example John Baylis (ed. ), Anglo-American Relations Since 1939: The Enduring Alliance (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997); Stephen Brooke, (ed. ), Reform and Reconstruction: Britain 
After the War, 1945-51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995); Sean Greenwood (ed. ), Britain and European Integration Since the Second World War (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 1996). 
77 This, Nigel Steele points out, is a trend in other subjects such as mathematics: 'It is now seen 
as desirable for students to take responsibility for their own learning'. In Nigel Steele, 'Method is More than the Sum of its Parts', Times Higher Education Supplement, 17 March 2000, p. 38. 
affected by postmodern reflection on the interpretative content of history. It is 
as if letting the documents speak for themselves will circumvent 
postmodernism by ignoring historians' roles in the construction of stories about 
the past. Yet, where is the reflection on how the primary sources were chosen, 
or analysis of their limitations as factual sources about the past? 78 This is 
evidence of the dearth of reflection by historians on source limitations, which 
belies the heavy impact `accident' and `chance' can have on historical events 
and their narrativisation. 79 Such demands now being placed on the writing of 
textbooks will exaggerate the problems that have always faced textbook writers 
trying to convey their own interpretation in a general survey of events over a 
long period of history. 
The main point is that there is a methodological eclecticism to textbooks which 
produces consensus interpretations, even if the authors themselves do not 
realise it. 80 Just as methodological eclecticism vis-ä-vis primary sources led to 
Ellison's recognition that `extreme arguments are just that', 8' so textbook 
writers' use of a range of opinions seems to lead them in the same direction. 
'g Turning to Baylis' Anglo-American Relations Since 1939, there is on pp. 16-7 a brief 
statement to how the sources were chosen but no lengthy commentary. Greenwood's Britain 
and European L egration contains no notes on sources at all. 7' It would be appreciated if historians analysed gaps in the documentary record and what this 
tells us about their approach to the reconstruction of events. Helen Parr has commented on the 
destruction by rain of two months' worth of Department of Economic Affairs files in 1967 in 
`Gone Native: The Foreign Office and Harold Wilson's Application to Join the EEC', paper 
presented at The Second Try: Harold Wilson and Europe, 1964-67, Institute of Historical 
Research, London, 13 January 2000. Jim Tomlinson has also observe that `Despite the Thirty 
Year Rule, many of the files from the early 1960s have not yet reached Kew'. See his review, 
The Great Alliance: Economic Recovery and the Problems of Power. By Jim Phillips; 
Managing the British Economy in the 1960s. By Alec Cairncross', Contemporary British 
Histry- 10,3 (1996), pp. 142-4 (p. 143). 80 Michael Dockrill has noted in another field of scholarship that the use of an array of 
secondary and primary sources led John Dunbabin 'to produce a thorough synthesis of 
international relations since 1945'. See M. L. Dockrill, review, `The Cold War: The Great 
Powers and their Allies. By J. P. D. Dunbabin', International Affairs. 71,2 (1995), pp. 395-6. 
Methodological eclecticism is also a feature of the textbooks by Reynolds who 
used a smattering of primary material but largely secondary sources and media 
opinion, 82 and George who relied on secondary sources plus media opinion. 
For obvious reasons it is easy to see George as the founder of the `awkward 
partner' thesis about Britain and Europe, and as taking the orthodox stance. 83 
Yet on a searching reading of his text he proposes, or at least hints at, 
revisionist explanations which reflect the historiographical trend then in vogue 
due to the work of Kent, Young and others. 84 
Textbooks could perhaps even be placed in a school of writing of their own. 
Implicit in them is a post-revisionist synthesis born of a distinct method and 
eclectic historical interpretation. The questions textbook writers ask of history 
are different from those asked by them in other contexts. They are concerned 
to discover what the competing interpretations of events are, rather than what 
new light can be shed on particular issues. For authors such as Reynolds, who 
wrote a general text on Britain's foreign relations from an Anglo-American 
background, one also has the impression that Anglo-American relations feature 
81 Email correspondence, 1 March 2000. 82 On Plan G see Reynolds, Britannia Overruled, op. cit., pp. 217-20. 83 An interesting footnote to this is that `awkward partner' was never the intended title. His 
publishers, however, wanted a catchier name than `Britain and Europe'. The ultimate choice has 
inspired a generation of scholars, showing that the way we eventually interpret texts can be 
massively influenced by the symbolic nature of key words in titles and at the start of chapters. 
George disclosed this during questions in the `Britain and Europe' panel at the UACES 
Research Conference, University of Lincolnshire and Humberside, 10 September 1998. 84 Take these examples from George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit. On the Third Force issue, 
p. 17, he sympathetically references Young's work; on the Schuman Plan see pp. 20-2; the 
current historiographical trend towards discussing the impact of American policy on Anglo- 
European relations is evident in pp. 22-7 on the sections on EDC, Messina and the founding of 
the EEC. Global considerations behind the applications are hinted at on pp. 28-39. This is not 
full-scale revisionism but the hints are there if one looks away from the sections devoted to 
Camps and Barker. 
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more prominently in his thinking than Anglo-European. Thus, he relies on 
evidence from his peers working in European studies as a complement to his 
stronger focus on Britain's American and other global relationships. 85 
There is certainly something to recommend the construction of a different 
school of writing around textbooks. However, this study does not pursue this 
distinction for three reasons. First, it is interpretation which is the defining link 
among writers. To define schools in terms of questions and answers, that is, 
method, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the evolution of schools. 
Textbook writing is certainly a sub-set of the post-revisionist school, but not 
separate from it on the level of interpretation. Second, textbook writers also 
publish other types of study. To label Young, for instance, a post-revisionist on 
the basis of his Britain and European Unity, overlooks the strength of his 
revisionist claims to the contrary in earlier articles and other books. That, it 
seems, is the interpretation he prefers to place on events. Underscoring all this, 
finally, is the need to keep the schools as broad as possible for the purposes of 
clarity. Constructing schools purely on the grounds of the type of study would 
be even more problematic than inferring links backwards from interpretation, 
which is the method employed in the thesis. This research has been able to 
discover links among writers according to the genre of study penned, without 
raising its a priori significance above the many other factors that go into the 
choice of study and methods and sources used. Ih sum, interpretation is the key 
to understanding the links across writers. Textbook writers often fall into the 
as Reynolds, Britannia Ovemiled, op. cit. Other Anglo-American specialists betray a similar 
approach to the European sphere of Britain's foreign relations, repeating the conventional 
wisdom on Europe at their time of writing. 
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post-revisionist school for that reason, but have to be classed `implicit post- 
revisionists', a sub-set alongside their historiographically aware counterparts 
such as Ellison who explicitly portray their accounts as `balanced'. This 
approach to schoolification allows analysis of the many influences on 
interpretation, not just the type of study, and can highlight the flimsy 
boundaries between schools and yet their distinctiveness which is what makes 
the historiography of Britain's relations with Europe so fascinating. 
The second point of contact between the type of study and historiographical 
evolution extends the impact of the general over the specific still further. 
Genuine post-revisionism of the type we are currently witnessing on Plan G is 
fired by articles and books on shorter periods and specific themes in the 
history. Ellison and Schaad's balanced interpretations were first presented in 
articles analysing the history of a one and two year period respectively. 
Kaiser's was in a book covering the period 1945-63 period which afforded him 
the space to develop depth and sophistication of argument that a text on 
Britain's relations with Europe to the present day, or the entire range of 
multilateral relations since 1945, would not have given him. 86 The 
development of revisionism and post-revisionism is, therefore, associated 
strongly with analysis of specific periods and themes. Kaplan points out that 
`new' theories tend to operate in a smaller domain but there is no reason why 
they should not become accepted in other areas, spreading their influence 
96 Even so, Kane criticises Kaiser as follows: `in covering so many areas of dispute it fails to 
concentrate on any one and this leads to gaps in analysis and supporting evidence'. Kane, Using 
Europe... By Wolfram Kaiser', op, cit., p. 136. 
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across a field of research. 87 If the current trend continues, and there is more 
exploration of shorter periods in the history using new sources, this raises 
questions about what a post-revisionist account of Britain's relationship with 
Europe in the entire period 1945-73 might look like. 
3. The Prospects for a Broader Post-Revisionism 
On the general level of interpretation a post-revisionist interpretation of 
Britain's relations with Europe would be situated between the missed 
opportunities orthodoxy and the sympathetic approach taken by revisionists. It 
might run as follows. The British elite since 1945 remained largely aloof from 
the process of European integration, preferring intergovernmental over 
supranational forms of integration. This was for reasons associated with 
political dogma, the weight of history, economic pragmatism and perceptions 
of its world power status and `special relationship' with the United States. 
Charges of `missed opportunities' are, however, misplaced, because they 
assume that key decision-makers in London were offered, or wanted, 
opportunities to lead the integrative process. By contrast, the continentals were 
adept at making advances even in the wake of setbacks such as the collapse of 
the European Defence Community, demonstrating an enterprise and will to 
succeed which Britain underestimated. Moreover, they managed skillfully to 
control the pace of integration through careful management of the enlargement 
87 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 17. For `theory' read `interpretation' 
and the link to historiographical progression becomes clear. 
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agenda and by collaboration with key officials in the American State 
Department. Britain, in this light, was not as `negative' as has been portrayed. 
Neither were the `founding fathers' as keen to include Britain as they later 
made out. In sum, the political controversy surrounding British European 
policy obscures constructive advances on London's part and ignores the 
strength of the bilateral Franco-German relationship, the role of other 
European policy networks as well as the part played by the United States in 
determining British European policy outcomes. 
Where revisionists analysed the negative `tone' of British pronouncements on 
Europe which obscured what they saw as the constructive dimensions to 
policy, 88 a post-revisionist account would also explore the process of 
integration from the point of view of Washington and the European capitals in 
more depth, to show that debates about the minutiae of British policy are to 
some extent false. That is, whether policy was as `negative' as orthodox writers 
maintain or as `constructive' as revisionists respond, other factors, notably the 
impact of American policy, Franco-German relations and the attitude of the 
European Commission, need to be examined to explain British European 
policy outcomes. Post-revisionism is necessarily concerned with the 
uncertainty of individual's positions within the debate, more aware of the 
fluctuating national negotiating positions and the systemic forces hindering the 
projection of policy abroad. 
89 As Young put it: 'If Eden can be criticised for anything it is that (like Ernest Bevin before 
him) his tone too often gave the appearance of being anti-European'. See Young, Britain and 
European Unit +, op. cit., p. 40. 
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The globalism of a post-revisionist synthesis could therefore be achieved by 
integrating previously separate European and American historiography into 
British historiography. For example, on the `rejection' of the Schuman Plan by 
Britain, domestic literature has been dominated by an orthodoxy examining 
why London suffered from a `myopia that made [policy-makers] dismiss the 
Schuman Plan and the whole ideal of Europe as airy-fairy nonsense', 89 and a 
revisionism responding that British appreciation of the Plan was greater than 
the orthodoxy suggests, 90 allied to analysis of the official view that France 
intentionally excluded Britain. 91 
89 Michael Howard, review, `Sunny Days: Never Again: Britain 1945-51. By Peter Hennessy 
and Churchill on the Home Front 1900-1955. By Paul Addison', London Review of Books, 15, 
3 (1993), pp. 14-5 (p. 14). This interpretation is to be found in `Inverted Macawbers', 
Economist, 10 June 1950, pp. 1257-9 (p. 1257); `Socialism Contra Mundum', op. cit., p. 1314; 
`Repairing the Damage', Economist, 24 June 1950, pp. 369-70; Acheson, Present at the 
Creation, op. cit., p. 502; George W. Ball, `Introduction', in Brinkley and Hackett (eds. ), Jean 
Monnet, op. cit., pp. 12-22; Barker, Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., pp. 67-88; Bullock, 
Ernest Bevin, op. cit., esp. pp. 734-90; Peter Calvocoressi, World Politics Since 1945,6's edn. (London: Longman, 1991), p. 91; Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit., p. 212; Croft, `British 
Policy Towards Western Europe', op. cit., p. 619; Dalton, High Tide and After: Memoirs 1945- 
1960 (London: Frederick Muller, 1962), p. 135; Dell, The Schuman P1an, op. cit.; Denman, 
Missed Chances, op. cit., pp. 185-9; Gilmour and Garnett, Whatever Happened to the Tories, 
op. cit., p. 45; Heath, The Course of My Life, op. cit., p. 355; Home, Macmillan Volume 1, op. 
cit., pp. 303-24; Robert Marjolin, `What Type of Europe? ', in Brinkley and Hackett (eds. ), Jean 
Monet, op. cit., pp. 163-83; Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 400; 
Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 312; Northedge, British Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 135-9; Pimlott (ed. ), The Political Diary of Hugh Dalton, op. cit., 16 June, p. 476; Sked and Cook, Post-War 
Britain, op. cit., pp. 87-101 and p. 148. 90 Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., pp. 28-35; Geoffrey Warner, `The Labour 
Governments and the Unity of Western Europe', in Ovendale (ed. ), The Foreign Policy of the 
British Labour Governments, op. cit., pp. 61-82; Greenwood, Britain and European Co- 
operation. op. cit., p. 27-37; Melissen and Zeeman, ` Britain and Western Europe', op. cit., p. 93; 
Deighton, `Say it with Documents', op. cit., p. 400. 91 Jay argues ` the whole operation had been so devised that the British government was bound 
initially to decline', in Change and Fortune, op. cit., p. 199. See also Charhon, The Price of 
Victory- op. cit., p. 90; Donoghue and Jones, Herbert Morri son. op. cit., p. 481. Deighton, `Say 
it with Documents', op. cit., p. 400; Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, op. cit., 
p. 27-37; Meissen and Zeeman, `Britain and Western Europe', op. cit., p. 93; Geoffrey Warner, 
`The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe', in Ovendale (ed. ), The Foreign 
Policy of the British Labour Governments op. cit., pp. 61-82; Young, Britain and European 
Unity, op. cit., pp. 28-35. 
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A 1997 study by William Hitchcock exposes the positioned nature of both 
interpretations. 92 Using French foreign ministry papers and private archives, 93 
he argues that Schuman's personal concerns were at the heart of the proposal. 
He wanted to `rescue his foreign policy and boost France's fading influence in 
Europe. The plan for a coal-steel pool would provide him with the means to do 
both' 94 He continues in the same vein: `Through the means Monnet had 
devised, France could capture the diplomatic initiative from the Anglo- 
Americans, subvert British objections to continental unification schemes, and 
strike a bargain with Germany on a bilateral basis: equality of rights in 
exchange for a balance of power'. 95 More subversively, Robin Edmonds and 
Walter LaFeber saw a plan by Paris to exclude Britain and America from 
European affairs. 96 The impact of developments abroad are also found in the 
interpretations of Watt and Raymond Aron who took the Schuman Plan as an 
92 Hitchcock, `France, the Western Alliance', op., cit. This reflects the prescient comment by 
Beloff that the Franco-German axis has been the crux of integration, not the Anglo-French or 
Anglo-German. Beloff, Dialogue of the Deaf op. cit., p. 7. 93 Notably Georges Bidault, French Prime Minister October 1949 to June 1950. 94 Hitchcock, `France, the Western Alliance', op. cot., p. 606. 9s Ibid., p. 628. Young, who also consulted French sources, came to a similarly detached view of 
the Plan: `The idea of a French "plot" goes too far... Rather it seems that British membership 
was not a priority for Monnet'. See Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 33. 
Monnet's memoirs appear to back this up. `I knew that the essential prize had already been 
won, irrevocably. Europe was on the move. Whatever the British decided would be their own 
affair'. Monnet, Memoirs, op. cit., p. 306. And as he reportedly told Chancellor Stafford Cripps: 
`I hope with all my heart that you will join in this from the start. But if you don't, we shall go 
ahead without you'. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., p. 778; Dell, The Schuman Plan, op. cit., 
127; Milward, The Reconstruction of Western Europe, op. cit., p. 401. 
Robin Edmonds, Setting the Mould: The United States and Britain. 1945-1950 (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), pp. 210-1. LaFeber was nearer to Hitchock: `exclusion of 
England and the United States from the Plan would increase the ability of France to influence all 
of Western Europe'. See his America. Russia. and the Cold War 1945-1992,7t° edn. (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1993), p. 86. 
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`American decision that Britain must be coerced, or driven by neglect, willy- 
nilly into a closer relationship with Europe'. 97 
The obsession by British historians with what Britain could have done, or did 
do, to get involved in the Schuman Plan, pale into insignificance when 
compared to the strategic concerns uppermost in the minds of its architects, for 
whom it was, the Economist observed, `the last chance of solving the German 
problem'. 98 A post-revisionist account of Britain's non-participation in the 
Schuman Plan would combine analysis of the failings of British diplomacy 
from the orthodoxy with the constructive appraisal of revisionists. It would 
also blend in American, French and German enthusiasm for the Plan which 
accounts for the complex international environment within which the Plan was 
developed and received. It would conclude that Britain could have joined the 
scheme, but that in the end the will to succeed on the continent and in America 
scuppered Britain's hopes of making `association' seem a viable alternative to 
membership. This account echoes Young's suggestion that the `notion of a 
French "plot" goes too far', 99 but takes it further by examining in greater depth 
the domestic concerns in Paris, Bonn and Washington. Others who are alert to 
Monnet's ambitions for the Plan include Bullock and Milward. 100 Ludlow is 
97 Watt, Succeeding John Bull, op. cit., p. 122; Raymond Aron, `The Historical Sketch of the 
Great Debate', in Daniel Lerner and Raymond (eds. ), France Defeats EDC (London: Thames 
and Hudson, 1957), pp. 2-21 (p. 3). See also Winand, Eisenhower. Kennedy, op. cit., p. 23. 98 `Thoughts Behind the Schuman Offer', Economist, 17 June 1950, p. 1335. 99 Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., p. 33. 10° Despite considering what more London could have done to join, Bullock also argued that 
this was not an entirely one-sided exclusion, highlighting Monnet's desire to exclude the 
`awkward British' until the Six had successfully made the first step towards European 
integration. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, op. cit., pp. 770-85; Milward, The Reconstruction of 
Western Europe op. cit., p. 401. 
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similarly intrigued by the consensus between the first two interpretations: the 
decision not to attend the ECSC negotiations, he argues, `was not primarily a 
result of either the brusque behaviour of the French or negligence and 
inattention on the part of the Labour government. Instead, it reflected profound 
difference in both economic and political circumstances between Britain and 
the Six as the 1950s began'. 101 Ludlow is an example of a methodologically 
eclectic historian, using Commission archives as well as British sources. This 
is further evidence that interpretative eclecticism can be linked to 
methodological eclecticism. The wider the range of opinions consulted, the 
harder it becomes to propound one line or the other. 
One could examine the other key debates on Britain and Europe to make the 
same point. On the collapse of the EDC the scope is there for a synthesis 
between British historians examining Britain's non-participation, 102 and 
101 Ludlow, Dealing with Britain, op. cit., pp. 16-7. 102 The tone was set by the Economist: `It remains true', it noted, `that if Britain had been 
willing to go a little further into Europe, more could have been made of the idea of European 
integration'. See 'A Vote for Paralysis', Economist, 4 September 1954, pp. 711-3 (p. 713). Its 
damning verdict on British policy continued into the next month, with the criticism that the 
failure of the EDC was the failure of Britain's willingness to `take matters to their logical 
conclusion' after the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties in 1947-8. `Had Britain', it continues, 'gone 
even part of the way it went at Lancaster House [with the WEU commitment] there is a good 
possibility that EDC would have been accepted in Paris'. See `Britain was an Island', 
Economics, 9 October 1954, pp. 132-3 (p. 133). See also `Small Expectations', 22 December 
1951, pp. 1509-10 (p. 1509). The hope that Britain would take the lead in the European Army 
project also comes through strongly in `Arms and Diplomacy', Economist 
, 
20 January 1951, 
pp. 113-4; `The Defence of Britain', 31 March 1951, pp. 723-4; `Towards Europe's Army', 
Economist, 28 July 1951, pp. 194-6; `Three Years Ahead', Economist, 29 December 1951, 
pp. 1561-4; `The Six Power Army', Economist. 5 January 1952, pp. 3-4; `Europe in a Hurry', 
Economist 12 July 1952, pp. 67-8; `Challenge from the Capital', mss, 24 January 1953, 
pp. 183-5. This interpretation is echoed in Barker, ]Britain in a Divided Europe, op. cit., p. 107; 
Beloff, Britain and the European Union, op. cit., p. 56; Charlton, The Price of Victory, op. cit., 
pp. 151-62; Charmley, Churchill's Grand Alliance. op. cit., p. 255; Macmillan, Tides of Fortune, 
op. cit., p. 220; Nutting, Europe Will Not Wait, op. cit., p. 75; Keith Robbins, Churchill (New 
York: Longman, 1992; Seldon, Churchill's Indian Summer. op. cit., p. 413; Sked and Cook, 
Post-War Britain, op. cit., p. 112. 
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American and continental writers assessing the non-British factors. 103 On the 
first application the current literature displays a strong global perspective 
reminiscent of the foreign historiography of de Gaulle's veto. 104 On the second 
application and veto, the historiography is shortly to incorporate such 
dimensions. 105 On Heath and Europe we. are some way off even a revisionist 
account, but the Economist at the time and the biography by Campbell, for 
103 The contrast with the focus on London's failings is clear: `For some people, responsibility 
for the failure of the EDC rests with France; for others the blame is entirely with the UK; yet 
others are more specific and mention individuals. The issue is complicated by so many and 
varying and dissimilar factors 
... 
the story spells out the facts of a long drawn-out case which 
some would call manslaughter, some, death by default; and some, plain murder'. Fursdon, The 
European Defence Community, op. cit., p. 342. See also Young, Britain and European Unity, 
op. cit., pp. 38-9; H. Young, This Blessed Plot, op. cit., p. 76. 104 See the earlier chapter on Revisionism, pp. 145-51, for further discussion of this. 105 See Oliver Daddow (ed. ), The Second Try: Harold Wilson and Europe. 1964-67 (Macmillan, forthcoming). The contributions set the apparent inevitability of the second veto in the context 
of French, German and American policies, as well as providing more discussion than hitherto of 
the domestic context of European policy-making. 
316 
example, raise doubts about the received wisdom of Heath's vision of `Europe' 
and his attitude to America. 106 
4. Conclusion 
106 If previous trends are a guide the following works have set out the orthodoxy: Anthony 
Barber, Taking the Tide: A Memoir (Norwich: Michael Russell, 1998); Brandt, People and 
Politics, op. cit.; Heath, The Course of My Life, op. cit., Home, The Way the Wind Blows, op. 
cit.; Douglas Hurd, An End to Promises: Sketch of a Government 1970-74 (London: Collins, 
1979); Hutchinson, Edward Heath, op. cit.; Cecil King, The Cecil King Diary 1970-1974 
(London: Jonathan Cape, 1975); Henry Kissinger, The White House Year s (London: 
Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Michael Joseph, 1979); Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, Michael Joseph, 1982); Laing, Edward Heath, op. cit.; 
Richard Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nix on (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978); 
Andrew Roth, Heath and the Heathmen (London: Routledge, 1972); Roussel, Georges 
Pompidou, op. cit.; Sainsbury, 'Lord Home', in Shlaim, Jones and Sainsbury (eds. ), British 
Foreign Secretaries, op. cit., Thatcher, The Path to Power, op. cit.; Thorpe, Alec Douglas- 
Home, op. cit. By contrast, reading the Economist one gets a clearer picture of the obstacles 
facing Heath and the other individuals active in negotiating Britain's way into the Community, 
which many of these accounts ignore: 'His Europe-Or Europe's? ', Economist, op. cit., p. 930; 
'How Europe Never Happened', Economist, 7 February 1970, pp. 15-6; 'Showing Their First Cards', 
14 February 1970, pp. 22-7; 'Weekend Skirmish', Economist. 7 March 1970, pp. 64-8; 'Filling in the 
Map', Economist. 14 March 1970, pp. 37-8; 'It's Not What You Do, It's the Way That You Do It', 
Economist, 25 April 1970, pp. 36-9; 'The Size of Two Men's Hands', Economist, 2 May 1970, 
pp. 35-6. 'EEC: Timetable for Next Tuesday', Economist. 27 June 1970, pp. 54-5 (p. 54). 'Here We 
Go Again', Economist. 25 July 1970, pp. 14-5 (p. 14). See also 'On the Wrong Foot? ', Economist. 4 
July 1970, pp. 14-5; 'Not so much a Community, More Like Them and Us', Economist, 4 July 1970, 
pp. 30-3; 'Rippon on Stage', Economist, 3 October 1970, pp. 16-7; 'Into a Bog at Brussels? ',
Economist 24 October 1970, pp. 68-9. 'Well, Nothing's Gone Wrong So Far', Economist. 31 
October 1970, p. 29; 'Shaping up for Europe', Economist 26 December 1970, pp. 11-3; 'The Year 
for Europe', Economist 2 January 1971, pp-9-1 1, 'Bending with the Breeze', Economist 9 January 
1971, p. 28; 'Talking as Equals', Economist, 23 January 1971, p. 28; 'How to Make Jokes and Still 
Get In', Economist 30 January 1971, pp. 28-9; 'Road Cleared', Ewan, 13 February 1971, 
pp. 29-30; 'Build-Up for the Big Fight', Economist 13 March 1971, p. 29; 'Understanding Mr. 
Pompidou', Economist 27 March 1971, pp. 14-5; 'Morale-Boosting in Rome', Economist. 3 April 
1971, p. 39; 'Will they Lay an Egg? ', Economist. 10 April 1971, pp. 17-8; 'The Time When Hearts 
Beat Together', Economist, 24 April 1971, pp. 12-3; 'Me Voici! ', Economist 15 May 1971, pp. 11-3. 
Despite the limitations on sources, the following contain greater depth and detail, suggestive of 
a revisionist interpretation in the near future: Campbell, Edward Heath, op. cit., especially 
pp. 108-38; Christopher Lord, Britain's Entry to the Europon Community Under the Heath 
Government of 1970-4 (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1993); Robert Taylor, 'The Heath Government, 
Industrial Policy and the "New Capitalism"', in Ball and Seldon (eds. ), The Heath Government. 
op. cit., pp. 139-59; John W. Young, 'The Heath Government and British Entry into the 
European Community', in Ball and Seldon (eds. ), The Heath Government, op. cit., pp. 259-84; 
Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., pp. 107-19; Young, This Blessed Plot, op. cit., 
pp. 214-56. 
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What this chapter has shown is that, as with the two earlier schools, explaining 
the emergence of a post-revisionist turn to the historiography requires 
consideration of a plethora of variables. The most significant seems to be an 
understanding of generational change, the social dimension of the 
historiography. The social context is crucial, given that awareness of pre- 
existing historical debate can influence one's own approach to the sources. 
Ellison's comments given above highlight just this awareness. The sources he 
consulted were, of course, important. But so too was his awareness of the 
polemics of earlier debate. The orthodoxy justified British policy, revisionists- 
and key continental politicians- attacked it. Given the complexities of the 
formation and development of Plan G, post-revisionists argue, rigidly adhering 
to one side of the debate or the other did not appear tenable. This is 
particularly true when analysing the vacillating positions of key individuals, 
such as Macmillan and Eden, in the foreign policy process at this time. This 
approach serves a reminder of one the major epistemological foundations of 
historical inquiry in Britain: one should be wary of making generalisations, 
even about short periods of history. 
One can draw three additional conclusions from this chapter. First, it has been 
shown that post-revisionism is closely allied both methodologically and 
interpretatively to revisionism. Similar sociological ties bind writers in the two 
schools, which are dominated by professional historians using primary 
material. Ellison in particular is adamant that, despite the Free Trade Area 
proposal mutating to take on a less hostile purpose by the end of 1956, for 
some in Whitehall, an appealing outcome of the negotiations would have been 
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for the Six to abandon their interest in forming a common market. Hence, it 
can be argued that the interpretative boundaries between the revisionist and 
post-revisionist schools are thinner than those between the orthodoxy and 
revisionism. Kaiser's placement as a key writer of both schools illustrates this 
point. On this issue, he presents a post-revisionist interpretation. On other 
issues, notably his analysis of the missed opportunities and interpretation of the 
first British application to join the EEC, his is a revisionist account. 107 It will 
be interesting to see whether future publications on Britain and Europe, 1945- 
73, opt for a broader post-revisionist approach. 
The second broader conclusion to emerge from this chapter is that the barriers 
between the revisionist and post-revisionist schools are extremely low, but 
nonetheless identifiable. This observation can be made in light of the argument 
developed above, that the prospect for a post-revisionist account of this period 
of the history was long in existence. The unresolved contradictions in many 
key historical texts, notably in the work of Camps, have, however, yet to be 
picked up by historians. The impact of Derridan `double-reading', the attention 
to the detailed- but not always consistent positions- taken by historians, might 
therefore have a significant role to play in the development of new historical 
understandings of British European policy. The development of post- 
revisionism on Plan G, which has only taken place in the last four years, 
reinforces the core argument of this thesis that the evolution of schools of 
107 Kaiser, Using Euroi 
, 
op. cit., pp. 15-8, introduction and pp. 108-203. 
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writing is intimately connected with many factors, but especially sociological 
and generational factors. 
The third broader conclusion one can draw from this chapter is the importance 
of primary evidence to historians of Britain and Europe. Just as revisionists 
scrutinised the interpretations placed upon events by orthodox writers, post- 
revisionists have been investigating the revisionist position, as well as orthodox 
interpretations. Just as revisionists have been drawn to the PRO in search of 
primary documentary evidence, so post-revisionists have also been drawn to 
the PRO in search of still more evidence with which to explain the making of 
foreign policy. The need to find new evidence, combined with the volume of 
sources still to be scrutinised in the PRO, also means that it is likely to remain 
at the centre of the attention of British historians for a time longer. It is both 
cost effective and easily accessible, more so than sources abroad, for obvious 
reasons. In a discipline in which money is a scarce resource, historical 
accounts of Britain and Europe by British researchers will remain heavily 
dependent on evidence in the PRO. 
Concurrent with this continued emphasis on evidence from the PRO, historical 
training and practicing historians need to pay greater attention to the process of 
narrativisation. As Jordanova observes: `is research primarily about the 
investigative process, through which sources are gathered and read? What 
about the process of writing, through which interpretative frameworks are 
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developed? "08 Historians are, after all, in a privileged position from which to 
discuss the limits to human understanding of the past. Further dialogue with 
philosophers of history about the sources they use and methods of historical 
reconstruction and narrativity can only be of benefit to both communities of 
researchers. The concluding chapter that follows reflects more on this point, as 
well as on the core and other wider conclusions to emerge from this thesis. 
108 Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., p. 23. 
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CONCLUSION 
Postmodern philosophies of history are bringing into sharper focus the debates 
about the ontology, epistemology and methodology of historical research. 
Their concern with the epistemological dimension of historical understanding 
is proving an especially potent challenge to the practice of history. It is, 
arguably, of even greater prescience to scholars of contemporary history, for 
whom living through the events they describe make `objectivity' even harder to 
attain. This concluding chapter aims to analyse further the core and wider 
arguments developed in this thesis. It will go on to reflect on the different 
approaches to the historiography of Britain and Europe that could have been 
employed, and on the wider points of historical and political interest that 
emerge from this study. 
The chapter is split into five sections to achieve these aims. The first restates 
the primary argument advanced above, that the historiography of Britain's 
relations with Europe has been driven by a plethora of forces. Prime amongst 
these is the different communities dominant in the field at particular times. 
From here, one can deduce all the other factors at work on interpretation, 
notably the type of study written, the level of foreign policy analysis on which 
explanations are advanced, the approach to intentions and outcomes in the 
international arena, the use of hindsight, myth-making and which sources 
dominate historical works. It is argued in this section that postmodern 
approaches to history, notably that by White, have served to heighten pre- 
existing debates about the role of interpretation and bias in historiography. 
However, they have done so with such force, and been so misunderstood, that 
the time is most propitious for a restatement of their key tenets. 
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The second section analyses the supporting argument made in the thesis, that 
three schools of writing can be identified in the historiography of British 
European policy. These schools, it is shown, have been developed in 
accordance with the definition of schools offered by Tim Dunne, ' another 
British writer who has approached historiographically a given corpus of 
literature. After analysing the nature and relevance of identifying schools of 
writing, this section continues by analysing two alternative approaches to 
historiographical analysis of the writing of British European policy that could 
be taken by future writers. The first involves taking a chronological rather than 
thematic, schools-based approach, perhaps over a shorter period of time: 1945- 
51,1951-57 or 1957-63, for example. This would have the benefit showing the 
relationship between writers in more detail and allowing sharper contrasts to 
be drawn between political scientists, contemporary historians and 
international relations scholars to be drawn out in greater depth. The second 
alternative approach would be to admit the plethora of influences at work on 
historians, but reject that they can be `schoolified'. It will be argued that while 
both containing merits, none of these alternatives offers the conceptual clarity 
or appeal to philosophers, historians and political scientists of the approach 
taken in this study. 
The third section analyses two other wider conclusions to be drawn from the 
thesis. The first is that there is much to be gained from historians being more 
'Dunne, Inventing International Society, op. cit., p. 5. 
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critical, more reflective about the nature of the sources they use and about 
those they might use. The second is that there is genuine scope for cross- 
fertilisation between historians, political scientists and policy-makers in the 
area of foreign policy projection. The rhetoric about foreign policy 
developments, it has been shown, is as important as the content of policy 
itself. This demonstrates that more attention needs to be paid in the literature 
not just to the making, but presentation of foreign policy. 
The fourth section continues the theme of wider conclusions, by considering 
three broader points of interest to emerge from this study. The first is that the 
questions one asks of history determine the questions one elicits from history. 
In this light, and this is the second point, there needs to be more attention paid 
in the teaching of research methods to the practice and writing up, not just 
theory, of research. Seeking historical evidence is one matter, interpreting it 
and constructing narratives involve quite different issues. They are, however, 
issues which methods training courses have yet to address in detail. The third 
broader point of interest to emerge from this thesis concerns Britain's 
continuing attempts to define its relationship with Europe and the wider world. 
It considers the historical evidence that has been uncovered on French, German 
and American designs for the integration process in the 1950s and 1960s. It 
allies this to consideration of one of the broader themes in European 
integration history, the centrality of the Franco-German axis to advances in 
integration. In this light, the debates about what role Britain should be playing 
in the world are less prescient that what role it can play. The final remarks in 
the fifth section highlight the appeal of this thesis to philosophers, historians 
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and political scientists, combining as it does insights of a theoretical and 
empirical nature stemming from the historiography of Britain and Europe, 
1945-73. 
1. The Symbiosis of Historiography and Postmodernism 
Grigg is not being uncontroversial when he argues: `Of course all history is 
partial, both in the sense that it never reveals the whole truth (because the 
whole truth can never be known) and in the sense that it is bound to be 
coloured by the author's own opinion'. 2 George Brown also observed that 
`facts are not always facts; facts are not always absolutes. They depend so 
much on like beauty on the eye of the beholder, on one's involvement in the 
event'. 3 ` La neutralite absolue est impossible et au demeurant peu souhaitable', 
concurs Eric Roussel. 4 Kaplan was also certain that `the phrase "the truth of 
history" is too strong; perhaps history provides us instead with "truths". Yet 
even these "truths" illuminate matters for us successfully only to the extent that 
our knowledge of the context from which the "truth" is seen enables us to 
evaluate it against other perspectives'. ' 
Earlier than all these reflections on the importance of interpretation in history, 
one finds an intensely revealing passage in Herbert Butterfield's History and 
2 Grigg, review, `Policies of Impotence', International Affairs, op. cit., p. 72. 3 Brown, In My Way, op. cit., p. 12. 4 Eric Roussel, Georges Pompidou, (Poitiers/Ligugb: Jean-Claude Lattes, 1984), p. 12. 5 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., pp. 93-4. 
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Human Relations, published in 1951. He is worth quoting at length on this: `If 
we consider the history of the historical writing that has been issued, 
generation after generation, on a given body of events, we shall generally find 
that in the early stages of this process of reconstruction the narrative which is 
produced has a primitive and simple shape. As one generation of students 
succeeds another, however... the narrative passes through certain typical stages 
until it is brought to a high and subtle form of organisation. It would be 
difficult to give names to these successive stages in the development of the 
historiography of a given theme'. 6 His words are revealing both about the core 
and secondary arguments advanced in this thesis. It is important first of all to 
reflect on his words and those of Grigg, Brown and Kaplan, in the context of 
the primary argument advanced. That is, there are many influences at work on 
the construction of historical narratives. 
The reason all these observations about the essentially contested nature of 
history are quoted here, is that they are forerunners of the postmodern position. 
White, Jenkins, Southgate, Appleby, Hunt and Jacob are not the first to 
question the notion of objectivity in history. What they have done, and what 
this thesis aims to do, is bring greater analytical content to the debate by 
assessing the role of historians in shaping the events they describe. The 
particular issue they confront, White especially, is the epistemological 
problematic in history: what kinds of knowledge can one discover about the 
past and how does one present that knowledge to others effectively? 
6 Butterfield, History and Human Relations, op. cit., p. 10. 
327 
The use and abuse of postmodernism by those who either misunderstand its 
central tenets, or who willingly distort them for political ends, make this an 
area in urgent need of attention. The reason why this assertion holds is that 
postmodernism has many useful insights to offer historians on the practice of 
history. Similarly, historians are in a privileged position from which to inform 
philosophers about the everyday issuers they confront as they attempt to 
reconstruct past events. More cross-fertilisation of ideas and practices across 
communities would be beneficial to both. 
This is where this thesis fits in. It agrees with Ankersmit's claim that: 
`Historiography truly is the postmodernist discipline par excellence, since in 
historiography reality yields to the depictions of itself so that we are left with 
mere appearances, that is, with representations mirroring an ever absent past 
reality'. 7 By clarifying the postmodern position taken by White and others, and 
applying the assumption that there is no single `neutral' account of the past to a 
given body of historical writing, this thesis has found that there is room for a 
complementary relationship to develop between historians and philosophers of 
history. 
This point has been developed in the core argument of the thesis. That is, the 
historiography of Britain's relations with Europe, 1945-73, has been influenced 
by several factors at work on the interpretation placed on events by different 
7 Ankersmit, `Reply to Professor Zagorin', op. cit., p. 294. 
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writers. While it is difficult to elicit a direct relationship between cause and 
effect in the context of influences upon historical interpretation, the thesis has 
found that one can place the influences in an order as follows. The most 
significant factor, from which most of the others flow, is sociological. 
Different communities of writers, it has been shown, place different 
interpretations on events. A dividing line was thus drawn between politicians 
and officials who dominate the orthodox school and professional historians 
who dominate the revisionist and post-revisionist schools. 
The different communities of writers bring with them different assumptions 
about how to study foreign policy and write history. That these assumptions are 
often implicit makes them none the less important. The thesis went on to 
analyse six further divisions between the schools. Second was the level of 
foreign policy analysis on which writers based their accounts, orthodox writers 
preferring structural determinants of British foreign policy, revisionists and 
post-revisionists the two lower levels. Third came a division between the 
approaches to intentions and outcomes in the foreign policy arena. Orthodox 
writers, it was argued, were generally agreed that policy makers in London 
could be held responsible for the alleged failings of British European policy 
after 1945. Revisionists and post-revisionists were more sensitive to the 
expectations placed on Britain by the Monnetists who, they assert, have 
distorted what was essentially a more constructive approach to the continent in 
content if not in tone. 
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The fourth and fifth variables, hindsight and myth-making, are two sides of the 
same coin. Professional historians have been unhappy with the tendency of 
orthodox writers to look back upon the events they describe from the vantage 
of the present. They prefer empathetic reflection based on a consideration of 
the evidence through the eyes of the individuals they study, eschewing the 
generalising tendencies of the orthodoxy. This leads directly to the use of 
sources by each school. Orthodox writers, it was argued, tend to use eye- 
witness accounts and the arguments made during live political debate about 
British European policy at the time as the basis of their accounts. Revisionists 
and post-revisionists have been more heavily reliant on primary sources, 
especially those in the PRO. This revealed much not only about the division 
between the schools, but about the practical considerations governing the 
nature and practice of contemporary history in Britain. 
The seventh and final influence on the interpretation placed on the key debates 
about British European policy was shown to stem from the type of study 
written. It was argued that it was intertwined with all the other influences, but 
deserved analysis because of what it demonstrated about the pressures 
associated with different genres of historical study. Memoirs, diaries, 
autobiographies, biographies, journalistic histories, survey histories, academic 
monographs, articles and textbooks were shown to place the author in different 
dilemmas vis-a-vis the organisation of his or her material. The different genres 
(and sub-genres with reference to biography- official, unofficial and 
`contextualised') all asked different questions of British European policy, 
dictating to a large extent the interpretations placed on events. As an 
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underpinning to the core argument that historical interpretation is influenced 
by many different factors, the last factor seems an apt way of summing up the 
differences between the schools. It shows the change in the field from 
dominance by political tracts and general surveys to academic histories. Thus, 
the core argument of the thesis was that it is crucial to understand the social 
construction of history. From here, one can deduce other influences that are 
themselves products of the social background of the writers. The secondary 
argument was that the historiographic process can best be traced by identifying 
three schools of writing in the historiography of Britain and Europe. The 
second section will now reflect on the value of this approach and what it 
reveals about the nature of the term `school of writing' in Britain. It will then 
consider two alternative approaches to the historiography of Britain's relations 
with Europe that might have been taken in this thesis. 
2. Schools of Writing in Contemporary History 
The secondary argument developed in this study has been that the writers of 
British European policy can be grouped in three schools: orthodox, revisionist 
and post-revisionist. Using these labels, coined from American Cold War 
historiography, it has been argued, is a most apt way of demonstrating the 
changes in the dominant communities of writers within the field. Butterfield's 
words, quoted above, concerning the stages in historiographical progression 
come close to the way this thesis has used the terms used by American Cold 
War scholars to denote the stages in the writing of British European policy. 
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The argument can be made that there is a strong academic tradition of 
`schoolifying' historical literature. 
This in turn raises the issue of how one defines a `school of writing'. For it has 
been argued that the strongly political overtones associated with the terms 
`orthodox', `revisionist' and `post-revisionist' are less a feature of British 
historiography. Instead, the terms have been used to designate a time-line in 
historical writing, from an orthodox interpretation, through revisionism and 
post-revisionism. Stoker argues that it is misleading to use the term `school' to 
describe competing methods of studying political science, preferring the looser 
label `approach'. The term `school', he observes, `creates an exaggerated sense 
of cohesion and order within the various sub-divisions of political science'. 8 
What, therefore, is the rationale for using the term `school' to distinguish 
between the competing bodies of writing on Britain and Europe? 
Dunne gets close to the way this study encapsulates schools of writing, by 
arguing that they contain writers linked by `family resemblances'. Schools do 
not have to contain writers adhering rigidly to a single interpretation of 
historical events. Instead, there are `aspects of their thinking which are 
interwoven and distinct'. 9 He goes on to give three defining characteristics of 
the `English school' of International Relations: a common agenda, broad 
interpretive approach and use of theory. The defining characteristics of the 
schools identified in this thesis echo all three characteristics. This definition 
8 Stoker, `Introduction', op. cit., p. 7. 9 Dunne, Inventing International Society, op. cit., p. 5. 
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echoes that of Roger Epp who argues `any identifiable intellectual tradition or 
school is known by the dilemmas it keeps. It can be understood as an extended 
answer to a set of questions which, in turn, shape it in ways that open up 
certain types of inquiry and preclude others'. 10 
The notion of `family resemblances' is also apt because human families do not 
generally consist of individuals who are all identical. Nor do family members 
all act exactly the same, with the same foibles and character traits. Hence, it 
has been argued in this thesis that debate not only occurs between writers 
belonging to different schools, but among writers within individual schools. 
The other advantage of the `family' metaphor is that it allows interpretations to 
develop across time, supporting the argument that one has to understand 
different historical interpretations in the context of social and generational 
changes in the field. What this means is that one school might dominate for 
certain periods, but even during those periods there are always certain 
individuals keeping the other school(s) alive. Revisionists and post-revisionists 
may currently be dominating the field, but there are still publications that 
expound the orthodoxy on Britain and Europe, notably those by politicians. 
Having established that the boundaries between schools are extant on 
interpretation, it is now possible to assess the reasons for breakout from one 
school to another. The most important factor is sociological. It has been shown 
how revisionist explanations, or the potential for them, were latent in many 
10 Epp, `The English School', op. cit., op. 50. 
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orthodox works. Yet it took until the end of the 1980s for them to develop into 
a distinct, competing interpretation. That the potential for this to occur existed 
decades before, suggests that schools are extant upon not just the changing 
climate of opinion and communities of writing dominant in the field, though 
they cannot be discounted. It requires an individual or individuals to break out 
decisively against the received wisdom. These lead and others, as is human 
nature, then have the confidence to follow. Subsequent writers than refine and 
reinterpret elements of the new interpretation, but they belong to this new 
`family' or school of writing. In the meantime, the earlier school continues to 
exist, but it fades into the background, a new generation fascinated with the 
new approach. 
The second reason, therefore, why one school supplants another is 
historiographical awareness. " What this means is that one school tends to 
replace another when a writer enters into the archives aware of the current state 
of the historiographical art. It is not necessarily that they are seeking evidence 
with which to debunk the conventional wisdom, but they are alert to the main 
strands of interpretation then in fashion and can therefore set up their 
interpretations explicitly against them. Such historiographical developments 
involve, notes Holub, `the recognition and praise of hitherto unnoticed 
factors'. 12 This was the case in Third Force scholarship from 1989, when 
historians, following Kent and 'young, gained the confidence to challenge the 
Cold War-dominated accounts of their predecessors. It was also true of the 
1 As the comments by Ellison in the last chapter showed. 12 Holub, Reception Theory, op. cit., p. 22. 
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post-revisionist turn in the historiography on Plan G which, for Ellison at least, 
was born out of the juxtaposition of the evidence he found in the PRO, with the 
polemics of existing interpretations. Establishing which came first in the 
historiographical shift from school to school is problematic- was it sources or 
the natural, in-built tendency for new generations to revise existing accounts? 
Kaplan observed that revisionism is not just extant upon presentism but `is 
usually identified with scholars protesting other scholars' interpretations that 
revisionists consider to be abhorrent. 13 This can be for a variety of reasons. 
Whichever it is, the second barrier between schools can be explained in terms 
of historiographical awareness and the confidence this instills in historians who 
approach fresh evidence with existing accounts at the forefront of their minds. 
The importance of this word `confidence' is perhaps in need of further 
explanation, for it leads on to the third explanation for the dominance of 
particular schools at different times. All histories are attempts by individuals to 
rationalise events about the past. In Britain, the use of theory by historians is, 
this thesis argues, implicit rather than explicit. However, underlying all schools 
are implicit assumptions about how to study the past and conceptualise the 
foreign policy process. That one school supplants another is as much due to the 
confidence groups of historians have in particular explanatory frameworks. 
When one explanatory framework comes to be seen as unable to deliver a 
comprehensive explanation of the past, it is rejected in favour of another. In 
this process the role played by `confidence' is crucial. As Viktor Shklovski 
13 Kaplan, `The Cold War and European Revisionism', op. cit., p. 143. 
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argues: `The new hegemony is... one involving the presence of features from 
other junior schools, even features (but now in a subordinate role) inherited 
from its predecessors on the throne'. 14 
Kaplan also remarked that: `Many of our interpretations of history rest on 
apparent plausibility'. 15 If one admits that the scope for revisionism and post- 
revisionism was long evident in the historiography, the barrier between schools 
might seem flimsy. Yet they are massive in terms of the leaps of faith required 
to make the transition. This leap of faith comes from historians' confidence in 
the explanatory power of new interpretations which, however small in terms of 
the period they purport to explain, can catch on and set the agenda for a period 
in which the new theory captures the minds of historians. The labelling of 
approaches against which one argues, 16 can be crucial in setting up the 
linguistic basis on which subsequent historians work. In effect, the shift 
between schools relies on the changing discursive formations used to describe 
events. The confidence one gets from allying with others in the field makes it 
more likely that revisionism on one issue will snowball into revisionism on 
other periods of history, as a new generation seeks to debunk the `old' 
discursive formation. Thus, `although the domain of a new theory may be 
smaller than the previously accepted domain of the old theory, its new domain 
is larger than the now (often) zero domain of the old theory'. '7 
14 Quoted in Holub, Reception Theoy, op. cit., p. 21. 1s Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing op. cit., p. 64. 16 Kent and Young, in 1992, coined the term `consensus' to describe the literature on the period 
1945-9 against which they set their account, in Kent and John Young, `British Policy Overseas', 
oT. cit., p. 41. 1 Kaplan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., p. 17. 
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The language used to define the boundaries between schools can itself become 
the point of reference for historians, rather then the evidence used to construct 
the interpretation. This supports the Hans Georg Gadamer's observation that 
intentions are only intelligible against `the prior existence of shared 
meaning'. '8 It was shown how the missed opportunities orthodoxy proved 
attractive to historians until the early 1990s, creeping in at the end of works 
which could plausibly have provided evidence for the revisionist interpretation. 
Fads and fashions in scholarship, the in-built dynamic of revisionism and post- 
revisionism, thus has something of an artificial air to it. Take this remark in a 
recent review by Raymond Keitch, a doctoral research student at the LSE. `My 
only criticism would be of the theoretical approach taken in the concluding 
chapter which continues the overused "train" metaphor of a "federalising" EU 
with Britain being left behind'. 19 It is apparent from this that a new generation 
of historians are still reacting against the orthodox representation of British 
European policy- it is now seen as outdated. This shows that the language used 
by historians can be as decisive in determining the plausibility and longevity of 
their accounts as the evidence on which they reconstruct the past. 
Taken together, what these three factors influencing the timing of the break-out 
from one school to another show, is the historiographic significance of 
sociological and generational changes. The historiography is not just dependent 
IB Paraphrased in Roger Epp, `The English School on the Frontier of International Relations', 
Review of International Studies 24 (1998), pp. 47-63 (p. 51). 19 Raymond Keitch, review `Britain and Europe Since 1945. By A. May', Journal of Common Market Studies 38,1 (2000), p. 183. 
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on new sources and methods of research but, crucially, on the bonding of 
particular individuals and sub-communities within the field which help 
produce these changes in the first place. But apart from the delineation of 
overarching schools of writing on the entire period 1945-73, there are two 
alternative ways in which one might analyse the historiography of Britain's 
relationship with Europe. It is to an analysis of the alternatives that this chapter 
now turns. 
The first alternative would be to take a chronological rather than thematic 
approach. That is, one could organise analysis of the schools around the 
historical themes and debates in the order in which they usually appear in the 
literature. A representative work is Young's Britain and European Unity, 
which has chapters on `The Birth of European Unity, 1929-49', ` The Schuman 
Plan, the European Army and the Treaties of Rome, 1950-7', `Macmillan, the 
Free Trade Area and the First Application, 1957-63', `Wilson's Entry Bid, 
1964-70', `Entry, Renegotiation and the Referendum, 1970-9' and so forth. 2° 
Many other historians, notably George, Greenwood, Hugo Young, Gowland 
and Turner have chronologically ordered their studies. 21 
The historiographer might therefore wish to examine the inter-relationship of 
writers to each other in a chronological context, organising one's study around 
historiographic analysis of each particular period in the history. One could then 
spend longer examining the intea-school as well as inter-school debates among 
20 Young, Britain and European Unity, op. cit., contents, p. 7. 2' George, An Awkward Partner, op. cit.; Greenwood, Britain and European Co-operation, op. 
cit.; Gowland and Turner, Reluctant Europeans, op. cit.; Young, This Blessed Plot, op. cit. 
writers. This would be of great benefit to all historians of the period under 
scrutiny, because it would surely provide more time for critical analysis of the 
differences in interpretation between historians, as well as those between 
historians and political scientists and the broader groupings of academics and 
politicians and officials. It would, in short, be attractive in terms of 
organisation, because it would reflect more accurately how historians have 
been thinking about these issues. Moreover, the chronological approach would 
be able to explore more fully the range of opinions to which this thesis, 
organised thematically around schools, has only been able to allude 
occasionally. 
The second alternative approach to the historiography of Britain and Europe, 
1945-73, would be to ignore the process of schoolification altogether. That is, 
one could examine the core argument about the multiple influences at work on 
historians yet define no schools at all. The intrinsic individuality of historical 
reconstruction constitutes a strong case against any attempt to delineate 
schools of writing in history. Identifying a pattern of interpretation in 
contemporary history is arguably even more hazardous. Our memory of 
contemporary historical events shapes contemporary attitudes and is all the 
time shaped by them in a continuous cycle of interpretation and re- 
interpretation. The interaction of the historian with contemporary history is 
therefore even more deeply defined by what Kaplan describes as `the 
relationship of the observer to the observed'. 22 An extreme existentialist 
22 Ibid., preface, pp. 11-2. 
interpretation has it not just that historical understanding is extant upon class 
or social position, but that `form is imposed by the human mind on external 
reality, that we play self-imposed roles in the world, and that reality is what we 
make it, if not an outright fiction'. 23 In this light, it might be argued, the 
positioning of one writer next to another, and in opposition to others, is to 
artificially simplify the multi-layered and complex texts they have produced. 
This thesis has uncovered evidence of writing that is hard to fit into any of the 
schools according to which it suggests we analyse this corpus of writing. 
The writers it is hard to locate in any one school tend to be those who offer the 
most eclectic interpretations. One is Mark Deavin, who it is not possible to 
locate in any of the schools identified in this study. His approach to 
Macmillan's application suggests that it stemmed from a strong commitment to 
supranational ism and `world government', in the context of a Communist-style 
European integration movement `to reshape the wider international order on 
the part of a homogenous transatlantic and financial elite'. 24 His linkage 
between Macmillan's pro-planning goals, Communist sympathies and free- 
masonry, not to mention his consistent allusions to Macmillan's sexual 
preference as underpinning all this, make this a very hard thesis to locate in the 
framework of this study. 25 Revisionist accounts using primary sources are not 
nearly so convinced, on the theoretical level, that Macmillan controlled policy 
zs Ibid., p. 3. 24 Deavin, `Harold Macmillan', op. cit., p. 18, p. 13. 25 Ibid., pp. 19-81, p. 100_ What is interesting is that it is the opposite argument of Jay who 
argues the Marxist line, in Change and Fortune, op. cit., pp. 425-7, that the EEC was a capitalist 
club designed to meet the needs of transnational financial capital at the expense of labour. See 
also Sanders, Losing an Empire, op. cit., p. 151. 
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so tightly, or, on an interpretative level, that it was his Communism which 
drove forward British ]European policy from 1957. 
There are also writers who are difficult to locate in schools because of their 
inconsistency across issues. Kaiser places a post-revisionist interpretation on 
Plan G. In some debates in British European policy however, notably on 
Bevin's concept of the Third Force, he presents a revisionist account. On 
others, such as Macmillan's application to join the EEC, he presents a neo- 
orthodox view. 26 On specific issues, notably Baylis on the Third Force, writers 
have changed their interpretations across time. Does this make him a post- 
revisionist or just confused? 27 Likewise, Rothwell, Bullock and other 
`waverers' hinted at Bevin's Third Force aspirations but refused to go further. 
Narrative reconstruction of historical events is, by its very nature, heavily 
dependent on the political climate of opinion and the mental processes of 
reconstruction in the minds of the individual historians. 
The sympathy which one has for the idea of putting writers into schools 
depends on one's definition of a `school'. If, like Beloff, one associates schools 
with particular institutions, the secondary argument developed in this thesis- 
26 On Plan G, see Using Europe. op. cit., pp. 61-87. On the Third Force see pp. 1-14. On the first 
application Kaiser's view is that Macmillan pursued a `dual appeasement strategy', attempting 
to join to appease Washington and the Conservative Party, see pp. 108-73. In this sense he 
echoes the essentially ` negative' view of the application put out by orthodox writers. 27 John Baylis, `Britain and the Dunkirk Treaty: The Origins of NATO', in Journal of Strategic 
Studies, 5,2 (1982), pp. 236-47; John Baylis, `Britain, the Brussels Pact and the Continental 
Commitment', International Affairs, 60,4 (1984), pp. 615-29. John Baylis, The Diplomacy of 
Praarnsm Britain and the Formation of NATO. 1942-49 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1993). 
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that schools must principally be defined in terms of interpretation not 
approaches to the study of history- will have had only limited appeal. 28 One 
also has to confront the issue of cohesion, which has a precedent in the debate 
between Kimball and Gaddis in the United States. Kimball asserted that to 
`lump' writers together in schools `suggests that [Gaddis] sees a high degree of 
unity' among them, which is not borne out by the evidence of substantial 
disagreements among writers, particularly of the New Left. 29 Taking the 
eclecticism of academic literature together with the supposed foundations of 
schools of writing, how can one schoolify British historians? 
Gaddis responded to Kimball thus: `sophistication does not... necessitate 
limiting ourselves to a single "lump" in our historiographical cup of tea'. 30 The 
secondary argument of this thesis is that, despite important exceptions and in 
the face of these objections, schools of writing on British European policy 
1945-73 can be identified. It has been argued that British revisionism has not 
been as politically charged as its American counterpart, nor are the schools 
necessarily reliant on institutional afliation. 3 ' Broad similarities across 
interpretation are sufficient to locate some writers in the orthodox school, 
others in the revisionist school and others in the post-revisionist school. Even 
the `waverers' such as Bullock implicitly come down on one side of the debate 
25 He railed, in interview, against trying to schoolify this literature, partly because he thought 
British scholarship immune from the shared outlooks that strong institutional ties can instill in 
historians. Interview evidence, 15 April, 1998. To take one example, political scientists at the 
LSE have developed the notion of `third-way' politics which has had such an impact on Tony 
Blair. See Webster, ` Harnessing the Rampant Theory', op. cit. 29 Gardner, Kaplan, Kimball and Kuniholm, `Responses', op. cit., p. 198. 30 Gaddis, `The Corporatist Synthesis', op. cit., p. 362. 31 Though it does make the point that historians associated with Oxford and LSE have been at 
the forefront of revisionism. 
342 
or the other by treating particular sources of evidence in a particular way, or by 
nuances of language, or by their general perceptions of the making of British 
foreign policy. 
The writers who are hard to locate in any school serve to highlight the vibrancy 
of the discipline of contemporary history in Britain. This reinforces the 
theoretical emphasis placed in the thesis on the concept of individual 
interpretation. That one might choose not to schoolify the writers in this field 
may still leave the core argument of this thesis intact. However, it has been 
shown that, so strong is the case for analysing the social construction of 
history, there is also a case for identifying schools of writing. Depending on 
how one defines a `school', one might arrange the thesis differently to how it 
has been arranged here. Since the aim of this study has been to show the 
general interpretative links among writers and historians of British European 
policy, some of the detailed debate among writers on the minutiae of policy 
has necessarily been overlooked. Analytical clarity demanded just such an 
approach, but that is not to say there are no other ways to approach this body of 
literature historiographically, as has been demonstrated by consideration of the 
two alternatives explored in this section. It is now necessary to move on from 
discussion of schools of writing, to explore two other broader conclusions to 
emerge from this thesis. Both show the relevance of this thesis not only to 
philosophers of history but to historians, political scientists and policy-makers 
alike. 
3. Broader Conclusions to Emerge from the Thesis 
The introductory chapter to this study analysed the value of historiography in 
theoretical and empirical terms. In the latter context, it argued, 
historiographical analysis of a given body of literature is extremely useful to 
practitioners in the field. First, it elucidates the array of interpretations that 
have been placed on historical events. Second, it highlights avenues down 
which they might wish to travel in the future to develop historical and political 
insights into a given field of inquiry. The thesis has dealt mainly with the first 
of these findings, providing a comprehensive set of data for historians and 
political scientists- as well as philosophers of history- on the range of 
interpretations placed on the historical record. It is useful now to consider the 
importance of this thesis in the more traditional sense. For it has uncovered 
two new pieces of evidence which historians and political scientists may be 
able to use to refine their understanding of contemporary history and political 
science. 
The first is that historians could be far more reflective about the sources they 
use. That there is so little methodological reflection in the accounts analysed in 
this thesis suggests either that historians do not feel it necessary, or that they 
have little awareness of the ontology, epistemology and methodology of the 
research they undertake. If the first explanation holds, that they smugly do not 
think it necessary to be reflective, then this is a comment on the Eltonian 
tradition of historical research in Britain which assumes that `a philosophic 
concern with such problems as the reality of historical knowledge or the nature 
of historical thought only hinders the practice of history'. 32 One suspects that 
they could also be reacting against the alleged `nihilism' of postmodernism 
which undermines the concept of `doing historical research'. In the hands of 
the Holocaust revisionists' approach to postmodernism, it can become a 
dangerous device for propaganda. One fears, if Evans' reaction is symptomatic, 
that this kind of distortion of White's position has served to heighten the 
barriers between historians and critical theorists rather than promote dialogue 
between them. 
However, Evans admitted that: `drawing up the disciplinary drawbridge has 
never been a good idea for historians'. 33 The second explanation, that 
historians are methodologically malnourished, might therefore be the more 
persuasive explanation for the lack of theoretical reflection in their work. What 
this implies is that, while they are aware of the interpretative content of history, 
they are less attuned to the opportunities and constraints of working with 
primary sources and, just as important, secondary texts. This is of absolutely 
crucial importance because it serves as a reminder that, just as we cannot treat 
secondary texts as primary sources, nor can we assume that primary sources 
are any less positioned. 
Take the sources in the PRO on which so much British historical research is 
conducted. They are intrinsically positioned for three reasons: they have gone 
through a long process of weeding before they reach the shelves at Kew. 
32 Elton, The Practice of History, op. cit., preface, p. 7. 33 Evans, In Defence of History, op. cit., p. 9. 
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`Archivists have often weeded out records they consider unimportant, while 
retaining those they consider of lasting value'. But `Documents which seem 
worthless to one age, and hence ripe for the shredder, can seem extremely 
valuable to another'. 34 There is the additional point, notes Nicholas Cox, that 
`what they contain had a particular significance at the time it was written, and 
in the circumstances of the time'. They cannot for that reason be taken as 
resembling `the truth' about events. 35 Second, it is officials, government 
employees, who choose which survive and which are shredded. Finally, even 
the records that make it to the PRO contain gaps arising from files being `lost' 
and in terms of specific sentences or words or names being cut out for 
`security' reasons. 
The suggestion is, that primary sources are as `positioned' as secondary 
sources. To cling to them as the foundation of historical knowledge, Jenkins 
argues, `commits the fallacy of taking just one part of the technical 
instrumentation of history (source investigation etc. ) as if it constituted its 
"essence". It is as if the complicated epistemological, methodological, 
ideological, problematical positionings of historical representation could be 
solved "technically"'. 36 Ironically it is Evans, a virulent critic of 
postmodernism, who notes that the process of archival weeding `could reflect a 
view that many historians would now find outmoded, a view which considered 
34 Evans, In Defence of History. op. cit., p. 87. See also Jenkins, On 'What is NNstory? ', op. cit., 
17. 
Nicholas Cox, 'Public Records', in Seldon (ed. ), Contemporary History, op. cit., pp. 70-88 
73). 
Jenkins, 'Introduction', op. cit., p. 13. 
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"history" only as the history of the elites'. 37 From the findings in this thesis, 
historians working on Britain's relations with Europe presumably do not find 
such a view `outmoded', content as they have generally been to analyse the 
official version of events put into the PRO by employees of the very people 
whose legacy they are examining. 38 As Lucas observed in 1997: ` The strength 
of the discipline [of contemporary history] in Britain continues to lie in studies 
of official policy-making and implementation. The surge in the USA of studies 
on the cultural dimension of foreign policy and on the cultural relationship 
between the state and private sector has not been replicated here'. 39 
The conclusions one can draw from this study about the methods of historical 
research in Britain thus all point in a similar direction. Since there is 
apparently widespread acceptance that archives are positioned, historians need 
to reflect on the limitations imposed on our historical understanding by the 
fragmentary and necessarily tainted evidence of the past which survives to us 
in oral and documentary form. There is real value to be gained from historians 
telling their readers where they have found gaps in the record because it serves 
as a reminder that `accidents' are as much a part of history as rational actions. 
Such 
`accidents' affect the making of policy, its implementation and 
subsequent reconstruction of it, especially in the light of evidence that months' 
worth of archives have, for whatever reason, not made it to the PRO because 
37 Evans, In Defence of History, op. cit., p. 87. 39 This is interesting for the further reason that it sheds light on the financial and time constraints 
on historical research in Britain, a reminder that research methods courses have very little to say 
about the practicalities of choosing a research design. 39 Lucas, review, `Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century. By John W. Young', 
Contemporary British History, op. cit., p. 126. 
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they have been ` lost' or damaged in some way. It is useful to quote Kaplan on 
this: `we can never acquire all the information necessary to arrive at a 
conclusion, in particular information contained within the privacy of a 
decision-maker's mind, we can never know that we have a genuine 
explanation; we can only know that we have something that meets some of the 
criteria of an explanation and some degree of confidence that it is not an 
artifact' 
. 
40 Historians are in a privileged position to reveal the practical 
constraints on human understanding of the past. It is to be hoped that they will 
engage more critically with their material, though the time factor on the 
writing of academic histories cannot be overlooked as a barrier to such 
reflection. 
Of particular interest has also been the discovery in this thesis that historians in 
Britain could make far more use of media sources which are, arguably, the first 
draft of history. The Economist- though not a source to be used uncritically- 
has been shown to offer deeply revealing insights into the British foreign 
policy process. That only a few historians use it as a source of history suggests 
again the dominance of the official record over historical research in Britain. 
Yet, interested as they are in the workings of the Whitehall machine, the 
Economist and other such establishment publications have often provided tacit 
support for the revisionist position, as its use by writers such as Young 
demonstrates. It also gives historians the opportunity to assess the European 
and American perspectives on events earlier in the historiographic process than 
40 KaPlan, On Historical and Political Knowing, op. cit., pp. 67-8. 
they are generally brought in. Use of such media sources would add context 
and balance to studies based essentially on PRO sources. 
The second wider conclusion to emerge from this study operates at the 
intersection of history and political science. It has been found that, in the field 
of foreign policy making, rhetoric can be as important as reality in determining 
foreign policy outcomes. That is, the different interpretations that have been 
placed on British foreign policy show the need for policy-makers to be 
absolutely clear about their intentions for policy, which requires attention to 
the tone of policy pronouncements as well as content. Kaplan captured the 
complexity of projecting foreign policy in a fluid international environment: 
`The policy of a state may be related to constraints imposed by the nature of 
the international system, constraints imposed by technology and weapons 
systems, constraints imposed by the character of the domestic political system, 
constraints imposed by the bargaining conditions that make up the 
governments, constraints imposed by regime requirements, constraints imposed 
by personal relations, friendship or personality, constraints imposed by purely 
accidental factors or the particular order within which information is 
received'. 41 Smith and Smith have more recently been emphasising that it is 
not only the formulation but presentation of policy that determines outcomes: 
`such policies as are decided must be implemented in the international 
context... a setting characterised by multilateralism, transnationalism and 
interdependence'. 42 
41 Kaplan, On Historical and political Knowing, op. cit., p. 68. 42 Smith and Smith, `The Analytical Background', op. cit., p. 21. 
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This suggests that the process of foreign policy implementation is crucial to 
one's perception of its content, perhaps more than the content itself. This is 
especially true of the language used to describe a policy innovation and the 
diplomacy surrounding its projection in the international arena. These, it 
appears, can be critical determinants of the perception of a state's foreign 
policy. If one accept the findings of revisionists and post-revisionists, that 
British European policy was more constructive at both the planning and 
implementation stages than it later appeared when announced, it can be argued 
that it is not sufficient to develop a constructive policy in private, one must be 
seen to have a constructive policy in public. Of course, one might argue, 
foreign policy will always be interpreted differently by different people 
according to their ideology, expectations and country of origin. The 
constructive elements can conveniently be forgotten to suit a particular 
ideology. This is not in dispute. 
What is, is the practical void that exists between the making and projection of 
foreign policy, what Michael Smith refers to as `the control of policy in 
complex settings'. 43 What one discovers, according to this view, is that `the 
implementation process determines foreign policy'. 44 This thesis reinforces this 
argument that accounts of the making of British foreign policy need to pay 
more attention not just to domestic constraints, the permeation of the British 
foreign policy process by governmental and non-governmental interests. They 
43 Smith, `Foreign Policy Implementation. Edited by Steve Smith and Michael Clarke', Journal 
Of Common Market Studies, op. cit., p. 85. 44 Smith and Clarke, quoted in ibid. 
need to be more aware of the language of diplomacy, because it is through 
policy statements that British foreign policy is received, its direction perceived 
and later remembered in historical accounts. That British European policy was 
consistently perceived as contrary to the interests of the Six suggests that any 
proposal shorn of supranationalism would have been met with suspicion by the 
Monnetists. However, greater attention to the tone of pronouncements may 
have meant British policy receiving a more sympathetic hearing than it did 
then and does now. 
It can thus be seen that this thesis has conclusions to offer not just philosophers 
of history, but historians and political scientists working in the areas of British 
and European history and on foreign policy-making. The study combines 
reflectivism, intepretationism and philosophical concerns about the nature and 
practice of contemporary history in Britain, with more traditional concerns of 
historical theses: the uncovering of new empirical evidence. What both these 
broader conclusions demonstrate is the essential vitality of academic study and 
the potential appeal it has for the policy-making elite. The findings on the 
language of diplomacy also open potentially fruitful avenues for dialogue 
between academics and policy-makers. This chapter will now turn away from 
conclusions and to three broader points of interest to emerge from this thesis. 
4. Broader Points of Interest to Emerge from the Thesis 
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This chapter has so far analysed the core and secondary conclusions one can 
take from this study. What this section will do is take a step back and reflect on 
three other issues of interest that flow from it. The first concerns the 
relationship that has been found to exist between the type of study written and 
the interpretations historians offer about the past. In this light, more research 
needs to be carried out into the editorial demands, practices and policies of 
publishing houses, for they surely have an impact on the direction in which 
historians take their studies. The second point concerns the over-emphasis that 
has come to be placed in Britain and North America on possessing a method of 
study. What room, it is asked, does this leave for a thorough consideration by 
scholars of the process of narrative reconstruction? The third point moves into 
the empirical arena, addressing the issues raised by historians of Britain and 
Europe about Britain's role in the world. It argues that debates about `decline' 
can to some extent be seen to miss the real issue. That is, whatever Britain's 
economic or political standing, the history of European integration suggests 
that neither the Americans, French or Germans will let Britain fatally hinder 
the process of integration on the continent. Britain will soon have to decide 
whether it wants to remain in the second speed pf the integration process. 
Whether those in the first want Britain to join them, is quite another matter. 
This thesis has shown the strong relationship between questions and answers in 
history. This is seen by analysing the parallel relationship between the type of 
study written and the interpretation placed on historical events. Eero Loone 
puts his views on the matter thus: `The distinguishing feature of scientific 
historiography... is the putting by the historian of his own questions on the 
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subject of his research, and not mere acceptance of the questions implicit in his 
manuscript sources... The historian then draws conclusions from his answers to 
these questions (and not from the sources), these answers being cased on facts 
for which the sources provide evidence'. 45 This conclusion itself turns on the 
observation that the study one writes is a strong dictator of the interpretation 
one places on historical events. 
The reason for this is that writing different studies means asking different 
question of the past. Critical biographers are clearly asking different questions 
from official biographers. General studies of Britain's global relations since 
1945 have less time to devote to European integration than texts surveying just 
the Western European dimension of Britain's foreign affairs. The development 
of Britain and Europe as an area of academic inquiry prompted a whole new 
set of questions to be asked of precisely this dimension. Yet even leading 
revisionists have had to dilute their explanations when they come to write 
textbooks. 46 Thus, the date of writing, sources, range of interviews used are all 
important determinants of interpretation. But none of them override the finding 
that it is ultimately the narrative use to which those are put that shape one's 
ultimate interpretation of events. 
This can be seen by turning to the second issue under the heading of `questions 
and answers': closure. Where one begins and ends the historical story, and 
therefore the emphasis placed on different events within the narrative 
es Quoted in Callinicos, Theories and Narratives, op. cit., p. 77. 46 Shown by the comparison between Young's articles and textbook on Britain and Europe. 
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framework, is crucial in determining interpretation. It is possible to interpret 
the same document in a number of ways, depending on the stress one places on 
words and phrases contained in it and the importance one assigns particular 
periods in the development of policy. Hence the numerous examples given in 
the thesis of historians examining the same theme in the same period using the 
same sources and yet placing competing interpretations on events. 47 
There is more work to be done on the pressures on interpretation stemming 
from the genre of study one writes. There is also research to be carried out into 
the agendas and editorial policies of publishing houses in determining the 
direction of historical inquiry. It seems harder to gain publishing contracts with 
the major publishing houses such as Macmillan, Longman and Routledge for 
analysis of short periods- two or three years- in the history. Articles on these 
periods tend to be published in specialist journals. Is this to the detriment of 
balanced historical understanding, when politicians and officials, it has been 
found, gain relatively easy access to publishing deals, 48 yet rarely offer as many 
insights into the inner workings of administrations as are revealed later by the 
documents released under the Thirty Year Rule? History for public 
consumption, it seems, is simply not as easy to digest, which perhaps tells us 
much about the British historical consciousness and the separation of academic 
47 See the example of Kane compared to Ellison, Schaad and Kaiser and the revisionists on Plan 
G, discussed in the previous chapter. 48 Take the example of Harold Wilson's two volumes of memoirs, A Prime Minister 
Remembers op. cit., and The Labour Government. It must surely be more than a coincidence 
that these tepid accounts, even by politicians' standards, were published by a known associate of 
Wilson, George Weidenfeld's publishing house, Weidenfeld and Nicolson. See George 
Weidenfeld, Remembering My Good Friends: An Autobioarapby (London: HarperCollins, 
1985). On pp. 328-61 he outlines his long association with Wilson. 
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history from the type of history fed to the public on television and in the press. 
The second point of interest to emerge from this study is that there is a gap 
between the practice of research and narrating one's findings. Learning how to 
research, by taking methods courses at university, for example, is one thing. 
One will then be able to construct a research design, choose which sources are 
to form the basis of the research and decide who will be interviewed. Together, 
this might constitute a chapter at the beginning of one's thesis, or monograph, 
explaining for the reader how the research was undertaken. What this thesis 
has shown, however, is the fundamental importance to historical research 
played by the issue of time and money. What a concern with method overlooks 
is the individual historian's input to the making of history. It is the practice of 
history which is actually the more interesting point of departure, the financial 
and strategic implications of examining certain issues and periods over others. 
The focus of methods courses also seems to be on the need to appear 
scientific, at the expense of reflecting on the processes by which research 
findings are translated into texts. For it is in this domain that some of the most 
interesting interpretative developments occur. Historiography, because of its 
symbiotic relationship with postmodernism, is in a privileged position to 
address the additional questions left unexplored by research methods courses. 
The first concerns the individual historian: how does he or she reconstruct the 
chronicle of facts obtained from the morass of sources available? It is one thing 
to assemble historical data, quite another to envisage how all the individuals 
were interacting with each other over time, how different departments and 
organisations came to decide on particular stances on issues and, finally, how 
policy emerged from the plethora of individuals, departments, institutions, 
organisations and pressure groups involved in the decision-making network. 
The issue of closure also reappears here. Where one begins and ends historical 
stories can, it has been shown, influence interpretation. So can giving some 
events more interpretative weight than others. These are rarely associated with 
designs or methods, but occur through the process of narrativisation itself. 
It is common to stress the value of possessing a `method' in the social sciences 
because it shows one's commitment to the search for objective facts about 
human interaction, giving an empirical base and therefore authority to one's 
research. But this equation of `method' with `science' misses the intrinsically 
human process of carrying out research. Behind the rhetoric of `method' and 
`design' lies the process of academic research which is driven by pragmatic 
concerns of time, money and career-building. The RAE, doctoral research 
deadlines and other such time constraints have, for example, had a massive 
impact on the use made by revisionist and post-revisionist historians of the 
PRO. Thus, while they have apparently been guided by the institutionalist 
perspective on how to construct causal chains of events over time, they have 
also been making intensely personal, exigent appraisals of what makes a viable 
three-year research project that will result in publications. The inputs to 
scholarship from interpretation and sources of funding and publishing are ones 
that need addressing if the study of history is to take full advantage of 
postmodern reflections on the nature and practice of history. Historians need 
also to open up dialogue with their colleagues in psychology and anthropology, 
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if they are to understand better the multifarious influences at work on the 
construction of narratives. 
The third broader point of interest to emerge from this thesis concerns Britain's 
struggle to define a place for itself in the post-war world. The interpretation of 
British European policy put forward by the orthodox school, crystallised 
around the problems Britain was encountering economically and strategically 
in the first three decades after the Second World War. Arguing that Britain 
`missed opportunities' to lead European integration was, for British if not 
Monnetist commentators, another way of asserting that Britain could be a 
world power if only it tried harder. The revisionist challenge centred on the 
fundamental inconsistencies in this position. It did not simply take the 
orthodoxy to task for its misrepresentation of the content of British European 
policy. Revisionists also countered the suggestion that Britain could have led 
the integration process at all. It is this latter point that is of interest in this 
section. 
By challenging the assumption that Britain was in a position to lead European 
integration after the war, revisionists pose a double threat to the rhetoric of 
post-war British foreign policy. First, they undermine the assumption that 
Britain has had a privileged or `special relationship' with the United States. 
While this may have held at certain moments, Washington, they argue, has 
consistently preferred that Britain join the Europeans in their integrative 
efforts. The tacit, and occasionally not so tacit, 49 sponsorship of European 
integration by the Americans, and their enthusiasm for Britain to be involved 
are well known to historians of Britain and Europe. How can the relationship 
be portrayed as `special' when the Americans have spent at least as much time 
cultivating links with Paris and Bonn? 
The second observation concerns Britain's relationship with its European 
partners. Revisionists assert that British involvement in the process of 
integration was not considered by many leading players in the United States 
and Western Europe as necessary to the success of the various schemes 
undertaken in the 1950s. With the benefit of hindsight, Britain's confidence in 
the strength of the Empire and the `special relationship' now seems 
anachronistic. At the time, however, those in London can hardly be held 
responsible for not predicting the course of future events. What is perhaps 
more culpable is their persistent inability to learn from history, their 
underestimation of the depth of feeling in Paris and Bonn about the need for 
integration as a means of securing peace in Europe. 
Revisionist findings on the centrality of the Paris-Bonn axis to the pace and 
direction of European integration support broader arguments made in the field 
of European studies. Simon Bulmer and William Paterson have, for example, 
argued that `Major policy initiatives stand little chance of acceptance if they 
49 John Foster Dulles' threat in 1953 of an `agonising reappraisal' of American foreign policy 
should the Europeans not show willingness to shoulder more of the defence burden, is perhaps 
the most memorable example. 
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they are not acceptable to France or Germany'. 50 If one assesses the major 
advances in integration since the war, this argument seems persuasive. The 
Schuman Plan, the (failed) EDC, The Rome Treaty, the Common Agricultural 
Policy, the SEA, the Maastricht Treaty have all been stimulated in no small 
part by Franco-German initiatives, and implemented on the basis of a 
complicated series of trade-offs between the two countries. 
What role could Britain have played in European integration, therefore 
becomes a more important question than what role should it have played? Even 
if one does not subscribe to the theory that Britain was being intentionally 
excluded from integrative endeavours, there remains the argument that British 
membership of the club of the Six was not a priority for Monnet, Schuman or 
their successors. If Britain's ability to act on the world stage was being heavily 
constrained by American, French and German plans for Europe, can the British 
not rightly feel a little harshly done by Europe? Only if one also accepts that 
leading policy-makers wanted a European role for Britain. That many of them 
seem to have been `bored' with integration by the mid-1950s, suggests they 
were happier attempting to sit at the intersection of all three of Churchill's 
`circles' of influence, rather than undertake a radical reassessment of Britain's 
place in the world after 1945. 
With this in mind, there is scope to be sceptical about the process of 
integration in Europe from a British viewpoint. What also comes through 
30 Simon Bulmer and William Paterson, The Federal Republic of Germany and the European 
Community (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1987), p. 14. 
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strongly in orthodox and revisionist accounts, however, is the sense that, 
because the integration process is strongly shaped by individuals, communities 
and transnational policy networks, Britain has little to fear from closer co- 
operation with the continent. Hazy notions of `identity', `sovereignty', of 
managing `our own affairs', and controlling `our destiny', 51 are but convenient 
rhetorical devices to avoid a serious debate about Britain's relationship to 
Europe and the wider world. When one examines closely the institutional 
configuration of the EU, the dispersal of power within it and the strategic 
direction provided by the member states, one finds a Union far removed from 
how the British people have been conditioned to perceive it. 
In sum, the rhetoric about `Europe' has overridden the reality. The constructive 
advances in British European policy have been overlooked in favour of debates 
about why Britain is `awkward', why Britain is in `decline', why the British 
economy lags behind the rest of the world. British public and policy-makers 
find themselves unable to let go of an imperial past. Yet they refuse to engage 
in serious debate about what this implies for the future of British foreign 
policy. Put in the historical perspective adopted in this thesis, foreign policy 
emerges as an incremental, almost haphazard process in which planning is 
almost entirely overridden by the exigencies of handling day to day, routine 
business. The very language used in the debate about Britain's place in the 
wider world, concentrating on the rights and wrongs of British policy-makers, 
suggests that the British have yet to fully grasp the implications of an 
31 The latter two terms are taken from Nicholas Ridley, My Style of Government: The Thatcher 
Years (London: Hutchinson, 1991), p. 136. 
interdependent global political economy. The third broader point of interest in 
the thesis is, therefore, that ` integration' and `world influence' are not mutually 
exclusive concepts. Indeed, entering into the former can be an aid to achieving 
the latter. If Britain does decide it wants a European future, policy-makers 
could do worse than learning from the past in this respect. 
5. Final Remarks 
Ankersmit has argued that `The wild, greedy, and uncontrolled digging into the 
past, inspired by the desire to discover a past reality and reconstruct it 
scientifically, is no longer the historian's unquestioned task. We would do 
better to examine the result of a hundred and fifty years' digging more 
attentively and ask ourselves more often what all this adds up to'. 52 Being alert 
to the crucial role language and symbolism plays in human interaction is not 
merely a theoretical observation. It is a vital consideration for anyone wishing 
to understand better the nature of historical and political events and subsequent 
interpretations of them. 
Accepting this forces postmodern reflection on the conduct of human relations 
to the fore. It raises the a priori significance of historiography, the study of the 
historians who pen the accounts which still fascinate us, still stimulate us, and 
whose interpretations in time come to represent history itself. Historiography 
52 Ankersmit, `Historiography and Postmodernism', op. cit., p. 152. 
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and postmodernism are locked in a symbiotic relationship based on critical 
reflection of the interpretative content of narrative reconstruction. They both 
involve what Carl Becker called `the survey of imagination'. 53 It is not merely 
a process of uncovering documentary, ideological or intellectual constraints for 
the sake of it. For Jordanova, `There is no such thing as unbiased history, but 
there is such a thing as balanced, "self-aware" history.. [hence] the importance 
of knowing an author's position'. 54 More dialogue between historians and 
philosophers would be of great benefit to both disciplines. The same might be 
said of the relationship between historians and political scientists. 55 
The aim of this study has been to promote dialogue between historians and 
postmodernists on the nature of historical understanding, an aim which even 
White `has not accomplished'. It has succeeded by clarifying White's 
thinking on the existence of `facts' about the past and by identifying the 
various communities of writers who have driven forward the historiography of 
British European policy. This has been used as the basis from to discuss their 
shared outlooks on events, methods and sources. It has shown how the 
identification of schools of writing alerts us to the positioned nature of all 
historiographic representations of the past. It is not that `facts' about the past 
do not exist, but that it is always the individual historian who has to collate 
those facts into a composite whole. This process necessarily takes us into the 
53 Quoted in Smith, Carl Becker, op. cit., p. 211. 54 Jordanova, History in Practice, op. cit., preliminaries, p. 14. 
ss Kavanagh, ` Why Political Science Needs History', op, cit. 56 Lustick, ` History, Historiography and Political Science', op. cit., p. 613. 
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realms of the psychology of historians, the founding assumption of White's 
memorable observation that: `one of the things one learns from the study of 
history is that such study is never innocent'. 51 It is hoped that this thesis buries 
once and for all Elton's mischievous verdict on historiography that `All these 
booklets and pamphlets which treat historical problems by collecting extracts 
from historians writing about them give off a clear light only when a match is 
put to them'. 58 
57 White, The Content of the Form, op. cit., p. 82. 59 $Iton, The Practice of History, op. cit., p. 154. 
APPENDIX 
The Federal Union and related organisations have had a wide-ranging impact 
in Britain, Western Europe and the United States. There are two ways of 
defining its influence. The first is to draw up a list of key participants and 
activists from its inception in 1939. This suffers from the obvious failing that 
some change opinion over time, and apart from the kernel of long-standing 
federalists many names come and go, their precise outlook on the key question 
of federalism in Europe unclear. 
A more appropriate way of representing the transnational impact of Federal 
Union is to trace its association with, and influence on, other key organs of 
federalism. This can be used to reinforce the argument advanced in this study, 
that orthodox historiography is strongly rooted in the federalist thinking of the 
British Monnetists, who had, and continue to have, mulitfarious political, 
economic, social and journalistic contacts around the world. Thus the 
pervasiveness of the missed opportunities critique of British European policy. 
Using Mayne and Pinder's history of the pressure group the diagram below 
charts this web of relationships. ' 
1 Mayne and Pinder, Federal Union. op. cit. 
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